George Boole (1815-1864) is well known to mathematicians for his research and textbooks on the calculus, but his name has spread world-wide for his innovations in symbolic logic and the development and applications made since his day. The utility of "Boolean algebra" in computing has greatly increased curiosity in the nature and extent of his achievements. His work is most accessible in his two books on logic, "A mathematical analysis of logic" (1947) and "An investigation of the laws of thought" (1954). But at various times he wrote manuscript essays, especially after the publication of the second book; several were intended for a non-technical work, "The Philosophy of logic," which he was not able to complete. This volume contains an edited selection which not only relates them to Boole's publications and the historical context of his time, but also describes their strange history of family, followers and scholars have treid to confect an edition. The book will appeal to logicians, mathematicians and philosophers, and those interested in the histories of the corresponding subjects; and also students of the early Victorian Britain in which they were written.

With collective behaviors playing a fundamental role in many scientific and technical disciplines, the book, after an overview on the background to systemics, introduces the concept of COLLECTIVE BEING as a Multiple System established by processes of emergence and self-organization of the same agents simultaneously or dynamically interacting in different ways. The general principles underlying this approach are grounded on the theoretical role of the observer. This extended view allows to model in a more suitable way complex systems, such as in physics, biology and economics. The Dynamical Usage of Models (DYSAM) is the related modelling methodology. This innovating approach is applied to artificial and natural systems equipped with cognitive systems, such as autonomous robots and social systems. The authors discuss in two different chapters both traditional (i.e. based on dynamical systems and dissipative structures) and non-traditional (i.e. based on theory of phase transitions, Synergetics and connectionistic models) models of emergence. The book also introduces an innovative methodology for detecting the establishment of processes of emergence based on changes of ergodicity.

After a theoretical introduction of the concepts, the authors discuss the application to social systems and cognitive systems. Applications to social systems deal with issues such as representing and distinguishing growth and development, sustainable development, ethics and its crucial role to induce and maintain emergence of social systems, virtual systems, knowledge management and organizational learning. Applications to cognitive systems deal with approaches going beyond computationalism, theories ofconsciousness and embodied cognition.

Two conclusive appendices on (1) Some systemic properties and (2) Some questions and answers about Systemics, help the reader to have a synthesized view of the book.

Following A.N. Whitehead, this book takes up the principal challenge facing a natural philosopher who wishes to engage with Nature while rescuing both Life and Thought from materialistic approaches which rob them of their 'quicknesses'. Selecting certain insights and intuitions from the writings of Peirce, Coleridge, Deleuze and Nietzsche, the author proffers a remedy for the pervasive nihilism of 'the moderns' which illustrates Deleuze's suggestion that philosophy should be imaged as a dynamic collage that is forever in the making.

What do philosophy and computer science have in common? It turns out, quite a lot! In providing an introduction to computer science (using Python), Daniel Lim presents in this book key philosophical issues, ranging from external world skepticism to the existence of God to the problem of induction. These issues, and others, are introduced through the use of critical computational concepts, ranging from image manipulation to recursive programming to elementary machine learning techniques. In illuminating some of the overlapping conceptual spaces of computer science and philosophy, Lim teaches the reader fundamental programming skills and also allows her to develop the critical thinking skills essential for examining some of the enduring questions of philosophy. Key Features Teaches readers actual computer programming, not merely ideas about computers Includes fun programming projects (like digital image manipulation and Game of Life simulation), allowing the reader to develop the ability to write larger computer programs that require decomposition, abstraction, and algorithmic thinking Uses computational concepts to introduce, clarify, and develop a variety of philosophical issues Covers various aspects of machine learning and relates them to philosophical issues involving science and induction as well as to ethical issues Provides a framework to critically analyze arguments in classic and contemporary philosophical debates

The articles in this volume have been stimulated in two different ways. More than two years ago the editor of Synthese, laakko Hintikka, an nounced a special issue devoted to space and time, and articles were solicited. Part of the reason for that announcement was also the second source of papers. Several years ago I gave a seminar on special relativity at Stanford, and the papers by Domotor, Harrison, Hudgin, Latzer and myself partially arose out of discussion in that seminar. All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. 1-2). I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library. Of these four additional articles, only the one by Fine has pre viously appeared in print (Synthese 22 (1971),448--481); its relevance to the present volume is apparent. In preparing the papers for publication and in carrying out the various editorIal chores of such a task, I am very much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole for her extensive assistance. INTRODUCTION The philosophy of space and time has been of permanent importance in philosophy, and most of the major historical figures in philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, have had a good deal to say about the nature of space and time."

Joseph Agassi is a critic, a gadfly, a debunker and deflater; he is also a constructor, a speculator and an imaginative scholaro In the history and philosophy of science, he has been Peck's bad boy, delighting in sharp and pungent criticism, relishing directness and simplicity, and enjoying it all enormously. As one of that small group of Popper's students (ineluding Bartley, Feyerabend and Lakatos) who took Popper seriously enough to criticize him, Agassi remained his own man, holding Popper's work itself to the criteria of critical refutation. Agassi's range is wide and his publications proliik. He has published serious studies in the historiography of science, applied sociology (on Hong Kong with LC. Jarvie), foundations of anthropology, interpretive scientific biography (Faraday), Judaic studies, philosophy of technology (which Agassi pioneered, particulady in distinguishing it from the philosophy of science), as weIl as the many works on the Iogic, methodoI ogy, and history of science. Even as we go to press, Agassi's works are appearing; we append an imperfect and selected bibliography. For Agassi, the test of relevance is whether something is interesting."

The author argues that a reconstruction of scientific laws should give an account of laws relating phenomena to underlying mechanisms generating them, as well as of laws relating this mechanism to its inherent capacities. While contemporary philosophy of science deals only with the former, the author provides the concept for the reconstruction of scientific laws, where the knowledge of the phenomena enables one to grasp the quantity of their cause. He then provides the concepts for scientific laws dealing with the relation of the quantity and quality of the cause underlying phenomena to the quality and quantity of its capacities. Finally, he provides concepts for scientific laws expressing how a certain cause, due to the quantity and quality of its capacities, generates the quantitative and qualitative determinations of its manifestations. The book is intended for philosophers of science and philosophers of social science, as well as for natural and social scientists.

For a philosopher with an abiding interest in the nature of objective knowledge systems in science, what could be more important than trying to think in terms of those very subjects of such knowledge to which men like Galileo, Newton, Max Planck, Einstein and others devoted their entire lifetimes? In certain respects, these systems and their structures may not be beyond the grasp of a linguistic conception of science, and scientific change, which men of science and philosophy have advocated in various forms in recent times. But certainly it is wrong-headed to think that one's conception of science can be based on an identification of its theories with languages in which they may be, my own alternatively, framed. There may be more than one place in book (1983: 87) where they may seem to get confused with each other, quite against my original intentiens. The distinction between the objec tive knowledge systems in science and the dynamic frameworks of the languages of the special individual sciences, in which their growth can be embedded in significant ways, assumes here, therefore, much impor tance. It must be recognized that the problems concerning scientific change, which these systems undergo, are not just problems concerning language change."

The Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and the First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference were held in JyvaskyIa, Finland, June 29-July 6, 1976. The Conferences were organized by a committee which consisted of the editors of the present volume. The Conferences were supported financially by the Ministry of Education of Finland, by the Academy of Finland, and by the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History of Science. The Philosophical Society of Finland and the Jyvaskyla Summer Festival gave valuable help in various practicalities. 35 papers by authors representing 10 countries were presented at the two meetings. Of those papers 24 appear here. THE EDITORS v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE v PART 1/ PROOF THEORY GEORG KREISEL / Some Facts from the Theory of Proofs and Some Fictions from General Proof Theory 3 DAG PRAWITZ / Proofs and the Meaning and Completeness of the Logical Constants 25 v. A. SMIRNOV / Theory of Quantification and tff-calculi 41 LARS SVENONIUS/Two Kinds of Extensions of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic 49 DIRK VAN DALEN and R. STATMAN / Equality in the Presence of Apartness 95 PART II / INFINITARY LANGUAGES VEIKKO RANTALA / Game-Theoretical Semantics and Back-and- Forth 119 MAARET KAR TTUNEN / Infinitary Languages N oo .

Like Bohr, Einstein and Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli was not only a Nobel laureate and one of the creators of modern physics, but also an eminent philosopher of modern science. This is the first book in English to include all his famous articles on physics and epistemology. They were actually translated during Pauli's lifetime by R. Schlapp and are now edited and annotated by Pauli's former assistant Ch. Enz. Pauli writes about the philosophical significance of complementarity, about space, time and causality, symmetry and the exclusion principle, but also about therole of the unconscious in modern science. His famous article on Kepler is included as well as many historical essays on Bohr, Ehrenfest, and Einstein as well as on the influence of the unconscious on scientific theories. The book addresses not only physicists, philosophers and historians of science, but also the general public.

In this essay I am concerned with the problem of conceptual change. There are, needless to say, many ways to approach the issue. But, as I see it, the problem reduces to showing how present and future systems of thought are the rational extensions of prior ones. This goal may not be attainable. Kuhn, for example, suggests that change is mainly a function of socio-economic pressures (taken broadly). But there are some who believe that a case can be made for the rationality of change, especially in science. Wilfrid Sellars is one of those. While Sellars has developed a full account of the issues involved in solving the problem of conceptual change, he is also a very difficult philosopher to discuss. The difficulty stems from the fact that he is a philosopher in the very best sense of the word. First, he performs the tasks of analyzing alternative views with both finesse and insight, dialectically laying bare the essentials of problems and the inadequacies of previous proposals. Secondly, he is a systematic philosopher. That is, he is concerned to elaborate a system of philosophical thought in the grand tradition stretching from Plato to White head. Now with all of this to his credit, it would appear that there is no difficulty at all, one should simply treat him like all the others, if he indeed follows in the footsteps of past builders of philosophic systems."

This book discusses three possible human enhancement paradigms and explores how each involves different values, uses of technology, and different degrees and kinds of ethical concerns. A new framework is advanced that promotes technological innovation that serves the improvement of the human condition in a respectful and sustainable way.

There is hardly any university, college, or even high school left where they do not teach Darwinism-and rightly so. Yet, most of these places do more preaching than teaching. They teach more than they should, and at the same time, they teach less than they should. Most books on Darwinism are either oriented on biology or philosophy, but this book tries to combine both approaches, so it explains the biological aspects for (future) philosophers as well as the philosophical aspects for (future) biologists. It leaves Darwinism intact, but removes the "sting" that many of its opponents dislike. In what Verschuuren calls "The Good" parts of Darwin's legacy, the author explores what Darwin's great contributions are to the study and theory of evolution. At the same time, the book will also delve into the areas where Darwin's thoughts were not so perfect or even wrong, especially in a philosophical sense - "The Not So Good" parts of his legacy. Almost all books on the philosophy of biology, and neo-Darwinism in particular, were born in the cradle of logical positivism or linguistic analysis. This book, on the other hand, tries to cross the border between the physical and the meta-physical.

First published in 1927, Science and Philosophy: And Other Essays is a collection of individual papers written by Bernard Bosanquet during his highly industrious philosophical life. The collection was put together by Bosanquet's wife after the death of the writer and remains mostly unaltered with just a few papers added and the order of entries improved. The papers here displayed consist of various contributions Bosanquet made to Mind, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, the International Journal of Ethics and other periodicals, as well as work from volumes of lectures and essays under his own or other editorship. Throughout the collection, Bosanquet considers the relationship between science and philosophy. The two subject areas became increasingly intertwined during Bosanquet's lifetime as scientific writers grew more interested in the philosophical investigation of the concepts which underlined their work and philosophical thinkers recognised the importance of the relationship between mathematics and logic as well as that between physics and metaphysics. The first essay in this volume discusses this idea explicitly and all subsequent articles may be regarded as essays in support of the main discussion with which the volume opens.

How happy it is to recall Imre Lakatos. Now, fifteen years after his death, his intelligence, wit, generosity are vivid. In the Preface to the book of Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Boston Studies, 39, 1976), the editors wrote: ... Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. The book before us carries old and new friends of that Lakatosian spirit further into the issues which he wanted to investigate. That the new friends include a dozen scientific, historical and philosophical scholars from Greece would have pleased Lakatos very much, and with an essay from China, he would have smiled all the more. But the key lies in the quality of these papers, and in the imaginative organization of the conference at Thessaloniki in summer 1986 which worked so well.

This book contains contributions presented during the international conference on Model-Based Reasoning (MBR012), held on June 21-23 in Sestri Levante, Italy. Interdisciplinary researchers discuss in this volume how scientific cognition and other kinds of cognition make use of models, abduction, and explanatory reasoning in order to produce important or creative changes in theories and concepts. Some of the contributions analyzed the problem of model-based reasoning in technology and stressed the issues of scientific and technological innovation. The book is divided in three main parts: models, mental models, representations; abduction, problem solving and practical reasoning; historical, epistemological and technological issues.

The volume is based on the papers that were presented at the international

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The most important characteristic of the "world filled with nonlinearity" is the existence of scale interference: disparate space-time scales interfere with each other. Thus, the effects of unknowable scales invade the world that we can observe directly. This leads to various peculiar phenomena such as chaos, critical phenomena, and complex biological phenomena, among others. Conceptual analysis and phenomenology are the keys to describe and understand phenomena that are subject to scale interference, because precise description of unfamiliar phenomena requires precise concepts and their phenomenological description. The book starts with an illustration of conceptual analysis in terms of chaos and randomness, and goes on to explain renormalization group philosophy as an approach to phenomenology. Then, abduction is outlined as a way to express what we have understood about the world. The book concludes with discussions on how we can approach genuinely complex phenomena, including biological phenomena. The main target of this volume is young people who have just started to appreciate the world seriously. The author also wishes the book to be helpful to those who have been observing the world, but who wish to appreciate it afresh from a different angle.

Milic Capek has devoted his scholarship to the history and philosophy of modern physics. With impeccable care, he has mastered the epistemologi cal and scientific developments by working through the papers, treatises, correspondence of physicists since Kant, and likewise he has put his learning and critical skill into the related philosophical literature. Coming from his original scientific career with a philosophy doctorate from the Charles University in Prague, Capek has ranged beyond a narrowly defined philosophy of physics into general epistemology of the natural sciences and to the full historical evolution of these matters. He has ex pounded his views on these matters in a number of articles and, systema tically, in his book The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary PhYSiCS, published in 1961 and reprinted with two new appendices in 1969. His particular gift for many of his readers and students lies in the great period from the mid-nineteenth century through the foundations of the physics and philosophy of the twentieth, and within this spectacular time, Profes sor Capek has become a principal expositor and sympathetic critic of the philosophy of Henri Bergson. He joins a distinguished group of scholars -physicists and philosophers -who have been stimulated to some of their most profound and imaginative thought by Bergson's metaphysical and psychological work: Cassirer, Meyerson, de Broglie, Metz, Jankelevitch, Zawirski, and in recent years, Costa de Beauregard, Watanabe, Blanche, and others."

x philosophy when he inaugurated a debate about the principle of methodologi cal individualism, a debate which continues to this day, and which has inspired a literature as great as any in contemporary philosophy. Few collections of material in the general area of philosophy of social science would be considered complete unless they contained at least one of Watkins's many contributions to the discussion of this issue. In 1957 Watkins published the flrst of a series of three papers (1957b, 1958d and 196Oa) in which he tried to codify and rehabilitate metaphysics within the Popperian philosophy, placing it somewhere between the analytic and the empirical. He thus signalled the emergence of an important implica tion of Popper's thought that had not to that point been stressed by Sir Karl himself, and which marked off his followers from the antimetaphysical ideas of the regnant logical positivists. In 1965 years of work in political philosophy and in the history of philosophy in the seventeenth century were brought to fruition in Watkins's widely cited and admired Hobbes's System of Ideas (1965a, second edition 1973d). This book is an important contribution not just to our understanding of Hobbes's political thinking, but, perhaps more importantly, to our understanding of the way in which a system of ideas is constituted and applied. Watkins built on earlier work in developing an account of Hobbes's ideas in which was revealed and clarifled the unity of Hobbes's metaphysical, epistemological and political ideas."

The sub-title of this symposium is accurate and, in a curious way, promises more than it states: Classical Physicist, Modem Philosopher. Heinrich Hertz, as the con summate experimentalist of 19th century technique and as brilliant clarifying critic of physical theory of his time, achieved one of the fulfilments but at the same time opened one of the transition points of classical physics. Thus, in his 'popular' lecture 'On the Relations Between Light and Electricity' at Heidelberg in the Fall of 1889, Hertz identified the ether as henceforth the most fundamental problem of physics, as the conceptual mystery but also the key to understanding mass, electric ity, and gravity. Of Hertz's demonstration of electric waves, Helmholtz told the Physical Society of Berlin: "Gentlemen I have to communicate to you today the most important physical discovery of the century. " Hertz, philosophizing in his direct, lucid, pithy style, once wrote "We have to imagine." Perhaps this is metaphysics on the horizon? In the early pages of his Principles of Mechanics, we read A doubt which makes an impression on our mind cannot be removed by calling it metaphysical: every thoughtful mind as such has needs which scientific men are accustomed to denote as metaphysical. (PM23) And at another place, concerning the terms 'force' and 'electricity' and the alleged mystery of their natures, Hertz wrote: We have an obscure feeling of this and want to have things cleared up."

In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists."

The first section of this chapter describes the major goals of this investiga tion and the general strategy of my presentation. The remaining three sections review some requisite background material and introduce some terminology and notation used in the book. Section B contains a brief review of some of the ideas and notation of elementary logic and set theory. Section C contains an introductory discussion of kinds and at tributes. Section D presents some basic ideas about laws and law sentences. A. GENERAL PLAN OF THE BOOK Basic scientific research is directed towards the goals of increasing our knowledge of the wor1d and our understanding of the wor1d. Knowledge increases through the discovery and confirmation of facts and laws. Understanding results from the explanation of known facts and laws, and through the formulation of general, systematic theories. Other things being equal, we tend to feeI that our understanding of a c1ass of phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively unified theories of that c1ass of phenomena. It is therefore natural to consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least in principle, governs all known phenomena. The dream of obtaining such a theory, and the understanding that it would provide, has motivated an enormous amount of research by both scientists and philosophers."