First published in 2000. This is Volume VI of six in the Library of Philosophy series on the Philosophy of Science. Written in 1929, using the initial ideas of A.N. Whitehead, this book on Biological Principles includes the concept of abstraction methodology in biology. This expands into an investigation into the general problems of the theory of knowledge, difficulties in biological knowledge and finally suggestions towards a resolution of certain traditional biological conflicts.

l. The work of Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) consists of two kinds of writings: in the first part of his active life he devoted himself entirely to problems of physics, while in the second part he tried to find a philosoph 1 ical background for his activities in and around the natural sciences. Most scientists are much more aware of his creative work in physics than of his digressions on the meaning and structure of science. I think in the present case the reason is not so much that most scientists are usually almost entirely occupied with their trade, because Boltzmann's philosophical work is also concerned with the (natural) sciences. I rather believe that the quality and consistency of Boltzmann's purely scientific work is of a more appealing nature than his less structured considerations on human activity in science and in life in general. 2. I think that it may be appropriate for the readers of this anthology to say a few words on the main findings of Boltzmann in physics, since in the end their 'philosophical' inlpact has been larger than the effect of his later writings. Moreover some knowledge of his scientific achievements can be helpful for the understanding and appreciation of the essays printed in this book, which almost all stem from Boltzmann's philosophical period. Boltzmann was one of the main protagonists - at least in continental Europe - of atomistics for explaining the phenomena of physics."

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The corps of philosophers who make up the Society for Philosophy & Technology has now been collaborating, in one fashion or another, for almost fifteen years. In addition, the number of philosophers, world-wide, who have begun to focus their analytical skills on technology and related social problems grows increasingly every year. {It would certainly swell the ranks if all of them joined the Society ) It seems more than ap propriate, in this context, to publish a miscellaneous volume that em phasizes the extraordinary range and diversity of contemporary contribu tions to the philosophical understanding of the exceedingly complex phenomenon that is modern technology. My thanks, once again, to the anonymous referees who do so much to maintain standards for the series. And thanks also to the secretaries - Mary Imperatore and Dorothy Milsom - in the Philosophy Department at the University of Delaware; their typing and retyping of the MSS, and especially notes and references, also contributes to keeping our standards high. PAUL T. DURBIN vii Paul T. Durbin (ed.), Philosophy ofT echnology, p. vii."

Since the origin of the modern sciences, our views on discovery and creativity had a remarkable history. Originally, discovery was seen as an integral part of methodology and the logic of discovery as algorithmic or nearly algorithmic. During the nineteenth century, conceptions in line with romanticism led to the famous opposition between the context of discovery and the context of justification, culminating in a view that banned discovery from methodology. The revival of the methodological investigation of discovery, which started some thirty years ago, derived its major impetus from historical and sociological studies of the sciences and from developments within cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence. Today, a large majority of philosophers of science agrees that the classical conception as well as the romantic conception are mistaken. Against the classical conception, it is generally accepted that truly novel discoveries are not the result of simply applying some standardized procedure. Against the romantic conception, it is rejected that discoveries are produced by unstructured flashes of insight.

An especially important result of the contemporary study concerns the availability of (descriptive and normative) models for explaining discoveries and creative processes. Descriptive models mainly aim at explaining the origin of novel products; normative models moreover address the question how rational researchers should proceed when confronted with problems for which a standard procedure is missing. The present book provides an overview of these models and of the important changes they induced within methodology. As appears from several papers, the methodological study of discovery and creativity led to profound changes in our conceptions of justification and acceptance, of rationality, of scientific change, and of conceptual change. The book contains contributions from both historians and philosophers of science. All of them, however, are methodological in the contemporary sense of the term. The central values of this methodology are empirical accurateness, clarity and precision, and rationality. The different contributions realize these values by their interdisciplinary nature. Some philosophically oriented papers rely on historical case studies and results from the cognitive sciences, others on recent results from the computer sciences and/or non-standard logics. The historically oriented papers address central philosophical questions and hypotheses.

In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not."

Here is a much needed study of the American historian and philosopher, E.A. Burtt. H. Floris Cohen, author of "The Scientific Revolution, A Historiography," has described Burtt as an "individual thinker...beyond philosophical or historical currents or fashion." Burtt's book, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, is something of a puzzle within the context of twentieth-century intellectual history, especially American intellectual history. Burtt's pioneering study of the scientific revolution has proved to prophetic in its rejection of both scientism and positivism. Published in 1924, Burtt's book continues to be read in educated circles and remains both the rose and the thorn on university reading lists, raising skeptical questions about science methods and science knowledge just as it did seventy-five years ago.
This book examines Burtt's public, academic and personal life. From his politics of conscience after World War I on through the Cold War Burtt is shown to be a man of unparalleled integrity, whose relentless search for philosophic understanding drove his more quixotic philosophical quests and steered his personal life, including its tragic dimension, toward simple virtue.
The many who have been affected by The Metaphysical Foundations will be especially interested in this new perspective on the life and thought of its author. Those who have not read Burtt's books might be inspired to study this unusual American thinker.

This open access book provides an overview of issues of scientific responsibility. The volume comprises three types of contributions: first, analyses of the responsibility of science; second, analyses of the structural conditions for science and its responsibility; and third, normative versions of scientific responsibility. The questions and problems dealt with include science as a profession, ambivalence of research and dual-use, innovation vs. precaution, notions of responsibility, the role of science within society and its relation to human rights, as well as scientific and public discourses. The book addresses scholars in the fields of Science Studies and Research Policy. This is an open access book.

In Science, Order and Creativity, David Bohm and F. David Peat argue that science has lost its way in recent years and needs to go beyond a narrow and fragmented view of nature and embrace a wider holistic view that restores the importance of creativity and communication for all humanity - not just scientists.
The result of a close collaboration by one of the 20th century's greatest physicists and thinkers, David Bohm, with leading science writer F. David Peat, provides a rare combination of profound reflection and clear exposition that can be appreciated by anyone concerned with science and its importance in our lives.
This new edition includes a new preface and an extended additional chapter by Peat which draws upon further discussions with David Bohm before the latter's death in 1992. A fascinating diagnosis and considered proposal for a cure for science's ills, it is also very accessible entry point to the work of David Bohm. Bohm and Peat contend that science has lost its bearings in the last century in favour of a narrow, abstracted, fragmented approach to nature and reality. Tracing the history of science, Bohm and Peat offer intriguing new insights into how scientific theories come into being, how to eliminate blocks of creativity and how science can lead to a deeper understanding of society, the human condition and the human mind itself.

Using simple physical examples, this work by Erhard Scheibe presents an important and powerful approach to the reduction of physical theories. Novel to the approach is that it is not based, as usual, on a single reduction concept that is fixed once and for all, but on a series of recursively constructed reductions, with which all reductions appear as combinations of very specific elementary reductions. This leaves the general notion of theory reduction initially open and is beneficial for the treatment of the difficult cases of reduction from the fields of special and general relativity, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics,and quantum mechanics, which are treated in the second volume. The book is systematically organized and intended for readers interested in philosophy of science as well as physicists without deep philosophical knowledge.

This book is the first comprehensive critical study of the work of Paul Feyerabend, one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science.

The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend's thought, beginning with his early attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein's conception of meaning onto Popper's falsificationist philosophy. The key elements of Feyerabend's model of the acquisition of knowledge are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend's early work emerges as a continuation of Popper's philosophy of science, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to science with which he is usually associated.
In his more notorious later work, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. The roots of Feyerabend's 'epistemological anarchism' are exposed and the weaknesses of his cultural relativism are brought out.

Throughout the book, Preston discusses the influence of Feyerabend's thought on contemporary philosophers and traces his stimulating but divided legacy. The book will be of interest to students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.

"If a science has to be supported by fraudulent means, let it perish. " With these words of Kepler, Agassi plunges into the actual troubles and glories of science (321). The sociology of science is no foreign intruder upon scientific knowledge in these essays, for we see clearly how Agassi transforms the tired internalist/externalist debate about the causal influences in the history of science. The social character of the entire intertwined epistemological and practical natures of the sciences is intrinsic to science and itself split: the internal sociology within science, the external sOciology of the social setting without. Agassi sees these social matters in the small as well as the large: from the details of scientific communication, changing publishing as he thinks to 'on-demand' centralism with less waste (Ch. 12), to the colossal tension of romanticism and rationality in the sweep of historical cultures. Agassi is a moral and political philosopher of science, defending, dis turbing, comprehending, criticizing. For him, science in a society requires confrontation, again and again, with issues of autonomy vs. legitimation as the central problem of democracy. And furthermore, devotion to science, pace Popper, Polanyi, and Weber, carries preoccupational dangers: Popper's elitist rooting out of 'pseudo-science', Weber's hard-working obsessive com mitment to science. See Agassi's Weberian gloss on the social psychology of science in his provocative 'picture of the scientist as maniac' (437)."

Science and the Quest for Reality is an interdisciplinary anthology that situates contemporary science within its complex philosophical, historical, and sociological contexts. The anthology is divided between, firstly, characterizing science as an intellectual activity and, secondly, defining its social role. The philosophical and historical vicissitudes of science's truth claims has raised profound questions concerning the role of science in society beyond its technological innovations. The deeper philosophical issues thus complement the critical inquiry concerning the broader social and ethical influence of contemporary science. In the tradition of the 'Main Trends of the Modern World' series, this volume includes both classical and contemporary works on the subject.

The present selection from the Wissenschaftslehre (Sulzbach 1837) of Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) aims at giving a compact view of his main ideas in logic, semantics, epistemology and the methodology of science. These ideas are analyzed from a modern point of view in the Introduction. Furthermore, excerpts from Bolzano's correspondence are included which yield important remarks on his own work. The translation of the sections from the Wissenschaftslehre are based on a German text, which I have located in the Manuscript Department of the University Library in Prague (signature: 75 B 459). It was one of Bolzano's own copies of his printed work and contains a vast number of corrections made by Bolzano himself, thus representing the final stage of his thought, which has gone unnoticed in previous editions. The German originals of Bolzano's letters to M. J. Fesl, J. P. Romang, R. Zimmermann and F. Pi'ihonsky are in the Literary Archive of the Pamatnfk narodnfho pfsemnictvf in Prague. The original of the letter to F. Exner belongs to the Manuscript Department of the Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek in Vienna. The original of the letter to J. E. Seidel is preserved in the Museum of the City of Ceske Budejovice.

The more traditional approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology continue as well, and probably will continue as long as there are skillful practitioners such as Carl Hempel, Ernest Nagel, and th ir students. Finally, there are still other approaches that address some of the technical problems arising when we try to provide an account of belief and of rational choice. - These include efforts to provide logical frameworks within which we can make sense of these notions. This series will attempt to bring together work from all of these approaches to the history and philosophy of science and technology in the belief that each has something to add to our understanding. The volumes of this series have emerged either from lectures given by authors while they served as honorary visiting professors at the City College of New York or from conferences sponsored by that institution. The City College Program in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology oversees and directs these lectures and conferences with the financial aid of the Association for Philosophy of Science, Psychotheraphy, and Ethics. MARTIN TAMNY RAPHAEL STERN PREFACE The papers in this collection stem largely from the conference 'Foun dations: Logic, Language, and Mathematics' held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on 14-15 November 1980."

"Philosophy of Science: An Anthology" assembles some of the finest papers in the philosophy of science since 1945, showcasing enduring classics alongside important and innovative recent work.
Introductions by the editor highlight connections between selections, and contextualize the articles
Nine sections address topics at the heart of philosophy of science, including realism and the character of scientific theories, scientific explanations and laws of nature, singular casusation, and the metaphysical implications of modern physics
Provides an authoritative and accessible overview of the field

This volume discusses some crucial ideas of the founders of the analytic philosophy: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, or the 'golden trio'. The book shows how these 'old' ideas are still present and influential in the current philosophical debates and to what extent these debates echo the original ideas. The collection aim is twofold: to better understand these fruitful ideas by placing them in the original setting, and to systematically examine these ideas in the context of the current debates animating philosophical discussions today. Divided into five sections, the book first sets the stage and offers a general introduction to the background influences, as well as delimitations of the initial foundational positions. This first section contains two papers dedicated to the discussion of realism and the status of science at that time, followed by two papers that tackle the epistemic status of logical laws. The next three sections constitute the core of the volume, each being dedicated to the most important figures in the early analytic tradition: Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. The last section gathers several essays that discuss either the relation between two or more analytic thinkers, or various important concepts such as 'predicativism' and 'arbitrary function', or the principles of abstraction and non-contradiction.

The Universe as a Scientific and Philosophical Problem.- The Geometric Structure of the Universe.- Superstring Unification and the Existence of Gravity.- The Universe of Modern Science and its Philosophical Exploration.- From Molecules to Life.- Meta-Neuroanatomy: The Myth of the Unbounded Main/Brain.- Emergence and Reduction in Morphogenetic Theories.- What can we know about the Universe?.- The Universe as a Scientific Object.- General Laws of Nature and The Uniqueness of the Universe.- The Anthropic Principle and its Epistemological Status in Modern Physical Cosmology.- Evolutionary Ideas and Contemporary Naturalism.- Origin and Evolution of the Universe and Mankind.- Index of Names.

This book provides the reader with a detailed and captivating account of the story where, for the first time, physicists ventured into proposing a new force of nature beyond the four known ones - the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, and gravitation - based entirely on the reanalysis of existing experimental data. Back in 1986, Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, Carrick Talmadge and their collaborators proposed a modification of Newton's Law of universal gravitation. Underlying this proposal were three tantalizing pieces of evidence: 1) an energy dependence of the CP (particle-antiparticle and reflection symmetry) parameters, 2) differences between the measurements of G, the universal gravitational constant, in laboratories and in mineshafts, and 3) a reanalysis of the Eoetvos experiment, which had previously been used to show that the gravitational mass of an object and its inertia mass were equal to approximately one part in a billion. The reanalysis revealed that, contrary to Galileo's position, the force of gravity was in fact very slightly different for different substances. The resulting Fifth Force hypothesis included this composition dependence and also added a small distance dependence to the inverse-square gravitational force. Over the next four years numerous experiments were performed to test the hypothesis. By 1990 there was overwhelming evidence that the Fifth Force, as initially proposed, did not exist. This book discusses how the Fifth Force hypothesis came to be proposed and how it went on to become a showcase of discovery, pursuit and justification in modern physics, prior to its demise. In this new and significantly expanded edition, the material from the first edition is complemented by two essays, one containing Fischbach's personal reminiscences of the proposal, and a second on the ongoing history and impact of the Fifth Force hypothesis from 1990 to the present.

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This book provides a new all-round perspective on the life and work of Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He was close to the Vienna Circle and has been hitherto almost exclusively referred to in terms of the so-called "Zilsel thesis" on the origins of modern science. Much beyond this "thesis", Zilsel's brilliant work provides original insights on a broad number of topics, ranging from the philosophy of probability and statistics to the concept of "genius", from the issues of scientific laws and theories to the sociological background of science and philosophy, and to the political analysis of the problems of his time. Praised by Herbert Feigl as an "outstanding brilliant mind", Zilsel, being as a Social-Democrat of Jewish origins, mostly led a life of hardship marked by emigration and coming to a sudden and tragic end by suicide in 1944. The impossibility of an academic career has hindered the reception of Zilsel's scientific work for a long time. This volume is a contribution to its late reception, providing new insights especially into his work during his years in Vienna; moreover, it shows the heuristic value of Zilsel's ideas for future scholarly research - in philosophy, history, and sociology.

This book presents essays and commentaries that continue on Thomas Kuhn's work from where he left off at the time of his death. Contrary to other books, this volume picks up the gauntlet to develop, from a contemporary perspective, some points that can be improved in the light of recent findings and conceptualizations in metatheory. Thus, this work pays a visit to the classical Kuhnian landscapes, but rather proposing interpretations, it takes them as the starting point to go further. One hundred years after Kuhn's birth, the editors and authors rekindle the passion and interest that have always surrounded the work of the great Boston philosopher and historian.