This book discusses two of the oldest and hardest problems in both science and philosophy: What is matter?, and What is mind? A reason for tackling both problems in a single book is that two of the most influential views in modern philosophy are that the universe is mental (idealism), and that the everything real is material (materialism). Most of the thinkers who espouse a materialist view of mind have obsolete ideas about matter, whereas those who claim that science supports idealism have not explained how the universe could have existed before humans emerged. Besides, both groups tend to ignore the other levels of existence-chemical, biological, social, and technological. If such levels and the concomitant emergence processes are ignored, the physicalism/spiritualism dilemma remains unsolved, whereas if they are included, the alleged mysteries are shown to be problems that science is treating successfully.

Deservedly so, Jules Vuillemin is widely respected and greatly admired. It is not simply that he has produced a large body of outstanding work, in many different areas of philosophy. Or that he combines to an unusual degree rigorous standards with a very wide perspective. Or even that in his path-breaking accounts of algebra, of !)escartes, of Kant and of Russell, he showed in new and profound ways how the histories of science and philosophy could be used to illuminate each other. It is also that he has pursued the application of formal techniques and the defense of liberal institutions with a rare singlemindedness and courage. In a time and place where the former were generally ignored and the latter often attacked, he carried on, at some personal cost, embodying a traditional and ideal conception of the philosophical life, bridging national differences. Those who know him also treasure his friendship. Always curious, he delights in new facts and new experiences, and continually heightens the perception of those around him. Almost yearly, at the College de France he introduced brand new courses always with fresh and fruitful inSights. Exceptionally solicitous, he follows the lives of the families around him in great detail. The devotion of his students is legend. His personal energy is also legend. Many of us have followed him bounding up the stairs two at a time or through the gardens of the Luxembourg, his wit and irony apace.

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and to computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. Few areas of inquiry have generated as much interest and enthusiasm in recent times as has the discipline known as "evolutionary psychology," but its pretentions and its accomlishments have not always been properly understood. This collection brings together important work in psychology, anthropology, and the philosophy of science that contributes toward that goal, especially by emphasizing the role of natural selection and sexual selection as crucial factors in the evolution of cognitive mechanisms for information processing. The methodological studies that are presented here are bound to enhance appreciation for the scope and limits of this fascinating domain. The editor has produced a fascinating volume that should appeal to a broad and diverse audience.

A number of years ago, Harriet Sheridan, then Dean of Brown University, organized a series oflectures in which individual faculty members described how it came about that they entered their various fields. I was invited to participate in this series and found in the invitation an opportunity to recall events going back to my early teens. The lecture was well received and its reception encouraged me to work up an expanded version. My manuscript lay dormant all these years. In the meanwhile, sufficiently many other mathematical experiences and encounters accumulated to make this little book. My 1981 lecture is the basis of the first piece: "Napoleon's Theorem. " Although there is a connection between the first piece and the second, the four pieces here are essentially independent. The sec ond piece, "Carpenter and the Napoleon Ascription," has as its object a full description of a certain type of scholar-storyteller (of whom I have known and admired several). It is a pastiche, contain ing a salad bar selection blended together by my own imagination. This piece purports, as a secondary goal, to present a solution to a certain unsolved historical problem raised in the first piece. The third piece, "The Man Who Began His Lectures with 'Namely'," is a short reminiscence of Stefan Bergman, one of my teachers of graduate mathematics. Bergman, a remarkable person ality, was born in Poland and came to the United States in 1939."

It is generally believed that doing science means accumulating empirical data with no or little reference to the interpretation of the data based on the scientist's th- retical framework or presuppositions. Holton (1969a) has deplored the widely accepted myth (experimenticism) according to which progress in science is presented as the inexorable result of the pursuit of logically sound conclusions from un- biguous experimental data. Surprisingly, some of the leading scientists themselves (Millikan is a good example) have contributed to perpetuate the myth with respect to modern science being essentially empirical, that is carefully tested experim- tal facts (free of a priori conceptions), leading to inductive generalizations. Based on the existing knowledge in a field of research a scientist formulates the guiding assumptions (Laudan et al. , 1988), presuppositions (Holton, 1978, 1998) and "hard core" (Lakatos, 1970) of the research program that constitutes the imperative of presuppositions, which is not abandoned in the face of anomalous data. Laudan and his group consider the following paraphrase of Kant by Lakatos as an important guideline: philosophy of science without history of science is empty. Starting in the 1960s, this "historical school" has attempted to redraw and replace the positivist or logical empiricist image of science that dominated for the first half of the twentieth century. Among other aspects, one that looms large in these studies is that of "guiding assumptions" and has considerable implications for the main thesis of this monograph (Chapter 2).

The Age of Reason is left the Dark Ages of the history of mechanics. Clifford A. Truesdell) 1. 1 THE INVISIBLE TRUTH OF CLASSICAL PHYSICS There are some questions that physics since the days of Newton simply cannot an swer. Perhaps the most important of these can be categorized as 'questions of eth ics', and 'questions of ultimate meaning'. The question of humanity's place in the cosmos and in nature is pre-eminently a philosophical and religious one, and physics seems to have little to contribute to answering it. Although physics claims to have made very fundamental discoveries about the cosmos and nature, its concern is with the coherence and order of material phenomena rather than with questions of mean ing. Now and then thinkers such as Stephen Hawking or Fritjof Capra emerge, who appear to claim that a total world-view can be derived from physics. Generally, however, such authors do not actually make any great effort to make good on their claim to completeness: their answers to questions of meaning often pale in compari 2 son with their answers to conventional questions in physics. Moreover, to the extent that they do attempt to answer questions of meaning, it is easy to show that they 3 draw on assumptions from outside physics."

Every reader interested in understanding the important problems in physics and astrophysics and their historic development over the past 60 years will enjoy this book immensely. The philosophy, history and the individual views of famous scientists of the 20th century known personally to the author, make this book fascinating for non-physicists, too. The book consists of three parts on (I) major problems of physics and astrophysics, (II) the philosophy and history of science and (III) memorial essays on famous physicists. The author is an internationally renowned scientist, who summarises here his life-long experience.

Unique in its use of literature from Dutch, French, and German sources. No other comparable textbook on legal method/ legal science. Interdisciplinary; useful also for those looking to understand the philosophy of science.

Over the past three decades, the philosophy of biology has emerged from the shadow of the philosophy of physics to become a respectable and thriving philosophical subdiscipline. The authors take a fresh look at the life sciences and the philosophy of biology from a strictly realist and emergentist-naturalist perspective. They outline a unified and science-oriented philosophical framework that enables the clarification of many foundational and philosophical issues in biology. This book will be of interest both to life scientists and philosophers.

To STUDY the philosophy of science has always been a complex task, reaching to the methods and achievements of the sciences, to their histories and their contexts, and to their human implications. Sometimes favored by their social environment, sometimes dissenting from their Zeitgeist, the scientists have taken varying roles in the social spectrum, allied with differing interests, classes, powers, religions, evaluative outlooks. Philosophers should be interested as much in the changing social situations of science and of scientists as in the changing empirical findings and explanatory conceptions; recognition that rationality, experience, and inquiry have a history is no longer novel. Moreover the historical development of scientific perceptions of nature is linked-whether loosely or tightly--by the development of perceptions of science itself. Percep tions of science are located not only in the self-awareness of scientists but also in the critical awareness of their fellow human beings. No doubt some friends or critics are more articulate than others, but the context for science has not been bland or neutral. Plaything, weapon, savior, hireling, magician, devil, priest, the stereotypes of science and scientist are neither the simple result of plain ignorance nor the obvious reflection of some successes and some failures of the scientific enterprise. Public perceptions of science have great importance for understanding both the public in society and the sciences at the stage per ceived."

This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, infonnation, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis will be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experi mental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. In the present volume, Bruce Thyer has brought together an impressive collection of original studies concerning philosophical aspects of behaviorism, which continues to exert considerable influence even in the era of the Cognitive Revolution. From its early origins and basic principles to its analysis of verbal behavior, consciousness, and free-will, determinism, and self-control, this work offers something of value for everyone with a serious interest in understanding scientific method in application to human behavior. Indeed, as the editor remarks, behaviorism is as much a philosophy as it is an approach to the study of behavior. The breadth and depth of this approach receives proper representation in this work devoted to its rich and varied philosophical legacy. J.H.F. v BA. Thyer (ed.). The Philosophical Legacy of Behaviorism, v."

Incongruent counterparts are objects that are perfectly similar except for being mirror images of each other, such as left and right human hands. Immanuel Kant was the first great thinker to point out the philosophical significance of such objects. He called them "counter parts" because they are similar in nearly every way, "incongruent" because, despite their similarity, one could never be put in the place of the other. Three important discussions of incongruent counterparts occur in Kant's writings. The first is an article published in 1768, 'On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space', in which Kant con tended that incongruent counterparts furnish a refutation of Leibniz's relational theory of space and a proof of Newton's rival theory of absolute space. The second is a section of his Inaugural Dissertation, published two years later in 1770, in which he cited incongruent counterparts as showing that our knowledge of space must rest on intuitions. The third is a section of the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783, in which he cited incongruent counterparts as a paradox resolvable only by his own theory of space as mind-dependent. A fourth mention in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science of 1786 briefly repeats the Prolegomena point. Curiously, there is no mention of incongruent counterparts in either of the editions (1781 and 1787) of Kant's magnum opus, the Critique of Pure Reason."

Much of Duhem's work as a professional scientist was closely related to the newly emerging discipline of physical chemistry. The book and associated papers translated here revolve around his concomitant philosophical and historical interests in chemistry-topics largely uncovered by Duhem's writings hitherto available in English. He understood contemporary concerns of chemists to be a development of the ancient dispute over the nature of mixture. Having developed his historical account from distinctions drawn from the atomists and Aristotelians of antiquity, he places his own views of chemical combination squarely within the Aristotelian tradition. Apart from illuminating Duhem's own work, it is of interest to see how the ancient dispute can be related to modern science by someone competent to make such comparisons. The book is lucid and logically stringent without assuming any particular mathematical prerequisites, and provides a masterly statement of an important line of nineteenth century thought which is of interest in its own right as well as providing insight into Duhem's broader philosophical views.

Audience: This volume is of interest to Duhem scholars, philosophers of science and chemists with an interest in philosophy.

The essays included in this volume are a mixture of old and new. Three of them make their first appearance in print on this occa sion (Nos III, IV, and V). The remaining four are based upon materials previously published in learned journals or anthologies. (However, these previously published papers have been revised and, generally, expanded for inclusion here.) Detailed acknowl edgement of prior publications is made in the notes to the relevant articles. I am grateful to the editors of these several publications for their kind permission to use this material. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for the Western Ontario Series for some useful corrigenda. And I should like to thank John Horty and Lily Knezevich for their help in seeing this material through the press. NICHOLAS RESCHER Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania May, 1980 xi INTRODUCTION The unifying theme of these essays is their concern with Leibniz's metaphysics of nature. In particular, they revolve about his cos mology of creation and his conception of the real world as one among infinitely many equipossible alternatives."

Historians of Latin American philosophy have paid relatively little attention to the development of philosophical analysis in Latin America. There are two reasons for this neglect: First, they have been primarily concerned with the forma tive period of philosophical development, in particular with the so called "founders" of La ti n American philosophy. And second. philosophical analysis did not become a noticeable philosophical trend in Latin America until recent years. True. a nunber of Latin American philosophers took notice of Moore. Russell. the members of the Vienna Circle and other important figures in the analytic movement qui te early. But these were isolated instances that lacked the sustained effort and broad base indispensible to make a serious impact in the development of Latin American philosophy. That has changed now. There are not only good numbers of philosophers who work within the analytic tradition, but also some journals and institutes dedicated to the analytic mode of philosophizing. It is. therefore. most appropriate to publish a collection of articles which would introduce the reader of philosophy to the most representative analytic material produced so far in Latin America. Indeed. it is not only appropriate. but also necessary. since most of the published analytic literature to date is scattered in various journals, sometimes of difficult access. Moreover, not all that has been published is representative of the best already produced and of the potential that the movement has in Latin America.

It is ten years since Adolf Griinbaum published the first edition of this book. It was promptly recognized to be one of the few major works in the philosophy of the natural sciences of this generation. In part, this is so because Griinbaum has chosen a problem basic both to philosophy and to the natural sciences - the nature of space and time; and in part, this is so because he so admirably exemplifies that Aristotelian devotion to the intimate and mutual dependence of actual science and philosophical understanding. More than this, however, the quality of his work derives from his achievement in combining detail with scope. The problems of space and time have been among the most difficult in contemporary and classical thought, and Griinbaum has been responsible to the full depth and complexity of these difficulties. This revised and enlarged second edition is a work in progress, in the tradition of reflective analysis of modern science of such figures as Ehrenfest and Reichenbach. In publishing this work among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, we hope to contribute to and encourage that broad tradition of natural philosophy which is marked by the close collaboration of philoso phers and scientists. To this end, we have published the proceedings of our Colloquia, of meetings and conferences here and abroad, as well as the works of single authors."

Do electrons and genes exist? If inclined to answer 'yes', let's ask a harder question: do numbers exist? This book argues that the answer should be, again, affirmative. It elaborates a philosophical position according to which all, and only, entities truly indispensable to the formulation of modern scientific theories should be recognized as existent, regardless of how we might be initially tempted to categorize them - as concrete-physical or abstract-mathematical. In addition to explicating the subtleties of the positive reasons supporting this form of realism, the book clarifies and rebuts a variety of objections raised against this position.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of thematically-connected essays edited by scholars based in Australia or New Zealand with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority ofthe contributors are from Australia or New Zealand. Contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out, however, and are actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. I believe that the present volume will be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History And Philosophy of Science viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The majority of the papers in this collection had their origin in the 2001 Australasian Association for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science annual conference, held at the University of Melbourne, where streams of papers on the themes of scientific realism and commonsense were organised.

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos (1922-1974): Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K.

Depending on how one construes the kinship relations, technology has been either the stepchild of philosophy or its grandfather. In either case, technology has not been taken into the bosom of the family, but has had to wait for attention, care and feeding, while the more unclear elements - science, art, politics, ethics - were being nurtured (or cleaned up). Don Ihde puts technology in the middle of things, and develops a philosophy of technology that is at once distinctive, revealing and thought provoking. Typically, philosophy of technology has existed at, or beyond, the margins of the philosophy of science, and therefore the question of technology has come to be posed (when it is) either by historians of technology or by social critics. The philosophy of technology, as analysis and critique of the concepts, methodologies, implicit epistemologies and ontologies of technological praxis and thought, has remained underdeveloped. When philosophy does turn its attention to the insistent presence of technology, it inevitably casts the question in one or another of the dominant modes of philosophical interpretation and reconstruction. Thus, the logic of technological thinking and practice has been a subject of some systematic work (e. g., in the Praxiology of Kotarbinski and Kotarbinska, among others). And the question of technology's relation to science has been posed in the framework of the nomological model of explanation in the sciences - e. g."

These essays on Finalization in Science - The Social Orientation of Scientific Progress comprise a remarkable, problematic and controversial book. The authors propose a thesis about the social direction of scientific research which was the occasion of a lively and often bitter debate in Germany from 1976 to 1982. Their provocative thesis, briefly, is this: that modern science converges, historically, to the development of a number of 'closed theories', i. e. stable and relatively completed sciences, no longer to be improved by small changes but only by major changes in an entire theoretical structure. Further: that at such a stage of 'mature theory', the formerly viable norm of intra-scientific autonomy may appropriately be replaced by the social direction' of further scientific research (within such a 'mature' field) for socially relevant or, we may bluntly say, 'task-oriented' purposes. This is nothing less than a theory for the planning and social directing of science, under certain specific conditions. Understandably, it raised the sharp objections that such an approach would subordinate scientific inquiry as a free and untrammeled search for truth to the dictates of social relevance and dominant interests, even possibly to dictation and control for particularistic social and political interests.

This is the second of two volumes containing papers submitted by the invited speakers to the 11th international Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, held in Cracow in 1999, under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. The invited speakers are the leading researchers and accordingly the book presents the current state of the intellectual discourse in the respective fields.