The Vietnam War was a defining event for a generation of Americans. But for years, misguided cliches about its veterans have proliferated. Philip F. Napoli's "Bringing It All Back Home" strips away the myths and reveals the complex individuals who served in Southeast Asia. Napoli helped to create Tom Brokaw's The Greatest Generation, and in the spirit of that enterprise, his oral histories recast our understanding of a war and its legacy.
Napoli introduces a remarkable group of young New Yorkers who went abroad with high hopes only to find a bewildering conflict. We meet, for instance, a nurse who staged a hunger strike to promote peace while working at a field hospital and a black soldier who achieved an unexpected camaraderie with his fellow servicemen in racially tense times. Some of these soldiers became active opponents of the war; others did not. Tracing their journeys from the streets of Brooklyn and Queens to the banks of the Mekong, and back to the most glamorous corporations and meanest homeless shelters of New York City, Napoli uncovers the variety and surprising vibrancy of the ex-soldiers' experiences.

A psychologist, through letters and narrative, describes his forty-three year journey from war in Vietnam to the present day. How does a returning war veteran re-integrate his life after the moral ambiguity of war, killing, the death of friends, and a naive, disinterested public? Combat trauma, reconciliation, and healing are woven into a story of daily faith.

Have you ever wondered what you would do if you were contacted by the US Government to perform a covert mission? First Light is a story about Curt Gray, an ex-Vietnam helicopter pilot, who is suddenly thrust into a secretive mission to help locate American POWs. Problem is Curt has buried his memories of the war into the dark recesses of his mind. His first thoughts are to refuse the mission, but his loyalty and patriotism will not allow him such luxury. As the mission unfolds, Curt finds himself entangled in a dark web of deception and emotional mayhem. Review: "Chuck Gross continues to capture the Vietnam experience, just like he did in Rattler One-Seven, in a way that takes me back to my own months in the jungle. After the authenticity of Rattler One Seven, Chuck, in his new novel, weaves reality into a story that will leave the reader wondering is it fiction or reality? My bet is on . . ." -- Barry Rice, President of the Tennessee State Council, Vietnam Veterans of America

THE SHOCKING TRUTH REVEALED A blistering, firsthand account of an American Soldier who joined forces with the Montagnards WHILE LOSING THE WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, ARVN TROOPS CONDUCTED A SECRET PROGRAM OF GENOCIDE AGAINST THE MONTAGNARD HILL PEOPLE. THE U.S. ARMY DIDN'T INTERVENE. THE GLOBAL MEDIA DIDN'T NOTICE. BUT THE 'YARDS WEREN'T ALONE. A HANDFUL OF GREEN BERETS FOUGHT AT THEIR SIDE...

19: I never had a birthday in Vietnam was written to show how the guys out in the field lived from day to day and not knowing if it was going to be their last day. There's some laughter, sorrow, feeling so down that taking a bullet to end it didn't seem so bad. Guys are guys and the nineteen to twenty four year olds that were in Vietnam were a little more intense than most. Living with death day to day is something only another combat soldier would understand. This was written to get the reader to understand that.

Pictorial account of the preparation and transportation of the CIA A-12 Blackbird from the SkunkWorks in Burbank, California to Area 51.

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of information for staff studies, will be readily recognized. Written to complement The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam focuses upon the activities of the Joint Chiefs that were concerned with events in Vietnam during these years. The nature of the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the sensitivity of the sources used caused the volume to be written originally as a classified document. Classification designations are those that appeared in the classified publication. This volume describes those JCS activities related to developments in Vietnam during the period 1964-1966. At times, the role of the Joint Chiefs in events in Vietnam may appear to be submerged in the description of foreign relations, politics, economics, and other areas having little to do with military matters. However, developments in these areas provide essential background for understanding the military activity of the 1960s. Originally a collaborative effort of the entire Historical Section, JCS, the classified publication on which this volume is based was written by Mr. Willard J. Webb. The current version has been updated by Dr. Graham A. Cosmas. Dr. John F. Shortal edited the resulting manuscript; Ms. Susan Carroll compiled the Index; and Ms. Penny Norman prepared the manuscript for publication. The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.

This is a narrative drawn from the era of the Southeast Asian conflict, detailing a unique event in that lengthy struggle called Linebacker II. For the first time in contemporary warfare, heavy jet bombers were employed for their designed role to conduct extended strategic operations against the warmaking capacity of a hostile nation. This monograph tells part of the story of Strategic Air Command's participation in Linebacker II. In doing so it addressed the efforts of a complex mixture of Air Force and sister service operations, with all service working in concern towards a common goal. Rather than develop a complete chronology or blow-by-blow account, which are matters of record in other works, the campaign is pursued more form the personal perspective. Office of Air Force History. United States Air Force.

This is the second of a series of functional volumes on the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War, which will complement the nine-volume operational and chronological series also underway. This particular history examines the Marine Corps lawyer's role in Vietnam and how that role evolved. Also considered is the effectiveness of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a combat environment. Military law functioned in Vietnam. but was it acceptably efficient and effective? There were several thousand courts-martial tried by the 400 Marine Corps lawyers who served in Vietnam. Those trials stand as testament to the Marines, officer and enlisted, who made the justice system yield results through their work, dedication, and refusal to allow the circumstances of Vietnam to deter them. Did the military justice system really work? The reader can be the judge, for both successes and failures are depicted here. This book presents a straightforward and unflinching examination of painful subjects. Marine lawyers in Vietnam came to legal grips with drug use, racism, fragging, and the murder of noncombatants, along with the variety of offenses more usually encountered. The Marine Corps can take pride in the commanders and the judge advocates who ensured that whenever those crimes were discovered they were exposed and vigorously prosecuted. There were no cover-ups; no impediments to the judge advocates who conscientiously represented the accused or the United States.

In this study, Dr. Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions than he answers, and, some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its author's purpose if something here provokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cherished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. The Vietnam War stands uneasily on the edge of public memory - slipping into the past and becoming part of our national history, yet still too recent to be forgotten by those who lived through its trials. But history seeks a meaning in its clouded events, a retrospective order and pattern that could instruct, and sometimes even inspire, successive generations. At present, then, Americans face the peculiar dilemma of having to respond to the impact of a war for which there is still no comprehensively shared vision. One cannot expect broad enthusiasm for a vision of the past whose primary purpose is to justify current policies, acquisitions, deployment, and research. Americans have thought of themselves as individualistic and unruly people - a flattering self-image, though in some ways a false one. Indeed, during the Vietnam War it was the patience and long-suffering of the American people that most deserved comment. This was not the first war to fact great protest and challenge from Americans. Opposition to a massive commitment that was killing young Americans, as well as many Southeast Asians, should hardly have seemed surprising. What should have caused real surprise was how long it took for opposition to coalesce. In the end, the Vietnam experience ought to remind us of how well Americans can rally to a cause, even when it is poorly conceived and executed. But these are not the lessons of Vietnam. They are only illustrations of how we may come to different understandings of the Vietnam experience. The central lesson is that even when we cannot control the circumstances around us, we can still control ourselves. The use of military and political resources to have our way is not only a practical and technical issue, it is also a philosophical and moral one. It may be worth asking if we have ever won a war by betraying our own traditions and values. In this study, Dr. Donald J. Mrozek probes various groups of Americans as they come to grips with the consequences of the Vietnam War. He poses far more questions that he answers, and some of what he says may invite strong dissent. Yet it will serve its purpose if something here provokes creative thinking and critical reexamination, even of some long-cherished ideas. Viewing the Vietnam War as a logical outcome of American defense thinking has challenging implications, as does seeing the "cold war consensus" on foreign affairs as an oddity. Yet this is not a litany of objection and protest. Doctor Mrozek raises serious questions about how the contemporary notion of deterrence has emerged; and dealing with such questions forthrightly could make deterrence more effective. So, too, questions the past relationship of military professionals with the mass media is not an assignment of guilt but an invitation to develop a beneficial and cooperative relationship. Nor is this study a tale of gloom and despair; it is rather an appeal for self-consciousness and self-awareness. It is a plea for us to take command of the problems that beset us by taking control of ourselves first.

This is the ninth volume in a nine-volume operational and chronological historical series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories. This volume details the final chapter in the Corps' involvement in Southeast Asia, including chapters on Cambodia, the refugees, and the recovery of the container ship SS Mayaguez. In January 1973, the United States signed the Paris Peace Accords setting the stage for democracy in Southeast Asia to test its resolve in Cambodia and South Vietnam. The result was not a rewarding experience for America nor its allies. By March 1975, democracy was on the retreat in Southeast Asia and the U.S. was preparing for the worst, the simultaneous evacuation of Americans and key officials from Cambodia and South Vietnam. With Operation Eagle Pull and Operation Frequent Wind, the United States accomplished that task in April 1975 using Navy ships, Marine Corps helicopters, and the Marines of the III Marine Amphibious Force. When the last helicopter touched down on the deck of the USS Okinawa at 0825 on the morning of 30 April, the U.S. Marine Corps' involvement in South Vietnam ended, but one more encounter with the Communists in Southeast Asia remained. After the seizure of the SS Mayaguez on 12 May 1975, the United States decided to recover that vessel using armed force. Senior commanders in the Western Pacific chose the Marine Corps to act as the security force for the recovery. Marines of 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 1st Battalion, 4th Marines played a key role in the events of 15 May 1975 when America regained control of the ship and recovered its crew, concluding American combat in Indochina and this volume's history. Although largely written from the perspective of the III Marine Amphibious Force, this volume also describes the roles of the two joint commands operating in the region: the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, and the United States Support Activities Group, Thailand. Thus, while the volume emphasizes the Marine Corps' role in the events of the period, significant attention also is given to the overall contribution of these commands in executing U.S. policy in Southeast Asia from 1973 to 1975. Additionally, a chapter is devoted to the Marine Corps' role in assisting thousands of refugees who fled South Vietnam in the final weeks of that nation's existence.

Two hundred and fifty-five men earned the nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, during Vietnam; fourteen Airmen, fifty-seven Marines, fifteen Sailors, and one hundred and seventy Soldiers. The author is donating all profits he receives equally to the American Legion, the Disabled America Veterans, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Brian D. Blodgett, a professor of History and Military History at the American Public University System (American Military University and American Public University). He is a native of Ohio and a retired U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer who served two tours in the Republic of South Korea. Both tours were with the 2nd Infantry Division, 1989-1990 as an Infantryman and 2003-2004 as an Intelligence Analyst. He resides in Maryland.

This is the first of a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam conflict. This particular volume covers a relatively obscure chapter in U.S. Marine Corps history-the activities of Marines in Vietnam between 1954 and 1964. The narrative traces the evolution of those activities from a one-man advisory operation at the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954 to the advisory and combat support activities of some 700 Marines at the end of 1964. As the introductory volume for the series this account has an important secondary objective: to establish a geographical, political, and military foundation upon which the subsequent histories can be developed.

This is the second volume in a series of nine chronological histories being prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the Ill Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam's northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U. S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964, The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

U.S. Marines as advisors have a long history, from Presley O'Bannon at Tripoli through Iraq and Afghanistan via Haiti, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and Vietnam. While most Marines think of the Vietnamese Marine Corps as the primary advisory experience during that conflict, others served with various other advisory programs with the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Joint Special Operations, and U.S. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. One of these is the subject of this study: Marine advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). This narrative is a combination of experience, research, and reflection. While other journalistic or academic accounts have been published, this is a narrative of participants. Many historians consider the two most effective counterinsurgency organizations employed during the Vietnam War to have been the PRU and USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP). In both cases, U.S. Marines played a significant role in the success of these innovative programs. It should be pointed out, however, that the number of U.S. Marines assigned to these programs was small and the bulk of the forces were locally recruited fighters. Both programs used a small cadre of Marines providing leadership, training, and combat support for large numbers of indigenous troops, and in so doing, capitalized on the inherent strengths of each. The author believes that both of these programs have applicability in any counterinsurgency where U.S. forces are called upon to assist a host government. Obviously, adjustments to these programs would have to be made to take into account local conditions, but the core concept of providing U.S. Marines to command or advise local militia and special police units is one that has great promise for success. With a clear understanding of why the PRUs and CAPs worked, and with the necessary adjustments to take into account local conditions, similar units can be created to defeat future insurgencies. With this in mind, the author hopes that this work will provide U.S. military planners with insights into creating and managing units capable of defeating a well-organized and highly motivated insurgent political infrastructure.

"Abandoned in Place" provides a snapshot of the Vietnam POW/MIA issue. From the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, in January 1973, ending American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia to the "dysfunctional" POW/MIA accounting effort of 2014. With the period 1980 -1981 a clear line in the sand. As the U.S. government refocused its efforts from the rescue of surviving POWs to the recovery of remains. "Abandoned in Place" painstakingly details the intelligence available in 1980 that led to the conclusion American POWs survived in Laos, six years after the end of the Vietnam War. Using never before seen documents, the author reconstructs events leading up to a CIA reconnaissance mission, doomed from the start, to confirm the presence of POWs held deep in the Laotian jungle. As the CIA team headed toward the camp, members of the Joint Special Operation Command trained for a strike of surgical precision. Its mission rescue the POWs held at the camp known as Nhom Marrott. A lack of political will, bureaucratic failures, and leaks forced a stand-down order, condemning any surviving POWs. The author highlights the post Nhom Marrott government accounting effort, focusing on several specific POW/MIA cases. Crippled by a "mindset to debunk" officials ignored evidence of capture and survival in captivity. They edited witness statements to support pre-conceived conclusion of death and dismissed Vietnamese admissions of capture. This despite overwhelming evidence POWs not only survived but also continued to lay down signals in hopes of eventual rescue. Early Reviews - Col. Don Gordon (USA-Ret) Special Operations Command, J2 Director of Intelligence 1980-1983 - "O'Shea leads readers to form their own reasoned conclusions. She writes the most comprehensive and thoroughly researched compendium, private or government, classified or unclassified, about this complicated and emotional subject. It is an event long needed to be told accurately and with respect for the missing in action and their families. O'Shea is fidelis to that cause. She carefully distinguishes fact from speculation. Abandoned in Place is a meticulously detailed, thoroughly verified, and reliable story, well told. It describes plans to rescue about 35 United States Military servicemen strongly believed held in a prison camp in Laos in 1980. Step-by-step, O'Shea builds a strong case that some US military likely remained under North Vietnamese and Lao control after the war." Former Senator and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs Bob Smith - "Lynn O'Shea has provided the best in depth analysis ever written and brilliantly combined over 25 years of personal research, evidence and a chronological portrayal of the facts to prove, without any doubt, that America left men behind in Southeast Asia at the end of the Viet Nam War. When we were told that the North Vietnamese, Lao and Viet Cong had complied with the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 and returned all of our men, the evidence shows that was an outright lie and many of our government leaders and the intelligence community knew it." Dr. Jeffrey Donahue, Brother of Major Morgan Donahue - "Lynn masterfully connects a mind-boggling array of dots to not only affirm the truth of the Indochina POW-MIA issue but also to rigorously convey how and why the U.S. government knowingly left men behind and then covered it up. Lynn has woven together tens of thousands of documents and countless hours of interviews to produce a cogent and unassailable profile of one of the most tragic episodes of modern American history. The how and why have never been so brilliantly researched, documented and conveyed."

The author first served with Vietnamese Marines in 1972 when they came on board the U.S. Navy ships that Battalion Landing Team 1/9 was embarked on. They were preparing for an amphibious landing to counter the North Vietnamese Army's Spring Offensive in Military Region 1 (I Corps) in South Vietnam. They brought with them their U.S. Marine advisors who were known by the senior members of the battalion. They had already witnessed or heard of the exploits of then-Captain John Ripley and Lieutenant Colonel Gerry Turley in blunting the initial attacks of the Easter Offensive. As the Vietnamese were formed into helicopter or boat teams and fed a meal before going ashore, they bantered with the American Marines and Sailors, telling them to come along to "kill communists." After a turbulent start to the offensive, the Vietnamese Marines exhibited the fighting spirit that elite units create for themselves. This was reflected in the various names of their battalions that were the focus of their unit identification. The infantry battalions had a series of nicknames and slogans that were reflected on their unit insignia: 1st Battalion's "Wild Bird," 2d Battalion's "Crazy Buffalo," 3d Battalion's "SeaWolf," 4th Battalion's "Killer Shark," 5th Battalion's "Black Dragon," 6th Battalion's "Sacred Bird," 7th Battalion's "Black Tiger," 8th Battalion's "Sea Eagle," and 9th Battalion's "Mighty Tiger." For the artillery units, this was the 1st Battalion's "Lightning Fire," 2d Battalion's "Sacred Arrow," and 3d Battalion's "Sacred Bow." Support and service battalions followed this example as well. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade and its embarked troops provided helicopters, amphibious tractors, and landing craft support for a series of attacks leading to the recapture of Quang Tri City through the fall of 1972. In addition, command and control facilities and liaison were provided to the Republic of Vietnam's I Corps and Military Advisory Command Vietnam's 1st Regional Advisory Command in the sustained counteroffensive. This reinforced the impression made by the Vietnamese Marines themselves. This began the interest in the story that follows. The period after World War II saw a number of associated Marine Corps formed in the republics of China, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. They had been founded, with the help of foreign military aid, to fight the various conflicts to contain communist expansion in the region. Also present at various times were other Marines from the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The beginnings of the Cold War witnessed this proliferation of amphibious forces in Asia, in part because of the reputation the U.S. Marines had earned in the cross Pacific drive against Japan and in other postwar confrontations. This is about one of them, the Vietnamese Marine Corps or Thuy Quan Luc Chien (TQLC). This occasional paper provides documents on the topics of the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit from this period.

James V. Weatherill served as an Army helicopter pilot in Vietnam from November 1967 to November 1968. His memoir, THE BLADES CARRY ME: INSIDE THE HELICOPTER WAR IN VIETNAM, takes the reader into the CH-47 Chinook helicopter cockpit and the daily life of a 22-year-old pilot. The young man must reconcile his ideals of patriotism, courage, and honor with the reality and politics of a war where victory is measured by body-count ratios instead of territory gained or lost. When it's time to go home, he realizes he'll leave more than war behind. On the home front, the pilot's wife, Annie, provides a counterpoint as a pregnant college senior and military spouse during an unpopular war. With letters and tape recordings their sole means of communication, how will they grow up without growing apart?

During the Vietnam War, when conventional warfare tactics weren't proving enough to eliminate Communist insurgency, the U.S. Army implemented small unit operations to take a new kind of fight to the enemy. Five to six man Long Range Patrol teams, composed of specially trained young enlisted soldiers, went behind enemy lines to gather intelligence on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units, capture POWs, or set deadly ambushes that unnerved the enemy in their once-thought-secure jungle sanctuaries. These Long Range Patrol or LRP teams would lead to the re-establishment of the 75th Infantry Ranger Companies in combat and would carry on the proud history and legacy of the U.S. Army Rangers. It would also earn them a coveted place in special operations units, at times at a painful and deadly cost. In this remarkably humble, first-hand account, Seymour covers what it took to do 54 LRP/Ranger missions behind the lines, and the dozens of team insertions and white knuckle extractions that he took part in. In The Jungle... Camping with the Enemy offers a unique and personal insight from an extraordinary soldier and those who served as LRP/Rangers with the U.S. Army First Air Cavalry Division.

John Vanvorden--the Flying Dutchman--is a Vietnam pilot and one of the rugged few who know the danger and thrill of combat while piloting the U.S. Army's UH-1H "Huey" Iroquois helicopter. He experiences screaming descents into hot landing zones to place military assault troops and rescue wounded soldiers. He has the clarity of mind to survive seven days of horror in a Vietnamese jungle swamp while the psychology of a fellow soldier is severely tested. He's got the guts to buck military orders and battle his own brass to pursue an investigation when a botched operation spells disaster for the men under him. Based on the authors' personal experiences in the Vietnam War, Huey is an authentic, action-filled book of historical fiction. Originally published 30 years ago, this moving novel became a New York Times bestseller within days of publishing. Editorial Reviews "Those who have read the classic book of helicopter combat in Vietnam, "Chickenhawk" by Robert Mason, but who still have an appetite for more books of that sort can do no better than to read this novel." - "The VVA Veteran," Books in Review II Book Excerpt: From eight thousand feet, the Flying Dutchman flew his chopper into a nose-high attitude and peeled off into a single-ship approach. His passengers were looking straight down at the ground from the open doorway. Before anyone could blink, they were diving toward the ground at four thousand feet a minute, about as fast as a helicopter can come out of the sky with its main rotor still attached. The 12.7's opened up. Tracer rounds looked like basketballs zooming by. The supersonic bullets popped as they passed, breaking the sound barrier. When a bullet found its mark, it smacked the ship like a baseball bat. As soon as the troops on the ground had hefted the two critical cases into each side, John blasted out low level, taking fire from the ground. He knew the Huey didn't have long before it became battered magnesium. . . .

This book examines Operation SEALORDS, the capstone campaign conducted by the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Was the SEALORDS campaign successful, and if so, what lessons, can be learned from SEALORDS and how might we employ brown-water forces in the future? This book breaks down the SEALORDS campaign into three areas of study. First, the study examines the barrier interdiction portion of the campaign designed to stem the flow of enemy infiltration of men and material from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. Second, this study analyzes the Denial of Sanctuary Operations and Pacification portion of the SEALORDS operations. Lastly, the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program known as "ACTOV" is examined to determine its effectiveness. The Findings of this book suggest that by concentrating naval forces athwart the major infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy lines of communication into South Vietnam and severly restricted enemy attempts at infiltration. Additionally, the findings suggest that SEALORDS contributed significantly to pacification efforts in the southern part of III Corps and all of the TV Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, the ACTOV Program is evaluated as successful and put the navy out ahead of the other services with respect to Vietnamization of the war effort.