This book seeks to arrive at a better understanding of the relationships between the objective and subjective aspects of time. It discusses the existence of fluent time, a controversial concept in many areas, from philosophy to physics. Fluent time is understood as directional time with a past, a present and a future. We experience fluent time in our lives and we adopt a temporal perspective in our ways of knowing and acting. Nevertheless, the existence of fluent time has been debated for both philosophical and scientific reasons, thus creating a rift between the subjective and objective aspects of time. Starting from the basic notion of points of view, or perspectives, this book explores the relationships between objective or external time, as it has been conceptualized by science, and subjective or internal time, which is involved in our lived experiences. It establishes a general framework encompassing the nature, structure and mode of existence of points of view, in which the objective and subjective aspects of time can be integrated. The book mainly addresses researchers and postgraduates in philosophy and logic. Additionally, it offers inspiration for physicists and computer scientists involved in the modeling and simulation of complex behaviors for which the representation of internal time should be considered together with the notion of objective, external time.

This volume constitutes the Proceedings and Discussions of the 1968 Salzburg Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. The Colloquium was held at the Institut fUr Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungszentrum fUr Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, Salzburg, Austria, from August 28 to August 31, 1968, under the joint auspices of the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and the Institut fur Wissenschaftstheorie of the Internationales Forschungs- zentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was organized by an executive committee consisting ofY. Bar-Hillel (President), M. Black, J. Hintikka, B. Juhos, M. Strauss, and P. Weingartner (Secretary). The Colloquium was generously subsidised by the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, and by the Internationales For- schungszentrum, Salzburg. The Colloquium was divided into three main sections: Induction and Probability (Chairman: 1. Hintikka), Foundations of Physics (Chairman: M. Strauss), and Science and Ethics: The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Chairman: M. Black). This volume contains all papers presented at the Colloquium. Six of those papers concerning Induction and Probability, have, with slight changes, already been published in Synthese 20, 1969. Although the articles of the section Science and Ethics were only read at the International Congress of Philosophy in Vienna on September 3, 1968, the discussion on them took place in Salzburg two days ago. This was possible, because early drafts of all papers had been sent to each participant, in order to prepare appropriate discussions.

In philosophy as in ordinary life, cause and effect are twin pillars on which much of our thought seems based. But almost a century ago, Bertrand Russell declared that modern physics leaves these pillars without foundations. Russell's revolutionary conclusion was that "the law of causality is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm."
Russell's famous challenge remains unanswered. Despite dramatic advances in physics, the intervening century has taken us no closer to an explanation of how to find a place for causation in a world of the kind that physics reveals. In particular, we still have no satisfactory account of the directionality of causation -- the difference between cause and effect, and the fact that causes typically precede their effects. In this important collection of new essays, 13 leading scholars revisit Russell's revolution, in search of reconciliation.
The connecting theme in these essays is that to reconcile causation with physics, we need to put ourselves in the picture: we need to think about why creatures in our situation should present their world in causal terms.

The decision to undertake this volume was made in 1971 at Lake Como during the Varenna summer school ofthe Italian Physical Society, where Professor Leon Rosenfeld was lecturing on the history of quantum theory. We had long been struck by the unique blend of epistemological, histori cal and social concerns in his work on the foundations and development of physics, and decided to approach him there with the idea of publishing a collection of his papers. He responded enthusiastically, and agreed to help us select the papers; furthermore, he also agreed to write a lengthy introduction and to comment separately on those papers that he felt needed critical re-evaluation in the light of his current views. For he was still vigorously engaged in both theoretical investigations of, and critical not reflections on the foundations of theoretical physics. We certainly did conceive of the volume as a memorial to a 'living saint', but rather more practically, as a useful tool to place in the hands of fellow workers and students engaged in wrestling with these difficult problems. All too sadly, fate has added a memorial aspect to our labors. We agreed that in order to make this book most useful for the con temporary community of physicists and philosophers, we should trans late all non-English items into English."

Philosophy of biology has a long and honourable history. Indeed, like most of the great intellectual achievements of the Western World, it goes back to the Greeks. However, until recently in this century, it was sadly neglected. With a few noteworthy exceptions, someone wishing to delve into the subject had to choose between extremes of insipid vitalism on the one hand, and sterile formalizations of the most elementary biological principles on the other. Whilst philosophy of physics pushed confidently ahead, the philosophy of biology languished. In the past decade, however, things have changed dramatically. A number of energetic and thoughtful young philosophers have made real efforts to master the outlines and details of contemporary biology. They have shown that many stimulating problems emerge when analytic skills are turned towards the life-sciences, particularly if one does not feeI con strained to stay only with theoretical parts of biology, but can range over to more medical parts of the spectrum. At the same time, biology itself has had one of the most fruitful yet turbulent periods in its whole history, and more and more biologists have grown to see that many of the problems they face take them beyond the narrow confines of empiric al science: a broader perspective is needed."

Why is there a world? Does it reflect the presence of God in any way? Did the world spontaneously come into existence or is there a creator? How will it end? Does God Exist? Do religions give a coherent view of His existence and nature? Can we enter into relation with Him? Robert Crawford tries to answer these and other questions by arguing that religion and science complement one another and, while they use different sources and methods, insights can be gleaned from both concerning our nature, the world, and God. Major attention is given to Christianity because modern science arose in that context but the discussion includes the teachings of five other religions in the hope that we can also learn from them.

This book focuses on various concepts of space and their historical evolution. In particular, it examines the variations that have modified the notions of place, orientation, distance, vacuum, limit, bound and boundary, form and figure, continuity and contingence, in order to show how spatial characteristics are decisive in a range of contexts: in the determination and comprehension of exteriority; in individuation and identification; in defining the meaning of nature and of the natural sciences; in aesthetical formations and representations; in determining the relationship between experience, behavior and environment; and in the construction of mental and social subjectivity. Accordingly, the book offers a comprehensive review of concepts of space as formulated by Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Penrose and Thorne, subsequently comparing them to notions developed more recently, in the current age, which Foucault dubbed the age of space. The book is divided into four distinct yet deeply interconnected parts, which explore the space of life, the space of experience, the space of science and the space of the arts.

Margarita Diaz-Andreu offers an innovative history of archaeology during the nineteenth century, encompassing all its fields from the origins of humanity to the medieval period, and all areas of the world. The development of archaeology is placed within the framework of contemporary political events, with a particular focus upon the ideologies of nationalism and imperialism. Diaz-Andreu examines a wide range of issues, including the creation of institutions, the conversion of the study of antiquities into a profession, public memory, changes in archaeological thought and practice, and the effect on archaeology of racism, religion, the belief in progress, hegemony, and resistance.

Quantum physicist, New York Times bestselling author, and BBC host Jim Al-Khalili offers a fascinating and illuminating look at what physics reveals about the world Shining a light on the most profound insights revealed by modern physics, Jim Al-Khalili invites us all to understand what this crucially important science tells us about the universe and the nature of reality itself. Al-Khalili begins by introducing the fundamental concepts of space, time, energy, and matter, and then describes the three pillars of modern physics-quantum theory, relativity, and thermodynamics-showing how all three must come together if we are ever to have a full understanding of reality. Using wonderful examples and thought-provoking analogies, Al-Khalili illuminates the physics of the extreme cosmic and quantum scales, the speculative frontiers of the field, and the physics that underpins our everyday experiences and technologies, bringing the reader up to speed with the biggest ideas in physics in just a few sittings. Physics is revealed as an intrepid human quest for ever more foundational principles that accurately explain the natural world we see around us, an undertaking guided by core values such as honesty and doubt. The knowledge discovered by physics both empowers and humbles us, and still, physics continues to delve valiantly into the unknown. Making even the most enigmatic scientific ideas accessible and captivating, this deeply insightful book illuminates why physics matters to everyone and calls one and all to share in the profound adventure of seeking truth in the world around us.

In an age characterized by impersonality and a fear of individuality this book is indeed unusual. It is personal, individualistic and idiosyncratic - a record of the scientific adventure of a single mind. Most scientific writing today is so depersonalized that it is impossible to recognize the man behind the work, even when one knows him. Costa de Beauregard's scientific career has focused on three domains - special relativity, statistics and irreversibility, and quantum mechanics. In Time, the Physical Magnitude he has provided a personal vade mecum to those problems, concepts, and ideas with which he has been so long preoccupied. Some years ago we were struck by a simple and profound observa tion of Mendel Sachs, the gist of which follows. Relativity is based on very simple ideas but, because it requires highly complicated mathe matics, people find it difficult. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, derives from very complicated principles but, since its mathematics is straightforward, people feel they understand it. In some ways they are like the bourgeois gentilhomme of Moliere in that they speak quantum mechanics without knowing what it is. Costa de Beauregard recognizes the complexity of quantum mechanics. A great virtue of the book is that he does not hide or shy away from the complexity. He exposes it fully while presenting his ideas in a non-dogmatic way."

This volume builds on two recent developments in philosophy on the relationship between art and science: the notion of representation and the role of values in theory choice and the development of scientific theories. Its aim is to address questions regarding scientific creativity and imagination, the status of scientific performances-such as thought experiments and visual aids-and the role of aesthetic considerations in the context of discovery and justification of scientific theories. Several contributions focus on the concept of beauty as employed by practising scientists, the aesthetic factors at play in science and their role in decision making. Other essays address the question of scientific creativity and how aesthetic judgment resolves the problem of theory choice by employing aesthetic criteria and incorporating insights from both objectivism and subjectivism. The volume also features original perspectives on the role of the sublime in science and sheds light on the empirical work studying the experience of the sublime in science and its relation to the experience of understanding. The Aesthetics of Science tackles these topics from a variety of novel and thought-provoking angles. It will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in philosophy of science and aesthetics, as well as other subdisciplines such as epistemology and philosophy of mathematics.

For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with other accepted findings. The new interest gave rise to important questions. How is logical anarchy' avoided? Is it ever rational to accept an inconsistent theory? In what sense, if any, can inconsistent theories be considered as true?
The present collection of papers is the first to deal with this kind of questions. It contains case studies as well as philosophical analyses, and presents an excellent overview of the different approaches in the domain.

The essays in this collection have been written for Gerd Buchdahl, by colleagues, students and friends, and are self-standing pieces of original research which have as their main concern the metaphysics and philosophy of science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They focus on issues about the development of philosophical and scientific thought which are raised by or in the work of such as Bernoulli, Descartes, Galileo, Kant, Leibniz, Maclaurin, Priestly, Schelling, Vico. Apart from the initial bio-bibliographical piece and those by Robert Butts and Michael Power, they do not discuss Buchdahl or his ideas in any systematic, lengthy, or detailed way. But they are collected under a title which alludes to the book, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant (1969), which is central in the corpus of his work, and deal with the period and some of the topics with which that book deals.

Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The book will be of interest to philosophers and scientists alike in the reassessment it provides of earlier debates about method and current directions of research.

In this book Emma Ruttkamp demonstrates the power of the full-blown employment of the model-theoretic paradigm in the philosophy of science. Within this paradigm she gives an account of sciences as process and product. She expounds the "received statement" and the "non-statement" views of science, and shows how the model-theoretic approach resolves the spurious tension between these views. In this endeavour she also engages the views of a number of contemporary philosophers of science with affinity to model theory. This text can be read by specialists working in philosophy of science or formal semantics, by logicians working on the structure of theories, and by students in philosophy of science - this text offers a thorough introduction to non-statement accounts of sciences as well as a discussion of the traditional statement account of science.

That concern about human genetics is at the top of many lists of issues requiring intense discussion from scientific, political, social, and ethical points of view is today no surprise. It was in the spirit of attempting to establish the basis for intelligent discussion of the issues involved that a group of us gathered at a meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology in the Summer of 1995 at Brandeis University and began an exploration of these questions in earlier versions of the papers presented here. Our aim was to cross disciplines and jump national boundaries, to be catholic in the methods and approaches taken, and to bring before readers interested in the emerging issues of human genetics well-reasoned, informative, and provocative papers. The initial conference and elements of the editorial work which have followed were generously supported by the Stifterverband fUr die Deutsche Wissenschaft. We thank Professor Peter Weingart of Bielefeld University for his assistance in gaining this support. As Editors, we thank the anonymous readers who commented upon and critiqued many of the papers and in tum made each paper a more valuable contribution. We also thank the authors for their understanding and patience. Michael Fortnn Everett Mendelsohn Cambridge, MA September 1998 vii INTRODUCTION In 1986, the annual symposium at the venerable Cold Spring Harbor laboratories was devoted to the "Molecular Biology of Homo sapiens.

This is the first of two volumes containing papers submitted by the invited speakers to the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in Cracow in 1999, under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. The invited speakers are the leading researchers and accordingly the book presents the current state of the intellectual discourse in the respective fields.
The papers delivered at the congress were divided into 17 sections. Thus the structure of the volume corresponds to the very schedule of the congress. Volume one contains the opening lecture by Andrzej K. WrA3blewski as well as invited papers in sections of Proof Theory, Model Theory, Recursion Theory, Axiomatic Set Theory, Logic and Computation, Logic, Language and Cognition, Methodology, Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory, Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Computer Science, and Philosophy of the Physical Sciences.

In the last 25 years, the concept of information has played a crucial role in communication theory, so much so that the terms information theory and communication theory are sometimes used almost interchangeably. It seems to us, however, that the notion of information is also destined to render valuable services to the student of induction and probability, of learning and reinforcement, of semantic meaning and deductive inference, as well as of scientific method in general. The present volume is an attempt to illustrate some of these uses of information concepts. In 'On Semantic Information' Hintikka summarizes some of his and his associates' recent work on information and induction, and comments briefly on its philosophical suggestions. Jamison surveys from the sub jectivistic point of view some recent results in 'Bayesian Information Usage'. Rosenkrantz analyzes the information obtained by experimen tation from the Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson standpoints, and also from the standpoint of entropy and related concepts. The much-debated principle of total evidence prompts Hilpinen to examine the problem of measuring the information yield of observations in his paper 'On the Information Provided by Observations'. Pietarinen addresses himself to the more general task of evaluating the systematizing ('explanatory') power of hypotheses and theories, a task which quickly leads him to information concepts. Domotor develops a qualitative theory of information and entropy. His paper gives what is probably the first axiomatization of a general qualitative theory of information adequate to guarantee a numerical representation of the standard sort."

Wolfgang Stegmuller was born on June 3rd, 1923, at Natters near Innsbruck. He received his doctorates in economics and philosophy in 1945 and 1947 respectively, and his qualification (Habilitation) for lecturing in philosophy in 1949. He has been Professor of Philosophy, Logic, and Philosophy of Science at the Ludwig Maximilian University at Munich since 1958. He reintroduced analytic philosophy and philosophy of science in Germany by teaching and by publishing both introductory texts and research work in these areas; the present understanding of the term "Wissenschaftstheorie" is largely shaped by his work. At the same time he has shown a remarkable ability to interpret philosophical work in other areas of philosophy, even when that work is shaped by different premises and proceeds by very different methods and standards of clarity than his own. He is one of the very few philosophers in the world to have succeeded in creating an important new line of research in technical philosophy while keeping a synoptic view of what is transpiring in philosophy as a whole. Among Stegmuller's major publications are the books Hauptstromungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis, Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, The Struc turalist View of Theories, and Rationale Rekonstruktion von Wissenschaft und ihrem Wandel (which contains an "Autobiographische Einleitung"). Some of these books have been translated into English and Spanish."

This book deals with some of the current issues in the philosophy, methodology and foundations of physics. Some such problems are: - Do mathematical formalisms interpret themselves or is it necessary to adjoin them interpretation assumptions, and if so how are these as sumptions to be framed? - What are physical theories about: physical systems or laboratory operations or both or neither? - How are the basic concepts of a theory to be introduced: by ref erence to measurements or by explicit definition or axiomatically? - What is the use ofaxiomatics in physics? - How are the various physical theories inter-related: like Chinese boxes or in more complex ways? - What is the role of analogy in the construction and in the inter pretation of physical theories? In particular, are classical analogues like those of particle and wave indispensable in quantum theories? - What is the role of the apparatus in quantum phenomena and what is the place of measurement theory in quantum mechanics? - How does a theory face experiment: single-handed or with the help of further theories? These and several other questions of the kind are met with by the research physicist, the physics teacher and the physics student in their everyday work. If dodged they will recur. And a wrong answer to them may obscure the understanding of what has been achieved and may even hamper further advancement. Philosophy, methodology and foundations, like rose bushes, are enjoyable when cultivated but become ugly and thorny when neglected."

Richard Taylor was born in Charlotte, Michigan on 5 November 1919. He received his A. B. from the University of illinois in 1941, his M. A. from Oberlin College in 1947, and his Ph. D. from Brown University in 1951. He has been William H. P. Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University, Professor of Philosophy (Graduate Faculties) at Columbia University, and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rochester. He is the author of about fifty articles and of five philosophical books. This volume consists of essays presented to Richard Taylor on the occa sion of his sixtieth birthday. Some of the contributors have been Taylor'S students; some have been his colleagues; and all have been, and continue to be, his admirers. I have made several attempts to articulate what it is I (I would not presume to speak for anyone else) admire about Richard Taylor: (1) There is a particular 'flavor' to Taylor's philosophical writing and con versation that is wholly delightful. Like any other flavor, it can be tasted and enjoyed and remembered but never adequately described. (If there should be someone who has picked up this book who does not know what I mean, I recommend that he read the chapter on 'God' in Taylor's Metaphysics. ) (2) Taylor is a masterful dialectician."

The fourteenth volume of the Second Edition covers central topics in philosophical logic that have been studied for thousands of years, since Aristotle: Inconsistency, Causality, Conditionals, and Quantifiers. These topics are central in many applications of logic in central disciplines and this book is indispensable to any advanced student or researcher using logic in these areas. The chapters are comprehensive and written by major figures in the field.

For many years essentialism - the view that some objects have essentially or necessarily certain properties without which they could not exist or be the things they are - was considered to be beyond the pale in philosophy, a relic of discredited Aristotelianism. This is no longer so. Kripke and Putnam have made belief in essential natures once more respectable. Harre and Madden have boldly argued against Hume's theory of causation, and developed an alternative theory based on the assumption that there are genuine causal powers in nature. Dretske, Tooley, Armstrong, Swoyer and Carroll have all developed strong alternatives to Hume's theory of the laws of nature. Shoemaker has developed a thoroughly non-Humean theory of properties. The new essentialism has evolved from these beginnings and can now reasonably claim to be a metaphysic for a modern scientific understanding of the world - one that challenges the conception of the world as comprising passive entities whose interactions are to be explained by appeal to contingent laws of nature externally imposed.