In nine new essays, distinguished philosophers of science take on outstanding philosophical issues that arise in the exploration of the foundations of contemporary, especially physical scientific theories. In the first part of the book issues of scientific method are explored. What are we asking when we pose scientific "why?" questions? How does probability play a role in answering such questions? What are scientific laws of nature? How can we understand what abstract theories are telling us about the world? What is the structure of the theories we use to explain the observable phenomena? Finally, how do theories evolve over time and what consequence do such changes have for our intuition that science is seeking the truth?
In the second part of the volume, foundational issues are explored in a number of crucial physical theories. What do our best available theories tell us about space and time? When we apply quantum theory to fields or other systems with infinite degrees of freedom, what new foundational puzzles appear and how might a theory of interpretation deal with them? Finally, what are the crucial foundational issues in statistical mechanics, where probabilities are applied to explain macroscopic thermal phenomena?

J. S. MILLS PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD The Hafner Library of Classics Number Twelve OSKAR PIEST Editor in Chief EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD CURT J. DUCASSE Professor of Philosophy, Brown University CLARENCE H. FAUST Dean of the Humanities and Sciences Stanford University ROBERT M. MACIVER Professor of Political Science, Columbia University ROSCOE POUND University Professor, Emeritus Formerly Dean of the Law School of Harvard University HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University John Stuart Mills Philosophy of Scientific Method Edited with an Introduction by ERNEST NAGEL Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University 1950 HAFNER PUBLISHING COMPANY NEW YORK CONTENTS PAGE EDITORS INTRODUCTION xv NOTE ON THE TEXT xlix SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 A SYSTEM OF LOGIC PREFACE 3 INTRODUCTION 1. Is logic the art and science of reasoning 2 . . . 7 2. Logic is concerned with inferences, not with intuitive truths 4, abridged 8 3. Relation of logic to the other sciences 5 . . . 11 BOOK I OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS CHAPTER I. OF THE NECESSITY OF COMMENCING WITH AN ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE 1. Theory of names, why a necessary part of logic . 13 2. First step in the analysis of propositions . . 15 II. OF NAMES 1. Names are names of things, not of our ideas . 16 2. Words which are not names, but parts of names . 17 3. General and singular names 20 4. Concrete and abstract 22 5. Connotative and non-connotative abridged . 24 III. OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES 1. Necessity of an enumeration of namable things. The categories of Aristotle abridged . . 35 2. Feelings, or states of consciousness 3 . . 35 3. Feelings must be distinguished from their physical antecedents. Perceptions, what 4 . . 374. Volitions and actions, what 5 . . . . 40 5. Substance and attribute 6 40 VI CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE 6. Body 7 42 7. Mind 8 48 8. Qualities 9 49 9. Relations 10 52 10. Resemblance 11 55 11. Quantity 12 58 12. All attributes of bodies are grounded on states of consciousness 13 59 13. So also all attributes of mind 14 ... 60 14. Recapitulation 15 61 IV. OF THE IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS CH. V 1. Doctrine that a proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas 64 2. that it consists in referring something to, or excluding something from, a class 3, abridged 67 3. What it really is 4 71 4. It asserts or denies a sequence, a co-existence, a simple existence, a causation 5, abridged . 73 5. or a resemblance 6, abridged .... 76 6. Propositions of which the terms are abstract 7 . 78 V. OF PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL CH. VI 1. All essential propositions are identical propositions 2 82 2. Individuals have no essences 3 . . . . 86 3. Real propositions, how distinguished from verbal 4 87 4. Two modes of representing the import of a real proposition 5 88 VI. OF THE NATURE OF CLASSIFICATION AND THE FIVE PREDICABLES CH. VII 1. Classification, how connected with naming . . 90 2. Kinds have a real existence in nature 4, abridged 91 VII. OF DEFINITION CH. VIII 1. A definition, what abridged 96 2. Every name can be defined whose meaning is sus ceptible of analysis 97 3. How distinguished from descriptions 4, abridged 100 CONTENTS Vll CHAPTER PAGE 4. What are called definitions of things are defini tions of names with an implied assumption of the existence of things corresponding to them 5, abridged 102 5. Definitions, though of names only, must be grounded on knowledge of the corresponding things7, abridged 106 BOOK II OF REASONING I. OF INFERENCE, OR REASONING, IN GENERAL 1. Retrospect of the preceding book abridged . . 109 2. Inferences improperly so called abridged . .110 II. OF RATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM 1. Analysis of the syllogism abridged . . . Ill 2. The dictum de omni not the foundation of reason ing, but a mere identical proposition . .112 3. What is the really fundamental axiom of ratiocina tion 116 4. The other form of the axiom 118 III. OF THE FUNCTIONS AND LOGICAL VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM 1. Is the syllogism a petitio prindpiif . . ...

Lucretius' account of the origin of life, the origin of species, and human prehistory (first century BC) is the longest and most detailed account extant from the ancient world. It is a mechanistic theory that does away with the need for any divine design, and has been seen as a forerunner of Darwin's theory of evolution. This commentary seeks to locate Lucretius in both the ancient and modern contexts. The recent revival of creationism makes this study particularly relevant to contemporary debate, and indeed, many of the central questions posed by creationists are those Lucretius attempts to answer.

The influence of Thomas Kuhn (1922 -1996) on the history and philosophy of science has been truly enormous. In 1962, Kuhn's famous work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, helped to inaugurate a revolution - the historiographic revolution - in the latter half of the twentieth century, providing a new understanding of science in which 'paradigm shifts' (scientific revolutions) are punctuated with periods of stasis (normal science). Kuhn's revolution not only had a huge impact on the history and philosophy of science but on other disciplines as well, including sociology, education, economics, theology, and even science policy. James A. Marcum's new book focuses on the following questions: What exactly was Kuhn's historiographic revolution? How did it come about? Why did it have the impact it did? What, if any, will its future impact be for both academia and society? At the heart of the answers to these questions is the person of Kuhn himself, i.e., his personality, his pedagogical style, his institutional and social commitments, and the intellectual and social context in which he practiced his trade. Drawing on the rich archival sources at MIT, and engaging fully with current scholarship on Kuhn, Marcum's is the first book to show in detail how Kuhn's influence transcended the boundaries of the history and philosophy of science community to reach many others - sociologists, economists, theologians, political scientists, educators, and even policy makers and politicians.

This book reconnects health and thought, as the two were treated together in the seventeenth century, and by reuniting them, it adds a significant dimension to our historical understanding. Indeed, there is hardly a single early modern figure who took a serious interest in one but not the other, with their attitudes toward body-mind interaction often revealed in acts of self-diagnosis and experimentation. The essays collected here specifically reveal the way experiment and especially self-experiment, combined with careful attention to the states of mind which accompany states of body, provide a new means of assessing attitudes to body-mind interactions just as they show the abiding interest and relevance of source material typically ignored by historians of science and historians of philosophy. In the surviving records of such experimenting on one's own body, we can observe leading figures like Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke, deliberately setting out to repeat pleasurable, or intellectually productive moods and states of mind, by applying the same medicine on successive occasions. In this way we can witness theories of the working of the human mind being developed by key members of an urban culture (London; interregnum Oxford) who based those theories in part on their own regular, long-term use of self-administered, mind-altering substances. It is hardly an overstatement to claim that there was a significant drug culture in the early modern period linked to self-experimentation, new medicines, and the new science. This is one of the many things this volume has to teach us.

This book is an historical narrative of academic appointments, significant personal and collaborative research endeavours, and important editorial and institutional engagements. For forty years Michael Matthews has been a prominent international researcher, author, editor and organiser in the field of 'History, Philosophy and Science Teaching'. He has systematically brought his own discipline training in science, psychology, philosophy of education, and the history and philosophy of science, to bear upon theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in science education. The book includes accounts of philosophers who greatly influenced his own thinking and who also were personal friends - Wallis Suchting, Abner Shimony, Robert Cohen, Marx Wartofsky, Israel Scheffler, Michael Martin and Mario Bunge. It advocates the importance of clear writing and avoidance of faddism in both philosophy and in education. It concludes with a proposal for informed and enlightened science teacher education.

There has recently been considerable discussion of a "replication crisis" in some areas of science. In this book, the authors argue that replication is not a necessary criterion for the validation of a scientific experiment. Five episodes from physics and genetics are used to substantiate this thesis: the Meselson-Stahl experiment on DNA replication, the discoveries of the positron and the omega minus hyperon, Mendel's plant experiments, and the discovery of parity nonconservation. Two cases in which once wasn't enough are also discussed, the nondiscovery of parity nonconservation and the search for magnetic monopoles. Reasons why once wasn't enough are also discussed.

Is science our most precious possession or has our culture elevated science into a false idol? Is technology a useful servant or a malign genie? These questions are at the center of the "science wars" currently being waged over the role and future of science and technology in our society.
This anthology presents the best debates on this important issue. Divided into two major sections, the first part deals with challenges to scientific knowledge, in particular its claims to objectivity and impartiality. Some conservative thinkers charge that many scientists follow a dogmatic naturalistic philosophy rather than truly objective standards of inquiry. Sociologists of knowledge claim that scientists "construct" scientific facts rather than "discover" them. And some feminists see patriarchal bias in traditional scientific ideals of method and rationality. Each of these claims will be presented and challenged by leading thinkers.
The second part considers current controversies over technology and the applications of science. Have computers changed the world for the better? Is high-tech medicine the answer to our health needs? Will the biotechnology revolution feed billions and cure disease or lead us into the Brave New World? Do the electronic media offer harmless entertainment or subtle enslavement?
This balanced selection of a variety of perspectives on the hotly contested role of science and technology in contemporary society will clarify this vital debate for both specialists and nonspecialists.

Space, Time, Matter, and Form collects ten of David Bostock's essays on themes from Aristotle's Physics, four of them published here for the first time. The first five papers look at issues raised in the first two books of the Physics, centred on notions of matter and form, and the idea of substance as what persists through change. They also range over other of Aristotle's scientific works, such as his biology and psychology and the account of change in his De Generatione et Corruptione. The volume's remaining essays examine themes in later books of the Physics, including infinity, place, time, and continuity. Bostock argues that Aristotle's views on these topics are of real interest in their own right, independent of his notions of substance, form, and matter; they also raise some pressing problems of interpretation, which these essays seek to resolve.

This monograph presents new ideas in nomic truth approximation. It features original and revised papers from a (formal) philosopher of science who has studied the concept for more than 35 years. Over the course of time, the author's initial ideas evolved. He discovered a way to generalize his first theory of nomic truth approximation, viz. by dropping an unnecessarily strong assumption. In particular, he first believed to have to assume that theories were maximally specific in the sense that they did not only exclude certain conceptual possibilities, but also that all non-excluded possibilities were in fact claimed to be nomically possible. Now, he argues that the exclusion claim alone, or for that matter the inclusion claim alone, is sufficient to motivate the formal definition of being closer to the nomic truth. The papers collected here detail this generalized view of nomic truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Besides this, the book presents, in adapted form, the relation with several other topics, such as, domain revision, aesthetic progress, abduction, inference to the best explanation, pragmatic aspects, probabilistic methods, belief revision and epistemological positions, notably constructive realism. Overall, the volume presents profound insight into nomic truth approximation. This idea seeks to determine how one theory can be closer to, or more similar to, the truth about what is nomically, e.g. physically, chemically, biologically, possible than another theory. As a result, it represents the ultimate goal of theory oriented empirical science. Theo Kuipers is the author of Studies in Inductive Probability and Rational Expectation (1978), From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism (2000) and Structures in Science (2001). He is the volume-editor of the Handbook on General Philosophy of Science (2007). In 2005 there appeared two volumes of Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, entitled Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation and Cognitive Structures in Scientific Inquiry.

A 2001 ECPA Gold Medallion Award winner A 2001 Christianity Today Award of Merit winner Science is the supreme authority in our culture. If there is a dispute, science arbitrates it. If a law is to be passed, science must ratify it. If truth is to be taught, science must approve it. And when science is ignored, stroms of protest are heard in the media, in the university--even in local coffee shops. Yet a society ruled by science (and the naturalistic philosophy that undergirds much of it) faces major problems. Science speaks so authoritatively in our culture that many are tempted to use its clout to back claims that go beyond the available evidence. How can we spot when such ideological slight of hand has taken place? More important, while we may learn a great deal from science, it does not offer us unlimited knowledge. In fact, most scientists readily acknowledge that science cannot provide answers to questions of ultimate purpose or meaning. So to what authority will we turn for these? The deficiencies in science and the philosophy (naturalism) that undergirds it call for a cognitive revolution--a fundamental change in our thinking habits. And it all begins with a wedge of truth. This wedge of truth does not "wedge out" a necessary foundation of rational thought. But it does "wedge in" the much-needed acknowledgment that reason encompasses more than mere scientific investigation. Phillip E. Johnson argues compellingly for an understanding of reason that brings scientific certainty back into relational balance with philosophical inquiry and religious faith. Applying his wedge of truth, Johnson analyzes the latest debates between science and religion played out in our media, our universities and society-at-large. He looks to thinkers such as Newbigin, Polanyi and Pascal to lay a foundation for our seeing the universe in a totally different way. And from that base he then considers the educational programs and research agendas that should be undertaken--and have already begun in some earnest--during this new century. In the end, Johnson prophetically concludes that the walls of naturalism will fall and that the Christian gospel must play a vital role in building a new foundation fro thinking--not just about science and religion but about everyhting that gives human life hopeand meaning.

This monograph details the entire scientific thought of an influential natural philosopher whose contributions, unfortunately, have become obscured by the pages of history. Readers will discover an important thinker: Burchard de Volder. He was instrumental in founding the first experimental cabinet at a European University in 1675. The author goes beyond the familiar image of De Volder as a forerunner of Newtonianism in Continental Europe. He consults neglected materials, including handwritten sources, and takes into account new historiographical categories. His investigation maps the thought of an author who did not sit with an univocal philosophical school, but critically dealt with all the 'major' philosophers and scientists of his age: from Descartes to Newton, via Spinoza, Boyle, Huygens, Bernoulli, and Leibniz. It explores the way De Volder's un-systematic thought used, rejected, and re-shaped their theories and approaches. In addition, the title includes transcriptions of De Volder's teaching materials: disputations, dictations, and notes. Insightful analysis combined with a trove of primary source material will help readers gain a new perspective on a thinker so far mostly ignored by scholars. They will find a thoughtful figure who engaged with early modern science and developed a place that fostered experimental philosophy.

This book describes in detail the various theories on the shape of the Earth from classical antiquity to the present day and examines how measurements of its form and dimensions have evolved throughout this period. The origins of the notion of the sphericity of the Earth are explained, dating back to Eratosthenes and beyond, and detailed attention is paid to the struggle to establish key discoveries as part of the cultural heritage of humanity. In this context, the roles played by the Catholic Church and the philosophers of the Middle Ages are scrutinized. Later contributions by such luminaries as Richer, Newton, Clairaut, Maupertuis, and Delambre are thoroughly reviewed, with exploration of the importance of mathematics in their geodetic enterprises. The culmination of progress in scientific research is the recognition that the reference figure is not a sphere but rather a geoid and that the earth's shape is oblate. Today, satellite geodesy permits the solution of geodetic problems by means of precise measurements. Narrating this fascinating story from the very beginning not only casts light on our emerging understanding of the figure of the Earth but also offers profound insights into the broader evolution of human thought.

This book is about our ordinary concept of matter in the form of enduring continuants and the processes in which they are involved in the macroscopic realm. It emphasises what science rather than philosophical intuition tells us about the world, and chemistry rather than the physics that is more usually encountered in philosophical discussions. The central chapters dealing with the nature of matter pursue key steps in the historical development of scientific conceptions of chemical substance. Like many contemporary discussions of material objects, it relies heavily on mereology. The classical principles are applied to the mereological structure of regions of space, intervals of time, processes and quantities of matter. Quantities of matter, which don't gain or lose parts over time, are distinguished from individuals, which are typically constituted of different quantities of matter at different times. The proper treatment of the temporal aspect of the features of material objects is a central issue in this book, which is addressed by investigating the conditions governing the application of predicates relating time and other entities. Of particular interest here are relations between quantities of matter and times expressing substance kind, phase and mixture. Modal aspects of these features are taken up in the final chapter.

This interdisciplinary book ties the historical work of Descartes to his successors through current research and critical overviews on the neuroscience of consciousness, the brain, and cognition. This text is the first historical survey to focus on the cohesions and discontinuities between historical and contemporary thinkers working in philosophy, physiology, psychology, and neuroscience. The book introduces and analyzes early discussions of consciousness, such as: metaphysical alternatives to scientific explanations of consciousness and its connection to brain activity; claims about the possibilities and limits of neuroscientific accounts of consciousness and cognition; and the proposition of a "non-reductive naturalism" concerning phenomenal consciousness and rationality. The author assesses the contributions of early philosophers and scientists on brain, consciousness and cognition, among them: Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Haller, Kant, Fechner, Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond. The work of these pioneers is related to that of modern researchers in physiology, psychology, neuroscience and philosophy of mind, including: Freud, Hilary Putnam, Herbert Feigl, Gerald Edelman, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, amongst others. This text appeals to researchers and advanced students in the field.

This book is an attempt to give a systematic presentation of both logic and type theory from a categorical perspective, using the unifying concept of fibred category. Its intended audience consists of logicians, type theorists, category theorists and (theoretical) computer scientists.

Religio Medici, the timeless book of personal contemplations by renowned polymath Sir Thomas Browne, is presented here complete. Written by Browne during the 1640s as a means of profiling his psyche in a spiritual testament to the divine, Religio Medici - in English, Religion of a Doctor - was received with acclaim in England and continental Europe. The text is structured around three key virtues: the first part is occupied with the attributes of Faith and Hope; while the second part is concerned with Charity. Throughout, Browne maintains a recognisable style and tone, writing with frankness, clarity and conviction. For its profundity and explanatory wisdom, scholars of the 17th century lavished Religio Medici with praise, and Browne became famous. The book enjoyed a revival in the 19th century, as the characterful idiosyncrasies of Browne found appreciation among artists and intellectuals of that era. Today, the text remains a favourite for its accessible, thought-provoking merits.

Can the existence of God by proven by science? The answer will still surprise you. Since the advent of science in the 16th century, it has navigated mankind in the direction of mechanistic materialism, and as a consequence to atheism. Since the beginning of the 20th century this direction has changed. Relativity and quantum physics, in conjunction with Big Bang cosmology, laid the foundation for a revolution in physics, in what became labelled as the "New Physics". Subsequently during the 1970's it was discovered that the universe, at every level and from its first billionth of a second at the time of its creation, was mysteriously fine-tuned. This fine-tuning comprises the inexplicable and delicate balance of the four fundamental forces that rule the universe: gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and the weak nuclear forces. This discovery implies that even the most basic building blocks of matter, such as atoms and its sub-atomic particles, can only exist by the grace of an inexplicable, complex and delicate balance between these forces. The chance that this fine-tuning could have emerged spontaneously and fortuitously, is not only improbable, but utterly impossible. Intelligence or Chaos elucidates that the complexity and fine-tuning of the universe can only be explained by the presence of an all-pervasive intelligence, the source and reservoir of the Information that actually guides and controls the universe. For the first time in history such a conclusion is confirmed by indubitable scientific evidence. The existence of an all-pervading intelligence, as expressed in the principle of fine-tuning, is also at the core of the ancient Vedanta philosophy of India. The author explores how Vedanta disentangles some of the paradoxes encountered in quantum physics and major cosmological questions such as the Big Bang and its origin. Using the latest empirical and scientific evidence Intelligence or Chaos clearly shows that the universe is ruled by intelligence and information, and not by chance and chaos.

Some people claim that evolution is "just a theory." Do you know what a scientific theory really is? Just a theory is an overview of the modern concepts of science. A clear understanding of the nature of science will enable you to distinguish science from pseudoscience (which illegitimately wraps itself in the mantle of science), and real social issues in science from the caricatures portrayed in postmodernist critiques.
Prof. Ben-Ari's style is light (even humorous) and easy to read, bringing the latest concepts of science to the general reader. Of particular interest is his analysis of the terminology of science (fact, law, proof, theory) in relation to the colloquial meaning of these terms.
Between chapters are biographical vignettes of scientists -- both familiar and unfamiliar -- showing their common commitment to the enterprise of science, together with a diversity of backgrounds and personalities.
This accessible, informative, and comprehensive work will give lay readers a good grasp of real science.

This book argues for two claims: firstly, determinism in science does not infringe upon human free will because it is descriptive, not prescriptive, and secondly, the very formulation, testing and justification of scientific theories presupposes human free will and thereby persons as ontologically primitive. The argument against predetermination is broadly Humean, or more precisely 'Super-Humean', whereas that against naturalist reduction is in large Kantian, drawing from Sellars on the scientific and the manifest image. Thus, whilst the book defends scientific realism against the confusion between fact and fake, it also reveals why scientific theories, laws and explanations cannot succeed in imposing norms for our actions upon us, neither on the level of the individual nor on that of society. Esfeld makes a strong case for an ontology of science that is minimally sufficient to explain our scientific and common sense knowledge, not only removing the concern that the laws of nature are incompatible with human freedom, but furthermore showing how our freedom is in fact a very presupposition for science.

This book brings together papers from a conference that took place in the city of L'Aquila, 4-6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009. Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson: the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however, believes that scientific time is derived by abstraction, even in the sense of extraction, from a more fundamental time. The plurality of times envisaged by the theory of Relativity does not, for him, contradict the philosophical intuition of the existence of a single time. But how do things stand today? What can we say about the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of time in the light of contemporary science? What do quantum mechanics, biology and neuroscience teach us about the nature of time? The essays collected here take up the question that pitted Einstein against Bergson, science against philosophy, in an attempt to reverse the outcome of their monologue in two voices, with a multilogue in several voices.