This is the fourth volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This volume details the change in focus of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps. III MAF, faced with a continued threat in 1967 of North Vietnamese large unit entry across the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams, turned over the Chu Lai enclave to the U .S. Army's Task Force Oregon and shifted the bulk of its forces-and its attention-northward. Throughout the year, the 3d Marine Division fought a conventional, large-unit war against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) near the demilitarized zone. The 1st Marine Division, concentrated in Thua Thien and Quang Nam provinces, continued both offensive and pacification operations. Its enemy ranged from small groups of Viet Cong guerrillas in hamlets and villages up to formations as large as the 2d NVA Division. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided air support to both divisions, as well as Army and allied units in I Corps. The Force Logistic Command, amalgamated from all Marine logistics organizations in Vietnam, served all, major Marine commands. This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and II I MAF's perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort. The nature of the war facing III MAF during 1967 forced the authors to concentrate on major operations, particularly those characterized by heavy combat. The uneven quality of the official reports submitted by combat units also played a role in selecting the materials presented in this volume. This is not meant to slight those whose combat service involved long, hot days on patrol, wearying hours of perimeter defense, an d innumerable operations, named and un-named . These Marines also endured fights just as deadly as the ones against large enemy regular units. III MAF's combat successes in 1967 came from the efforts of all Americans in I Corps.

In 1971, while U.S. ground forces were prohibited from crossing the Laotian border, a South Vietnamese Army corps, with U.S. air support, launched the largest airmobile operation in the history of warfare, Lam Son 719. The objective: to sever the North Vietnamese Army's main logistical artery, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, at its hub, Tchepone in Laos, an operation that, according to General Creighton Abrams, could have been the decisive battle of the war, hastening the withdrawal of U.S. forces and ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. The outcome: defeat of the South Vietnamese Army and heavy losses of U.S. helicopters and aircrews, but a successful preemptive strike that met President Nixon's near-term political objectives. Author Robert Sander, a helicopter pilot in Lam Son 719, explores why an operation of such importance failed. Drawing on archives and interviews, and firsthand testimony and reports, Sander chronicles not only the planning and execution of the operation but also the maneuvers of the bastions of political and military power during the ten-year effort to end Communist infiltration of South Vietnam leading up to Lam Son 719. The result is a picture from disparate perspectives: the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations; the South Vietnamese government led by President Nguyen Van Thieu; and senior U.S. military commanders and army aviators. Sander's conclusion is at once powerful and persuasively clear. Lam Son 719 was doomed in both the planning and execution - a casualty of domestic and international politics, flawed assumptions, incompetent execution, and the resolve of the North Vietnamese Army. A powerful work of military and political history, this book offers eloquent testimony that ""failure, like success, cannot be measured in absolute terms.

This is the third volume in a planned 10-volume operational and chronological series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate topical series will complement the operational histories. This particular volume details the continue d buildup in 1966 of the III Marine Amphibious Force in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and the accelerated tempo of fighting during the year . The result was an "expanding war." The III Marine Amphibious Force had established three enclaves in I Corps during 1965. Employing what they believed was a balanced strategy-base defense, offensive operations, and pacification-the Marines planned to consolidate their base areas in 1966. At the beginning of 1966, the 1st Marine Division reinforced the 3d Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Vietnam. By the end of the year, the III Marine Amphibious Force had nearly doubled in size. Two separate events, however, were to dash the high hopes held by the Marines in 1966. An internal political crisis in the spring halted the Marine pacification campaign south of the large Da Nang Airbase. In July, the North Vietnamese Army launched an incursion through the Demilitarized Zone and Marines went north to counter the enemy thrust. By December 1966, Marine units were stretched thin along the 265-mile length of I Corps. As one Marine commander observed, "too much real estate-do not have enough men." Although written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume treats the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, and Marines on the staff of the U .S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in Saigon.

This is the first of a series of functional volumes on the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War, which will complement the 10-volume operational and chronological series also underway. This particular history examines the role of the Navy chaplain serving with Marines, a vital partnership of fighting man and man of God which has been an integral part of the history of the Marine Corps since its inception. The first Marine aviation units to support the South Vietnamese Government forces entered Vietnam in 1962 and with them came their chaplains. When major Marine ground forces were first assigned to Vietnam in 1965, the number of assigned chaplains increased apace. By 1968 the III Marine Amphibious Force, occupying the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, numbered over 80,000 Marines and had under its command the better part of three Marine divisions, a greatly expanded Marine aircraft wing, and a U.S. Army corps of multi-divisional strength. The number of Navy chaplains serving ashore with Marine units exceeded all past experience, and the scope of their ministry had expanded into new and sometimes troubling fields. When the American involvement in the war gave way to Vietnamization, Marine units phased down in strength, eventually departing the country from 1969-1971. Then, as today, they stood ready in the Pacific, on board ship and at bases in Okinawa, Japan, Hawaii, and California, to provide, as needed, a ready force to meet their country's call. And with them, as always, stood their chaplains, in peace or war ready to provide the counsel, comfort, and religious experience that are so much a part of military life.

"Greyhound in Vietnam," Richard M. Bush, Senior Chief Petty Officer, United States Navy (Ret.): Richard Bush served as crew on several United States Navy warships. Favored among them is USS Lynde McCormick (DDG 8); the "Best DDG." "Greyhound in Vietnam" manuscript evolved from a near- daily sea-journal penned aboard McCormick while Richard was Gunfire Control Technician Petty Officer Second Class, USN. Navy destroyer McCormick, a "greyhound," engaged a Western Pacific Ocean deployment, 1 October 1971 through 10 March 1972 (5 1/3 Months; 161 days). McCormick operated southeast Asia, offshore and in river deltas, in support of United States and Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Too, McCormick operated close inshore, Gulf of Tonkin, in support of U. S. pilots who flew missions against well defended North Vietnam shore-targets.

After relatively successful military interventions in Iraq in 1992 and Yugoslavia in 1998, many American strategists believed that airpower and remote technology were the future of U.S. military action. But America's most recent wars in the Middle East have reinforced the importance of counterinsurgency, with its imperative to "win hearts and minds" on the ground in foreign lands. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has studied and experimented with the combined action platoon (CAP) concept used from 1965 to 1971 by the Marine Corps in Vietnam.

Consisting of twelve Marines, a medic, and dozens of inexperienced local militiamen, the American contingent of CAPs lived in South Vietnamese villages where they provided twenty-four-hour security and daily medical support for civilians, and fostered social interaction through civic action projects, such as building schools, offices, and wells. Defend and Befriend is the first comprehensive study of the evolution of these platoons, emphasizing how and why the U.S. Marine Corps attempted to overcome the inherent military, social, and cultural obstacles on the ground in Vietnam. Basing his analysis on Marine records and numerous interviews with CAP veterans, author John Southard illustrates how thousands of soldiers tasked with counterinsurgency duties came to perceive the Vietnamese people and their mission.

This unique study counters prevailing stereotypes and provides a new perspective on the American infantryman in the Vietnam War. Illuminating the fear felt by many Americans as they served among groups of understandably suspicious civilians, Defend and Befriend offers important insights into the future development of counterinsurgency doctrine.

Originally published in 1973. Illustrated throughout with maps and photographs.

Excerpt: "We lined up in front of tables arranged by MOS (Military Occupation Speciality). I stood in line at the field radio operator table and waited for my turn. I took my turn, and a Lance Corporal seated behind the table picked up one of scores of stamps and stamped my orders. I read my orders and the imprint said: "SU#1, 1st ANGLICO, FMF, WESTPAC" OK, I knew FMF meant FLEET MARINE FORCE, and WESTPAC meant WESTERN PACIFIC (Vietnam), but I had never seen or heard of SU#1, 1st ANGLICO. I asked the Lance Corporal what ANGLICO was. He looked at my orders and said he had no idea. He tapped the Corporal working beside him, showed him my orders, and asked him where I was going. The Corporal shook his head and said he had never heard of it. The Lance Corporal gave me back my orders, looked into my eyes and said, "You're going to hell, Private." That made me a bit anxious. Luckily, one of the guys I went through boot camp with, John Staunton, also had the same orders. So if I was going to hell, I wasn't going alone." I served 19 months with the Republic of Korea's 2nd Marine Brigade (BLUE DRAGON BRIGADE). With one other enlisted U.S. Marine, much of that time was at company level. We wore their uniform, ate their food and learned their customs and habits. We learned how to communicate with those we were assigned to serve. It is a rare day that I do not think of that time in my life. I decided to tell the story.