Sudduth provides a critical exploration of classical empirical arguments for survival arguments that purport to show that data collected from ostensibly paranormal phenomena constitute good evidence for the survival of the self after death. Utilizing the conceptual tools of formal epistemology, he argues that classical arguments are unsuccessful.

This stimulating collection is devoted to the life and work of the most flamboyant of twentieth-century philosophers, Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend's radical epistemological claims, and his stunning argument that there is no such thing as scientific method, were highly influential during his life and have only gained attention since his death in 1994. The essays that make up this volume, written by some of today's most respected philosophers of science, many of whom knew Feyerabend as students and colleagues, cover the diverse themes in his extensive body of work and present a personal account of this fascinating thinker.

Robert Grosseteste (1168/75-1253), Bishop of Lincoln from 1235-1253, is widely recognized as one of the key intellectual figures of medieval England and as a trailblazer in the history of scientific methodology. Few of his numerous philosophical and scientific writings circulated as widely as the Compotus, a treatise on time reckoning and calendrical astronomy apparently written during a period of study in Paris in the 1220s. Besides its strong and long-lasting influence on later writers, Grossteste's Compotus is particularly noteworthy for its innovatory approach to the theory and practice of the ecclesiastical calendar-a subject of essential importance to the life of the Latin Church. Confronting traditional computistical doctrines with the lessons learned from Graeco-Arabic astronomy, Grosseteste offered his readers a critical and reform-oriented take on the discipline, in which he proposed a specific version of the Islamic lunar as a substitute for the failing nineteen-year cycle the Church still employed to calculate the date of Easter. This new critical edition of Grosseteste's Compotus contains the Latin text with an en-face English translation. It is flanked by an extensive introduction and chapter commentary, which will provide valuable new insights into the text's purpose and disciplinary background, its date and biographical context, its sources, as well as its reception in later centuries.

This unique volume introduces and discusses the methods of validating computer simulations in scientific research. The core concepts, strategies, and techniques of validation are explained by an international team of pre-eminent authorities, drawing on expertise from various fields ranging from engineering and the physical sciences to the social sciences and history. The work also offers new and original philosophical perspectives on the validation of simulations. Topics and features: introduces the fundamental concepts and principles related to the validation of computer simulations, and examines philosophical frameworks for thinking about validation; provides an overview of the various strategies and techniques available for validating simulations, as well as the preparatory steps that have to be taken prior to validation; describes commonly used reference points and mathematical frameworks applicable to simulation validation; reviews the legal prescriptions, and the administrative and procedural activities related to simulation validation; presents examples of best practice that demonstrate how methods of validation are applied in various disciplines and with different types of simulation models; covers important practical challenges faced by simulation scientists when applying validation methods and techniques; offers a selection of general philosophical reflections that explore the significance of validation from a broader perspective. This truly interdisciplinary handbook will appeal to a broad audience, from professional scientists spanning all natural and social sciences, to young scholars new to research with computer simulations. Philosophers of science, and methodologists seeking to increase their understanding of simulation validation, will also find much to benefit from in the text.

The nature of truth in mathematics is a problem which has exercised the minds of thinkers from at least the time of the ancient Greeks. The great advances in mathematics and philosophy in the twentieth century--and in particular the proof of Gödel's theorem and the development of the notion of independence in mathematics--have led to new viewpoints on his question. This book is the result of the interaction of a number of outstanding mathematicians and philosophers--including Yurii Manin, Vaughan Jones, and Per Martin-Löf--and their discussions of this problem. It provides an overview of the forefront of current thinking, and is a valuable introduction and reference for researchers in the area.

What would it mean to apply quantum theory, without restriction and without involving any notion of measurement and state reduction, to the whole universe? What would realism about the quantum state then imply? This book brings together an illustrious team of philosophers and physicists to debate these questions. The contributors broadly agree on the need, or aspiration, for a realist theory that unites micro- and macro-worlds. But they disagree on what this implies. Some argue that if unitary quantum evolution has unrestricted application, and if the quantum state is taken to be something physically real, then this universe emerges from the quantum state as one of countless others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result, they argue, is many worlds quantum theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. No other realist interpretation of unitary quantum theory has ever been found. Others argue in reply that this picture of many worlds is in no sense inherent to quantum theory, or fails to make physical sense, or is scientifically inadequate. The stuff of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained, nor are the worlds precisely defined; ordinary ideas about time and identity over time are compromised; no satisfactory role or substitute for probability can be found in many worlds theories; they can't explain experimental data; anyway, there are attractive realist alternatives to many worlds. Twenty original essays, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They consider questions of ontology - the existence of worlds; probability - whether and how probability can be related to the branching structure of the quantum state; alternatives to many worlds - whether there are one-world realist interpretations of quantum theory that leave quantum dynamics unchanged; and open questions even given many worlds, including the multiverse concept as it has arisen elsewhere in modern cosmology. A comprehensive introduction lays out the main arguments of the book, which provides a state-of-the-art guide to many worlds quantum theory and its problems.

This is the first book in bioethics that explains how it is that you actually go about doing good bioethics. Bioethics has made a mistake about its methods, and this has led not only to too much theorizing, but also fragmentation within bioethics. The unhelpful disputes between those who think bioethics needs to be more philosophical, more sociological, more clinical, or more empirical, continue. While each of these claims will have some point, they obscure what should be common to all instances of bioethics. Moreover, they provide another phantom that can lead newcomers to bioethics down blind alleyways stalked by bristling sociologists and philosophers. The method common to all bioethics is bringing moral reason to bear upon ethical issues, and it is more accurate and productive to clarify what this involves than to stake out a methodological patch that shows why one discipline is the most important. This book develops an account of the nature of bioethics and then explains how a number of methodological spectres have obstructed bioethics becoming what it should. In the final part, it explains how moral reason can be brought to bear upon practical issues via an 'empirical, Socratic' approach.

Chapters "Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate" and "Turing and the History of Computer Music" are available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

What is a human being? Philosophical anthropology has approached this question with unusual sophistication, experimentalism, and subtlety. This volume explores the philosophical anthropologies of Scheler, Gehlen, Plessner, and Blumenberg in terms of their relevance to contemporary theories of nature, naturalism, organic life, and human affairs.

Contemporary philosophy and science strive to give a complete account of the world and our position in it. In this original and provocative book, David Gamez engages the reader in a series of colourful thought experiments that illustrate the limits of this mission. Although we commonly believe that science will give a final description of everything, What We Can Never Know reveals blindspots in many of our theories that completely undermine their ability to explain reality. Each chapter explores these problems using a popular question or topic in philosophy, such as our perception of space, the nature of time, scepticism or the relationship between reason and madness. In this series of lively studies, Gamez pushes our everyday assumptions to their limits and opens up fresh perspectives on philosophy and science. By leading the reader progressively through key areas of our knowledge, this book will leave you questioning everything that you think you know.

The problem of the limits of science is twofold. First, there is the problem of demarcation, i.e., the boundaries or "barriers" between what is science and what is not science. Second, there is the problem of the ceiling of scientific activity, which leads to the "confines" of this human enterprise. These two faces of the problem of the limits - the "barriers" and the "confines" of science - require a new analysis, which is the task of this book. The authors take into account the Kantian roots but they are focused on the current stage of the philosophical and methodological analyses of science. This vision looks to supersede the Kantian approach in order to reach a richer conception of science.

A unique approach to the philosophy of science that focuses on the liveliest and most important controversies surrounding science
Is science more rational or objective than any other intellectual endeavor? Are scientific theories accurate depictions of reality or just useful devices for manipulating the environment? These core questions are the focus of this unique approach to the philosophy of science. Unlike standard textbooks, this book does not attempt a comprehensive review of the entire field, but makes a selection of the most vibrant debates and issues.
The author tackles such stimulating questions as: Can science meet the challenges of skeptics? Should science address questions traditionally reserved for philosophy and religion? Further, does science leave room for human values, free will, and moral responsibility?
Written in an accessible, jargon-free style, the text succinctly presents complex ideas in an easily understandable fashion. By using numerous examples taken from diverse areas such as evolutionary theory, paleontology, and astronomy, the author piques readers' curiosity in current scientific controversies. Concise bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter invite readers to sample ideas different from the ones offered in the text and to explore the range of opinions on each topic.
Rigorous yet highly readable, this excellent invitation to the philosophy of science makes a convincing case that understanding the nature of science is essential for understanding life itself.

The Grammar of Science, originally published in 1892, was considered an essential read by budding young scientists like Albert Einstein. Pearson's work contributed to Einstein's greatest discoveries by introducing him to the ideas of relativity of motion, equivalence between matter and energy, and the concept of antimatter. Pearson opens his book with a definition and discussion of science itself, detailing what is required for inquiries to be scientific in nature. He then moves on to discuss space and time, motion, matter, and the future of scientific progress. Professionals and students alike will be fascinated by Pearson's insight into the nature of reality. British professor KARL PEARSON (1857-1936) worked at University College in London. He invented mathematical statistics and formed the Department of Applied Statistics at the University of London. He wrote many books and papers, including a biography of Francis Galton, a proponent of eugenics, and studies on evolution.

The Ten Assumptions of Science presents the logically coherent set of assumptions destined to define 21st century scientific philosophy. Glenn Borchardt first explains why assumptions and not absolutes are necessary for scientific thinking. By exploring the opposition between deterministic and indeterministic views, he clearly shows how critical choices among underlying assumptions either clarify or muddle scientific analysis. He shows how customary mixtures of deterministic and indeterministic assumptions are responsible for the current confusion in modern physics. According to Dr. Borchardt, only rare physicists and philosophers have an inkling of the nature of time, space, energy, and matter. The need for reassessing our fundamental assumptions is indicated by the present sorry state of cosmology. Otherwise intelligent scientists promulgate the idea that the universe expanded from a tiny singularity smaller than the period at the end of this sentence. At the very least, adherence to Borchardt's assumptions will contribute to the rejection of the Big Bang Theory, which has surpassed the flat Earth theory as the greatest embarrassment to serious thinkers everywhere. scientific philosophy, it is an astounding eye-opener for the educated reader with an interest in science and philosophy.

This volume combines the theoretical and historical perspective focusing on the specific features of a European philosophy of science. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle the Viennese roots and influences will be addressed, in addition. There is no doubt that contemporary philosophy of science originated mainly in Europe beginning in the 19th century and has influenced decisively the subsequent development of globalized philosophy of science, esp. in North America. Recent research in this field documents some specific characteristics of philosophy of science covering the natural, social, and also cultural sciences in the European context up to the destruction and forced migration caused by Fascism and National Socialism. This European perspective with the integration of history and philosophy of science and the current situation in the philosophy of science after the transatlantic interaction and transformation, and the "return" after World War II raises the question of contemporary European characteristics in the philosophy of science. The role and function of the renowned Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism and its impact and influence on contemporary philosophy of science is on the agenda, too. Accordingly, the general topic is dealt with in two parallel sessions representing systematic-formal as well as genetic-historical perspectives on philosophy of science in a European context up to the present.

In this wide-ranging philosophical work, Koons takes on two powerful dogmas: anti-realism and materialism. In doing so, Koons develops an efficient metaphysical system that accounts for such phenomena as information, mental representation, our knowledge of logic, mathematics and science, the structure of spacetime, the identity of physical objects, and the objectivity of values and moral norms.

What is 'technology'? What does it help us to do? What does it force us to consider about our experience of being in the world? In Challenging the Phenomena of Technology, technology is positioned as an experience with specific features, rather than as a class of objects, and this enables a reflection on the ways in which amateurs and experts interact with the artefacts that all humans rely upon. Using e-readers, such as the Kindle and iPad, as a case study, Hayler argues that the use of technology is both more complicated and more human than public discussion often gives it credit for, forcing us to consider its impacts on perception, cognition, and what it means to know anything at all.

The Grammar of Science, originally published in 1892, was considered an essential read by budding young scientists like Albert Einstein. Pearson's work contributed to Einstein's greatest discoveries by introducing him to the ideas of relativity of motion, equivalence between matter and energy, and the concept of antimatter. Pearson opens his book with a definition and discussion of science itself, detailing what is required for inquiries to be scientific in nature. He then moves on to discuss space and time, motion, matter, and the future of scientific progress. Professionals and students alike will be fascinated by Pearson's insight into the nature of reality. British professor KARL PEARSON (1857-1936) worked at University College in London. He invented mathematical statistics and formed the Department of Applied Statistics at the University of London. He wrote many books and papers, including a biography of Francis Galton, a proponent of eugenics, and studies on evolution.

The essays in this volume reflect the wide-ranging interests of John D. North, distinguished historian of science and philosophy. Section One has papers on horoscopes, astrolabes and time-reckoning, and it includes an edition of a twelfth-century treatise on the astrolabe and surveys of astrolabes. Section Two is devoted to the study of the medieval cosmos. These contributions discuss Calcidian astronomy, astronomy in the Spanish Jewish community, the role of God in scholastic natural philosophy, and other themes. New information is presented about previously unknown scholars such as Abd al-Mas of Winchester and Simon Bredon. Section Three contains essays on philosophy and scholarship in the early modern period, including pieces about commentaries on Boethius's "Consolatio Philosophiae" in the Northern Renaissance, Spinozistic philosophy, and the early modern concept of substance. These essays take up the various themes to which John D. North has made important contributions: the development of scientific knowledge and methodology, the style of scientific and philosophical thought, and the uses of scientific knowledge in the making of instruments or the casting of horoscopes: this book will be of much interest to all historians of science and philosophy. Contributors include: Charles Burnett, Bruce S. Eastwood, Owen Gingerich, Bernard R. Goldstein, Edward Grant, Keith Hutchison, David A. King, Richard Lorch, F.R. Maddison, Lodi Nauta, Detlev Patzold, J.A. van Ruler, Julio Samso, Keith Snedegar, A.J. Turner, Arjo Vanderjagt, and G. Frederici Vescovini.

This book is a critical appraisal of the status of the so-called Climate Sciences (CS). These are contributed by many other basic sciences like physics, geology, chemistry and as such employ theoretical and experimental methods. In the last few decades most of the CS have been identified with the global warming problem and numerical models have been used as the main tool for their investigations. The produced predictions can only be partially tested against experimental data and may represent one of the reasons CS are drifting away from the route of the scientific method. On the other hand the study of climate faces many other interesting and mostly unsolved problems (think about ice ages) whose solution could clarify how the climatic system works. As for the global warming, while its existence is largely proved, scientifically it can be solved only with a large experimental effort carried out for a few decades. Problems can arise when not proved hypotheses are adopted as the basis for public policy without the recognition that they may be on shaky ground. The strong interactions of the Global Warming (GW) with the society create another huge problem of political nature for the CS. The book argues that the knowledge gained so far on the specific GW problem is enough for the relevant political decisions to be taken and that Climate Science should resume the study of the climate system with appropriate means and methods. The book introduces the most relevant concepts needed for the discussion in the text or in appropriate appendices and it is directed to the general public with upper undergraduate background. Each chapter closes with a debate between a climate scientist and a humanist to reflect the discussions between climate science and philosophy or climate scientists and society.

In 1962, the publication of Thomas Kuhn's Structure 'revolutionized' the way one conducts philosophical and historical studies of science. Through the introduction of both memorable and controversial notions, such as paradigms, scientific revolutions, and incommensurability, Kuhn argued against the traditionally accepted notion of scientific change as a progression towards the truth about nature, and instead substituted the idea that science is a puzzle solving activity, operating under paradigms, which become discarded after it fails to respond accordingly to anomalous challenges and a rival paradigm. Kuhn's Structure has sold over 1.4 million copies and the Times Literary Supplement named it one of the "Hundred Most Influential Books since the Second World War." Now, fifty years after this groundbreaking work was published, this volume offers a timely reappraisal of the legacy of Kuhn's book and an investigation into what Structure offers philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of science in the future.