twentieth-century literature about the distinction between explanation and und- standing)? Second, can we do justice to a particular writer's notion of that category by taking at face value what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a) intellectual history - like other kinds of history - has to be careful not to uncritically adopt actors' categories, and (b) more generally, even the actors' own thinking about a particular issue has to be contextualized vis-a-vis their other intellectual commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks to read some of the nineteen- century philosophical writings about Erklaren and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem, which he terms the problem of the "unity of experience.""

The articles in this collection were all selected from the first five volumes of the Journal of Dialectics of Nature published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1979 and 1985. The Journal was established in 1979 as a comprehensive theoretical publication concerning the history, philosophy and sociology of the natural sciences. It began publication as a response to China's reform, particularly the policy of opening to the outside world. Chinese scholars began to undertake distinctive, original research in these fields. This collection provides a cross-section of their efforts during the initial phase. To enable western scholars to understand the historical process of this change in Chinese academics, Yu Guangyuan's On the Emancipation of the Mind' and Xu Liangying's Essay on the Role of Science and Democracy in Society' have been included in this collection. Three of the papers included on the philosophy of science are discussions of philosophical issues in cosmology and biology by scientists themselves. The remaining four are written by philosophers of science and discuss information and cognition, homeostasis and Chinese traditional medicine, the I Ching (Yi Jing) and mathematics, etc. Papers have been selected on the history of both classical and modern science and technology, the most distinctive of which are macro-comparisons of the development of science in China and the west. Some papers discuss the issue of the demarcation of periods in the history of science, the history of ancient Chinese mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, machinery, medicine, etc. Others discuss the history of modern physics and biology, the history of historiography of science in China and thehistory of regional development of Chinese science and technology. Also included are biographies of three post-eighteenth-century Chinese scholars, Li Shanlan (1811-1882), Hua Hengfang (1833&endash;1902), and Cai Yuanpei (1868&endash;1940), who contributed greatly to the introduction of western science and scholarship to China. In addition, three short papers have been included introducing the interactions between Chinese scholars and three great western scientists, Niels Bohr, Norbert Wiener, and Robert A. Millikan.

The IOth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, which took place in Florence in August 1995, offered a vivid and comprehensive picture of the present state of research in all directions of Logic and Philosophy of Science. The final program counted 51 invited lectures and around 700 contributed papers, distributed in 15 sections. Following the tradition of previous LMPS-meetings, some authors, whose papers aroused particular interest, were invited to submit their works for publication in a collection of selected contributed papers. Due to the large number of interesting contributions, it was decided to split the collection into two distinct volumes: one covering the areas of Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computer Science, the other focusing on the general Philosophy of Science and the Foundations of Physics. As a leading choice criterion for the present volume, we tried to combine papers containing relevant technical results in pure and applied logic with papers devoted to conceptual analyses, deeply rooted in advanced present-day research. After all, we believe this is part of the genuine spirit underlying the whole enterprise of LMPS studies."

The three well known revolutions of the past centuries - the Copernican, the Darwinian and the Freudian - each in their own way had a deflating and mechanizing effect on the position of humans in nature. They opened up a richness of disillusion: earth acquired a more modest place in the universe, the human body and mind became products of a long material evolutionary history, and human reason, instead of being the central, immaterial, locus of understanding, was admitted into the theater of discourse only as a materialized and frequently out-of-control actor. Is there something objectionable to this picture? Formulated as such, probably not. Why should we resist the idea that we are in certain ways, and to some degree, physically, biologically or psychically determined? Why refuse to acknowledge the fact that we are materially situated in an ever evolving world? Why deny that the ways of inscription (traces of past events and processes) are co-determinative of further "evolutionary pathways"? Why minimize the idea that each intervention, of each natural being, is temporally and materially situated, and has, as such, the inevitable consequence of changing the world? The point is, however, that there are many, more or less radically different, ways to consider the "mechanization" of man and nature. There are, in particular, many ways to get the message of "material and evolutionary determination," as well as many levels at which this determination can be thought of as relevant or irrelevant.

Philosophy has come to seem like a specialist interest with little or no influence on our lives. On the contrary, argues James Tartaglia, it was the philosophy of materialism which taught us to turn from the gods to seek practical assistance from the titans, thereby reversing the moral of an ancient Greek myth to inspire the building of today's technological world. As the largely unreflected belief-system it has now become, materialism continues to steer the direction of technological development, while making us think this direction is inevitable. By drawing on neglected idealist traditions of philosophy, Tartaglia argues for a new way of looking at reality which asserts our freedom to choose, reaffirms and builds upon our ordinary, everyday understanding, and motivates us to convert technological innovation into a process driven by public rationality and consent. With discussions ranging from consciousness, determinism and personal identity, to post-truth culture, ego-death and video games, this clear and accessible book will be of wide interest.

This volume is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the distinction between a context of justification and a context of discovery . It is meant for researchers and advanced students in philosophy of science, and for natural and social scientists interested in foundational topics. Spanning a wide range of disciplines, it combines the viewpoint of philosophers and scientists and casts a new interdisciplinary perspective on the problem of observation and experimentation.

The philosophical writings of Otto Neurath, and their central themes, have been described many times, by Carnap in his authobiographical essay, by Ayer and Morris and Kraft decades ago, by Haller and Hegselmann and Nemeth and others in recent years. How extraordinary Neurath's insights were, even when they perhaps were more to be seen as conjectures, aperfus, philosophical hypotheses, tools to be taken up and used in the practical workshop of life; and how prescient he was. A few examples may be helpful: (1) Neurath's 1912 lecture on the conceptual critique of the idea of a pleasure maximum [ON 50] substantially anticipates the development of aspects of analytical ethics in mid-century. (2) Neurath's 1915 paper on alternative hypotheses, and systems of hypotheses, within the science of physical optics [ON 81] gives a lucid account of the historically-developed clashing theories of light, their un realized further possibilities, and the implied contingencies of theory survival in science, all within his framework that antedates not only the quite similar work of Kuhn so many years later but also of the Vienna Circle too. (3) Neurath's subsequent paper of 1916 investigates the inadequacies of various attempts to classify systems of hypotheses [ON 82, and this volume], and sets forth a pioneering conception of the metatheoretical task of scientific philosophy.

A dominant feature of our ordinary experience of the world is a sense of irreversible change: things lose form, people grow old, energy dissipates. On the other hand, a major conceptual scheme we use to describe the natural world, molecular dynamics, has reversibility at its core. The need to harmonize conceptual schemes and experience leads to several questions, one of which is the focus of this book. How does irreversibility at the macroscopic level emerge from the reversibility that prevails at the molecular level? Attempts to explain the emergence have emphasized probability, and assigned different probabilities to the forward and reversed directions of processes so that one direction is far more probable than the other. The conclu sion is promising, but the reasons for it have been obscure. In many cases the aim has been to find an explana tion in the nature of probability itself. Reactions to that have been divided: some think the aim is justified while others think it is absurd."

Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science brings together original essays by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science that examine issues at the intersections of feminism, science, and the philosophy of science. Contributors explore parallels and tensions between feminist approaches to science and other approaches in the philosophy of science and more general science studies. In so doing, they explore notions at the heart of the philosophy of science, including the nature of objectivity, truth, evidence, cognitive agency, scientific method, and the relationship between science and values.

After his failure to replace metaphysics by a linguistic approach, Ludwig Boltzmann came to identify the philosophy of science with methodology which, in turn, he considered to be part of science itself, and thus not part of philosophy at all. His definition of philosophy as metaphysics meant that, from his point of view, all philosophers were metaphysicians, himself included. Boltzmann the philosopher was advised on the improvement of his Weltanschauung by Franz Brentano; to such effect that, by the summer of 1905, Boltzmann appeared to be close to a form of critical realism. However, the stronger this realism became, the more inconsistent it seemed to be with his Mach plus pictures' methodology of science. During this period, he planned to write a book, first on metaphysics and then later on what he called A priori probability' and what he considered to be its shortcomings. Apparently, the book was never completed. All know Boltzmann the great physicist. Much less widely known is that he was an original philosopher: one who had a great impact on early 20th Century Viennese philosophy, beginning with Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle and extending even to Popper and Feyerabend. Blackmore's delving into Boltzmann's correspondence, coupled with his unparalleled knowledge of Boltzmann's final years, allows him to present Boltzmann in an entirely new light to readers in the English language. For physicists, philosophers and historians.

[1977] Hermann von Helmholtz in the History of Scientific Method In 1921, the centenary of Helmholtz' birth, Paul Hertz, a physicist, and Moritz Schlick, a philosopher, published a selection of his papers and lectures on the philosophical foundations of the sciences, under the title Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie. Combining qualities of respect and criticism that Helmholtz would have demanded, Hertz and Schlick scrupulously annotated the texts. Their edition of Helmholtz was of historical influence, comparable to the influence among contemporary mathematicians and philosophers of Hermann Weyl's annotated edition in 1919 of Riemann's great dissertation of 1854 on the foundations of geometry. For several reasons, we are pleased to be able to bring this Schlick/ Hertz edition to the English-reading world: first, and primary, to honor the memory of Hermann von Helmholtz; second, as writings of historical value, to deepen the understanding of mathematics and the natural sciences, as well as of psychology and philosophy, in the 19th centur- for Helmholtz must be comprehended within at least that wide a range; third, with Schlick, to understand the developing empiricist philosophy of science in the early 20th century; and fourth, to bring the contributions of Schlick, Hertz, and Helmholtz to methodological debate in our own time, a half century later, long after the rise and consolidation of logical empiricism, the explosion of physics since Planck and Einstein, and the development of psychology since Freud and Pavlov.

The present work represents a unique undertaking in scientific publishing to honor Nick Metropolis, who passed away in October, 1999. Nick was the last survivor of the Manhattan Project that began during World War II in Los Alamos and later became the Los Alamos National Laboratory. In this volume, some of the leading scientists and humanists of our time have contributed essays related to their respective disciplines exploring various aspects of future developments in science, technology, and society. Speculations on the future developments of science and society, philosophy, national security, nuclear power, pure and applied mathematics, physics and biology, particle physics, computing, information science, among many others, are included. Contributors include: H. Agnew * R. Ashenhurst * K. Baclawski * G. Baker * N. Balazs * J.A. Freed * R. Hamming * M. Hawrylycz * O. Judd * D. Kleitman * M. Krieger * N. Krikorian * P. Lax * J.D. Louck * T. Puck * M. Raju * R. Richtmyer * J. Schwartz * R. Sokolowski * E. Teller * M. Waterman

Einstein Meets Magritte: An Interdisciplinary Reflection presents insights of the renowned key speakers of the interdisciplinary Einstein meets Magritte conference (1995, Brussels Free University). The contributions elaborate on fundamental questions of science, with regard to the contemporary world, and push beyond the borders of traditional approaches. All of the articles in this volume address this fundamental theme, but somewhere along the road the volume expanded to become much more than a mere expression of the conference's dynamics. The articles not only deal with several scientific disciplines, they also confront these fields with the full spectrum of contemporary life, and become new science. As such, this volume presents a state-of-the-art reflection of science in the world today, in all its diversity. The contributions are accessible to a large audience of scientists, students, educators, and everyone who wants to keep up with science today.

invoking the fluctuation-dissipation theorems of Einstein and 2 more recently those of Callen and Kubo in order to get to manageable results. In this manner, great strides have been made in the development of the many-body problem without reaching the necessity to legitimize thermodynamics. Ther modynamics and statistical mechanics were used successful ly as bridges and guides to get the new ideas to conform to the macroscopic experiences (measurements). Hence the dis 3 interest of theoreticians. The frustration in attracting the at tention of the working physicists on this problem is vividly described in Carnap's (1978) account on the reception of his ideas and efforts at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Prin ceton where he worked on the Two Essays on Entropy; it al most amounted, he thought, to a conspiracy of silence. The priorities of theoretical physicists remain with the puzzles and the cranking at hand: Quantum Field Theory (QFT) and "creation and annihilation" physics, solid state physics, - to mention only a few research areas - command the attention of those working on the research frontiers. Thermodynamics is taken for granted and is thought to be an almost depleted research area. Whatever the subterfuges, the hand-waving arguments, the paedagogical red herrings, the procedures work and nothing can be gained by allocating intellectual re sources to resolve ambiguities with few, if any, expected rewards. Down deep, all believe that the regularization of the field will one day be accomplished."

It is fitting that Professor Dirk Jan Struik be greeted with this melange of mathematical, scientific, historical, sociological and political essays. The authors are also appropriately varied: different countries, outlooks, religions, generations, and we suppose - of course we did not as- different politics too. Many more would have joined us, we know, but the good friends in this book make a fine and representative assembly of the intersection of two (mathematical ) classes: affectionately respect ful admirers of Dirk Struik, and the best thinkers of this troubled century. Struik has been among the most steadfast supporters of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, that discussion group which we have been holding at Boston University since 1960, but his luminous collaboration has been welcome, in Boston and Cambridge, for nearly five decades among mathematicians, physicists, philosophical and political thinkers, and especially among the students. It has not mattered whether they have been his own students or not, whether at M.LT. or elsewhere, whether scholars or dropouts, nature-lovers or book worms, anarchists or Republicans, Catholics or Unitarians, Communists or communists, prim or liberated. No doubt he has his preferences But the main thing for Struik has been to educate and respect the other person."

This book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Henryk Mehlberg, primarily because I want to recall his name to readers in the West; for, although Professor Mehlberg was the foremost Polish philosopher in the field of philosophy of time-in that version which is related to twentieth century physics-his fundamental work concerning time was published in English 43 years after its original publication (cf. Mehlberg, 1980). I am deeply indebted to Henryk Mehlberg. For two years after the Second World War, I was his student at Wroclaw University (where he lectured on philosophy and mathematical logic). At that time, I developed, under his influence, a long-life fascination with the philosophy of time, and was taught by him how to approach these problems effectively. My research in this field has resulted in three books. The first, Prop erties of Time, published (in Polish) in 1970, concerns the topological properties and properties of symmetry (homogeneity and anisotropy) of time. The second, The Nature of Time, published (in Polish) in 1975, looks at possible definitions of time within both theories of relativity. The present book is the third, originally published (in Polish) in 1979; it concerns philosophical problems of past, present, and future and is here presented in English to reach a wider audience."

The rapidity with which knowledge changes makes much of past science obsolete, and often just wrong, from the present's point of view. We no longer think, for example, that heat is a material substance transferred from hot to cold bodies. But is wrong science always or even usually bad science? The essays in this volume argue by example that much of the past's rejected science, wrong in retrospect though it may be - and sometimes markedly so - was nevertheless sound and exemplary of enduring standards that transcend the particularities of culture and locale.

This book deals with the entrenched misunderstandings of Feyerabend's philosophy, brings together the positive elements to be found in Feyerabend's work, and presents these elements as a coherent alternative conception of scientific rationality. It is the first book-length study of Feyerabend's post-1970 philosophy and will be an invaluable resource for philosophers of science, students of the philosophy of science, and anyone who wants to understand the views of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century.

With publication of the present volume, The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science enters its second phase. The first fourteen volumes in the Series were produced under the managing editorship of Professor James J. Leach, with the cooperation of a local editorial board. Many of these volumes resulted from colloguia and workshops held in con nection with the University of Western Ontario Graduate Programme in Philosophy of Science. Throughout its seven year history, the Series has been devoted to publication of high quality work in philosophy of science con sidered in its widest extent, including work in philosophy of the special sciences and history of the conceptual development of science. In future, this general editorial emphasis will be maintained, and hopefully, broadened to include important works by scholars working outside the local context. Appointment of a new managing editor, together with an expanded editorial board, brings with it the hope of an enlarged international presence for the Series. Serving the publication needs of those working in the various subfields within philosophy of science is a many-faceted operation. Thus in future the Series will continue to produce edited proceedings of worthwhile scholarly meetings and edited collections of seminal background papers. How ever, the publication priorities will shift emphasis to favour production of monographs in the various fields covered by the scope of the Series. THE MANAGING EDITOR vii W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker, and G. Pearce (eds.), lIs, vii."

What is scientific about the natural and human sciences? Precisely this: the legibility of our worlds and the distinctive reading strategies that they provoke. That proposal comes from Edith Stein, who as Husserl's assistant 1916-1918 labored in vain to bring his massive Ideen to publication. She argued that human bodily life itself affords direct access to the interplay of natural causality, cultural motivation, and personal initiative. This study explores the hermeneutical background of Stein's phenomenology and shows that she composed crucial passages of the Ideen manuscripts. Stein's own works on empathy and on psychology establish that natural science is a cultural achievement, resting on the ability to isolate caused data by recognizing and subtracting motivated data from raw data. This subtractive literacy is the most basic scientific competence, and it is fundamentally interpersonal. The reality of the illegible causal remainder overcomes the critiques of science recently offered by psychoanalytic and standpoint feminisms.

Prefatory Explanation It must be remarked at once that I am 'editor' of this volume only in that I had the honor of presiding at the symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences at which a number of these papers were presented (exceptions are those by Hans Jonas, Richard Popkin, Joe VanZandt and our four European contributors), in that I have given some editorial advice on details of some of the papers, including translations, and finally, in that my name appears on the cover. The choice of speakers, and of addi tional contributors, is entirely due to Robert Cohen and Debra Nails; and nearly all the burden of readying the manuscript for the press has been borne by the latter. In the introduction to another anthology on Spinoza I opened my remarks by quoting a statement of Sir Stuart Hampshire about inter pretations of Spinoza's chief work: All these masks have been fitted on him and each of them does to some extent fit. But they remain masks, not the living face. They do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts in Spinoza's Ethics. (Hampshire, 1973, p. 297) The double theme of 'moving tensions' and 'unresolved conflicts' seems even more appropriate to the present volume. What is Spinoza's rela tion to the sciences? The answers are many, and they criss-cross one another in a number of complicated ways."

Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science are devoted to symposia, con gresses, colloquia, monographs and collected papers on the philosophical foundations of the sciences. It is now our pleasure to include A. A. Zi nov'ev's treatise on complex logic among these volumes. Zinov'ev is one of the most creative of modern Soviet logicians, and at the same time an innovative worker on the methodological foundations of science. More over, Zinov'ev, although still a developing scholar, has exerted a sub stantial and stimulating influence upon his colleagues and students in Moscow and within other philosophical and logical circles of the Soviet Union. Hence it may be helpful, in bringing this present work to an English-reading audience, to review briefly some contemporary Soviet investigations into scientific methodology. During the 1950's, a vigorous new research program in logic was under taken, and the initial published work -characteristic of most Soviet pub lications in the logic and methodology of the sciences - was a collection of essays, Logical Investigations (Moscow, 1959). Among the authors, in addition to Zinov'ev himself, were the philosophers A. Kol'man and P. V. Tavanec, and the mathematicians and linguists, S. A. Janovskaja, A. S. Esenin-Vol'pin, S. K. Saumjan, G. N. Povarov."

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking."