New essays in science history ranging across the entire field and related in most instance to the works of Charles Gillispie, one of the field's founders.

In tbis splendid collection of the articles and addresses of P. L. Kapitza, the author remarks on the insight of the 18th century Ukrainian philosopher Skovoroda who wrote: "We must be grateful to God that He created the world in such a way that everytbing simple is true, and everything compli cated is untrue. " At another place, Kapitza meditates on the roles played by instinct, imagination, audacity, experiment, and hard work in the develop ment of science, and for a moment seems to despair at understanding the dogged arguments of great scientists: "Einstein loved to refer to God when there was no more sensible argument " With Academician Kapitza, there are reasoned arguments, plausible alter natives, humor and humane discipline, energy and patience, a skill for the practical, and transcendent clarity about what is at issue in theoretical practice as in engineering necessities. Kapitza has been physicist, engineer, research manager, teacher, humanist, and tbis book demonstrates that he is a wise interpreter of historical, philosophical, and social realities. He is also, in C. P. Snow's words, strong, brave, and good (Variety of Men, N. Y. 1966, p. 19). In this preface, we shall point to themes from Kapitza's interpretations of science and life. On scientific work. Good work is never done with someone else's hands. The separation of theory from experience, from experimental work, and from practice, above all harms theory itself."

During his lifetime, Henri PoincarA(c) published three major philosophical books which achieved great success: "La science et l'hypothA]se" (1902), "La valeur de la science" (1905) and "Science et mA(c)thode" (1908). After his death in 1913, a fourth volume of his philosophical works was published by his heirs as "DerniA]res pensA(c)es" (1913). The four books constitute the core of PoincarA(c)'s philosophic works and were given an ovation by scientific and general public. Around 1919, Gustave Le Bon wrote to PoincarA(c)'s widow. As the director of the "BibliothA]que de Philosophie Scientifique at Flammarion," he asked her permission to publish a second posthumous volume. "L'Opportunisme scientifique" was intended to be the fifth and final volume of PoincarA(c)'s philosophical writings. Louis Rougier had elaborated the project, with the collaboration of Gustave Le Bon, and the approval of the philosopher A0/00mile Boutroux and his son Pierre. Because of the reservations of the mathematician's heirs, this book was never published and DerniA]res pensA(c)es remained his last philosophical book. Nevertheless PoincarA(c)'s correspondence - which is kept in the PoincarA(c) Archives at University Nancy 2 - contains a large amount of documents concerning the project, its justification and the discussions between Louis Rougier and the mathematician's heirs. The aim of this book is to restore this episode, which gives some crucial informations about editorial practices of PoincarA(c) and about the posterity of his philosophic thinking.

A historical review of the most important scientific controversies that have shaped our knowledge of dinosaurs since the discovery of important fossils in the 1820s. In The Great Dinosaur Controversy: A Guide to the Debates, the major scientific disputes that have contributed to the understanding of dinosaurs come to light. Each chapter presents a major controversy then ponders the lessons learned and their impact on the scientific field. Colorful characters such as "anti-evolutionist" Robert Owen, "Darwin's bulldog," T.H. Huxley, and "dinosaur heretic" Robert Bakker, enliven the debates, which range from the origin of dinosaurs and their posture to their evolution or retrogression and whether they were warm- or cold-blooded. Two of the most recent debates concern how dinosaurs became extinct and whether or not birds are their descendents. Introductory chapter on the role of controversy in science focusing on the contributions of scientists such as Edward Cope and T. H. Huxley Illustrations of the major figures involved in the debates

Cultural critics say that 'science is politics by other means,' arguing that the results of scientific inquiry are profoundly shaped by the ideological agendas of powerful elites. Physicist Alan Sokal recently poked fun at these claims, touching off a still-unabated torrent of heated discussion. This hard-hitting collection picks up where Sokal left off, offering crisp, detailed critiques of case studies presented by cultural critics as evidence that scientific results tell us more about social context than they do about the natural world. Comprising new essays by distinguished scholars of history, philosophy, and science (including Sokal himself), this book raises a lively debate to a new level of seriousness.

The idea to produce the current volume was conceived by Jiirgen Mittelstrass and Robert E. Butts in 1978. Idealist philosophers are wrong about one thing: the temporal gap separating idea and reality can be very long indeed - even ten or so years Problems of timing were joined by personal problems and by the pressure of other professional commitments. Fortunately, James Brown agreed to cooperate in the editing of the volume; the infusion of his usual energy, good judgement and good-natured promptness saved the volume and made its produc tion possible. Despite the delays, the messages of the papers included in the book have not gone stale. An extremely worthwhile exercise in international philosophical cooperation has come to fruition; the German constructivist philosophical position is here represented in papers in English that will make its contemporary importance available to a larger audience. The editors owe thanks to many persons. All involved in the project owe much to the interest and support of Nicholas Rescher, a friend of the undertaking from the time of its inception. My review of the translations was helped immensely by Andrea Purvis' careful copy editing of the typescript. Most of all, however, we owe gratitude and admiration for the tireless efforts on behalf of this enterprise to Jiirgen Mittelstrass."

Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. For nearly a century, the axioms of set theory have played this role, so the question of how these axioms are properly judged takes on a central importance. Approaching the question from a broadly naturalistic or second-philosophical point of view, Defending the Axioms isolates the appropriate methods for such evaluations and investigates the ontological and epistemological backdrop that makes them appropriate. In the end, a new account of the objectivity of mathematics emerges, one refreshingly free of metaphysical commitments.

Originally published in 1983.This volume outlines some of the important innovations in astronomy, natural philosophy and medicine which took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and shows how the transformation in world-view during the period was affected by broader historical terms. Themes such as the spread of Puritanism, the decline of witchcraft and magic, and the incorporation of science as an integral part of the intellectual milieu of late seventeenth-century England.

Originally published in 1957. This book is concerned with the conflict between "Darwinism" as the Victorians called it, and Christianity, a conflict here re-stated in modern terms because it so vitally affects our understanding of human nature and human values today. The opening chapter describes the historical background. There is a short account of evolution and the argument over Genesis. The importance of natural selection is stressed, and rival theories as to the means of animal evolution are criticised. Discussions follow on whether the course of evolution has been random or determined, on the argument from design, death in nature, the biologist's methods and the difficulties in evolutionary ethics.

Originally published in 1975. The main concern of this book is the nature of the gap between the theoretical issues, raised at an abstract level by social scientists, and their facts, the material organized in an empirical analysis. The author draws on material from several disciplines to explore the contributions of social science theory to historical insight.

Kosik writes that the history of a text is in a certain sense the history of its interpretations. In the fifteen years that have passed since the fust (Czech) edition of his Dialectics of the Concrete, this book has been widely read and interpreted throughout Europe, in diverse centers of scholarship as well as in private studies. A faithful English language edition is long overdue. This publication of KosIk's work will surely provoke a range of new interpretations. For its theme is the characterization of science and of rationality in the context of the social roots of science and the social critique which an appropriately rational science should afford. Kosik's question is: How shall Karl Marx's understanding of science itself be understood? And how can it be further developed? In his treatment of the question of scientific rationality, Kosik drives bluntly into the issues of gravest human concern, not the least of which is how to avoid the pseudo-concrete, the pseudo-scientific, the pseudo-rational, the pseudo historical. Starting with Marx's methodological approach, of "ascending from the abstract to the concrete," Kosik develops a critique of positivism, of phenomenalist empiricism, and of "metaphysical" rationalism, counter posing them to "dialectical rationalism." He takes the category of the concrete in the dialectical sense of that which comes to be known by the active transformation of nature and society by human purposive activity."

History and Philosophy of Science reprints a distinguished selection of important texts published in this field over the last century. This set presents a unique opportunity to gain comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the history and philosophy of science. It covers all major fields of scientific thought throughout history from Physics, Biology, and Cosmology to ESP and Alchemy. It includes texts on all the great historical scientific figures including Darwin, Copernicus, Archimedes and Hooker and covers all main themes in science taking in creation, evolution, the development of scientific methodology and the future of science. For further information on this collection please email [email protected].

Originally published in 1970. Two major changes have characterised science in the twentieth century. Firstly, there has been its rapid growth. Secondly, and central to the theme his book ? science is no longer mainly an academic activity carried on in universities. Industry will soon be the largest employer of scientists. This book deals with issues of bureaucracy in science threatening its creativity and the failure of industry to recruit the best graduates, as well as what attracts people to study science.

Originally published in 1968. This volume discusses Francis Bacon 's thought and work in the context of the European cultural environment that influenced Bacon 's philosophy and was in turn influenced by it. It examines the influence of magical and alchemical traditions on Bacon and his opposition to these traditions, as well as illustrating the naturalist, materialist and ethico-political patterns in Bacon 's allegorical interpretations of fables.

Originally published in 1982. This volume explores some features of modern philosophy of science from the point of view of their utility for sociology's self-understanding. Recently philosophers of science have broken with the empiricism once fundamental to their discipline, and have sought alternative methods of science. Founded on the belief that these developments are significant for sociologists, the book explores the failings of the old "received view" and some of the more recent alternatives. It proposes a schematic outline of the structure of inquiry, paying detailed attention to questions about the nature of theory, explanation and demonstration.

In this book, I deal with some fundamental problems of the Hegelian dialectic. For this purpose, I take a middle course between total scepticism, which considers dialectic as a devastator sophistry with no respect even for the non-contradiction principle, and authoritarian dogmatism, which claims to solve any question with the magic wand of the Hegelian Aufhebung. That is, I decide to be critical, defining concepts anew, bringing out sources, determining conditions of possibility and fields of validity, accepting or rejecting when necessary. Following G. R. G. Mure's thinking, from an inner point of view I examine whether, in carrying out his work, Hegel remains faithful to the different principles he proclaims, and I find substantial deviations. And, following W. Becker's thinking, from an external point of view, that is, from a formal, empirical or existential contemporary angle, I try to determine the extent to which we may legitimately talk about the fruitfulness of Hegelian dialectic. In this way, I reconstruct Hegel's thought so that it may become acceptable to us-readers of the twentieth-century-as intelligible and coherent as possible. I conclude that dialectic, as a logic of human reality, has to be grasped and expressed from the viewpoint of the particular historical individual, in constant interaction with the cultural environment of his or her time. Using this approach, I investigate the questions at issue from Hegel's Logic point of view.

In this monograph, Steffen Ducheyne provides a historically detailed and systematically rich explication of Newton's methodology. Throughout the pages of this book, it will be shown that Newton developed a complex natural-philosophical methodology which encompasses procedures to minimize inductive risk during the process of theory formation and which, thereby, surpasses a standard hypothetico-deductive methodological setting. Accordingly, it will be highlighted that the so-called 'Newtonian Revolution' was not restricted to the empirical and theoretical dimensions of science, but applied equally to the methodological dimension of science. Furthermore, it will be documented that Newton's methodology was far from static and that it developed alongside with his scientific work. Attention will be paid not only to the successes of Newton's innovative methodology, but equally to its tensions and limitations. Based on a thorough study of Newton's extant manuscripts, this monograph will address and contextualize, inter alia, Newton's causal realism, his views on action at a distance and space and time, the status of efficient causation in the /Principia/, the different phases of his methodology, his treatment of force and the constituents of the physico-mathematical models in the context of Book I of the /Principia/, the analytic part of the argument for universal gravitation, the meaning and significance of his regulae philosophandi, the methodological differences between his mechanical and optical work, and, finally, the interplay between Newton's theology and his natural philosophy.

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.

The thirteen titles in this mini-set include works by some of the most well-known scientists and medical professionals of the twentieth century: Daedalus by J B S Haldane, Eos, or the Wider Aspects of Cosmogony by J H Jeans, Archimedes, or the Future of Physics by L L Whyte and the The Conquest of Cancer by H W S Wright to name but a few. Ground breaking in their day, some of the works remain controversial nearly 100 years after their original publication.

From the nineteen sixties onwards a branch of philosophy of science has come to development, called history-oriented philosophy of science. This development constitutes a reaction on the then prevailing logical empiricist conception of scientific knowledge. The latter was increasingly seen as suffering from insurmountable internal problems, like e. g. the problems with the particular "observational-theoretical distinction" on which it drew. In addition the logical empiricists' general approach was increasingly criticized for two external shortcomings. Firstly, the examples of scientific knowledge that the logical empiricists were focusing on were con sidered as too simplistic to be informative on the nature of real life science. Secondly, it was felt that the attention of these philosophers of science was restricted to the static aspects of scientific knowledge, while neglecting its developmental aspects. History-oriented philosophy of science has taken up the challenge implicit in the latter two criticisms, i. e. to develop accounts of science that would be more adequate for understanding the development 1 of real life science. One of the more successful products of this branch of philosophy of science is Lakatos's theory of scientific development, sometimes called the "methodology of scientific research programmes." This theory conceives science as consisting of so called research program mes developing in time, and competing with each other over the issue which one generates the best explan tions of the phenomena that they address."

Philosophers of science work not only with the methods of the sciences but with their contents as well. Substantive issues concerning the relation between mind and matter, between the material basis and the functions of cognition, have been central within the entire history of philosophy. We recall such philosophers as Aristotle, Descartes, the early Kant, Ernst Mach, and the early William James as directly inquiring of the organs and structures of thinking. Science and its philosophical self-criticism are especially and deeply united in the effort to understand the biological brain and human behavior, and so it requires no apology to include this collection of clinical studies among Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. The work of Dr. Norman Geschwind, well represented in this selection, explores the relation between structure and function, between the anatomy of the brain and the 'higher' behavior of men and women. As a clinical neurologist, Geschwind was led to these studies particularly by his in terest in those pathologies which have to do with human perception and language. His research into the anatomical substrates of specific dis orders-and strikingly the aphasias -present a fascinating and provocative examination of fundamental questions which will concern not neurologists alone but also psychologists, physicians, linguists, speech pathologists, educators, anthropologists, historians of medicine, and philosophers, among others, namely all those interested in the characteristic modes of human activity, in speech, in perception, and in the learning process generally."

No student or colleague of Marjorie Grene will miss her incisive presence in these papers on the study and nature of living nature, and we believe the new reader will quickly join the stimulating discussion and critique which Professor Grene steadily provokes. For years she has worked with equally sure knowledge in the classical domain of philosophy and in modern epistemological inquiry, equally philosopher of science and metaphysician. Moreover, she has the deeply sensible notion that she should be a critically intelligent learner as much as an imaginatively original thinker, and as a result she has brought insightful expository readings of other philosophers and scientists to her own work. We were most fortunate that Marjorie Grene was willing to spend a full semester of a recent leave here in Boston, and we have on other occasions sought her participation in our colloquia and elsewhere. Now we have the pleasure of including among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science this generous selection from Grene's philosophical inquiries into the understanding of the natural world, and of the men and women in it. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. W ARTOFSKY April 1974 PREFACE This collection spans - spottily - years from 1946 ('On Some Distinctions between Men and Brutes') to 1974 ('On the Nature of Natural Necessity').