Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought (HOT) that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain the HOT theory. A crucial feature of homomorphism theory is that it individuates and taxonomizes mental qualities independently of the way we're conscious of them, and indeed independently of our being conscious of them at all. So the theory accommodates the qualitative character not only of conscious sensations and perceptions, but also of those which fall outside our stream of consciousness. Rosenthal argues that, because this account of mental qualities makes no appeal to consciousness, it enables us to dispel such traditional quandaries as the alleged conceivability of undetectable quality inversion, and to disarm various apparent obstacles to explaining qualitative consciousness and understanding its nature. Six further essays build on the HOT theory to explain various important features of consciousness, among them the complex connections that hold in humans between consciousness and speech, the self-interpretative aspect of consciousness, and the compelling sense we have that consciousness is unified. Two of the essays, one an extended treatment of homomorphism theory, appear here for the first time. There is also a substantive introduction, which draws out the connections between the essays and highlights their implications.

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as 'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a scientific world view, and many have claimed that it is an irredeemable mystery. But Carruthers here claims to have explained it. He argues that phenomenally conscious states are ones that possess both an 'analog' (fine-grained) intentional content and a corresponding higher-order analog content, representing the first-order content of the experience. It is the higher-order analog content that enables our phenomenally conscious experiences to present themselves to us, and that constitutes their distinctive subjective aspect, or feel. The next two chapters explore some of the differences between conscious experience and conscious thought, and argue for the plausibility of some kind of eliminativism about conscious thinking (while retaining realism about phenomenal consciousness). Then the final four chapters focus on the minds of non-human animals. Carruthers argues that even if the experiences of animals aren't phenomenally conscious (as his account probably implies), this needn't prevent the frustrations and sufferings of animals from being appropriate objects of sympathy and concern. Nor need it mean that there is any sort of radical 'Cartesian divide' between our minds and theirs of deep significance for comparative psychology. In the final chapter, he argues provocatively that even insects have minds that include a belief/desire/perception psychology much like our own. So mindedness and phenomenal consciousness couldn't be further apart. Carruthers's writing throughout is distinctively clear and direct. The collection will be of great interest to anyone working in philosophy of mind or cognitive science.

Marijuana is the world's most popular illicit drug, with hundreds of millions of regular users worldwide. One in three Americans has smoked pot at least once. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that Americans smoke five million pounds of marijuana each year. And yet marijuana remains largely misunderstood by both its advocates and its detractors.
To some, marijuana is an insidious "stepping-stone" drug, enticing the inexperienced and paving the way to the inevitable abuse of harder drugs. To others, medical marijuana is an organic means of easing the discomfort or stimulating the appetite of the gravely ill. Others still view marijuana, like alcohol, as a largely harmless indulgence, dangerous only when used immoderately. All sides of the debate have appropriated the scientific evidence on marijuana to satisfy their claims. What then are we to make of these conflicting portrayals of a drug with historical origins dating back to 8,000 B.C.?
Understanding Marijuana examines the biological, psychological, and societal impact of this controversial substance. What are the effects, for mind and body, of long-term use? Are smokers of marijuana more likely than non-users to abuse cocaine and heroine? What effect has the increasing potency of marijuana in recent years had on users and on use? Does our current legal policy toward marijuana make sense? Earleywine separates science from opinion to show how marijuana defies easy dichotomies. Tracing the medical and political debates surrounding marijuana in a balanced, objective fashion, this book will be the definitive primer on our most controversial and widely used illicit substance.

In recent decades, issues that reside at the center of philosophical and psychological inquiry have been absorbed into a scientific framework variously identified as "brain science," "cognitive science," and "cognitive neuroscience." Scholars have heralded this development as revolutionary, but a revolution implies an existing method has been overturned in favor of something new. What long-held theories have been abandoned or significantly modified in light of cognitive neuroscience?

"Consciousness and Mental Life" questions our present approach to the study of consciousness and the way modern discoveries either mirror or contradict understandings reached in the centuries leading up to our own. Daniel N. Robinson does not wage an attack on the emerging discipline of cognitive science. Rather, he provides the necessary historical context to properly evaluate the relationship between issues of consciousness and neuroscience and their evolution over time.

Robinson begins with Aristotle and the ancient Greeks and continues through to Ren? Descartes, David Hume, William James, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Derek Parfit. Approaching the issue from both a philosophical and a psychological perspective, Robinson identifies what makes the study of consciousness so problematic and asks whether cognitive neuroscience can truly reveal the origins of mental events, emotions, and preference, or if these occurrences are better understood by studying the whole person, not just the brain. Well-reasoned and thoroughly argued, "Consciousness and Mental Life" corrects many claims made about the success of brain science and provides a valuable historical context for the study of human consciousness.

How do our emotions enable us to know? When Pascal noted that the heart has its own reasons, he implied that our rational faculty alone cannot grasp what is revealed in affective experience. Knowing Emotions seeks to explain comprehensively why human emotions are more than physiological disturbances, but experiences capable of making us aware of significant truths that we could not know by any other means. Recent philosophical and interdisciplinary research on the emotions has been dominated by a renewal of the debate over how best to characterize the intentionality of emotions as well as their bodily character. Rick Anthony Furtak frames this debate differently, however, arguing that intentionality and feeling are not two discrete parts of affective experience, but conceptually distinguishable aspects of a unified response. His account captures how an emotion's phenomenal or 'felt' quality (what it is like) relates to its intentional content (what it is about). Knowing Emotions provides a solid introduction to the philosophy of emotion before delving into the debates that surround it. Furtak draws from a wide range of analytic and Continental philosophers, including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, among others, and bolsters his analysis with empirical evidence from social psychology, neuroscience, and psychiatry. Perhaps most importantly, Furtak investigates all varieties of affective experience, from brief episodes to moods and emotional dispositions, loves and other longstanding concerns, and overall patterns of temperament and affective outlook. Ultimately, he argues that we must reject the misguided aspiration to purify ourselves of passion and attain an impersonal standpoint. Knowing Emotions attempts to clarify what kind of truth may be revealed through emotion, and what can be known - not despite, but precisely by virtue of, each person's idiosyncratic perspective.

From the study of brainstem-based models of sleep cycle control, current research is moving toward combined brainstem/forebrain models of sleep cognition. The book presents five papers by contemporary leading scientists, and more than seventy-five commentaries on those papers by nearly all of the other distinguished authorities in the field. Topics include mechanisms of dreaming and REM sleep, memory consolidation in REM sleep, and an evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. The papers and commentaries, together with the authors' rejoinders, represent significant advances in the understanding of the sleeping and dreaming brain.