This anthology opens new perspectives in the domain of history, philosophy, and science teaching research. Its four sections are: first, science, culture and education; second, the teaching and learning of science; third, curriculum development and justification; and fourth, indoctrination. The first group of essays deal with the neglected topic of science education and the Enlightenment tradition. These essays show that many core commitments of modern science education have their roots in this tradition, and consequently all can benefit from a more informed awareness of its strengths and weaknesses. Other essays address research on leaning and teaching from the perspectives of social epistemology and educational psychology. Included here is the first ever English translation of Ernst Mach's most influential 1890 paper on 'The Psychological and Logical Moment in Natural Science Teaching'. This paper launched the influential Machian tradition in education. Other essays address concrete cases of the utilisation of history and philosophy in the development and justification of school science curricula. These are instances of the supportive relation of HPS&ST research to curriculum theorising. Finally, two essays address the topic of Indoctrination in science education; a subject long-discussed in philosophy of education, but inadequately in science education. This book is a timely reminder of why history and philosophy of science are urgently needed to support understanding of science. From major traditions such as the Enlightenment to the tensions around cultural studies of science, the book provides a comprehensive context for the scientific endeavour, drawing on curriculum and instructional examples. Sibel Erduran, University of Oxford, UK The scholarship that each of the authors in this volume offers deepens our understanding of what we teach in science and why that understanding matters. This is an important book exploring a wide set of issues and should be read by anyone with an interest in science or science education. Jonathan Osborne, Stanford University, USA This volume presents new and updated perspectives in the field, such as the Enlightenment Tradition, Cultural Studies, Indoctrination in Science Education, and Nature of Science. Highly recommended. Mansoor Niaz, Universidad de Oriente, Venezuela This volume provides an extremely valuable set of insights into educational issues related to the history and philosophy of science. Michael J Reiss, University College London, UK

Kosik writes that the history of a text is in a certain sense the history of its interpretations. In the fifteen years that have passed since the fust (Czech) edition of his Dialectics of the Concrete, this book has been widely read and interpreted throughout Europe, in diverse centers of scholarship as well as in private studies. A faithful English language edition is long overdue. This publication of KosIk's work will surely provoke a range of new interpretations. For its theme is the characterization of science and of rationality in the context of the social roots of science and the social critique which an appropriately rational science should afford. Kosik's question is: How shall Karl Marx's understanding of science itself be understood? And how can it be further developed? In his treatment of the question of scientific rationality, Kosik drives bluntly into the issues of gravest human concern, not the least of which is how to avoid the pseudo-concrete, the pseudo-scientific, the pseudo-rational, the pseudo historical. Starting with Marx's methodological approach, of "ascending from the abstract to the concrete," Kosik develops a critique of positivism, of phenomenalist empiricism, and of "metaphysical" rationalism, counter posing them to "dialectical rationalism." He takes the category of the concrete in the dialectical sense of that which comes to be known by the active transformation of nature and society by human purposive activity."

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.

No student or colleague of Marjorie Grene will miss her incisive presence in these papers on the study and nature of living nature, and we believe the new reader will quickly join the stimulating discussion and critique which Professor Grene steadily provokes. For years she has worked with equally sure knowledge in the classical domain of philosophy and in modern epistemological inquiry, equally philosopher of science and metaphysician. Moreover, she has the deeply sensible notion that she should be a critically intelligent learner as much as an imaginatively original thinker, and as a result she has brought insightful expository readings of other philosophers and scientists to her own work. We were most fortunate that Marjorie Grene was willing to spend a full semester of a recent leave here in Boston, and we have on other occasions sought her participation in our colloquia and elsewhere. Now we have the pleasure of including among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science this generous selection from Grene's philosophical inquiries into the understanding of the natural world, and of the men and women in it. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. W ARTOFSKY April 1974 PREFACE This collection spans - spottily - years from 1946 ('On Some Distinctions between Men and Brutes') to 1974 ('On the Nature of Natural Necessity').

Every Thing Must Go aruges that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, they demonstrate how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental phsyics ("ontic structural realism"), which, when combined with their metaphysics of the special sciences ("rainforet realism"), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics intself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, Ladyman and Ross argue, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects.
Every Thing Must Go also assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the author's metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism vs. empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds

As an academic discipline, the philosophy and history of science in Turkey was marked by two historical events: Hans Reichenbach's immigrating to Turkey and taking a post between 1933 and 1938 at Istanbul University prior to his tenure at UCLA, and Aydin Sayili's establishing a chair in the history of science in 1952 after having become the first student to receive a Ph.D. under George Sarton at Harvard University. Since then, both disciplines have flourished in Turkey.

The present book, which contains seventeen newly commissioned articles, aims to give a rich overview of the current state of research by Turkish philosophers and historians of science. Topics covered address issues in methodology, causation, and reduction, and include philosophy of logic and physics, philosophy of psychology and language, and Ottoman science studies. The book also contains an unpublished interview with Maria Reichenbach, Hans Reichenbach's wife, which sheds new light on Reichenbach's academic and personal life in Istanbul and at UCLA.

From the nineteen sixties onwards a branch of philosophy of science has come to development, called history-oriented philosophy of science. This development constitutes a reaction on the then prevailing logical empiricist conception of scientific knowledge. The latter was increasingly seen as suffering from insurmountable internal problems, like e. g. the problems with the particular "observational-theoretical distinction" on which it drew. In addition the logical empiricists' general approach was increasingly criticized for two external shortcomings. Firstly, the examples of scientific knowledge that the logical empiricists were focusing on were con sidered as too simplistic to be informative on the nature of real life science. Secondly, it was felt that the attention of these philosophers of science was restricted to the static aspects of scientific knowledge, while neglecting its developmental aspects. History-oriented philosophy of science has taken up the challenge implicit in the latter two criticisms, i. e. to develop accounts of science that would be more adequate for understanding the development 1 of real life science. One of the more successful products of this branch of philosophy of science is Lakatos's theory of scientific development, sometimes called the "methodology of scientific research programmes." This theory conceives science as consisting of so called research program mes developing in time, and competing with each other over the issue which one generates the best explan tions of the phenomena that they address."

In contributing a foreword to this book I am complying with a wish my husband expressed a few days before his death. He had completed the manuscript of this work, which may be considered a companion volume to his book Formal Methods. The task of seeing it through the press was undertaken by Mr. J. J. A. Mooij, acting director of the Institute for Research in Foundations and the Philosophy of Science (Instituut voor Grondslagenonderzoek en Filoso: fie der Exacte Wetenschappen) of the University of Amsterdam, with the help of Mrs. E. M. Barth, lecturer at the Institute. I wish to thank Mr. Mooij and Mrs. Barth most cordially for the care with which they have acquitted themselves of this delicate task and for the speed with which they have brought it to completion. I also wish to express my gratitude to Miss L. E. Minning, M. A., for the helpful advice she has so kindly given to Mr. Mooij and Mrs. Barth during the proof reading. C. P. C. BETH-PASTOOR VII PREFACE A few years ago Mr. Horace S.

Logical empiricism - not to be confused with logical positivism (see pp. 40-44) - is a movement which has left an indelible mark on twentieth century philosophy; Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was one of its found ers and one of its most productive advocates. His sudden and untimely death in 1953 halted his work when he was at the height of his intellectual powers; nevertheless, he bequeathed to us a handsome philosophical inheritance. At the present time, twenty-five years later, we can survey our heritage and see to what extent we have been enriched. The present collection of essays constitutes an effort to do just that - to exhibit the scope and unity of Reichenbach's philosophy, and its relevance to current philosophical issues. There is no Nobel Prize in philosophy - the closest analogue is a volume in The Library of Living Philosophers, an honor which, like the Nobel Prize, cannot be awarded posthumously. Among 'scientific philosophers, ' Rudolf Carnap, Albert Einstein, Karl Popper, and Bertrand Russell have been so honored. Had Reichenbach lived longer, he would have shared the honor with Carnap, for at the time of his death a volume on Logical Empiricism, treating the works of Carnap and Reichenbach, was in its early stages of preparation. In the volume which emerged, Carnap wrote, "In 1953, when Reichenbach's creative activity was suddenly ended by his premature death, our movement lost one of its most active leaders."

Philosophers of science work not only with the methods of the sciences but with their contents as well. Substantive issues concerning the relation between mind and matter, between the material basis and the functions of cognition, have been central within the entire history of philosophy. We recall such philosophers as Aristotle, Descartes, the early Kant, Ernst Mach, and the early William James as directly inquiring of the organs and structures of thinking. Science and its philosophical self-criticism are especially and deeply united in the effort to understand the biological brain and human behavior, and so it requires no apology to include this collection of clinical studies among Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. The work of Dr. Norman Geschwind, well represented in this selection, explores the relation between structure and function, between the anatomy of the brain and the 'higher' behavior of men and women. As a clinical neurologist, Geschwind was led to these studies particularly by his in terest in those pathologies which have to do with human perception and language. His research into the anatomical substrates of specific dis orders-and strikingly the aphasias -present a fascinating and provocative examination of fundamental questions which will concern not neurologists alone but also psychologists, physicians, linguists, speech pathologists, educators, anthropologists, historians of medicine, and philosophers, among others, namely all those interested in the characteristic modes of human activity, in speech, in perception, and in the learning process generally."

"The Knowledge Book" is a unique interdisciplinary reference work for students and researchers concerned with the nature of knowledge. It is the first work of its kind to be organized on the assumption that whatever else knowledge might be, it is intrinsically social. The book consists of 42 alphabetically arranged entries on key concepts at the intersection of philosophy and sociology - what used to be called "sociology of knowledge" but is now increasingly called "social epistemology". The entries include concepts common to disciplines that in recent years have devoted more of their attention to knowledge: cultural studies, communication studies, information science, education, policy studies and business studies. Special attention is given to concepts from the emerging field of science and technology studies. Each entry presents a short, self-contained essay providing an overview of a concept and concludes with suggestions for further reading. All the entries are fully cross-referenced, allowing readers to both make connections and follow their own interests.

The Lvov-Warsaw School was active in all spheres of philosophy. Its members worked in the border area between philosophy and disci- plines such as psychology, linguistics, and literary theory. But its most important achievements were without doubt in logic and philosophical analysis based on logic. The present book is concerned with fields to which the Lvov-Warsaw School made its most important and famous contributions. Data on the School as a whole are included only in the first and last part of the book. This work is based on my monograph (1985), which appeared in Polish. But it is not merely a translation, because some fragments of the Polish version have been omitted (e. g. , the chapter on ethics), and some have been revised. Many persons helped me in my work on the book in Polish as well as on the present edition. I must first mention the late Izydora D~mbska, to whom this book is dedicated. On various detailed issues I have availed myself of advice and information given to me by Stefan Amsterdamski, Zdzislaw Augustynek, Kazimierz Czarnota, Henryk Hii, Boleslaw Iwanus, Jacek Jadacki, Jacek KabziIiski, Stanislaw Kiczuk, Tomasz Komendzinski, Janina Kotarbinska, Czeslaw Lejewski, Jerzy Perzanowski, Marian Przet~cki, the late Jerzy Slupecki, Klemens Szaniawski, Stefan Zamecki, Zbigniew Zwinogrodzki i Jan Zygmunt. I am indebted to Jaakko Hintikka for suggesting that my book be trans- lated into English and published by Reidel. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz helped me to prepare the English text.

The essays in this volume (except for the contribution of Dr. Le Grand) are extremely revised versions of papers originally delivered at a workshop on Galileo held in Blacksburg, Virginia in October, 1975. The meeting was organized by Professor Joseph Pitt and sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and Religion, The College of Arts and Sciences, and the Division of Research of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. The papers that follow deal with problems OIf Galileo's philosophy of science, specific and general problems connected with his methodology, and with historical and conceptual questions concerning the relationship of his work to that of contemporaries and both earlier and later scientists. New perspectives take many forms. In this book the 'newness' has, for the most part, two forms. First, in the papers by Wisan, Shea, Le Grand and Wallace (the concerns will also appear in some of the other contributions), greatly enriched historical discoveries of how Galileo's science and its method ology developed are provided. It should be stressed that these papers are attempts to recapture a deep sense of the kind of science Galileo was creating. Other papers in the volume, for example, those by McMullin, Machamer, Butts and Pitt, underscore the importance of this historical venture by discussing various aspects of the philosophical background of Galileo's thought. The historical and philosophical evaluations and analyses compliment one another."

Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty-First Century Perspectives examines the philosophical views, influences and legacy of the Nobel Prize physicist and philosophical spokesman of the quantum revolution, Niels Bohr. The sixteen contributions in this collection by some of the best contemporary philosophers and physicists writing on Bohr's philosophy today all carefully distinguish his subtle and unique interpretation of quantum mechanics from views often imputed to him under the banner of the "Copenhagen Interpretation." With respect to philosophical influences on Bohr's outlook, the contributors analyse prominent similarities between his viewpoint and Kantian ways of thinking, the views of the Danish philosopher Harald Hoffding, and themes characteristic of American pragmatism. In recognizing the importance of Bohr's epistemological naturalism they examine his defence of the indispensability of classical concepts from a variety of different perspectives. This collection shows us that Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, now nearly a century old, still has the power to shed light on a variety of issues that have arisen only since his lifetime, as well as decoherence theory and other non-collapse interpretations. Balancing historical themes with contemporary discussions, Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics establishes Bohr's on-going contribution to the philosophy of physics and examines his place in the history of philosophy.

The larger part of Yearbook 6 of the Institute Vienna Circle constitutes the proceedings of a symposium on Alfred Tarski and his influence on and interchanges with the Vienna Circle, especially those on and with Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Goedel. It is the first time that this topic has been treated on such a scale and in such depth. Attention is mainly paid to the origins, development and subsequent role of Tarski's definition of truth. Some contributions are primarily historical, others analyze logical aspects of the concept of truth. Contributors include Anita and Saul Feferman, Jan Wolenski, Jan Tarski and Hans Sluga. Several Polish logicians contributed: Gzegorczyk, Wojcicki, Murawski and Rojszczak. The volume presents entirely new biographical material on Tarski, both from his Polish period and on his influential career in the United States: at Harvard, in Princeton, at Hunter, and at the University of California at Berkeley. The high point of the analysis involves Tarski's influence on Carnap's evolution from a narrow syntactical view of language, to the ontologically more sophisticated but more controversial semantical view. Another highlight involves the interchange between Tarski and Goedel on the connection between truth and proof and on the nature of metalanguages. The concluding part of Yearbook 6 includes documentation, book reviews and a summary of current activities of the Institute Vienna Circle. Jan Tarski introduces letters written by his father to Goedel; Paolo Parrini reports on the Vienna Circle's influence in Italy; several reviews cover recent books on logical empiricism, on Goedel, on cosmology, on holistic approaches in Germany, and on Mauthner.

Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Technology in the Middle Ages - September 1973

The last decades have seen major reformations in the philosophy and history of science. What has been called 'post-positivist' philosophy of science has introduced radically new concerns with historical, social, and valuative components of scientific thought in the natural sciences, and has raised up the demons of relativism, subjectivism and sociologism to haunt the once calm precincts of objectivity and realism. Though these disturbances intruded upon what had seemed to be the logically well-ordered domain of the philoso phy of the natural sciences, they were no news to the social sciences. There, the messy business of human action, volition, decision, the considerations of practical purposes and social values, the role of ideology and the problem of rationality, had long conspired to defeat logical-reconstructionist programs. The attempt to tarne the social sciences to the harness of a strict hypothetico deductive model of explanation failed. Within the social sciences, phenome nological, Marxist, hermeneuticist, action-theoretical approaches vied in attempting to capture the distinctiveness of human phenomena. In fact, the philosophy of the natural sciences, even in its 'hard' forms, has itself become infected with the increasing reflection upon the role of such social-scientific categories, in the attempt to understand the nature of the scientific enterprise."

Scientists often try to understand the world by building simplified and idealised models of it. Adam Toon develops a new approach to scientific models by comparing them to the dolls and toy trucks of children's imaginative games, and offers a unified framework to solve difficult metaphysical problems and help to make sense of scientific practice.

Special Relativity provides the foundations of our knowledge of space and time. Without it, our understanding of the world, and its place in the universe, would be unthinkable. This book gives a concise, elementary, yet exceptionally modern, introduction to special relativity. It is a gentle yet serious 'first encounter', in that it conveys a true understanding rather than purely reports the basic facts. Only very elementary mathematical knowledge is needed to master it (basic high-school maths), yet it will leave the reader with a sound understanding of the subject. Special Relativity: A First Encounter starts with a broad historical introduction and motivation of the basic notions. The central chapters are dedicated to special relativity, mainly following Einstein's historical route. Later chapters turn to various applications in all parts of physics and everyday life. Unlike other books on the subject, the current status of the experimental foundations of special relativity is accurately reported and the experiments explained. This book will appeal to anyone wanting a gentle introduction to the subject, as well as those who are interested in seriously learning about Einstein's legacy.

This richly textured book bridges analytic and hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophy of science. It features unique resources for students of the philosophy and history of quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation, cognitive theory and the psychology of perception, the history and philosophy of art, and the pragmatic and historical relationships between religion and science.

The essays in this volume constitute a portion of the research program being carried out by the International Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. Established as an affiliate society of the World Institute for Ad vanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in 1976, in Arezzo, Italy, by the president of the Institute, Dr Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, this particular society is devoted to an exploration of the relevance of phenomenological methods and insights for an understanding of the origins and goals of the specialised human sciences. The essays printed in the first part of the book were originally presented at the Second Congress of this society held at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 12-14 July 1979. The second part of the volume consists of selected essays from the third convention (the Eleventh International Congress of Phenomenology of the World Phenomen ology Institute) held in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1981. With the third part of this book we pass into the "Human Rights" issue as treated by the World Phenomenology Institute at the Interamerican Philosophy Congress held in Tallahassee, Florida, also in 1981. The volume opens with a mono graph by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka on the foundations of ethics in the moral practice within the life-world and the social world shown as clearly distinct. The main ideas of this work had been presented by Tymieniecka as lead lectures to the three conferences giving them a tight research-project con sistency."

In relation to the problems faced today, in contemplation and in practical affairs, philosophers must confront the question 'What is knowledge?', and consider whether knowledge has lost its object. Such was the problem placed before the seminar convened by the Philosophical Society of Turkey at Ankara in 1989. The 17 papers derived from the lectures and discussions deal with problems of knowing and believing, of the kinds and criteria of knowledge, of truth and fallibility, and of the cultural as well as individual factors in cognition. The authors include Guido Kung, L. Jonathan Cohen, Ernest Sosa, Arda Denkel, Venant Cauchy, David Evans, Gurol Irzik, Ioanna Kucuradi, Evandro Agazzi, Richard T. DeGeorge, Kwasi Wiredu, Teo Grunberg, H. Odera Oruka, Jindrich Zeleny, V.A. Lektorsky, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, and Francisco Miro Quesada. There is a critical and analytical Prologue by the convener of the Seminar, Ioanna Kucuradi.

This is the first introductory textbook of its kind devoted to philosophy of psychiatry, offering a thorough and accessible investigation of the conceptual and philosophical problems at the heart of psychiatric practice and research. While it applies some of the long-standing concerns of philosophy to the mental health professions, it also investigates philosophical problems and issues that have arisen more recently from careful examination of psychiatric phenomena. Divided into two parts, Philosophy of Psychiatric Practice and Research and Philosophy and Psychopathology, the book's 12 chapters cover topics like the ontological status of mental illness, philosophical issues in diagnosis, the role of culture in psychiatry and the relationship between mental illness and personal identity, as well as explore foundational problems in studying well-known psychopathologies like schizophrenia, depression and addiction. All chapters include initial overviews and concluding summaries and a list of suggested readings. Key Features Two-part structure - divided between (1) philosophy of psychiatric practice and research, and (2) philosophy and psychopathology - presents a clear, yet distinctive picture of the field Offers a unified style and vision throughout, with easy-to-follow segues from chapter to chapter Pedagogical features include chapter overviews and summaries, discussion questions and sections for further reading