Formulating Principal-Agent Service Contracts for a Revenue Generating Unit (Paperback, 2016 ed.)

This book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.

General

Imprint:	Springer International Publishing AG
Country of origin:	Switzerland
Series:	SpringerBriefs in Operations Management
Release date:	July 2015
First published:	2016
Authors:	Shuo Zeng • Moshe Dror
Dimensions:	235 x 155 x 8mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Paperback
Pages:	129
Edition:	2016 ed.
ISBN-13:	978-3-319-18671-9
Categories:	Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Economic theory & philosophy Books > Business & Economics > Business & management > Management & management techniques > Operational research Books > Business & Economics > Business & management > Management of specific areas > General
LSN:	3-319-18671-X
Barcode:	9783319186719

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