The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. Until today, it informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. It is due to this fact that new trends in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy. To acknowledge properly this important recent work we need to re-open the debate about the nature, development, and significance of the context distinction, about its merits and flaws. The contributions to this volume provide close readings and detailed analyses of the original textual sources for the context distinction.

The work of Galileo has long been important not only as a foundation of modern physics but also as a model - and perhaps the paradigmatic model - of scientific method, and therefore as a leading example of scientific rationality. However, as we know, the matter is not so simple. The range of Galileo readings is so varied that one may be led to the conclusion that it is a case of chacun a son Galileo; that here, as with the Bible, or Plato or Kant or Freud or Finnegan's Wake, the texts themselves underdetermine just what moral is to be pointed. But if there is no canonical reading, how can the texts be taken as evidence or example of a canonical view of scientific rationality, as in Galileo? Or is it the case, instead, that we decide a priori what the norms of rationality are and then pick through texts to fmd those which satisfy these norms? Specifically, how and on what grounds are we to accept or reject scientific theories, or scientific reasoning? If we are to do this on the basis of historical analysis of how, in fact, theories came to be accepted or rejected, how shall we distinguish 'is' from 'ought'? What follows (if anything does) from such analysis or reconstruction about how theories ought to be accepted or rejected? Maurice Finocchiaro's study of Galileo brings an important and original approach to the question of scientific rationality by way of a systematic read"

This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them.

This collection of papers contains historical case studies, systematic contributions of a general nature, and applications to specific sciences. The bibliographies of the contributions contain references to all central items from the traditions that are relevant today. While providing access to contemporary views on the issue, the papers illustrate the wide variety of functions of metaphors and analogies, as well as the many connections between the study of some of these functions and other subjects and disciplines.

The essays collected in this volume represent, in a revised version, the pa- pers of the Wittgenstein Conference held in November 1989 at the Univer- sity ofRome 'La Sapienza' to celebrate the centenary ofhis birth. They offer a systematic account ofWittgenstein's philosophy ofmind and contribute to illuminate his later conception of perceptive, emotional and cognitive lan- guage. Some of the reasons why it seemed the right time to promote an am- pIe confrontation ofideas on Wittgenstein's mature perspective are sufficiently c1ear as they derive from the need to sum up the state of research based on the availability of the Nachlass and the publication in the last decade of a conspicuous quantity ofwritings dedicated to philosophical psychology; other reasons are more complex as they depend on the already noticed tendency in the recent epistemological debate to interpret Wittgenstein's provocative and controversial theses in a "perverse" way, in a way which has been used as a banner for epistemic relativism, subjectivism, and irrationalism. The intention of this collection of essays is to construct an image of Wittgenstein's thought, which is as faithful as possible to his philosophy of mind and language from both a theoretical and exegetical point of view. The book also strives to assess the continuity and internal coherence of the theses developed throughout the different phases of his research.

First published in 1988, the aim of this book can be stated in Nietzsche's words: 'To look at science from the perspective of the artist, but at art from that of life'. The title contests the notions that science alone can provide us with the most objective truth about the world, and that artistic endeavour can produce nothing more valuable than entertainment. O'Hear argues that art and the study of art are not indispensable aspects of human life, and that this is equally as important as the investigation of the natural world.

In this collection of essays Allan Franklin defends the view that science provides us with knowledge about the world which is based on experimental evidence and on reasoned and critical discussion. In short, he argues that science is a reasonable enterprise. He begins with detailed studies of four episodes from the history of modern physics: (1) the early attempts to detect gravity waves, (2) how the physics community decided that a proposed new elementary particle, 17-keV neutrino, did not exist, (3) a sequence of experiments on K meson decay, and (4) the origins of the Fifth Force hypothesis, a proposed modification of Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation. The case studies are then used to examine issues such as how discord between experimental results is resolved, calibration of an experimental apparatus and its legitimate use in validating an experimental result, and how experimental results provide reasonable grounds for belief in both the truth of physical theories and in the existence of the entities involved in those theories. This book is a challenge to the critics of science, both postmodern and constructivist, to provide convincing alternative explanations of the episodes and issues discussed. It should be of interest to philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, and to scientists themselves.

This volume tackles Goedel's two-stage project of first using Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to reconstruct and develop Leibniz' monadology, and then founding classical mathematics on the metaphysics thus obtained. The author analyses the historical and systematic aspects of that project, and then evaluates it, with an emphasis on the second stage. The book is organised around Goedel's use of Leibniz, Husserl and Brouwer. Far from considering past philosophers irrelevant to actual systematic concerns, Goedel embraced the use of historical authors to frame his own philosophical perspective. The philosophies of Leibniz and Husserl define his project, while Brouwer's intuitionism is its principal foil: the close affinities between phenomenology and intuitionism set the bar for Goedel's attempt to go far beyond intuitionism. The four central essays are `Monads and sets', `On the philosophical development of Kurt Goedel', `Goedel and intuitionism', and `Construction and constitution in mathematics'. The first analyses and criticises Goedel's attempt to justify, by an argument from analogy with the monadology, the reflection principle in set theory. It also provides further support for Goedel's idea that the monadology needs to be reconstructed phenomenologically, by showing that the unsupplemented monadology is not able to found mathematics directly. The second studies Goedel's reading of Husserl, its relation to Leibniz' monadology, and its influence on his publishe d writings. The third discusses how on various occasions Brouwer's intuitionism actually inspired Goedel's work, in particular the Dialectica Interpretation. The fourth addresses the question whether classical mathematics admits of the phenomenological foundation that Goedel envisaged, and concludes that it does not. The remaining essays provide further context. The essays collected here were written and published over the last decade. Notes have been added to record further thoughts, changes of mind, connections between the essays, and updates of references.

This volume collects reflections on the role of philosophy in case studies in the history of science. Case studies have played a prominent role in recent history and philosophy of science. They have been used to illustrate, question, explore, or explicate philosophical points of view. Even if not explicitly so, historical narratives are always guided by philosophical background assumptions. But what happens if different philosophies lead to different narratives of the same historical episodes? Can historical case studies decide between competing philosophical viewpoints? What are the criteria that a case study has to fulfill in order to be philosophically relevant? Bringing together leading practitioners in the fields of history and philosophy of the physical and the life sciences, this volume addresses this methodological problem and proposes ways of rendering explicit philosophical assumptions of historical work.

This volume has its already distant or1g1n in an inter national conference on Evolutionary Epistemology the editors organized at the University of Ghent in November 1984. This conference aimed to follow up the endeavor started at the ERISS (Epistemologically Relevant Internalist Sociology of Science) conference organized by Don Campbell and Alex Rosen berg at Cazenovia Lake, New York, in June 1981, whilst in jecting the gist of certain current continental intellectual developments into a debate whose focus, we thought, was in danger of being narrowed too much, considering the still underdeveloped state of affairs in the field. Broadly speaking, evolutionary epistemology today con sists of two interrelated, yet qualitatively distinct inves tigative efforts. Both are drawing on Darwinian concepts, which may explain why many people have failed to discriminate them. One is the study of the evolution of the cognitive apparatus of living organisms, which is first and foremost the province of biologists and psychologists (H. C. Plotkin, Ed. , Learning, Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolu tionary Epistemology, New York, Wiley, 1984), although quite a few philosophers - professional or vocational - have also felt the need to express themselves on this vast subject (F. M. Wuketits, Ed. , Conce ts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, Dordrecht Boston, Reidel, 1984). The other approach deals with the evolution of science, and has been dominated hitherto by (allegedly) 'naturalized' philosophers; no book-length survey of this literature is available at present.

TIus is the second, and fmal, volume to derive from the exciting Kronberg conference of 1975, and to show the intelligent editorial care of Gerard Radnitzky and Gunnar Andersson that was so evident in the first book, Progress and Rationality in Science (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 58). Together they set forth central themes in current history and philosophy of the sciences, and in particular they will be seen as also providing obbligatos: research programs, metaphysical inevitabilities, methodological options, logical constraints, historical conjectures. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. WARTOFSKY July 1979 T T ABLE OF CONTENTS v EDITORIAL EDITORIAL PREFACE PREFACE ix PREFACE PREFACE INTRODUCTION GUNNAR ANDERSSON / Presuppositions, Problems, Progress 3 PART I: METAPHYSICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE NICHOLAS RESCHER / Some Issues Regarding the Completeness of Science and the limits of Scientific Knowledge 19 MAX JAMMER / A Consideration of the Philosophical Implications of the New Physics 41 PAUL FEYERABEND / Dialogue on Method 63 PETER HODGSON / Presuppositions and limits of Science 133 PART II: RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE WOLFGANG STEGMULLER / A Combined Approach to the Dynam ics of Theories. How to Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change by Applying Set Theoretical Structures 151 JOSEPH J. KOCKELMANS / Reflections on Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs 187 P A TRICK A."

How do scientists approach science? Scientists, sociologists and philosophers were asked to write on this intriguing problem and to display their results at the International Congress Einstein Meets Magritte'. The outcome of their effort can be found in this rather unique book, presenting all kinds of different views on science. Quantum mechanics is a discipline which deserves and receives special attention in this book, mainly because it is fascinating and, hence, appeals to the general public. This book not only contains articles on the introductory level, it also provides new insights and bold, even provocative proposals. That way, the reader gets acquainted with science in the making', sitting in the front row. The contributions have been written for a broad interdisciplinary audience of scholars and students.

Proceedings of the Conference for Formal Methods in the Methodology of Emperical Sciences, Warsaw, June 17-21, 1974, Poland.

Can religious belief survive in a scientific era? Aldous Huxley thought so. His early recognition of the profound significance of twentieth-century science and the need for moral and spiritual direction resulted in his espousal of mysticism. An examination of his fiction and nonfiction reveals Huxley's significance for cross-disciplinary debates between religion, science and literature and provides examples of the transmission or refraction of knowledge from one discourse to another.

This book provides a chronological introduction to modern atomic theory, which represented an attempt to reconcile the ancient doctrine of atomism with careful experiments-performed during the 19th century-on the flow of heat through substances and across empty space. Included herein are selections from classic texts such as Carnot's Reflection on the Motive Power of Fire, Clausius' Mechanical Theory of Heat, Rutherford's Nuclear Constitution of Atoms, Planck's Atomic Theory of Matter and Heisenberg's Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Theory. Each chapter begins with a short introduction followed by a reading selection. Carefully crafted study questions draw out key points in the text and focus the reader's attention on the author's methods, analysis and conclusions. Numerical and laboratory exercises at the end of each chapter test the reader's ability to understand and apply key concepts from the text. Heat, Radiation and Quanta is the last of four volumes in A Student's Guide through the Great Physics Texts. The book comes from a four-semester undergraduate physics curriculum designed to encourage a critical and circumspect approach to natural science while at the same time preparing students for advanced coursework in physics. This book is particularly suitable as a college-level textbook for students of the natural sciences, history or philosophy. It might also serve as a textbook for advanced high-school or home-schooled students, or as a thematically-organized source-book for scholars and motivated lay-readers. In studying the classic scientific texts included herein, the reader will be drawn toward a lifetime of contemplation.

First published in 1963, this title considers the philosophical problems encountered when attempting to provide a clear and general explanation of scientific principles, and the basic confrontation between such principles and experience. Beginning with a detailed introduction that considers various approaches to the philosophy and theory of science, Israel Scheffler then divides his study into three key sections - Explanation, Significance and Confirmation - that explore how these complex issues involved have been dealt with in contemporary research. This title, by one of America's leading philosophers, will provide a valuable analysis of the theory and problems surrounding the Philosophy of Science.

Boris Kuznetsov was a scientist among humanists, a philosopher among scientists, a historian for those who look to the future, an optimist in an age of sadness. He was steeped in classical European culture, from earliest times to the latest avant-garde, and he roamed through the ages, an inveterate time-traveller, chatting and arguing with Aristotle and Descartes, Heine and Dante, among many others. Kuznetsov was also, in his intelligent and thoughtful way, a Marxist scholar and a practical engineer, a patriotic Russian Jew of the first sixty years of the Soviet Union. Above all he meditated upon the revolutionary developments of the natural sciences, throughout history to be sure but particularly in his own time, the time of what he called 'non-classical science', and of his beloved and noblest hero, Albert Einstein. Kuznetsov was born in Dnepropetrovsk on October 5, 1903 (then Yekaterinoslav). By early years he had begun to teach, first in 1921 at an institute of mining engineering and then at other technological institutions. By 1933 he had received a scientific post within the Academy of Science of the U. S. S. R. , and then at the end of the Second World War he joined several colleagues at the new Institute of the History of Science and Technology. For more than 40 years he worked there until his death two years ago.

Richard Martin's thoroughly philosophical as well as thoroughly tech nical investigations deserve continued and appreciative study. His sympathy and good cheer do not obscure his rigorous standard, nor do his contemporary sophistication and intellectual independence obscure his critical congeniality toward classical and medieval philosophers. So he deals with old and new; his papers, in his neat self-descriptions, consist of reminders, criticisms, and constructions. They might also be seen as studies in the understanding of truth, ramifying as widely in mathematics, logic, and epistemology as well as metaphysics, as such understanding has required. For us it is a pleasant occasion to welcome Richard Martin's new Boston Studies, and to note his continuously con collection to the structive and critical interventions at the Boston Colloquium for the of Science. Philosophy Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. WARTOFSKY July 1979 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE vii PREFACE xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv I. Truth and Its Illicit Surrogates II. Some Reminders concerning Truth, Satisfaction, and Reference 17 III. On Disquotation and Intensionality 30 IV. On Truth, Belief, and Modes of Description 42 V. The Pragmatics of Self-Reference 55 VI. On Suppositio and Denotation 72 VII. Of Time and the Null Individual 82 VIII. Existence and Logical Form 95 IX. Tense, Aspect, and Modality 110 X. Of 'Of' 130 XI. Events and Actions: Brand and Kim 144 XII. Why I Am Not a Montague Grammarian 160 XIII."

Scientific research is viewed as a deliberate activity and the logic of discovery consists of strategies and arguments whereby the best objectives (questions) and optimal means for achieving these objectives (heuristics) are chosen. This book includes a discussion and some proposals regarding the way the logic of questions can be applied to understanding scientific research and draws upon work in artificial intelligence in a discussion of heuristics and methods for appraising heuristics (metaheuristics). It also includes a discussion of a third source for scientific objectives and heuristics; episodes and examplars from the history of science and the history of philosophy. This book is written to be accessible to advanced students in philosophy and to the scientific community. It is of interest to philosophers of science, philosophers of biology, historians of physics, and historians of biology.

These two volumes form a full portrait of Hans Reichenbach, from the school boy and university student to the maturing and creative scholar, who was as well an immensely devoted teacher and a gifted popular writer and speaker on science and philosophy. We selected the articles for several reasons. Many of them have not pre viously been available in English; many are out of print, either in English or in German; some, especially the early ones, have been little known, and deal with subject-matters other than philosophy of science. The genesis and evolu tion of Reichenbach's ideas appeared to be of deep interest, and so we in cluded papers from four decades, despite occasional redundancy. We were, for example, pleased to include his extensive review article from the encyclo pedic Handbuch der Physik of 1929 on 'The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge', written at a time of creative collaboration between Reichenbach's Berlin group and the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap. Reichenbach was a pioneer, opening new pathways to the solution of age-old problems in many fields: space, time, causality, induction and probability - philosophical analysis and interpretation of classical physics, relativity and quantum physics - logic, language, ethics, scientific explanation and methodology, critical appreciation and reconstruction of past metaphysical thinkers and scientists from Plato to Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, his own philosophical journey was initiated by his passage from Kant to anti-Kant."

The argument of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Critique of Pure Reason is the deepest and most far-reaching in philosophy. In his new book, Robert Howell interprets main themes of the Deduction using ideas from contemporary philosophy and intensional logic, thereby providing a keener grasp of Kant's many subtleties than has hitherto been available. No other work pursues Kant's argument through every twist and turn with the careful, logically detailed attention maintained here. Surprising new accounts of apperception, the concept of an object, the logical functions of thought, the role of the Metaphysical Deduction, and Kant's relations to his Aristotelian-Cartesian background are developed. Howell makes a precise contribution to the discussion of most of the disputed issues in the history of Deduction interpretation. Controversial in its conclusions, this book demands the attention of all who take seriously the task of understanding Kant's work and evaluating it dispassionately.

Modern philosophy has benefited immensely from the intelligence and sensitivity, the creative and critical energies, and the lucidity of Polish scholars. Their investigations into the logical and methodological founda- tions of mathematics, the physical and biological sciences, ethics and esthetics, psychology, linguistics, economics and jurisprudence, and the social sciences - all are marked by profound and imaginative work. To the centers of empiricist philosophy of science in Vienna, Berlin and Cambridge during the first half of this century, one always added the great school of analytic and methodological studies in Warsaw and Lw6w. To the world centers of Marxist theoretical practice in Berlin, Moscow, Paris, Rome and elsewhere, one must add the Poland of the same era, from Ludwig Krzywicki (1859-1941) onward. (From our preface to Wiatr [1979p. Other movements also have been distinctive in Poland. Phenomenology was developed in the impressive school of Roman Ingarden at Cracow, semiotics from the early work of the philosopher and psychologist Kazimierz Twardowski at Lw6w in the 1890's, with masterful develop- ment by his disciples Kotarbinski and Ajdukiewicz onward, conceptual foundations of physics in the incisive methodological reflections of Marian Smoluchowski, and mathematical logic from Jan I:.ukasiewicz and Stanislaw Lesniewski to Tarski, Mostowski, and many others.

Some philosophers think that Paul Feyerabend is a clown, a great many others think that he is one of the most exciting philosophers of science of this century. For me the truth does not lie somewhere in between, for I am decidedly of the second opinion, an opinion that is becoming general around the world as this century comes to an end and history begins to cast its appraising eye upon the intellectual harvest of our era. A good example of this opinion may be found in the admiration for Feyerabend's philosophy of science expressed by Grover Maxwell in his contribution to this volume. Maxwell, recalling his own intellectual transformation, says also that it was Feyerabend who "confirmed my then incipient suspicions that most of the foundations of currently fashionable philosophy and even a great deal of the methodology to which many scientists pay enthusiastic lip service are based on simple mistake- assumptions whose absurdity becomes obvious once attention is directed at them." And lest the reader thinks, as many still do, that however sharp Feyerabend's attacks upon the philosophical establishment may have been, he does not offer a positive philosophy (a complain made by C.A. Hooker and some of the other contributors), Paul Churchland argues otherwise.

twentieth-century literature about the distinction between explanation and und- standing)? Second, can we do justice to a particular writer's notion of that category by taking at face value what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a) intellectual history - like other kinds of history - has to be careful not to uncritically adopt actors' categories, and (b) more generally, even the actors' own thinking about a particular issue has to be contextualized vis-a-vis their other intellectual commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks to read some of the nineteen- century philosophical writings about Erklaren and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem, which he terms the problem of the "unity of experience.""

The articles in this collection were all selected from the first five volumes of the Journal of Dialectics of Nature published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1979 and 1985. The Journal was established in 1979 as a comprehensive theoretical publication concerning the history, philosophy and sociology of the natural sciences. It began publication as a response to China's reform, particularly the policy of opening to the outside world. Chinese scholars began to undertake distinctive, original research in these fields. This collection provides a cross-section of their efforts during the initial phase. To enable western scholars to understand the historical process of this change in Chinese academics, Yu Guangyuan's On the Emancipation of the Mind' and Xu Liangying's Essay on the Role of Science and Democracy in Society' have been included in this collection. Three of the papers included on the philosophy of science are discussions of philosophical issues in cosmology and biology by scientists themselves. The remaining four are written by philosophers of science and discuss information and cognition, homeostasis and Chinese traditional medicine, the I Ching (Yi Jing) and mathematics, etc. Papers have been selected on the history of both classical and modern science and technology, the most distinctive of which are macro-comparisons of the development of science in China and the west. Some papers discuss the issue of the demarcation of periods in the history of science, the history of ancient Chinese mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, machinery, medicine, etc. Others discuss the history of modern physics and biology, the history of historiography of science in China and thehistory of regional development of Chinese science and technology. Also included are biographies of three post-eighteenth-century Chinese scholars, Li Shanlan (1811-1882), Hua Hengfang (1833&endash;1902), and Cai Yuanpei (1868&endash;1940), who contributed greatly to the introduction of western science and scholarship to China. In addition, three short papers have been included introducing the interactions between Chinese scholars and three great western scientists, Niels Bohr, Norbert Wiener, and Robert A. Millikan.