Aristotle's account of place, in which he defined a thing's place as the inner surface of its nearest immobile container, was supported by the Latin Middle Ages, even 1600 years after his death, though it had not convinced many ancient Greek philosophers. The sixth century commentator Philoponus took a more common-sense view. For him, place was an immobile three-dimensional extension, whose essence did not preclude its being empty, even if for other reasons it had always to be filled with body. However, Philoponus reserved his own definition for an excursus, already translated in this series, The Corollary on Place. In the text translated here he wanted instead to explain Aristotle's view to elementary students. The recent conjecture that he wished to attract young fellow Christians away from the official pagan professor of philosophy in Alexandria has the merit of explaining why he expounds Aristotle here, rather than attacking him. But he still puts the students through their paces, for example when discussing Aristotle's claim that place cannot be a body, or two bodies would coincide. This volume contains an English translation of Philoponus' commentary, as well as a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.

Australia and New Zealand boast an active community of scholars working in the field of history, philosophy and social studies of science. 'Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science' aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for their work. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. In each volume, a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand. CQntributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out, however, and are indeed actively encouraged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. Earlier volumes in the series have been welcomed for significantly advancing the discussion of the topics they have dealt with. The present volume will I believe be greeted equally enthusiastically by readers in many parts of the world. R. W. Home General Editor Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Vll ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The stimulus to assemble this collection of essays grew from a number of interesting seminars conducted during the academic years 1991-92, under the auspices of the Victorian Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science (which is centred at the Bundoora campus of La Trobe University in the outer suburbs of Melbourne). Some of the seminar presentations to the Victorian Centre for HPS and other articles awaiting pUblication have been made available as part of the Pre-print Series of the Victorian Centre.

In this collection of thought-provoking essays, a range of distinguished scientists and theologians, men and women, young and old, all with strong scientific training and deeply held religious beliefs, in the Judeao-Christian tradition, give their personal answers. They do not always agree, the views of each contributor being informed both by their particular scientific expertise and religious affiliation. They address a wide range of problems that will interest all concerned to reconcile their own religious beliefs with currently-accepted scientific theory and practice. The divergences of opinion are as a significant as the agreements. Positions are thoughtfully explained and make important, often novel and illuminating, contributions to debate on these great issues.

In Admirable Evasions, Theodore Dalrymple explains why human self-understanding has not been bettered by the false promises of the different schools of psychological thought. Most psychological explanations of human behavior are not only ludicrously inadequate oversimplifications, argues Dalrymple, they are socially harmful in that they allow those who believe in them to evade personal responsibility for their actions and to put the blame on a multitude of scapegoats: on their childhood, their genes, their neurochemistry, even on evolutionary pressures. Dalrymple reveals how the fashionable schools of psychoanalysis, behaviorism, modern neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology all prevent the kind of honest self-examination that is necessary to the formation of human character. Instead, they promote self-obsession without self-examination, and the gross overuse of medicines that affect the mind. Admirable Evasions also considers metaphysical objections to the assumptions of psychology, and suggests that literature is a far more illuminating window into the human condition than psychology could ever hope to be.

All physicists would agree that one of the most fundamental problems of the 21st century physics is the dimensionality of the world. In the four-dimensional world of Minkowski (or Minkowski spacetime) the most challenging problem is the nature of the temporal dimension. In Minkowski spacetime it is merely one of the four dimensions, which means that it is entirely given like the other three spacial dimensions. If the temporal dimension were not given in its entirety and only one constantly changing moment of it existed, Minkowski spacetime would be reduced to the ordinary three-dimensional space. But if the physical world, represented by Minkowski spacetime, is indeed four-dimensional with time being the fourth dimension, then such a world is drastically different from its image based on our perceptions.

To celebrate Adolf Griinbaum's sixtieth birthday by offering him this bouquet of essays written for this purpose was the happy task of an autonomous Editorial Committee: Wesley C. Salmon, Nicholas Rescher, Larry Laudan, Carl G. Hempel, and Robert S. Cohen. To present the book within the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science was altogether fitting and natural, for Griinbaum has' been friend and supporter of philosophy of science at Boston University for twenty-five years, and unofficial godfather to the Boston Colloquium. To regret that we could not include contributions from all his well-wishers, critical admirers and admiring critics, is only to regret that we did not have an encyclopedic space at the committee's disposal. But we, and all involved in this book, speak for all the others in the philo sophical, scientific, and personal worlds of Adolf Griinbaum in greeting him on May 15, 1983, with our wishes for his health, his scholarship, his happiness. Our gratitude is due to Carolyn Fawcett for her care and accuracy in editing this book, and for the preparation of the Index; and to Elizabeth McMunn for her help again and again, especially in preparation of the Bibliography of the Published Writings of Adolf Griinbaum; and to Thelma Griinbaum for encouraging, planning, and cheering. Boston University R.S.C. Center for the Philosophy and History of Science M.W.W."

This book presents essays and commentaries that continue on Thomas Kuhn's work from where he left off at the time of his death. Contrary to other books, this volume picks up the gauntlet to develop, from a contemporary perspective, some points that can be improved in the light of recent findings and conceptualizations in metatheory. Thus, this work pays a visit to the classical Kuhnian landscapes, but rather proposing interpretations, it takes them as the starting point to go further. One hundred years after Kuhn's birth, the editors and authors rekindle the passion and interest that have always surrounded the work of the great Boston philosopher and historian.

Within the field of psychology there is a proliferation of paradigms, theories, models, and dimensions without an underlying conceptual framework or theory. This conclusion has been reached by representatives of many different psychological specialties. In response to this inconsistency this book presents a hierarchical framework about important theoretical issues that are present in psychological thinking. These issues concern definitions of three major theoretical concepts in theory and practice: (a) paradigms, (b) theories, and (c) models. It focuses on defining, comparing, and contrasting these three conceptual terms. This framework clarifies differences among paradigms, theories, and models, terms which have become increasingly confused in the psychological literature. Paradigms are usually confused with theories or with models while theories are confused with models. Examples of misuses of these terms suggest the need for a hierarchical structure that views paradigms as conceptual constructions overseeing a variety of psychological theories and verifiable models.

This book provides an up-to-date revision of materialism's central tenets, its main varieties, and the place of materialistic philosophy vis a vis scientific knowledge. Materialism has been the subject of extensive and rich controversies since Robert Boyle introduced the term for the first time in the 17th century. But what is materialism and what can it offer today? The term is usually defined as the worldview according to which everything real is material. Nevertheless, there is no philosophical consensus about whether the meaning of matter can be enlarged beyond the physical. As a consequence, materialism is often defined in stark exclusive and reductionist terms: whatever exists is either physical or ontologically reducible to it. This conception, if consistent, mutilates reality, excluding the ontological significance of political, economic, sociocultural, anthropological and psychological realities. Starting from a new history of materialism, the present book focuses on the central ontological and epistemological debates aroused by today's leading materialist approaches, including some little known to an anglophone readership. The key concepts of matter, system, emergence, space and time, life, mind, and software are checked over and updated. Controversial issues such as the nature of mathematics and the place of reductionism are also discussed from different materialist approaches. As a result, materialism emerges as a powerful, indispensable scientifically-supported worldview with a surprising wealth of nuances and possibilities.

This book offers a comprehensive update on the scientific realism debate, enabling readers to gain a novel appreciation of the role of objectivity and truth in science and to understand fully the various ways in which antirealist conceptions have been subjected to challenge over recent decades. Authoritative representatives of different philosophical traditions explain their perspectives on the meaning and validity of scientific realism and describe the strategies being adopted to counter persisting antirealist positions. The coverage extends beyond the usual discussion of realism within the context of the natural sciences, and especially physics, to encompass also its applicability in mathematics, logic, and the human sciences. The book will appeal to all with an interest in the recent realist epistemologies of science, the nature of current philosophical debate, and the ongoing rehabilitation of truth as the legitimate goal of scientific research.

In this highly-interdisciplinary volume, we systematically study the role of metaphors and analogies in (mis)shaping our understanding of the world. Metaphors and Analogies occupy a prominent place in scientific discourses, as they do in literature, humanities and at the very level of our thinking itself. But when misused they can lead us astray, blinding our understanding inexorably. How can metaphors aid us in our understanding of the world? What role do they play in our scientific discourses and in humanities? How do they help us understand and skillfully deal with our complex socio-political scenarios? Where is the dividing line between their use and abuse? Join us as we explore some of these questions in this volume.

Without of course adopting a Platonic metaphysics, the eighteenth-century philosophes were Grecophiles who regarded the Athenian philosophers as their intellectual forbearers and mentors. So powerful was their identification with c1assification that ancient ideas were taken as keys to the design of the modem world, but usually the ideas were taken separately and as divided from their systematic context. The power of number was an idea the En lightenment thinkers deployed with their legendary passion and vigor, particularly as an instrument for social reconstruction. It is no exaggemtion to say that the role of quantities in contemporary social scientific theorizing cannot be understood with any depth absent a recollection of the philosophes' axial development of the notion of quantification. It is a commonplace that for the philosophes progress required releasing human abilities to have power over nature. Aprerequisite for this power was knowledge of the underlying causes of natural events, knowledge that required quantitative precision. Enlightenment thinkers were sufficiently aware of themselves as products of their time to appreciate the importance of a liberal social environment to the knowledge enterprise; the supposition that the reverse is also the case, that enhanced knowledge could advance social conditions, came easily."

This book provides a new all-round perspective on the life and work of Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He was close to the Vienna Circle and has been hitherto almost exclusively referred to in terms of the so-called "Zilsel thesis" on the origins of modern science. Much beyond this "thesis", Zilsel's brilliant work provides original insights on a broad number of topics, ranging from the philosophy of probability and statistics to the concept of "genius", from the issues of scientific laws and theories to the sociological background of science and philosophy, and to the political analysis of the problems of his time. Praised by Herbert Feigl as an "outstanding brilliant mind", Zilsel, being as a Social-Democrat of Jewish origins, mostly led a life of hardship marked by emigration and coming to a sudden and tragic end by suicide in 1944. The impossibility of an academic career has hindered the reception of Zilsel's scientific work for a long time. This volume is a contribution to its late reception, providing new insights especially into his work during his years in Vienna; moreover, it shows the heuristic value of Zilsel's ideas for future scholarly research - in philosophy, history, and sociology.

Often people have wondered why there is no introductory text on category theory aimed at philosophers working in related areas. The answer is simple: what makes categories interesting and significant is their specific use for specific purposes. These uses and purposes, however, vary over many areas, both "pure", e.g., mathematical, foundational and logical, and "applied", e.g., applied to physics, biology and the nature and structure of mathematical models. Borrowing from the title of Saunders Mac Lane's seminal work "Categories for the Working Mathematician", this book aims to bring the concepts of category theory to philosophers working in areas ranging from mathematics to proof theory to computer science to ontology, from to physics to biology to cognition, from mathematical modeling to the structure of scientific theories to the structure of the world. Moreover, it aims to do this in a way that is accessible to non-specialists. Each chapter is written by either a category-theorist or a philosopher working in one of the represented areas, and in a way that builds on the concepts that are already familiar to philosophers working in these areas.

Cellular-molecular approach to evolution has led to radical changes in our understanding of biologic principles ranging from the Cell, to the Life Cycle, Development, Homeostasis, Senescence/Aging, Heterochrony, Pleiotropy, Phenotype, and perhaps the purpose of life itself. Much of this new way of thinking about biology and medicine emanates from experimental evidence for epigenetic inheritance. This leads one to question whether our unicellular state is the actual primary level of selection. One particular system that is now recognized as being under the auspices of epigenetic inheritance is the endocrine system, which is conventionally thought to regulate physiologic homeostasis. However, because the sex hormones play such a major role in behaviors related to the acquisition of epigenetic data, and the processing of such epigenetic data by the gonads during meiosis, their role in the evolution of the organism become tractable. The composite of the activities of the individual over the course of its lifetime can now be understood causally, resulting from the orchestration of its physiology by hormones, prenatally, postnatally and during the aging process, across the entire life span of the organism. Specific behaviors over the course of the life cycle during childhood, adolescence, puberty, adulthood and aging can now be understood mechanistically rather than merely as milestones in the various stages of life. With the above considerations in mind, this book presents the cellular-evolutionary perspective towards the relationship of the organism with its surroundings, human and non-human alike renders biology and medicine a continuum instead of fragmented, un-related anecdotes.

Klemens Szaniawski was born in Warsaw on March 3, 1925. He began to study philosophy in the clandestine Warsaw University during World War II. Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Jan Lukasiewicz, Maria and Stanislaw Ossowskis, Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, and Henryk Hii: were among his teachers. Sza- niawski was also a member of the Polish Home Army (AK), one of the young- est. He was arrested and spent the last period of the war as a prisoner in Auschwitz. After 1945, he continued his studies in the University of L6dz; his Master thesis was devoted to French moral thought of the 17th and 18th cen- turies. Then he worked in the Department of Ethics in L6dZ. In 1950, he received his Ph. D. on the basis of the dissertation on the concept of honour in knight groups in the Middle Ages; Maria Ossowska was the supervisor. In the early fifties he moved to Warsaw to the Department of Logic, directed by Kotarbinski. He took his habilitation exams in 1961. In 1969 he became a professor. Since 1970 he was the head of Department of the Logic at the Warsaw University. In the sixties Szaniawski was also the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology. In 1984 he was elected the Rector Magnificus of the Warsaw University but the Ministry overruled the autonomous democra- tic vote of the academic community. He served as the President of the Polish (since 1977) taking this post after Kotarbinski.

Rationality of science was the topic of two conferences (held in 1988 and 1989) organized by the Department of Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University. Both conferences included a small group of invited speakers. This book contains a selection of papers presented there. It is intended mainly for specialists in the philosophy of science and scientists interested in philosophy. Students and especially postgraduate students would also benefit from reading it. The first conference, 'Popper, Polanyi and the Notion of Rationality', was held from 1 to 5 October 1988 in Janowice. The second conference, 'The Aim and Rationality of Science', was held in Cracow at the Jagiellonian Univer sity, from 4-10 June 1989. The topics of both conferences were inspired by our late friend Dr. Tomasz Kocowski, who many years earlier invited me and my colleagues from the Department to participate in research concerning the problem of creativity, and serve him and other psychologists as methodological advisors. Personal contacts with this intelligent and inquisitive man helped us to realize that we could not fulfill our task while adhering to the received view in the philoso phy of science. This experience helped us to see science not only as scientific knowledge but also as a process of research. We then turned our attention to Michael Polanyi, who seemed to provide the philosophy we were looking for."

Mauro Dorato charts pressing debates within the philosophy of science that centre around scientific expertise, access to knowledge, consensus, debate, and decision-making. This English-language translation of Disinformazione Scientifica e Democrazia argues that the advancement of science depends on an exponential process of specialization, accompanied by the creation of technical languages that are less and less accessible to the general public. Dorato reveals how such a process must align with representative forms of democracies, in which knowledge and decision-making ought to aim at the society's general interest. Given the importance of the principle of competence, however, the role of experts as mediators of knowledge threatens the citizens' autonomy of choice. Consequently, the risk of technocratic regimes calls for new ways to increase literacy about science and its philosophical and probabilistic foundations. Stressing the conceptual conflict between pluralism and conformism, Science and Representative Democracyreveals the obstacles to the functioning of both science and democracy.

The epistemological synthesis of the various theories of evolution, since the first formulation in 1802 with the transmission of the inherited characters by J.B. Lamarck, shows the need for an alternative synthesis to that of Princeton (1947). This new synthesis integrates the scientific models of self-organization developed during the second half of the 20th century based on the laws of physics, thermodynamics, and mathematics with the emergent evolutionary problematics such as self-organized memory. This book shows, how self-organization is integrated in modern evolutionary biology. It is divided in two parts: The first part pays attention to the modern observations in paleontology and biology, which include major theoreticians of the self-organization (d'Arcy Thompson, Henri Bergson, Rene Thom, Ilya Prigogine). The second part presents different emergent evolutionary models including the sciences of complexity, the non-linear dynamical systems, fractals, attractors, epigenesis, systemics, and mesology with different examples of the sciences of complexity and self-organization as observed in the human lineage, from both internal (embryogenesis-morphogenesis) and external (mesology) viewpoints.

This open-access book is the first to investigate the roots of Logical Empiricism in the context of the Life Reform and the German Youth Movements. Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach are the key protagonists; they both belonged to the German Youth Movement and developed their early philosophical views in this setting. By combining scholarly essays with unpublished and hard to access manuscripts, letters, and articles, this volume recasts our understanding of the early years of Logical Empiricism.

The three spatial characteristics of length, height and depth are used in the same unreflective way by laymen, technicians and scientists alike to describe the forms, positions and measure of bodies and hollow bodies. But how do we know that the space we live in has just these three dimensions? The question has occupied philosophers and scientists since antiquity. The answers proposed have become ever more presumptuous and have increasingly lost sight of everyday intuitions and have sacrificed explanatory power. In Euclid's Heritage Janich shows that all explanations of three-dimensionality hinge on an unreflective geometrical language which seems to accept the lack of an alternative for the three sorts of entities -- points, lines and planes -- that bound the three extended entities -- lines, planes and solids. This is a Euclidean heritage in a dual sense: Euclid himself adopted a geometrical language from the art of figure drawing, and left a tradition of doing geometry as planimetry and of doing stereometry by rotating plane figures. The systematic approach offered here starts out from operational definitions of the spatial forms -- plane, straight edge and perpendicularity -- and proofs that only three planes can intersect pairwise orthogonally. This is the constructive solution in the frame theory of action, providing an unequivocal characterisation of spatial relations in the physical world. The traditional order of geometric concepts turns out to be the most important obstacle to the methodical ordering of everyday scientific concepts.

With exoplanets being discovered daily, Earth is still the only planet we know of that is home to creatures who seek a coherent explanation for the structure, origins, and fate of the universe, and of humanity s place within it. Today, science and religion are the two major cultural entities on our planet that share this goal of coherent understanding, though their interpretation of evidence differs dramatically. Many scientists look at the known universe and conclude we are here by chance. The renowned astronomer and historian of science Owen Gingerich looks at the same evidence along with the fact that the universe is comprehensible to our minds and sees it as proof for the planning and intentions of a Creator-God. He believes that the idea of a universe without God is an oxymoron, a self-contradiction. God s Planet" exposes the fallacy in thinking that science and religion can be kept apart.

Gingerich frames his argument around three questions: Was Copernicus right, in dethroning Earth from its place at the center of the universe? Was Darwin right, in placing humans securely in an evolving animal kingdom? And was Hoyle right, in identifying physical constants in nature that seem singularly tuned to allow the existence of intelligent life on planet Earth? Using these episodes from the history of science, Gingerich demonstrates that cultural attitudes, including religious or antireligious beliefs, play a significant role in what passes as scientific understanding. The more rigorous science becomes over time, the more clearly God s handiwork can be comprehended."

This book newly articulates the international and interdisciplinary reach of Whitehead's organic process cosmology for a variety of topics across science and philosophy, and in dialogue with a variety historical and contemporary voices. Integrating Whitehead's thought with the insights of Bergson, James, Pierce, Merleau-Ponty, Descola, Fuchs, Hofmann, Grof and many others, contributors from around the world reveal the relevance of process philosophy to physics, cosmology, astrobiology, ecology, metaphysics, aesthetics, psychedelics, and religion. A global collection, this book expresses multivocal possibilities for the development of process cosmology after Whitehead.