According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in
the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are
phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The
phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it
is the content of a "transparent self-model." In "Being No One,"
Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific
research to present a representationalist and functional analysis
of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually
is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical
sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and
metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as
agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new
sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness.
Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong,
consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events
in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether
conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone
that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be
analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and
how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such
can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted
in the deeper representational structure of our conscious
minds.
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