The best philosophy of science during the last generation has been highly historical; and the best history of science, highly philosophical. No one has better exemplified this intimate relationship between history and philosophy than has Robert E. Butts in his work. Through out his numerous writings, science, its philosophy, and its history have been treated as a seamless web. The result has been a body of work that is sensitive in its conception, ambitious in its scope, and illuminat ing in its execution. Not only has his work opened new paths of inquiry, but his enthusiasm for the discipline, his encouragement of others (particularly students and younger colleagues), and his tireless efforts to build an international community of scholars, have stimulated the growth of HPS throughout Europe and North America. Many of the essays in this volume reflect that influence. Our title, of course, is deliberately ambiguous. The essays herein are by colleagues and former students, all of us wishing to honour an intimate friend. Happy Birthday, Bob IX INTRODUCTION The essays herein cover a variety of concerns: from Descartes to reduction, from Galileo to gambling, from Freud's psychoanalysis to Kant's thing-in-itself. But under this diversity there is an approach common to them all. Things are largely done with a concern for and a sensitivity to historical matters (including contemporary history, of course)."

George Boole (1815-1864) is well known to mathematicians for his research and textbooks on the calculus, but his name has spread world-wide for his innovations in symbolic logic and the development and applications made since his day. The utility of "Boolean algebra" in computing has greatly increased curiosity in the nature and extent of his achievements. His work is most accessible in his two books on logic, "A mathematical analysis of logic" (1947) and "An investigation of the laws of thought" (1954). But at various times he wrote manuscript essays, especially after the publication of the second book; several were intended for a non-technical work, "The Philosophy of logic," which he was not able to complete. This volume contains an edited selection which not only relates them to Boole's publications and the historical context of his time, but also describes their strange history of family, followers and scholars have treid to confect an edition. The book will appeal to logicians, mathematicians and philosophers, and those interested in the histories of the corresponding subjects; and also students of the early Victorian Britain in which they were written.

In this book, 11 leading scholars contribute to the understanding of the scientific and philosophical works of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), the most luminous Jewish intellectual since Talmudic times. Deeply learned in mathematics, astronomy, astrology (which he strongly rejected), logic, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and jurisprudence, and himself a practising physician, Maimonides flourished within the high Arabic culture of the 12th century, where he had momentous influence upon subsequent Jewish beliefs and behavior, upon ethical demands, and upon ritual traditions. For him, mastery of the sciences was indispensable in the process of religious fulfilment.

This volume in the Synthese Library Series is the result of a con- ference held at the Roskilde University, Denmark, September 16- 18, 1998. The purpose of this meeting was to shed light on some of the recent issues in probability theory and track their history; to analyze their philosophical and mathematical significance, and to analyze the role of mathematical probability theory in other sciences. Hence the conference was called Probability Theory- Philosophy! Recent History and Relations to Science. The editors would like to thank the invited speakers includ- ing in alphabetical order Prof. N.H. Bingham (BruneI Univer- sity), Prof. Berna KIlmc; (Bogazici University), Prof. Eberhard Knoblock (Techniche Universitat Berlin), Prof. J.B. Paris (Uni- versity of Manchester), Prof. T. Seidenfeld (Carnegie Mellon University), Prof. Glenn Shafer (Rutgers University) and Prof. Volodya Vovk (University of London) for contributing, in the most lucid and encouraging way, to the fulfillment of the con- ference aim. The editors are also grateful to the invited speakers for making their contributions available for publication. The conference was organized by the Danish Network on the History and Philosophy of Mathematics http://mmf.ruc.dkjmathnetj The editors would like to thank the network's organizing com- mittee consisting of Prof. Kirsti Andersen (University of Aarhus), Prof. Jesper Liitzen (University of Copenhagen), Dr. Tinne Hoff Kjeldsen (Roskilde University) and the committee's secretaries Lise Mariane Jeppesen and Jesper Thrane (Roskilde University).

Patrick Suppes is a philosopher and scientist whose contributions range over probability and statistics, mathematical and experimental psychology, the foundations of physics, education theory, the philosophy of language, measurement theory, and the philosophy of science. He has also been a pioneer in the area of computer assisted instruction. In each of these areas, Suppes has provided seminal ideas that in some cases led to shaping the direction of research in the field. The papers contained in this collection were commissioned with the mandate of advancing research in their respective fields rather than retrospectively surveying the contributions that Suppes himself has made. The authors form an interesting mixture of researchers in both formal philosophy of science and science itself all of whom have been inspired by his ideas. To maintain the spirit of constructive dialogue that characterizes Suppes's intellectual style, he has written individual responses to each article. In Volume 1: Probability and Probabilistic Causality, nineteen distinguished philosophers and scientists focus their attention on probabilistic issues. In Part I the contributors explore axiomatic representations of probability theory including qualitative and interval valued probabilities as well as traditional point valued probabilities. Belief structures and the dynamics of belief are also treated in detail. In Part II the rapidly growing field of probabilistic causation is assessed from both formal and empirical viewpoints. For probability theorists, statisticians, economists, philosophers of science, psychologists and those interested in the foundations of mathematical social science. In Volume 2: Philosophy of Physics, Theory Structure, and Measurement Theory, fifteen distinguished philosophers and scientists cover a wide variety of topics. Part III covers issues in quantum theory, geometry, classical mechanics, and computational physics. Part IV explores Suppes's well known set-theoretic account of scientific theories which has served him well throughout his career. Suppes's contributions to measurement theory have been widely used in mathematical psychology and elsewhere, and this material is the subject of Part V. For physicists, logicians, workers in mathematical social sicence, and philosophers of science. In Volume 3: Philosophy of Language and Logic, Learning and Action Theory, fourteen distinguished philosophers and scientists explore issues in the philosophy of language, logic, and philosophical psychology. Suppes's suggestions that quantum theory requires a rethinking of classical logic form a particularly sharp account of that controversial thesis, and Part VI deals with this issue together with topics in the philosophy of language and logic, including relational grammars and anaphora. Part VII deals with issues in psychology, action theory, and robotics, while Part VIII concludes with a general survey of Suppes's views in the philosophy of science. A comprehensive chronological and topical bibliography of Suppes's writings is included in this volume. For philosophers of language, theoretical linguists, logicians, workers in mathematical social sciences, and philosophers of science.

The articles in this volume have been stimulated in two different ways. More than two years ago the editor of Synthese, laakko Hintikka, an nounced a special issue devoted to space and time, and articles were solicited. Part of the reason for that announcement was also the second source of papers. Several years ago I gave a seminar on special relativity at Stanford, and the papers by Domotor, Harrison, Hudgin, Latzer and myself partially arose out of discussion in that seminar. All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. 1-2). I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library. Of these four additional articles, only the one by Fine has pre viously appeared in print (Synthese 22 (1971),448--481); its relevance to the present volume is apparent. In preparing the papers for publication and in carrying out the various editorIal chores of such a task, I am very much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole for her extensive assistance. INTRODUCTION The philosophy of space and time has been of permanent importance in philosophy, and most of the major historical figures in philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, have had a good deal to say about the nature of space and time."

Joseph Agassi is a critic, a gadfly, a debunker and deflater; he is also a constructor, a speculator and an imaginative scholaro In the history and philosophy of science, he has been Peck's bad boy, delighting in sharp and pungent criticism, relishing directness and simplicity, and enjoying it all enormously. As one of that small group of Popper's students (ineluding Bartley, Feyerabend and Lakatos) who took Popper seriously enough to criticize him, Agassi remained his own man, holding Popper's work itself to the criteria of critical refutation. Agassi's range is wide and his publications proliik. He has published serious studies in the historiography of science, applied sociology (on Hong Kong with LC. Jarvie), foundations of anthropology, interpretive scientific biography (Faraday), Judaic studies, philosophy of technology (which Agassi pioneered, particulady in distinguishing it from the philosophy of science), as weIl as the many works on the Iogic, methodoI ogy, and history of science. Even as we go to press, Agassi's works are appearing; we append an imperfect and selected bibliography. For Agassi, the test of relevance is whether something is interesting."

The Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and the First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference were held in JyvaskyIa, Finland, June 29-July 6, 1976. The Conferences were organized by a committee which consisted of the editors of the present volume. The Conferences were supported financially by the Ministry of Education of Finland, by the Academy of Finland, and by the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History of Science. The Philosophical Society of Finland and the Jyvaskyla Summer Festival gave valuable help in various practicalities. 35 papers by authors representing 10 countries were presented at the two meetings. Of those papers 24 appear here. THE EDITORS v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v PART 1/ PROOF THEORY GEORG KREISEL / Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory 3 DAG PRAWITZ / Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants 25 v. A. SMIRNOV / Theory of Quantification and tff-calculi 41 LARS SVENONIUS/Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic 49 DIRK VAN DALEN and R. STATMAN / Equality in the Presence of Apartness 95 PART II / INFINITARY LANGUAGES VEIKKO RANTALA / Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and- Forth 119 MAARET KAR TTUNEN / Infinitary Languages N oo .

The philosophy of Robert Boyle (1627-1691) is of great importance in the early modern period. Boyle was at the centre of the scientific community of 17th-century England, and an accurate view of the Enlightenment scientific revolution is impossible without recognition of the contributions that he made. Work on Boyle's philosophy is also shedding light on contemporary issues in the philosophy of science - it can help us understand the nature of scientific explanation and the role that the mechanical model of explanation plays in present-day science. Boyle on Fire examines Boyle's work concerning a method of experiment common in the seventeenth century called Fire Analysis. In the Sceptical Chymist (1661), Boyle attacked elemental theories of chemical explanation primarily by raising objections against Aristotellan and Paracelsian interpretations of Fire Analysis. The book reconstructs Boyle's 'corpuscular' account of Fire Analysis and then compares it to these objections. This process reveals those characteristics of mechanical explanations that make them superior to elemental theories of chemical explanation, characteristics that have become an enduring feature of the scientific enterprise.

In this essay I am concerned with the problem of conceptual change. There are, needless to say, many ways to approach the issue. But, as I see it, the problem reduces to showing how present and future systems of thought are the rational extensions of prior ones. This goal may not be attainable. Kuhn, for example, suggests that change is mainly a function of socio-economic pressures (taken broadly). But there are some who believe that a case can be made for the rationality of change, especially in science. Wilfrid Sellars is one of those. While Sellars has developed a full account of the issues involved in solving the problem of conceptual change, he is also a very difficult philosopher to discuss. The difficulty stems from the fact that he is a philosopher in the very best sense of the word. First, he performs the tasks of analyzing alternative views with both finesse and insight, dialectically laying bare the essentials of problems and the inadequacies of previous proposals. Secondly, he is a systematic philosopher. That is, he is concerned to elaborate a system of philosophical thought in the grand tradition stretching from Plato to White head. Now with all of this to his credit, it would appear that there is no difficulty at all, one should simply treat him like all the others, if he indeed follows in the footsteps of past builders of philosophic systems."

The present publication is a continuation of two earlier series of chronicles, Philosophy in the Mid-Century (Firenze 1958/59) and Contemporary Philosophy (Firenze 1968), edited by Raymond Klibansky. As with the earlier series the present surveys purport to give a survey of significant trends in contemporary philosophical discussion. The need for such surveys has, I believe, increased rather than decreased over the last years. The philosophical scene appears, for various reasons, rather more complex than ever before. The continuing process of specialization in most branches, the emergence of new schools of thought, particularly in philosophical logic in the philosophy of language, and in social and political philosophy, the increasing attention being paid to the history of philosophy in discussions of contem porary problems as well as the increasing interest in cross-cultural philosophical discussion, are the most important contributory factors. Surveys of the present kind are a valuable source of knowledge about this complexity and may as such be of assistance in renewing the understanding of one's own philosophical problems. The surveys, it is to be hoped, may help to strengthen the Socratic element of modern philosophy, the world wide dialogue or Kommunikationsgemeinschaft. So far, six volumes have been prepared for the new series. The present surveys in Asian Philosophy (Vol. 7) follow the surveys in the Philosophy of Language and Philosophical Logic (Vol. I), Philosophy of Science (Vol. 2), Philosophy of Action (Vol. 3), Philosophy of Mind (Vol. 4), African Philosophy (Vol. 5), and Medieval Philosophy Part 1-2 (Vol. 6)."

How happy it is to recall Imre Lakatos. Now, fifteen years after his death, his intelligence, wit, generosity are vivid. In the Preface to the book of Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Boston Studies, 39, 1976), the editors wrote: ... Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. The book before us carries old and new friends of that Lakatosian spirit further into the issues which he wanted to investigate. That the new friends include a dozen scientific, historical and philosophical scholars from Greece would have pleased Lakatos very much, and with an essay from China, he would have smiled all the more. But the key lies in the quality of these papers, and in the imaginative organization of the conference at Thessaloniki in summer 1986 which worked so well.

The publication in 1632 of Galileo's Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, Ptolemaic and Copernican marked a crucial moment in the 'scientific revolution' and helped Galileo become the 'father of modern science'. The Dialogue contains Galileo's mature synthesis of astronomy, physics, and methodology, and a critical confirmation of Copernicus's hypothesis of the earth's motion. However, the book also led Galileo to stand trial with the Inquisition, in what became known as 'the greatest scandal in Christendom'. In The Routledge Guidebook to Galileo's Dialogue, Maurice A. Finocchiaro introduces and analyzes: the intellectual background and historical context of the Copernican controversy and Inquisition trial; the key arguments and critiques that Galileo presents on both sides of the 'dialogue'; the Dialogue's content and significance from three special points of view: science, methodology, and rhetoric; the enduring legacy of the Dialogue and the ongoing application of its approach to other areas. This is an essential introduction for all students of science, philosophy, history, and religion wanting a useful guide to Galileo's great classic.

For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck, Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change, which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that one's conception of science can be based on an identification of its theories with languages in which they may be, my own alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book (1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other, quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here, therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo, are not just problems concerning language change."

Milic Capek has devoted his scholarship to the history and philosophy of modern physics. With impeccable care, he has mastered the epistemologi cal and scientific developments by working through the papers, treatises, correspondence of physicists since Kant, and likewise he has put his learning and critical skill into the related philosophical literature. Coming from his original scientific career with a philosophy doctorate from the Charles University in Prague, Capek has ranged beyond a narrowly defined philosophy of physics into general epistemology of the natural sciences and to the full historical evolution of these matters. He has ex pounded his views on these matters in a number of articles and, systema tically, in his book The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary PhYSiCS, published in 1961 and reprinted with two new appendices in 1969. His particular gift for many of his readers and students lies in the great period from the mid-nineteenth century through the foundations of the physics and philosophy of the twentieth, and within this spectacular time, Profes sor Capek has become a principal expositor and sympathetic critic of the philosophy of Henri Bergson. He joins a distinguished group of scholars -physicists and philosophers -who have been stimulated to some of their most profound and imaginative thought by Bergson's metaphysical and psychological work: Cassirer, Meyerson, de Broglie, Metz, Jankelevitch, Zawirski, and in recent years, Costa de Beauregard, Watanabe, Blanche, and others."

The author argues that a reconstruction of scientific laws should give an account of laws relating phenomena to underlying mechanisms generating them, as well as of laws relating this mechanism to its inherent capacities. While contemporary philosophy of science deals only with the former, the author provides the concept for the reconstruction of scientific laws, where the knowledge of the phenomena enables one to grasp the quantity of their cause. He then provides the concepts for scientific laws dealing with the relation of the quantity and quality of the cause underlying phenomena to the quality and quantity of its capacities. Finally, he provides concepts for scientific laws expressing how a certain cause, due to the quantity and quality of its capacities, generates the quantitative and qualitative determinations of its manifestations. The book is intended for philosophers of science and philosophers of social science, as well as for natural and social scientists.

Like Bohr, Einstein and Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli was not only a Nobel laureate and one of the creators of modern physics, but also an eminent philosopher of modern science. This is the first book in English to include all his famous articles on physics and epistemology. They were actually translated during Pauli's lifetime by R. Schlapp and are now edited and annotated by Pauli's former assistant Ch. Enz. Pauli writes about the philosophical significance of complementarity, about space, time and causality, symmetry and the exclusion principle, but also about therole of the unconscious in modern science. His famous article on Kepler is included as well as many historical essays on Bohr, Ehrenfest, and Einstein as well as on the influence of the unconscious on scientific theories. The book addresses not only physicists, philosophers and historians of science, but also the general public.

With collective behaviors playing a fundamental role in many scientific and technical disciplines, the book, after an overview on the background to systemics, introduces the concept of COLLECTIVE BEING as a Multiple System established by processes of emergence and self-organization of the same agents simultaneously or dynamically interacting in different ways. The general principles underlying this approach are grounded on the theoretical role of the observer. This extended view allows to model in a more suitable way complex systems, such as in physics, biology and economics. The Dynamical Usage of Models (DYSAM) is the related modelling methodology. This innovating approach is applied to artificial and natural systems equipped with cognitive systems, such as autonomous robots and social systems. The authors discuss in two different chapters both traditional (i.e. based on dynamical systems and dissipative structures) and non-traditional (i.e. based on theory of phase transitions, Synergetics and connectionistic models) models of emergence. The book also introduces an innovative methodology for detecting the establishment of processes of emergence based on changes of ergodicity.

After a theoretical introduction of the concepts, the authors discuss the application to social systems and cognitive systems. Applications to social systems deal with issues such as representing and distinguishing growth and development, sustainable development, ethics and its crucial role to induce and maintain emergence of social systems, virtual systems, knowledge management and organizational learning. Applications to cognitive systems deal with approaches going beyond computationalism, theories ofconsciousness and embodied cognition.

Two conclusive appendices on (1) Some systemic properties and (2) Some questions and answers about Systemics, help the reader to have a synthesized view of the book.

Following A.N. Whitehead, this book takes up the principal challenge facing a natural philosopher who wishes to engage with Nature while rescuing both Life and Thought from materialistic approaches which rob them of their 'quicknesses'. Selecting certain insights and intuitions from the writings of Peirce, Coleridge, Deleuze and Nietzsche, the author proffers a remedy for the pervasive nihilism of 'the moderns' which illustrates Deleuze's suggestion that philosophy should be imaged as a dynamic collage that is forever in the making.

The first section of this chapter describes the major goals of this investiga tion and the general strategy of my presentation. The remaining three sections review some requisite background material and introduce some terminology and notation used in the book. Section B contains a brief review of some of the ideas and notation of elementary logic and set theory. Section C contains an introductory discussion of kinds and at tributes. Section D presents some basic ideas about laws and law sentences. A. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BOOK Basic scientific research is directed towards the goals of increasing our knowledge of the wor1d and our understanding of the wor1d. Knowledge increases through the discovery and confirmation of facts and laws. Understanding results from the explanation of known facts and laws, and through the formulation of general, systematic theories. Other things being equal, we tend to feeI that our understanding of a c1ass of phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively unified theories of that c1ass of phenomena. It is therefore natural to consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least in principle, governs all known phenomena. The dream of obtaining such a theory, and the understanding that it would provide, has motivated an enormous amount of research by both scientists and philosophers."

This book contains contributions presented during the international conference on Model-Based Reasoning (MBR012), held on June 21-23 in Sestri Levante, Italy. Interdisciplinary researchers discuss in this volume how scientific cognition and other kinds of cognition make use of models, abduction, and explanatory reasoning in order to produce important or creative changes in theories and concepts. Some of the contributions analyzed the problem of model-based reasoning in technology and stressed the issues of scientific and technological innovation. The book is divided in three main parts: models, mental models, representations; abduction, problem solving and practical reasoning; historical, epistemological and technological issues.

The volume is based on the papers that were presented at the international

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In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists."