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Causation with a Human Face - Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology (Hardcover)
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Causation with a Human Face - Normative Theory and Descriptive Psychology (Hardcover)
Series: Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science
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The past few decades have seen an explosion of research on causal
reasoning in philosophy, computer science, and statistics, as well
as descriptive work in psychology. In Causation with a Human Face,
James Woodward integrates these lines of research and argues for an
understanding of how each can inform the other: normative ideas can
suggest interesting experiments, while descriptive results can
suggest important normative concepts. Woodward's overall framework
builds on the interventionist treatment of causation that he
developed in Making Things Happen. Normative ideas discussed
include proposals about the role of invariant or stable
relationships in successful causal reasoning and the notion of
proportionality. He argues that these normative ideas are reflected
in the causal judgments that people actually make as a descriptive
matter. Woodward also discusses the common philosophical
practice-particularly salient in philosophical accounts of
causation-of appealing to "intuitions" or "judgments about cases"
in support of philosophical theses. He explores how, properly
understood, such appeals are not different in principle from
appeals to results from empirical research, and demonstrates how
they may serve as a useful source of information about causal
cognition.
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