"Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in an Uneasy Age" provides a sweeping portrait of the family in American law from the nineteenth century to the present. The family today has come to be defined by individuality and choice. Pre-nuptial agreements, non-marital cohabitation, gay and lesbian marriages have all profoundly altered our ideas about marriage and family. In the last few years, reproductive technology and surrogacy have accelerated this process of change at a breathtaking rate. Once simple questions have taken on a dizzying complexity: Who are the real parents of a child? What are the relationships and responsibilities between a child, the woman who carried it to term, and the egg donor? Between viable sperm and the wife of a dead donor?

The courts and the law have been wildly inconsistent and indecisive when grappling with these questions. Should these cases be decided in light of laws governing contracts and property? Or it is more appropriate to act in the best interests of the child, even if that child is unborn, or even unconceived? No longer merely settling disputes among family members, the law is now seeing its own role expand, to the point where it is asked to regulate situations unprecedented in human history. Janet L. Dolgin charts the response of the law to modern reproductive technology both as it transforms our image of the family and is itself transformed by the tide of social forces.

In this set of essays,public lawyers, property lawyers and legal philosophers examine the public dimensions of private property. At a time when governments across the globe are privatising formerly public property, the public forum is being replaced by the privately owned shopping mall, and an increasing range of interests are being described as 'property', an examination of the powers which attach to ownership becomes all the more pressing. The contributors consider whether property is a human right, its role in making responsible citizens, its relationship to freedom of speech and other values, the proper scope of constitutional protections of private property, impediments to the redistribution of property, and attempts to redress historical wrongs by property settlements to indigenous people. Taking a richly comparative perspective, examples have been drawn from jurisdictions as diverse as the United Kingdom, South Africa, Germany, the United States, and New Zealand. Contributors: Janet McLean (ed), Kevin Gray, Susan Francis Gray, Geoffrey Samuel, J W Harris, Gregory Alexander, Andre van der Walt, Tom Allen, Jeremy Waldron, Maurice Goldsmith, Alex Frame, John Dawson, Michael Robertson.

Church-state relations are becoming more and more critical. Deepening controversies over church-state relations, the increasing religious pluralism of American society, and the changing makeup of the Supreme Court are forcing a rethinking of approaches to church and state in the public policy realm. Stephen Monsma offers a new approach rooted in structural pluralism as a normative way to understand church-state relations. He suggests that the government should use a principle of positive neutrality in handling church-state relations. He integrates historical, theoretical, social, and legal perspectives and writes in a lively manner for interdisciplinary audiences of students, scholars, and general readers. This study provides an historical background of church and state relations in American society and discusses the development of church-state theory and practice. The author argues that confusions today can be traced back to flaws in the disestablishment settlement of the eighteenth century, flaws which have come to light in the twentieth century. He looks at this pluralist society and the concept of positive neutrality and of religious freedom historically and theoretically and then applies his approach to current issues relating to national policy and Supreme Court decision-making.

Lopeman examines the impact advocacy of intentional judicial activism by a justice of a state supreme court can have on establishing the court as a policy maker. He examines the attitudinal model and the judicial role model of decision making and concludes that, while the attitudinal model might describe the decision-making process in the U.S. Supreme Court, the judicial role model better describes decision making in state supreme courts. This judicial role model allows the activist to transform a court into a policy maker.

The traditions, recent history, and biographies of recent justices of the Indiana, West Virginia, and Ohio courts are examined to establish a significant relationship between the presence of an activist advocate justice and active policy making by the courts. These courts' decisions in cases with policy making potential are contrasted with decisions in similar cases of three state supreme courts that did not have an advocate justice. Lopeman argues that the presence of an activist advocate explains a court's transformation to active policy making, and that other apparent explanations are insufficient. He emphasizes that the motives of an activist advocate are likely to determine the permanence of policy making in the court. This volume is an important resource for political scientists, legal scholars, and other researchers involved with judicial decision making, state politics, and state constitutional law.

Constitutional Rights after Globalization juxtaposes the globalization of the economy and the worldwide spread of constitutional charters of rights. The shift of political authority to powerful economic actors entailed by neo-liberal globalization challenges the traditional state-centred focus of constitutional law. Contemporary debate has responded to this challenge in normative terms, whether by reinterpreting rights or redirecting their ends, e.g. to reach private actors. However, globalization undermines the liberal legalist epistemology on which these approaches rest, by positing the existence of multiple sites of legal production, (e.g. multinational corporations) beyond the state. This dynamic, between globalization and legal pluralism on one side, and rights constitutionalism on the other, provides the context for addressing the question of rights constitutionalism's counterhegemonic potential. This shows first that the interpretive and instrumental assumptions underlying constitutional adjudication are empirically suspect: constitutional law tends more to disorder than coherence, and frequently is an ineffective tool for social change. Instead, legal pluralism contends that constitutionalism's importance lies in symbolic terms as a legitimating discourse. The competing liberal and 'new' politics of definition (the latter highlighting how neoliberal values and institutions constrain political action) are contrasted to show how each advances different agenda. A comparative survey of constitutionalism's engagement with private power shows that conceiving of constitutions in the predominant liberal, legalist mode has broadly favoured hegemonic interests. It is concluded that counterhegemonic forms of constitutional discourse cannot be effected within, but only by unthinking, the dominant liberal legalist paradigm, in a manner that takes seriously all exercises of political power.

This is the first major treatment of the conflict of laws within the UK, a subject often dealt with only incidentally in the main texts on private international law. In particular, the book examines the effect of the UK's changing constitutional arrangements on questions of jurisdiction, choice of law and issues of recognition and enforcement which arise within the UK.
The book offers practical guidance on the applicable rules in intra-UK conflicts situations with sections devoted to forum shopping within the UK, and other procedural matters. A chapter is also included on the impact of EU legislation on intra-UK conflicts, concluding with a discussion on how "Europeanization" might affect the conflict of laws in the UK. There is also coverage of how public policy functions in the conflict of laws. The book's approach to the treatment of intra-UK conflicts is enhanced by a comparative analysis of the recent response of Canada and Australia to, respectively, interprovincial and interstate conflicts.

On July 21, 1990, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., announced his resignation from the nation's highest court. The judicial career of the man who Wat Hopkins considers the United States Supreme Court's premier protector of expression came to an end. Hopkins examines the body of Justice Brennan's free expression jurisprudence and shows how Justice Brennan's theory of free expression was built on the metaphor of a marketplace of ideas.

Hopkins' analysis is based primarily on an examination of the significant free expression cases during Brennan's thirty-four year term. He concludes that Brennan developed a philosophically sound First Amendment theory that was accepted by the Court, but is not being applied today with the force necessary to make it truly effective. This detailed examination of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence is a noteworthy addition to legal history and scholarship.

In a departure from the mainstream methodology of a positivist-oriented jurisprudence, Collective Rights provides the first legal-theoretical treatment of this area. It advances a normative-moral standpoint of 'value collectivism' which goes against the traditional political philosophy of liberalism and the dominant ideas of liberal multiculturalism. Moreover, it places a theoretical account of collective rights within the larger debate between proponents of different rights theories. By exploring why 'collective rights' should be differentiated from similar legal concepts, the relationship between collective and individual rights and why groups should be recognised as the third distinctive type of right-holders, it presents the topic as connected to the larger philosophical debate about international law of human rights, most notably to the problem of universality of rights.

This study proposes a multilateralist method of choice of law in order to alleviate the great disarray that currently exists in American choice law. In the early 20th century, there was a fairly-uniform multilateralist method of choice law. In the 1920s and 30s, however, scholars adn courts began to reject this method. Viewed as too mechanical the method sometimes resulted in the choice of law of a state with only a tenuous connection to the controversy. Currently, state courts use four different approached to choice law with numerous material variations. This study rejects these approaches on normative, constitutional, and practical grounds. Instead, it advocates that courts adopt a multilateralist approach to choice of law that is forum- and content-neutral and that respects the rights of both individuals and states. The study also argues that such an approach should satisfy a constitutional standard that requires a court not choose one state's law when another state has a significantly closer connection to controversy.

The proposed method consists of two parts. The first part determines the states that have created legal relations applying to the dispute. When more than one state has created a legal realtions applying to the dispute. When more than one state has created a legal relation that applies to the controversy, the second part adopts the law of the state that had the closest connection. The study then applies the suggested method to numerous choice of law problems.

Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror examines the judicial response to human rights claims arising from the Bush Administration's war on terror. Despite widespread agreement that the Administration's program of extraordinary rendition, prolonged detention, and "enhanced" interrogation was torture by another name, not a single federal appellate court has confirmed an award of damages to the program's victims. The silence of the federal courts leaves victims without redress and the constitutional limits on government action undefined. Many of the suits seeking redress have been based on the landmark 1971 Supreme Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. This book traces the history of common law accountability, the rise of Bivens claims, and the post-Bivens history of constitutional tort litigation. After evaluating the failure of Bivens litigation arising from the war on terror, the book considers and rejects the arguments that have been put forward to explain and justify judicial silence. The book provides the Supreme Court with the tools needed to rethink its Bivens jurisprudence. Rather than treating the overseas national security context as disabling, modern federal courts should take a page from the nineteenth century, presume the viability of tort litigation, and proceed to the merits. Only by doing so can the federal courts ensure redress for victims and prevent future Administrations from using torture as an instrument of official policy.

Recent controversies surrounding the war on terror and American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought rule of law rhetoric to a fevered pitch. While President Obama has repeatedly emphasized his Administration's commitment to transparency and the rule of law, nowhere has this resolve been so quickly and severely tested than with the issue of the possible prosecution of Bush Administration officials. While some worry that without legal consequences there will be no effective deterrence for the repetition of future transgressions of justice committed at the highest levels of government, others echo Obama's seemingly reluctant stance on launching an investigation into allegations of criminal wrongdoing by former President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, and members of the Office of Legal Counsel. Indeed, even some of the Bush Administration's harshest critics suggest that we should avoid such confrontations, that the price of political division is too high. Measured or partisan, scholarly or journalistic, clearly the debate about accountability for the alleged crimes of the Bush Administration will continue for some time.

Using this debate as its jumping off point, When Governments Break the Law takes an interdisciplinary approach to the legal challenges posed by the criminal wrongdoing of governments. But this book is not an indictment of the Bush Administration; rather, the contributors take distinct positions for and against the proposition, offering revealing reasons and illuminating alternatives. The contributors do not ask the substantive question of whether any Bush Administration officials, in fact, violated the law, but rather the procedural, legal, political, and cultural questions of what it would mean either to pursue criminal prosecutions or to refuse to do so. By presuming that officials could be prosecuted, these essays address whether they "should."

When Governments Break the Law provides a valuable and timely commentary on what is likely to be an ongoing process of understanding the relationship between politics and the rule of law in times of crisis.

Contributors: Claire Finkelstein, Lisa Hajjar, Daniel Herwitz, Stephen Holmes, Paul Horwitz, Nasser Hussain, Austin Sarat, and Stephen I. Vladeck.

Church-State Constitutional Issues explores the often-debated and always topical issue of the relationship between church and state as outlined in the First Amendment. Donald L. Drakeman takes an interdisciplinary approach to examine the meaning of the establishment clause, demonstrating how the studies of law, religion, history, and political science provide insight into this relationship, which, since the nation's inception, has been difficult to define. The study first chronicles the Supreme Court's decision regarding the interpretation of the establishment clause from the early 19th century to the present. This legal history is subsequently viewed from a cultural perspective as Drakeman traces both the background of the First Amendment and how the relationship of church and state has developed on its journey through the court system. The volume moves towards further understanding of this complex issue as it concludes with a new interpretation of the establishment clause derived from previous information as well as further legal and political interpretive material.

Command responsibility, or executive accountability, assumes that leaders are responsible for the actions of their subordinates. If subordinates misbehave, violate basic moral laws, transgress international law, or thwart international standards of behavior, their leader may be called before to justice. Standards that set the boundaries of human action have been evolving for many millennia, with some degree of precision arriving after the post-World War II international war crimes prosecutions. The United Nations and other organizations have helped codify the international law under which commanders may be held responsible. This book explores the factor that have moved civilization closer to a standard approach to rule of law and the accountability of leaders for the actions of those they command.

A critical analysis of the connections that the United States Supreme Court has made between campaign finance regulations and voters' behavior. The sanctity of political speech is a key element of the United States Constitution and a cornerstone of the American republic. When the Supreme Court linked political speech to campaign finance in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) decision, the modern era of campaign finance regulation was born. The decision stated that in order to pass constitutional muster, any laws limiting money in politics must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. The lone state interest the Court was willing to entertain was the mitigation of corruption. In order to reach this conclusion, the Court advanced a sophisticated behavioral model that made assumptions about how laws affect voters' opinions and behavior. These assumptions have received surprisingly little attention until now. In The Appearance of Corruption, Daron Shaw, Brian Roberts, and Mijeong Baek analyze the connections that the Court made between campaign finance regulations and voters' behavior. The court argued that an increase in perceived corruption would lower engagement and turnout. Drawing from original survey data and experiments, they confront the question of what happens when the Supreme Court is wrong-and when the foundation of over 40 years of jurisprudence is simply not true. Even with the heightened awareness of campaign finance issues that emerged in the wake of the 2010 Citizens United decision, there is little empirical support for the Court's reasoning that turnout would decline. A rigorous statistical analysis, this is the first work to simultaneously name and test each and every one of the Court's assumptions in the pre- and post-Citizen's United eras. It will also fundamentally reshape how we think about campaign finance regulation's effects on voter behavior.

How should political community be seen in the context of European integration? This book combines a theoretical treatment of political allegiance with a study of ordinary citizens, examining how taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic talk politics and situate themselves relative to political institutions and other citizens.

This book examines the structures of power and jurisdiction that operated in Tudor England. It explains what the institutions of central government were designed to do, and how they related to each other. It discusses how order and obedience were supposed to be preserved in the countryside, and it shows how the offices designed for that purpose worked in practice. In doing so, Professor Loades highlights the complex links between the formal and informal systems of peace-keeping that functioned throughout the country and examines the critical relationship between Church and State, providing readers with an important context for the social and political developments of the age.

The book shows the extent to which changes to the monarch's status affected his real power both within the Church and within his kingdom as a whole. It explores the tensions surrounding his position: the king administered the law, but he did not make it; he could claim revenue, but it had to be granted to him; he was head of the government and the Lords Annointed, but limited by innumerable customs and obligations. In unravelling the mysteries of this ancient and cumbersome system of government," Tudor Government" offers a valuable introduction to this complex yet pivotal aspect of early modern British history.

This is a search of a model for a humane law - where the cruelty ban is still in force. This book however is not intended as an utopian enterprise; the humane law which is looked for is not for the future, nor is it meant as a reform project, or as a programme for new institutions to come. Here the contention is that positive law is better understood, if it is not too easily equated with power, force, or command. Law - it is shown - is more a matter of discourse and deliberation, than of sheer decision or of power relations. Constitutionalism, legal argumentation, legal ethics - three fundamental moments of our daily experience with the law - are there to witness that this view may be right. Now a constitutional view of the law and its practice and the connected discoursive approach to legal reasoning can offer interesting solutions also to legal ethics.

Shedding new light on the foundations of European competition law, this volume is a legal and historical study of the emerging law and its evolution through the 1980s. It retraces the development and critical junctures of competition law not only at the level of the European Economic Community but also at the level of major Member States of the EEC. Intensely researched and rich with insights, the chapters in this volume reflect a close collaboration among an expert group of lawyers and historians and capitalize on previously unavailable source materials. The book examines several key themes including: the influence of national and international competition law on the development of EEC competition law; the drafting of the regulations that lead to the development of modern EU competition law; the role of the European Court of Justice in establishing the protection of competition as a central pillar of the Common Market; the internal dynamics, ideologies and tensions within the Competition Directorate General (DG IV) of the European Commission; and the role of industrial policy in European integration. Combining legal analysis with a meticulous excavation of historical evidence to reveal the forces driving key actors and the interactions among them, this volume rediscovers a past largely forgotten but essential to understanding the genesis of competition law in Europe, its role in Europe's construction, its hybrid institutional traits, and its often unique substance.