The Royal Institute of Philosophy has been sponsoring conferences in alter nate years since 1969. These have from the start been intended to be of interest to persons who are not philosophers by profession. They have mainly focused on interdisciplinary areas such as the philosophies of psychology, education and the social sciences. The volumes arising from these conferences have included discussions between philosophers and distinguished practitioners of other disciplines relevant to the chosen topic. Beginning with the 1979 conference on 'Law, Morality and Rights' and the 1981 conference on 'Space, Time and Causality' these volumes are now constituted as a series. It is hoped that this series will contribute to advancing philosophical understanding at the frontiers of philosophy and areas of interest to non-philosophers. It is hoped that it will do so by writing which reduces technicalities as much as the subject-matter permits. In this way the series is intended to demonstrate that philosophy can be clear and worthwhile in itself and at the same time relevant to the interests of lay people."

Foundations of Bayesianism is an authoritative collection of papers addressing the key challenges that face the Bayesian interpretation of probability today.
Some of these papers seek to clarify the relationships between Bayesian, causal and logical reasoning. Others consider the application of Bayesianism to artificial intelligence, decision theory, statistics and the philosophy of science and mathematics. The volume includes important criticisms of Bayesian reasoning and also gives an insight into some of the points of disagreement amongst advocates of the Bayesian approach. The upshot is a plethora of new problems and directions for Bayesians to pursue.

The book will be of interest to graduate students or researchers who wish to learn more about Bayesianism than can be provided by introductory textbooks to the subject. Those involved with the applications of Bayesian reasoning will find essential discussion on the validity of Bayesianism and its limits, while philosophers and others interested in pure reasoning will find new ideas on normativity and the logic of belief.

In the course of more than twenty works François Laruelle has developed one of the most singular and unique ways of thinking within contemporary philosophy. This volume develops the style of his late work, which has sought to combine the idioms of diverse areas (from the language of quantum mechanics to theology, messianism and Gnosticism) to create non-standard philosophical fictions which further articulate his thinking of radical immanence in relation to wide-ranging themes and concerns. The focus here is a reassessment of his attempt to rethink what it means to be human. Much of that work has taken place through an engagement with science, politics and religion, but now we see Laruelle confronting the challenge of ecology for his kind of humanism (which he would call a 'non-humanism', meaning a non-standard humanism). This challenge is one of thinking of the ethical demands of other entities within a general ecology. Namely the lives of plants and other vegetation alongside that of animals. Dealing with the intersections between science and philosophy in current French thought, this book is of particular interest to those concerned with the philosophical innovation and renewal of ecological thought that have influenced ecological theory. The first English translation of a key work from this highly original experimental philosopher, it will surely help cement his place in the firmament of avant-garde French thinkers, from Derrida and Deleuze to Badiou.

Scientism: The New Orthodoxy is a comprehensive philosophical overview of the question of scientism, discussing the role and place of science in the humanities, religion, and the social sciences. Clarifying and defining the key terms in play in discussions of scientism, this collection identifies the dimensions that differentiate science from scientism. Leading scholars appraise the means available to science, covering the impact of the neurosciences and the new challenges it presents for the law and the self. Illustrating the effect of scientism on the social sciences, and the humanities, Scientism: the New Orthodoxy addresses what science is and what it is not. This provocative collection is an important contribution to the social sciences and the humanities in the 21st century. Contributors include: Peter Hacker, Bastiaan van Fraassen, Daniel N. Robinson, Kenneth Schaffner, Roger Scruton, James K.A. Smith, Richard Swinburne, Lawrence Principe and Richard N. Williams.

This open-access book is the first to investigate the roots of Logical Empiricism in the context of the Life Reform and the German Youth Movements. Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach are the key protagonists; they both belonged to the German Youth Movement and developed their early philosophical views in this setting. By combining scholarly essays with unpublished and hard to access manuscripts, letters, and articles, this volume recasts our understanding of the early years of Logical Empiricism.

Different from traditional research on the mind-body problem often discussed from an epistemological viewpoint, which assumes that mental processes are internal to the person, this book demonstrates the crucial role of contextual relevance in the workings of the mind and illustrates how mind emerges from the individual's interactions with her physical, social, and cultural environments. It also develops the interpersonal and social aspects of embodied mind. The body that creates meaning is not only an emotional, kinesthetic, and aesthetically experiencing body; the body that creates meaning is a social body. It suggests that mind-body relations are not only achieved through the interaction between our own mind and body, but by other minds in our intersubjective interactions. It is related to epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, value theory, action theory, and the philosophies of mind, science, logic, and technology. The readership may include graduate and undergraduate students studying philosophy, law, political science, sociology, psychology, etc., educators, researchers, scholars, and anyone who shows an interest in philosophy.

This collection brings together several essays which have been written between the years 197 5 and 1983. During that period I have been occupied with the attempt to find a satisfactory explicate for the notion of tnithlike ness or verisimilitude. The technical results of this search have partly appeared elsewhere, and I am also working on a systematic presentation of them in a companion volume to this book: Truthlikeness (forthcoming hopefully in 1985). The essays collected in this book are less formal and more philos ophical: they all explore various aspects of the idea that progress in science is associated with an increase in the truthlikeness of its results. Even though they do not exhaust the problem area of scientific change, together they constitute a step in the direction which I find most promising in the defence of critical scientific realism. * Chapter 1 appeared originally in Finnish as the opening article of a new journal Tiede 2000 (no. 1 I 1980) - a Finnish counterpart to journals such as Science and Scientific American. This explains its programmatic character. It tries to give a compact answer to the question 'What is science?', and serves therefore as an introduction to the problem area of the later chapters. Chapter 2 is a revised translation of my inaugural lecture for the chair of Theoretical Philosophy in the University of Helsinki on April 8, 1981. It appeared in Finnish inParnasso 31 (1981), pp."

This book newly articulates the international and interdisciplinary reach of Whitehead's organic process cosmology for a variety of topics across science and philosophy, and in dialogue with a variety historical and contemporary voices. Integrating Whitehead's thought with the insights of Bergson, James, Pierce, Merleau-Ponty, Descola, Fuchs, Hofmann, Grof and many others, contributors from around the world reveal the relevance of process philosophy to physics, cosmology, astrobiology, ecology, metaphysics, aesthetics, psychedelics, and religion. A global collection, this book expresses multivocal possibilities for the development of process cosmology after Whitehead.

This book investigates how collaborative scientific practice yields scientific knowledge. At a time when most of today's scientific knowledge is created in research groups, the author reconsiders the social character of science to address the question of whether collaboratively created knowledge should be considered as collective achievement, and if so, in which sense. Combining philosophical analysis with qualitative empirical inquiry, this book provides a comparative case study of mono- and interdisciplinary research groups, offering insight into the day-to-day practice of scientists. The book includes field observations and interviews with scientists to present an empirically-grounded perspective on much-debated questions concerning research groups' division of labor, relations of epistemic dependence and trust.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.

Moritz Pasch (1843-1930) is justly celebrated as a key figure in the history of axiomatic geometry. Less well known are his contributions to other areas of foundational research. This volume features English translations of 14 papers Pasch published in the decade 1917-1926. In them, Pasch argues that geometry and, more surprisingly, number theory are branches of empirical science; he provides axioms for the combinatorial reasoning essential to Hilbert's program of consistency proofs; he explores "implicit definition" (a generalization of definition by abstraction) and indicates how this technique yields an "empiricist" reconstruction of set theory; he argues that we cannot fully understand the logical structure of mathematics without clearly distinguishing between decidable and undecidable properties; he offers a rare glimpse into the mind of a master of axiomatics, surveying in detail the thought experiments he employed as he struggled to identify fundamental mathematical principles; and much more. This volume will: Give English speakers access to an important body of work from a turbulent and pivotal period in the history of mathematics, help us look beyond the familiar triad of formalism, intuitionism, and logicism, show how deeply we can see with the help of a guide determined to present fundamental mathematical ideas in ways that match our human capacities, will be of interest to graduate students and researchers in logic and the foundations of mathematics.

Aristotle's account of place, in which he defined a thing's place as the inner surface of its nearest immobile container, was supported by the Latin Middle Ages, even 1600 years after his death, though it had not convinced many ancient Greek philosophers. The sixth century commentator Philoponus took a more common-sense view. For him, place was an immobile three-dimensional extension, whose essence did not preclude its being empty, even if for other reasons it had always to be filled with body. However, Philoponus reserved his own definition for an excursus, already translated in this series, The Corollary on Place. In the text translated here he wanted instead to explain Aristotle's view to elementary students. The recent conjecture that he wished to attract young fellow Christians away from the official pagan professor of philosophy in Alexandria has the merit of explaining why he expounds Aristotle here, rather than attacking him. But he still puts the students through their paces, for example when discussing Aristotle's claim that place cannot be a body, or two bodies would coincide. This volume contains an English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.

This book brings together twelve original contributions by leading scholars on the much-debated issues of what is free will and how can we exercise it in a world governed by laws of nature. Which conception of laws of nature best fits with how we conceive of free will? And which constraints does our conception of the laws of nature place on how we think of free will? The metaphysics of causation and the metaphysics of dispositions are also explored in this edited volume, in relation to whether they may or may not be game-changers in how we think about both free will and the laws of nature. The volume presents the views of a range of international experts on these issues, and aims at providing the reader with novel approaches to a core problem in philosophy. The target audience is composed by academics and scholars who are interested in an original and contemporary approach to these long-debated issues. Chapters [2] and [4] are available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

Emile Meyerson's writings on the philosophy of science are a rich source of ideas and information concerning many philosophical and historical aspects of the development of modem science. Meyerson's works are not widely read or cited today by philosophers or even philosophers of science, in part because they have long been out of print and are often not available even in research libraries. There are additional chevaux de !rise for all but the hardiest scholars: Meyerson's books are written in French (and do not all exist in English versions) and deal with the subject matter of science - ideas or concepts, laws or principles, theories - and epis temological questions rather than today's more fashionable topics of the social matrix and external influences on science with the concomitant neglect of the intellectual content of science. Born in Lublin, Poland, in 1859, Meyerson received most of his education in Germany, where he studied from the age of 12 to 23, preparing himself for a career in chemistry. ! He moved to Paris in 1882, where he began a career as an industrial chemist. Changing his profession, he then worked for a time as the foreign news editor of the HAVAS News Agency in Paris. In 1898 he joined the agency established by Edmond Rothschild that had as its purpose the settling of Jews in Palestine and became the Director of the Jewish Colonization Association for Europe and Asia Minor. These activities represent Meyerson's formal career.

With this defense of intensional realism as a philosophical foundation for understanding scientific procedures and grounding scientific knowledge, James Fetzer provides a systematic alternative to much of recent work on scientific theory. To Fetzer, the current state of understanding the 'laws' of nature, or the 'law-like' statements of scientific theories, appears to be one of philosophical defeat; and he is determined to overcome that defeat. Based upon his incisive advocacy of the single-case propensity interpretation of probability, Fetzer develops a coherent structure within which the central problems of the philosophy of science find their solutions. Whether the reader accepts the author's contentions may, in the end, depend upon ancient choices in the interpretation of experience and explanation, but there can be little doubt of Fetzer's spirited competence in arguing for setting ontology before epistemology, and within the analysis of language. To us, Fetzer's ambition is appealing, fusing, as he says, the substantive commitment of the Popperian with the conscientious sensitivity of the Hempelian to the technical precision required for justified explication. To Fetzer, science is the objective pursuit of fallible general knowledge. This innocent character ization, which we suppose most scientists would welcome, receives a most careful elaboration in this book; it will demand equally careful critical con sideration. Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, MARX W. WARTOFSKY Boston University October 1981 v TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE v FOREWORD xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv PART I: CAUSATION 1."

This book explores the hypothesis that the types of inscription or text used by a given community of practitioners are designed in the very same process as the one producing concepts and results. The book sets out to show how, in exactly the same way as for the other outcomes of scientific activity, all kinds of factors, cognitive as well as cultural, technological, social or institutional, conjoin in shaping the various types of writings and texts used by the practitioners of the sciences. To make this point, the book opts for a genuinely multicultural approach to the texts produced in the context of practices of knowledge. It is predicated on the conviction that, in order to approach any topic in the history of science from a theoretical point of view, it may be fruitful to consider it from a global perspective. The book hence does not only gather papers dealing with geometrical papyri of antiquity, sixteenth century French books in algebra, seventeenth century scientific manuscripts and paintings, eighteenth and nineteenth century memoirs published by European academies or scientific journals, and Western Opera Omnia. It also considers the problems of interpretation relating to reading Babylonian clay tablets, Sanskrit oral scriptures and Chinese books and illustrations. Thus it enables the reader to explore the diversity of forms which texts have taken in history and the wide range of uses they have inspired.

This volume will be of interest to historians, philosophers of science, linguists and anthropologists.

The physics of condensed matter, in contrast to quantum physics or cosmology, is not traditionally associated with deep philosophical questions. However, as science - largely thanks to more powerful computers - becomes capable of analysing and modelling ever more complex many-body systems, basic questions of philosophical relevance arise. Questions about the emergence of structure, the nature of cooperative behaviour, the implications of the second law, the quantum-classical transition and many other issues. This book is a collection of essays by leading physicists and philosophers. Each investigates one or more of these issues, making use of examples from modern condensed matter research. Physicists and philosophers alike will find surprising and stimulating ideas in these pages.

Professor Pandit, working among the admirable group of philosophers at the University of Delhi, has written a fundamental criticism and a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the sciences in modern Western philosoph- from the times of Galileo, Newton, Descartes and Leibniz to those of Russell and Wittgenstein, Carnap and Popper, and, we need hardly add, onward to the troubling relativisms and reconstructions of historical epistemologies in the works of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. His themes are intrigu ing, set forth as they are with masterly case studies of physics and the life sciences, and within an original conceptual framework for philosophical analysis of the processes, functions, and structures of scientific knowing. Pandit's contributions deserve thoughtful examination. For our part, we wish to point to some among them: (1) an interactive articulation of subjective and objective factors of both problems and theories in the course of scientific development; (2) a striking contrast between the explanatory power of a scientific theory and its 'resolving power', i. e."

The impressive record of Italian philosophical research since the end of Fascism thirty-two years ago is shown in many fields: esthetics, social and" personal ethics, history and sociology of philosophy, and magnificently, perhaps above all, in logic, foundations of mathematics and the philosophY, methodology, and intellectual history ofthe empirical sciences. To our pleasure, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara of the University of Florence gladly agreed to assemble a 'sampler' of recent Italian logical and analytical work on the philosophical foundations of mathematics and physics, along with a number of historical studies of epistemological and mathematical concepts. The twenty-five essays that form this volume will, we expect, encourage English-reading philosophers and scientists to seek further works by these authors and by their teachers, colleagues, and students; and, we hope, to look for those other Italian currents of thought in the philosophy of science for which points of departure are not wholly analytic, and which also deserve study and recognition in the world wide philosophical community. Of course, Italy has long been related to that world community in scien titlc matters."

Section Guide 1. Prolegomena 2. Biographical Sketch 3. Epistemology 4. Textbook Ontology 1. PROLEGOMENA While both philosophers and historians almost always love truth and the search for truth, and both often carry out extensive research, there can be noticeable differences when historians write about the history of philosophy and when philosophers write about it. Philosophers often look at the past with categories and interests taken from the present or at the least from the recent past, but many historians, especially those who love research for its own sake, will try to look at the past from a perspective either from that period or from even earlier. Both camps look for roots, but view them with different lenses and presupposi tions. This prolegomena has been added to prepare some philosophers for what will hopefully only be the mildest of shocks, for seeing the history of philosophy in a way which does not treat what is recent or latest as best, but which loves the context of ideas for its own sake, a context which can be very foreign to contemporary likes and dislikes. To be sure, we historians can deceive ourselves as easily as philosophers, but we tend to do so about different things.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. 'Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science' aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand. CQntributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out, however, and are indeed actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. The present volume will I believe be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Vll ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The stimulus to assemble this collection of essays grew from a number of interesting seminars conducted during the academic years 1991-92, under the auspices of the Victorian Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science (which is centred at the Bundoora campus of La Trobe University in the outer suburbs of Melbourne). Some of the seminar presentations to the Victorian Centre for HPS and other articles awaiting pUblication have been made available as part of the Pre-print Series of the Victorian Centre.

In this stimulating study of the logical character of selected fundamental topics of physics, Zinov'ev has written the first, and major, stage of a general semantics of science. In that sense he has shown, by rigorous examples, that in certain basic and surprising respects we may envision a reducibility of science to logic; and further that we may detect and eliminate frequent confusion of abstract and empirical objects. In place of a near chaos of unplanned theoretical languages, we may look toward a unified and epistemologically clarified general scientific language. In the course of this work, Zinov'ev treats issues of continuing urgency: the non-trivial import of Zeno's paradoxes; the residually significant meaning of 'cause' in scientific explanation; the need for lucidity in the conceptions of 'wave' and 'particle', and his own account of these; the logic of fields and of field propagation; Kant's antimonies today; and, in a startling aper u, an insightful note on 'measuring' consciousness. Logical physics, an odd-appearing field of investigation, is a part of logic; and as logic, logical physics deals with the linguistic expressions of time, space, particle, wave, field, causality, etc. How far this may be taken without explicit use of, or reference to, empirical statements is still to be clarified, but Zinov'ev takes a sympathetic reader well beyond a realist's expectation, beyond the classical conventionalist. Zinov'ev presents his investigations in four chapters and an appendix of technical elucidation.

There are many different approaches to science. Many students in school have a view of science that is far removed from the real world practice of science and they too often consider science to be a defined body of knowledge and scientists to know all the answers. Through a series of exercises this book tries to give students an awareness of the processes of science and of the nature of science as a changing body of knowledge with uncertainties and much remaining to be discovered. It is hoped that, by using it, teachers can communicate to their students some of the wonder and excitement of science and encourage the development of future generations of scientists. The Nature of Science includes a range of activities designed to look at different aspects of the nature of science and to teach investigative skills to 11-19 year old students. It contains teachers' notes, background information, photocopiable student worksheets and answers.