In The War after the War, Johannes Kadura offers a fresh interpretation of American strategy in the wake of the cease-fire that began in Vietnam on January 28, 1973. The U.S. exit from Vietnam continues to be important in discussions of present-day U.S. foreign policy, so it is crucial that it be interpreted correctly. In challenging the prevailing version of the history of the events, Kadura provides interesting correctives to the different accounts, including the ones of the key actors themselves, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger foremost among them. In so doing, Kadura aims to forge a synthesis between orthodox and revisionist interpretations of this important period.Kadura finds that the strategy employed by Nixon and Kissinger centered on the concepts of "equilibrium strategy" and "insurance policy." That approach allowed them to follow a twofold strategy of making a major effort to uphold South Vietnam while at the same time maintaining a fallback strategy of downplaying the overall significance of Vietnam. Whether they won or lost on their primary bet to secure South Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger expected to come through the crisis in a viable strategic position.

To fully comprehend the Vietnam War, it is essential to understand the central role that southerners played in the nation's commitment to the war, in the conflict's duration, and in the fighting itself. President Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and Secretary of State Dean Rusk of Georgia oversaw the dramatic escalation of U.S. military involvement from 1965 through 1968. General William Westmoreland, born and raised in South Carolina, commanded U.S. forces during most of the Johnson presidency. Widely supported by their constituents, southern legislators collectively provided the most dependable support for war funding and unwavering opposition to measures designed to hasten U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. In addition, southerners served, died, and were awarded the Medal of Honor in numbers significantly disproportionate to their states' populations. In The American South and the Vietnam War, Joseph A. Fry demonstrates how Dixie's majority pro-war stance derived from a host of distinctly regional values, perspectives, and interests. He also considers the views of the dissenters, from student protesters to legislators such as J. William Fulbright, Albert Gore Sr., and John Sherman Cooper, who worked in the corridors of power to end the conflict, and civil rights activists such as Martin Luther King Jr., Muhammad Ali, and Julian Bond, who were among the nation's most outspoken critics of the war. Fry's innovative and masterful study draws on policy analysis and polling data as well as oral histories, transcripts, and letters to illuminate not only the South's influence on foreign relations, but also the personal costs of war on the home front.

Tells the full story of the man who fought three of the world's great powers-and won. Cecil B. Currey makes clear one primary reason why America lost the Vietnam War: Vo Nguyen Giap. He has written the definitive biography of one of history's greatest generals.

"Joyful to heart-wrenching. Short non-fiction stories about moving to Los Angeles from Vietnam, and a dream-like childhood that's turned into a nightmare when the author's father returns to the family after spending years in a "re-education" camp. It's a well-written rollercoaster of beauty and terror." - Jason Koivu, 2003

Every Marine who has served in Vietnam has been heavily involved in efforts to improve the situation of the Vietnamese people. The civil affairs actions of the III Marine Amphibious Force have been every bit as important as the combat actions. In this reference pamphlet, which follows an earlier history of the first year of Marine Corps civic action in Vietnam, the story of the second year of civilian aid policies, programs, and activities is related. The use of civic action by the Marine Corps to accomplish its assigned mission is nothing new. Examples of how the Marines have employed civic action in the past can be found by reading accounts of their exploits during the 1920s in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. From these accomplishments and astute observations made by men such as Major Earl H. Ellis and others, accounts of "lessons learned" about civic action can be found recorded in the Small Wars Manual of 1940, which points out: "The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any action which may be contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured." With the basic concept of small wars in mind, the Manual of 1940 goes on to point out: "The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to estabJ.sh peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable. In so doing one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population." The concept of civic action may be simply stated, but the organization and application of carrying out an effective program becomes a difficult matter. This difficulty in application can be seen through the scope and magnitude of the U. S. Marine Corps civic action effort in the I Corps area of South Vietnam. There the Marine Corps came face-to-face with the age old problem of guerrilla warfare; winning the confidence of the population which is vital in defeating the insurgent. It was in the field of winning the confidence of a large civilian population, while at the same time fighting a war, that the Marine Corps was least prepared when its troops landed in South Vietnam.

This publication tells the story of the United States Ari Force's involvement in the region form the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops into Vietnam in1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air Force's principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government. This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force: the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issue unique to the Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle environment.