Originally published in 1957, this book offers a challenging intellectual experience to the reader who wishes to understand the broad historical trends that determine the future of humanity on this planet. The book examines natural laws that govern humanity by looking at communities over long periods of time and noting patterns which become evident. The book includes discussions of communism, the crisis in food and population growth, the significance of industrialism and man and his religious beliefs - all issues that remain as relevant today as when the book was first published.

Evolution by natural selection explains the tree of life and the complex adaptations found throughout nature. The power and versatility of evolutionary explanations have proved tempting to scientists outside of biology, but adapting evolutionary concepts to new domains has been challenging. Even within biology, there are many difficult questions and problem cases that face evolutionary theory. Modelling Evolution offers a new, general account of evolution by natural selection that identifies the essential features of evolutionary models that transcend any particular discipline. Evolution by natural selection in its broad sense is the systemic advantage of a type, in contrast to the narrow definition using heritable variation in fitness. This account is explained, contextualised and applied to a variety of questions in both biology and the social sciences. Offering an accessible and comprehensive account of evolution that is applicable both to biology and the broader social sciences, Modelling Evolution will appeal to students and researchers interested in fields such as biology, economics, sociology, history, and psychology.

These investigations identify and clarify some basic assumptions and methodological principles involved in ecological explanations of plant associations. How are plants geographically distributed into characteristic groups? What are the basic conditions that organize groups of interspecific plant populations that are characteristic of particular kinds of habitats? Answers to these questions concerning the geographical distribution of plants in late 19th century European plant geography and early 20th century American plant ecology can be distinguished according to differing logical assumptions concerning the habitats of plant associations. Through an analysis of several significant case studies in the early history of plant ecology, Konopka distinguishes a logic of habitats that conceives of plant associations in an analogy to individual organisms with a logic that conceives of plant associations in a reciprocal relation to habitat physiography. He argues that a phenomenological conception of the logical attributes of habitats can philosophically complement the physiographic tradition in early plant ecology and provide an attractive alternative to standard reductionism and holism debates that persist today. This wide ranging and original analysis will be valuable for readers interested in the history and philosophy of ecology.

This collection addresses metaphysical issues at the intersection between philosophy and science. A unique feature is the way in which it is guided both by history of philosophy, by interaction between philosophy and science, and by methodological awareness. In asking how metaphysics is possible in an age of science, the contributors draw on philosophical tools provided by three great thinkers who were fully conversant with and actively engaged with the sciences of their day: Kant, Husserl, and Frege. Part I sets out frameworks for scientifically informed metaphysics in accordance with the meta-metaphysics outlined by these three self-reflective philosophers. Part II explores the domain for co-existent metaphysics and science. Constraints on ambitious critical metaphysics are laid down in close consideration of logic, meta-theory, and specific conditions for science. Part III exemplifies the role of language and science in contemporary metaphysics. Quine's pursuit of truth is analysed; Cantor's absolute infinitude is reconstrued in modal terms; and sense is made of Weyl's take on the relationship between mathematics and empirical aspects of physics. With chapters by leading scholars, Metametaphysics and the Sciences is an in-depth resource for researchers and advanced students working within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy.

Originally published in 1967. Locke's views in the field of education had great influence in the UK and abroad; and the aim of this book is to present them in the context of his general philosophical thinking, since it was mainly as a philosopher that Locke won his place in history. Because Locke was at the same time very much a man of affairs, and an interesting character on his own merits, the book gives a fairly full account of his life and times. Some attention is paid to his relations with the brilliant political adventurer, Lord Shaftesbury, without whom Locke's own career would have been very different, and might not have offered the opportunities which led to his writings on education. The book seeks to emphasize the importance of Locke's empirical approach to truth - the method of modern science, without which the modern study of education, and the science of psychology in particular, would never have developed.

This unique book ranges across the physical, biological and social sciences in the development of its primary theme, that there are nine major 'integrative levels' which can be recognised. The term integrative levels was first used by Joseph Needham in 1937 and has two key features. The first is that members of a given integrative level are unified entities and the second is that a member of one level is commonly composed of parts which are members of the next lower level. Thus fundamental particles form Level 1 while Level 9 is that of sovereign states. This theme has been developed by Max Pettersson in a book which explores the many links between the physical, biological and social sciences, reaching wide-ranging and sometimes unexpected conclusions.

This volume launches a new series of contemporary conversations about scientific classification. Most philosophical conversations about kinds have focused centrally or solely on natural kinds, that is, kinds whose existence is not dependent on the scientific process of synthesis. This volume refocuses conversations about classification on unnatural, or synthetic, kinds via extensive study of three paradigm cases of unnatural kinds: nanomaterials, stem cells, and synthetic biology.

A Wall Street Journal Top Ten Book of the Year A First Things Books for Christmas Selection Winner of the Expanded Reason Award "This important work of moral philosophy argues that we are, first and foremost, embodied beings, and that public policy must recognize the limits and gifts that this entails." -Wall Street Journal The natural limits of the human body make us vulnerable and dependent on others. Yet law and policy concerning biomedical research and the practice of medicine frequently disregard these stubborn facts. What It Means to Be Human makes the case for a new paradigm, one that better reflects the gifts and challenges of being human. O. Carter Snead proposes a framework for public bioethics rooted in a vision of human identity and flourishing that supports those who are profoundly vulnerable and dependent-children, the disabled, and the elderly. He addresses three complex public matters: abortion, assisted reproductive technology, and end-of-life decisions. Avoiding typical dichotomies of conservative-liberal and secular-religious, Snead recasts debates within his framework of embodiment and dependence. He concludes that if the law is built on premises that reflect our lived experience, it will provide support for the vulnerable. "This remarkable and insightful account of contemporary public bioethics and its individualist assumptions is indispensable reading for anyone with bioethical concerns." -Alasdair MacIntyre, author of After Virtue "A brilliantly insightful book about how American law has enshrined individual autonomy as the highest moral good...Highly thought-provoking." -Francis Fukuyama, author of Identity

This volume offers critical responses to philosophical naturalism from the perspectives of four different yet fundamentally interconnected philosophical traditions: Kantian idealism, Hegelian idealism, British idealism, and American pragmatism. In bringing these rich perspectives into conversation with each other, the book illuminates the distinctive set of metaphilosophical assumptions underpinning each tradition's conception of the relationship between the human and natural sciences. The individual essays investigate the affinities and the divergences between Kant, Hegel, Collingwood, and the American pragmatists in their responses to philosophical naturalism. The ultimate aim of Responses to Naturalism is to help us understand how human beings can be committed to the idea of scientific progress without renouncing their humanistic explanations of the world. It will appeal to scholars interested in the role idealist and pragmatist perspectives play in contemporary debates about naturalism.

First published in 1972, Philosophical Tasks was written to identify and examine some central themes in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The book explores the claim that philosophy is essentially linguistic, and considers in particular such topics as philosophy and science, fact and language, conceptual analysis, first- and second-order tasks, scepticism, ordinary language, and conceptual frameworks.

First published in 1972, The Hope of Progress presents collection of essays and lectures dealing with the history of scientific ideas and the impact of science on society. The principle piece in this volume is the author's 1969 presidential address to the British Association 'On The Effecting of All Things Possible', an argument for believing in the ability of science to solve the problems it has itself created, and which too many of us believe insoluble. It contains author's Romanes Lecture on 'Science and Literature' and a well known critique of J.D. Watson's notorious account of the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, The Double Helix. Other chapters discuss the possibility of the control and domination by science of the body and mind of Man- though the author concludes in 'The Genetic Improvement of Man' : 'I think that, in the main, for many centuries to come, we shall have to put up with human beings as they are at present constituted'. This book will be useful for scholars and researchers of history of science, philosophy of science, natural science, and philosophy in general.

Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (iHPS) is commonly understood as the study of science from a combined historical and philosophical perspective. Yet, since its gradual formation as a research field, the question of how to suitably integrate both perspectives remains open. This volume presents cutting edge research from junior iHPS scholars, and in doing so provides a snapshot of current developments within the field, explores the connection between iHPS and other academic disciplines, and demonstrates some of the topics that are attracting the attention of scholars who will help define the future of iHPS.

Although the works of C.G. Jung have received worldwide attention, there has been surprisingly little engagement by philosophers. In this volume, internationally recognized philosophers, Jungian analysts, and scholars attempt to fill this void in the literature. Although Jung did not have a formalized, systematic philosophy, the philosophical implications of his thought are explored in relation to his key theoretical postulates on archetypes, the collective unconscious, the mind-body problem, phenomenology, epistemology, psychology of religion, alchemy, myth, ethics, aesthetics, and the question of transcendence. Through analyzing Jung philosophically, new vistas emerge for enhanced explication, theoretical refinement, revision, and redirecting shifts in emphasis that lend more proper cohesion to Jung's philosophy. For the first time we may observe philosophers attempting to unpack the philosophical consequences of Jung's thought applied to many traditional topics covered in the humanities and the social sciences. Given that Jung has not been historically taken up by philosophers, critiqued, nor applied to contemporary theories of mind, culture, and human nature, this is the first book of its kind. It is argued that a new generation of research in analytical psychology can benefit from philosophical scrutiny and theoretical fortification. Jung and Philosophy will be of interest to psychoanalysts, philosophers, cultural theorists, religious scholars, and the disciplines of depth psychology and post-Jungian studies.

Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject's epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. This is the first book to develop a comprehensive epistemic theory of checking. The author argues that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not for knowing, thereby finding a new home for the much discussed modal sensitivity principle. He then uses the distinction between checking and knowing to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly those concerning knowledge closure, bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation will be of interest to epistemologists and other philosophers looking for a general theory of checking and testing or for new solutions to central epistemological problems.

For almost a century and a half, biologists have gone to the seashore to study life. The oceans contain rich biodiversity, and organisms at the intersection of sea and shore provide a plentiful sampling for research into a variety of questions at the laboratory bench: How does life develop and how does it function? How are organisms that look different related, and what role does the environment play? From the Stazione Zoologica in Naples to the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole, the Amoy Station in China, or the Misaki Station in Japan, students and researchers at seaside research stations have long visited the ocean to investigate life at all stages of development and to convene discussions of biological discoveries. Exploring the history and current reasons for study by the sea, this book examines key people, institutions, research projects, organisms selected for study, and competing theories and interpretations of discoveries, and it considers different ways of understanding research, such as through research repertoires. A celebration of coastal marine research, Why Study Biology by the Sea? reveals why scientists have moved from the beach to the lab bench and back.

McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the agenda for 20th-century philosophy of time. Yet there is very little agreement on what it actually says-nobody agrees with the conclusion, but still everybody finds something important in it. This book presents the first critical overview of the last century of debate on what is popularly called "McTaggart's Paradox". Scholars have long assumed that McTaggart's argument stands alone and does not rely on any contentious ontological principles. The author demonstrates that these assumptions are incorrect-McTaggart himself explicitly claimed his argument to be dependent on the ontological principles that form the basis of his idealist metaphysics. The result is that scholars have proceeded to understand the argument on the basis of their own metaphysical assumptions, duly arriving at very different interpretations. This book offers an alternative reading of McTaggart's argument, and at the same time explains why other commentators arrive at their mutually incompatible interpretations. It will be of interest to students and scholars with an interest in the philosophy of time and other areas of contemporary metaphysics.

Originally published in 1947. This book looks at contemporary conundrums in philosophical tendencies, bringing the reader a first-principles review of the purpose of such enquiries in relation to modern life. It presents the importance of the history of the development of philosophical thought, beginning in Part 1 with perception. Significant definitions and theories are identified and later refinements discussed - in particular conceptualism and its development from the Greeks through Berkeley to modern realism and its limitations and critiques. Part 2 brings problems identified by past thinkersto the fore, from Plato's forms to Christian theology, in an examination of the apparent dichotomy between metaphysics and scientific methods. Part 3 examines the Rationalist and the Empiricist attacks on Scepticism and Kant's reconciliation of the differences of both. This provides the context and structure for discussion of the works of Hegel, and ultimate refutation thereof as a confusion between metaphysics and theology. Part 4 identifies the developments in thinking of Positivism, both Modern and Logical, and the New Synthesis of Alexander and Whitehead as the most recent approach.

Originally published in 1987. This book comprises a critical exposition of the thoughts on metaphysics of the major philosophers of the tradition. It introduces the ideas of these philosophers to students but is of interest to teachers as well. The author begins with a survey of the metaphysical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Leibniz and Bradley, clarifying throughout the relation of their methods and results to those of science. He follows this with a careful study of the critical attitudes to metaphysics espoused by Kant, Wittgenstein and the Logical Positivists. In the final section he scrutinizes the attempts by Collingwood, Wisdom and Lazerowitz to rehabilitate metaphysics.

An NRC Handelsblad Book of the Year "Offers rich discussions of olfactory perception, the conscious and subconscious impacts of smell on behavior and emotion." -Science Decades of cognition research have shown that external stimuli "spark" neural patterns in particular regions of the brain. We think of the brain as a space we can map: here it responds to faces, there it perceives a sensation. But the sense of smell-only recently attracting broader attention in neuroscience-doesn't work this way. So what does the nose tell the brain, and how does the brain understand it? A. S. Barwich turned to experts in neuroscience, psychology, chemistry, and perfumery in an effort to understand the mechanics and meaning of odors. She discovered that scents are often fickle, and do not line up with well-defined neural regions. Upending existing theories of perception, Smellosophy offers a new model for understanding how the brain senses and processes odors. "A beguiling analysis of olfactory experience that is fast becoming a core reference work in the field." -Irish Times "Lively, authoritative...Aims to rehabilitate smell's neglected and marginalized status." -Wall Street Journal "This is a special book...It teaches readers a lot about olfaction. It teaches us even more about what philosophy can be." -Times Literary Supplement

Normativity and Naturalism in the Social Sciences engages with a central debate within the philosophy of social science: whether social scientific explanation necessitates an appeal to norms, and if so, whether appeals to normativity can be rendered "scientific." This collection brings together contributions from a diverse group of philosophers who explore a broad but thematically unified set of questions, many of which stem from an ongoing debate between Stephen Turner and Joseph Rouse (both contributors to this volume) on the role of naturalism in the philosophy of the social sciences. Informed by recent developments in both philosophy and the social sciences, this volume will set the benchmark for contemporary discussions about normativity and naturalism. This collection will be relevant to philosophers of social science, philosophers in interested in the rule following and metaphysics of normativity, and theoretically oriented social scientists.

This book proposes a new way of reading modern Western philosophers in the Indian context. It questions the colonial methodology, or the practice of importing theories of Western philosophy, and shows how its unmediated applications are often incongruent, irrelevant, and unproductive in local frameworks. The author shows an alternative route to approaching philosophers from the West - Rousseau, Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari, and Bergson - by bending and reassembling aspects of their ideas and theories to relate with the diversity and complexity of Indian society. He also offers insights on the politics of non-being and negation from a neglected modern Indian philosopher, Vaddera Chandidas, as a step forward from the Western philosophers presented here. An intervention in philosophical research methodology, this volume will interest scholars and researchers of philosophy, Western philosophy, Indian philosophy, comparative studies, postcolonial studies, literature, cultural studies, and political philosophy.

Systems of units still fail to attract the philosophical attention they deserve, but this could change with the current reform of the International System of Units (SI). Most of the SI base units will henceforth be based on certain laws of nature and a choice of fundamental constants whose values will be frozen. The theoretical, experimental and institutional work required to implement the reform highlights the entanglement of scientific, technological and social features in scientific enterprise, while it also invites a philosophical inquiry that promises to overcome the tensions that have long obstructed science studies.

This book presents an interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a priori psychologism. It groups Kant's philosophy together with those of the British empiricists-Locke, Berkeley, and Hume-in a single line of psychologistic succession and offers a clear explanation of how Kant's psychologism differs from psychology and idealism. The book reconciles Kant's philosophy with subsequent developments in science and mathematics, including post-Fregean mathematical logic, non-Euclidean geometry, and both relativity and quantum theory. It also relates Kant's psychologism to Wittgenstein's later conception of language. Finally, the author reveals the ways in which Kant's philosophy dovetails with contemporary scientific theorizing about the natural phenomenon of consciousness and its place in nature. This book will be of interest to Kant scholars and historians of philosophy working on the British empiricists.

This volume consists of a selection of scholarly essays from literature, philosophy and history on the conception of reality as understood by Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Einstein. The nature of reality has been a long-debated issue among scientists and philosophers. Tagore (1861-1941) met Einstein (1879-1955) at the latter's house in Kaputh, Germany on 14 July 1930 and had a long conversation on this issue. This conversation has been widely quoted and discussed by scientists, philosophers and scholars from the literary world. The important question that Tagore and Einstein discussed was whether the world is a unity dependent on humanity, or the world is a reality independent of the human factor. Einstein believed that reality is independent of the mind and the human factor. On the other hand, Tagore adopted the opposite view. Nevertheless, both Einstein and Tagore claimed to be realists - their conceptions of reality were obviously fundamentally different. Where does the difference lie? Can it be harmonized at a deeper level? This volume brings together for the first time a gamut of views on this subject from eminent scholars. It presents some key reflections on reality, language, poetry, truth, science, personality, human sciences, virtue ethics, intelligibility and creativity. It will be useful to scholars and researchers of philosophy, literature, history and political studies, as also to those interested in Tagore.

Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated and resilient than its predecessors. This position-'cognitive instrumentalism'-involves three core theses. First, science makes theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with more predictive power or understanding concerning observable things. Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in truthlikeness. There are examples from science throughout the book, and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can achieve without having true, or even approximately true, representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism. Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate about realism in philosophy of science.