With contributions by sixteen scholars from such diverse fields as communication, linguistics, literary studies, rhetoric, and sociology of sciences, Essays in the Study of Scientific Discourse continues the contemporary discussion about the origin and nature of scientific discourse and its function in today's society. Essays document the increasing importance of rhetorical expertise in scientific discourse, shed new light into the history and language of science, and offer pedagogical guidance for teachers of scientific writing. Readers may also discover new topics for scholarly research in scientific discourse. Gay and Ted Gragson, for instance, show how technological advances may increase the rhetorical complexity of the grant proposal process, while J. Harrison Carpenter reveals the rhetorical power of the scientific report. In a related study, Cynthia Haller shows how scientific claims change as they mover from the scientific to the public arena. Dwight Atkinson gives empiricists a new methodology by integrating rhetorical analysis with sociolinguistic methodology. Richard Johnson-Sheehan and Dan Ding describe the evolution of scientific metaphor and passive voice, respectively. Ramon Plo Alastrue, Carmen Ramon Plo Alastrue-Llantada, and Rosemary Horowitz offer advice for teachers of scientific writing, while Steven Darian explores the intricacies and argumentative power of scientific classification schemas. In turn, Philippa Benson gives editorial advice to writers of scientific texts. Gender issues in scientific writing are addressed by Christine Skolnik and Mary Rosner. Trevor Pinch and Charles Alan Taylor put the cold fusion controversy of 1989 in critical perspective.

This volume presents essays by pioneering thinkers including Tyler Burge, Gregory Chaitin, Daniel Dennett, Barry Mazur, Nicholas Humphrey, John Searle and Ian Stewart. Together they illuminate the Map/Territory Distinction that underlies at the foundation of the scientific method, thought and the very reality itself. It is imperative to distinguish Map from the Territory while analyzing any subject but we often mistake map for the territory. Meaning for the Reference. Computational tool for what it computes. Representations are handy and tempting that we often end up committing the category error of over-marrying the representation with what is represented, so much so that the distinction between the former and the latter is lost. This error that has its roots in the pedagogy often generates a plethora of paradoxes/confusions which hinder the proper understanding of the subject. What are wave functions? Fields? Forces? Numbers? Sets? Classes? Operators? Functions? Alphabets and Sentences? Are they a part of our map (theory/representation)? Or do they actually belong to the territory (Reality)? Researcher, like a cartographer, clothes (or creates?) the reality by stitching multitudes of maps that simultaneously co-exist. A simple apple, for example, can be analyzed from several viewpoints beginning with evolution and biology, all the way down its microscopic quantum mechanical components. Is there a reality (or a real apple) out there apart from these maps? How do these various maps interact/intermingle with each other to produce a coherent reality that we interact with? Or do they not? Does our brain uses its own internal maps to facilitate "physicist/mathematician" in us to construct the maps about the external territories in turn? If so, what is the nature of these internal maps? Are there meta-maps? Evolution definitely fences our perception and thereby our ability to construct maps, revealing to us only those aspects beneficial for our survival. But the question is, to what extent? Is there a way out of the metaphorical Platonic cave erected around us by the nature? While "Map is not the territory" as Alfred Korzybski remarked, join us in this journey to know more, while we inquire on the nature and the reality of the maps which try to map the reality out there. The book also includes a foreword by Sir Roger Penrose and an afterword by Dagfinn Follesdal.

As society struggles to cope with the many repercussions of assisted life and death, the evening news is filled with stories of legal battles over frozen embryos and the possible prosecution of doctors for their patients' suicide. Using an "institutional" approach as an alternative to the prevailing "rights" based analysis of problems in law and medicine, this study explains why society should resist the tendency to look to science and law for a resolution of intimate matters, such as how our children are born and how we die. Palmer's institutional approach demonstrates that legislative analysis is often more important than judicial analysis when it comes to issues raised by new reproductive technologies and physician-assisted suicide. A reliance on individual rights alone for answers to the complex ethical questions that result from society's faith in scientific progress and science's close alliance with medicine will be insufficient and ill-advised. Palmer predicts that the key role of the family as a societal institution will mean that questions of assisted reproduction will be resolved more in response to market forces than through legal intervention. However, he does support a strong role for legislatures in decisions involving the physicians' role in our deaths. These findings are based on the differing views of the Supreme Court justices in these matters: a tendency to protect family formation from state interference (as in abortion decisions), but support of a legislative obligation to control medicine (assisted suicide). According to Palmer, recent Supreme Court decisions on physician assisted suicide usher in a new era in how legal institutions will resolve biomedical dilemmas.

Erwin Schroedinger has been described as one of the greatest figures of theoretical physics, but there is another side to the man: not only did his work revolutionize physics, it also radically changed the foundations of our modern world-view, modern biology, philosophy of science, philosophy of the mind, and epistemology. This book explores the lesser-known aspects of Schroedinger's thought, revealing the physicist as a philosopher and polymath whose ideas anticipated the current merging of the natural and the social sciences and the humanities. 13 renowned scientists and philosophers have contributed to the volume. Part I reveals the philosophical importance of Schroedinger's work as a physicist. Part II examines his theory of life and of the self-organization of matter. Part III shows how Schroedinger's ideas have influenced contemporary philosophy of nature and our modern view of the world, drawing a picture of the ongoing synthesis of nature and culture.

The authors describe systematic methods for uncovering scientific laws a priori, on the basis of intuition, or "Gedanken Experiments". Mathematical expressions of scientific laws are, by convention, constrained by the rule that their form must be invariant with changes of the units of their variables. This constraint makes it possible to narrow down the possible forms of the laws. It is closely related to, but different from, dimensional analysis. It is a mathematical book, largely based on solving functional equations. In fact, one chapter is an introduction to the theory of functional equations.

The essays and commentaries presented here are intended to strike a balance between the disciplines to which the Bar-Hillel Colloquium (formerly the Israel Colloquium) is dedicated. The historical and sociological vantage point is addressed in Krammick's and Mali's treatment of Priestley, in Vicker's and Feldhay's studies of the Renaissance occult and in Warnke's and Barasch's work on the imagination. From a philosophical angle several concepts, all material to the methodology of science, are taken up: rule following, by Smart and Margalit; analysis, by Ackerman, explanation, by Taylor; and the role of mathematics in physics, by Levy-Leblond and Pitowsky. In addition, the volume contains the proceedings of two symposia dedicated to two towering scientific figures: one celebrates Bohr's centennial, and the other examines the "other" Newton. The book should appeal to people whose interest or research is in the fields of philosophy, sociology and history of science, technology and medicine, as well as those interested in science education.

This book presents a novel approach to the analysis of interdisciplinary science based on the contemporary philosophical literature on scientific representation. The basic motivation for developing this approach is that epistemic issues are insufficiently dealt with in the existing literature on interdisciplinarity. This means that when interdisciplinary science is praised (as it often is), it is far from clear to what extent this praise is merited - at least if one cares about various more or less standardised measures of scientific quality. To develop a more adequate way of capturing what is going on in interdisciplinary science, the author draws inspiration from the rich philosophical literature on modelling, idealisation, perspectivism, and scientific pluralism. The discussion hereof reveals a number of critical pitfalls related to transferring mathematical and conceptual tools between scientific contexts, which should be relevant and interesting for anyone actively engaged in funding, evaluating, or carrying out interdisciplinary science.

The fifth volume of the collected works of Professor M.A.K. Halliday, The Language of Science, explores the semantic character of scientific discourse. The chapters are organized into two sections, one being on grammatical metaphor; the other dealing with scientific English. In language, there exists the potential for constructing new discourses, among them scientific discourse. The volume opens with a new work from Professor Halliday addressing the question, How big is a language? It is a question that goes to the heart of the paradigmatic complexity, or meaning potential, that characterizes language.

"The Emerging Religion of Science" is a broad and erudite examination of the individual's place in the modern world. What can we believe today that will not betray us tomorrow? the author asks. Religion is losing influence. But the scientist, who explores the laws of nature, may be the modern guide to meaning. The mathematical equations of science have become unifying elements of the world as we know it. The author explores ways to face today's problems within the context of good and evil, freedom and restraint, probability and certainty, the real and the illusory, and the concept of self. He offers the view that, thought the paths we take may be different, we are all searching for the same thing: a thread on which the beads of experience and education can be strung.

This is a translation of work which first appeared in 1816 in Germany. Although Schopenhauer himself acknowledged that the treatise did not present any new and significant doctrines to his philosophy, he nonetheless considered it important enough to publish it again in revised form toward the end of his life, in 1854. As Professor Cartwright argues in his introduction, the book's philosophical value is to be found in the means it provides for increasing our understanding of Schopenhauer's philosophy, both in terms of its method and meaning. Not only does this book aim to offer insight into the younger Schopenhauer, it is also a significant document in the history of optics and colour theory.

Robert Grosseteste (1168/75-1253), Bishop of Lincoln from 1235-1253, is widely recognized as one of the key intellectual figures of medieval England and as a trailblazer in the history of scientific methodology. Few of his numerous philosophical and scientific writings circulated as widely as the Compotus, a treatise on time reckoning and calendrical astronomy apparently written during a period of study in Paris in the 1220s. Besides its strong and long-lasting influence on later writers, Grossteste's Compotus is particularly noteworthy for its innovatory approach to the theory and practice of the ecclesiastical calendar-a subject of essential importance to the life of the Latin Church. Confronting traditional computistical doctrines with the lessons learned from Graeco-Arabic astronomy, Grosseteste offered his readers a critical and reform-oriented take on the discipline, in which he proposed a specific version of the Islamic lunar as a substitute for the failing nineteen-year cycle the Church still employed to calculate the date of Easter. This new critical edition of Grosseteste's Compotus contains the Latin text with an en-face English translation. It is flanked by an extensive introduction and chapter commentary, which will provide valuable new insights into the text's purpose and disciplinary background, its date and biographical context, its sources, as well as its reception in later centuries.

The book examines the emerging approach of using qualitative methods, such as interviews and field observations, in the philosophy of science. Qualitative methods are gaining popularity among philosophers of science as more and more scholars are resorting to empirical work in their study of scientific practices. At the same time, the results produced through empirical work are quite different from those gained through the kind of introspective conceptual analysis more typical of philosophy. This volume explores the benefits and challenges of an empirical philosophy of science and addresses questions such as: What do philosophers gain from empirical work? How can empirical research help to develop philosophical concepts? How do we integrate philosophical frameworks and empirical research? What constraints do we accept when choosing an empirical approach? What constraints does a pronounced theoretical focus impose on empirical work? Nine experts discuss their thoughts and empirical results in the chapters of this book with the aim of providing readers with an answer to these questions.

This book systematically creates a general descriptive theory of scientific change that explains the mechanics of changes in both scientific theories and the methods of their assessment. It was once believed that, while scientific theories change through time, their change itself is governed by a fixed method of science. Nowadays we know that there is no such thing as an unchangeable method of science; the criteria employed by scientists in theory evaluation also change through time. But if that is so, how and why do theories and methods change? Are there any general laws that govern this process, or is the choice of theories and methods completely arbitrary and random? Contrary to the widespread opinion, the book argues that scientific change is indeed a law-governed process and that there can be a general descriptive theory of scientific change. It does so by first presenting meta-theoretical issues, divided into chapters on the scope, possibility and assessment of theory of scientific change. It then builds a theory about the general laws that govern the process of scientific change, and goes into detail about the axioms and theorems of the theory.

This book presents a collection of authoritative contributions on the concept of time in early twentieth-century philosophy. It is structured in the form of a thematic atlas: each section is accompanied by relevant elementary logic maps that reproduce in a "spatial" form the directionalities (arguments and/or discourses) reported on in the text. The book is divided into three main sections, the first of which covers phenomenology and the perception of time by analyzing the works of Bergson, Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Guattari and Derrida. The second section focuses on the language and conceptualization of time, examining the works of Cassirer, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Lacan, Ricoeur and Foucault, while the last section addresses the science and logic of time as they appear in the works of Guillaume, Einstein, Reichenbach, Prigogine and Barbour. The purpose of the book is threefold: to provide readers with a comprehensive overview of the concept of time in early twentieth-century philosophy; to show how conceptual reasoning can be supported by accompanying linguistic and spatial representations; and to stimulate novel research in the humanistic field concerning the complex role of graphic representations in the comprehension of concepts.

Sudduth provides a critical exploration of classical empirical arguments for survival arguments that purport to show that data collected from ostensibly paranormal phenomena constitute good evidence for the survival of the self after death. Utilizing the conceptual tools of formal epistemology, he argues that classical arguments are unsuccessful.

This original work contains the first detailed account of the natural philosophy of Robert Hooke (1635-1703), leading figure of the early Royal Society. From celestial mechanics to microscopy, from optics to geology and biology, Hooke's contributions to the Scientific Revolution proved decisive. Focusing separately on partial aspects of Hooke's works, scholars have hitherto failed to see the unifying idea of the natural philosophy underlying them. Some of his unpublished papers have passed almost unnoticed. Hooke pursued the foundation of a real, mechanical and experimental philosophy, and this book is an attempt to reconstruct it. The book includes a selection of Hooke's unpublished papers. Readers will discover a study of the new science through the works of one of the most known protagonists. Challenging the current views on the scientific life of restoration England, this book sheds new light on the circulation of Baconian ideals and the mechanical philosophy in the early Royal Society. This book is a must-read to anybody interested in Hooke, early modern science or Restoration history.

Colour is everywhere. From blue skies to red sunsets, from the first flowers in spring to the blazing leaves of autumn. But what is the nature of colour? Scientific books present a variety of mechanical explanations but this approach leaves colour as a whole unexplained. In the nineteenth century, the German poet and scientist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe investigated a wide range of colour phenomena and discovered the underlying principles that govern colour itself. This lavishly illustrated book brings Goethe's pioneering research up to date. Through descriptions of simple observations and ingenious experiments, the reader will discover a series of colour phenomena that includes afterimages, coloured shadows, colour mixing, and prismatic and polarisation colours. Seeing Colour is a thought-provoking read for colour enthusiasts and experts alike, and an accessible route to a new way of seeing colour.

Disease is everywhere. Everyone experiences disease, everyone knows somebody who is, or has been diseased, and disease-related stories hit the headlines on a regular basis. Many important issues in the philosophy of disease, however, have received remarkably little attention from philosophical thinkers. This book examines a number of important debates in the philosophy of medicine, including 'what is disease?', and the roles and viability of concepts of causation, in clinical medicine and epidemiology. Where much of the existing literature targets conceptual analyses of health and disease, this book provides the reader with an insight into these debates, and develops plausible alternative accounts. The author explores a range of related subjects, discussing a host of interesting philosophical questions within clinical medicine, pathology and epidemiology. In the second part of the book, the author examines the concepts of causation employed by clinicians and pathologists, how one should classify diseases, and whether the epidemiologist's models for inferring the causes of disease are all they're cracked up to be.

Chapters "Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate" and "Turing and the History of Computer Music" are available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

Scientific realism is at the core of the contemporary philosophical debate on science. This book analyzes new versions of scientific realism. It makes explicit the advantages of scientific realism over alternatives and antagonists, contributes to deciding which of the new approaches better meets the descriptive and the prescriptive criteria, and expands the philosophico-methodological field to take in new topics and disciplines.

**A FINANCIAL TIMES BOOK OF THE YEAR 2022** 'Powerful... a clarion call for change', New Statesman 'Poetic and philosophical at times, intimate and expansive at others', Daily Telegraph How much light is too much light? The Darkness Manifesto urges us to cherish natural darkness for the sake of the environment, our own wellbeing, and all life on earth. The world's flora and fauna have evolved to operate in the natural cycle of day and night. But constant illumination has made light pollution a major issue. From space, our planet glows brightly, 24/7. By extending our day, we have forced out the inhabitants of the night and disrupted the circadian rhythms necessary to sustain all living things. Our cities' streetlamps and neon signs are altering entire ecosystems. Johan Ekloef encourages us to appreciate natural darkness and its unique benefits. He also writes passionately about the domino effect of damage we inflict by keeping the lights on: insects failing to reproduce; birds blinded and bewildered; bats starving as they wait in vain for insects that only come out in the dark. And humans can find that our hormones, weight and mental well-being are all impacted. Eye-opening and ultimately encouraging, The Darkness Manifesto offers simple steps that can benefit ourselves and the planet. The light bulb - long the symbol of progress - needs to be turned off. To ensure a bright future, we must embrace the darkness

Metaphysics has often held that laws of nature, if legitimate, must be time-independent. Yet mounting evidence from the foundations of science suggests that this constraint may be obsolete. This book provides arguments against this atemporality conjecture, which it locates both in metaphysics and in the philosophy of science, drawing on developments in a range of fields, from the foundations of physics to the philosophy of finance. It then seeks to excavate an alternative philosophical lineage which reconciles time-dependent laws with determinism, converging in the thought of Immanuel Kant.

This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive accuracy. On the other hand, antirealists argue that the success of science does not warrant belief in the approximate truth of our best scientific theories. This is because the history of science is a graveyard of theories that were once successful but were later discarded. The author eventually settles on a middle-ground position between scientific realism and antirealism called "relative realism".

Paul Abela presents a powerful, experience-sensitive form of realism about the relation between mind and world, based on an innovative interpretation of Kant. Abela breaks with tradition in taking seriously Kant's claim that his Transcendental Idealism yields a form of empirical realism, and giving a realist analysis of major themes of the Critique of Pure Reason. Abela's blending of Kantian scholarship with contemporary epistemology offers a new way of resolving philosophical debates about realism.