More than a quarter of a century after the last Marine Corps Huey left the American embassy in Saigon, the lessons and legacies of the most divisive war in twentieth-century American history are as hotly debated as ever. Why did successive administrations choose little-known Vietnam as the "test case" of American commitment in the fight against communism? Why were the "best and brightest" apparently blind to the illegitimacy of the state of South Vietnam? Would Kennedy have pulled out had he lived? And what lessons regarding American foreign policy emerged from the war?

"The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War" helps readers understand this tragic and complex conflict. The book contains both interpretive information and a wealth of facts in easy-to-find form. Part I provides a lucid narrative overview of contested issues and interpretations in Vietnam scholarship. Part II is a mini-encyclopedia with descriptions and analysis of individuals, events, groups, and military operations. Arranged alphabetically, this section enables readers to look up isolated facts and specialized terms. Part III is a chronology of key events. Part IV is an annotated guide to resources, including films, documentaries, CD-ROMs, and reliable Web sites. Part V contains excerpts from historical documents and statistical data.

'My Vietnam' is Dave Morgan's story. A typical 20 year old, he was forced into extraordinary circumstances in Vietnam. The Vietnam War would expose Dave to an omnipresent danger and sheer terror that would impact him forever. Dave's story focuses on his time as a soldier and his return psychologically exhausted to a divided nation.

Phil Gioia grew up an army brat during the decades after World War II. Drawn to the military, he attended the Virginia Military Institute, then was commissioned in the U.S. Army, where he completed Jump School and Ranger School. Not even a year after college graduation, he landed in Vietnam in early 1968-in the first weeks of the Tet offensive, which marked a major escalation of the war. Commanding a company in the 82nd Airborne Division, Gioia led his paratroopers into the city of Hue for intense fighting-danger was always just around the corner -and the grisly discovery of mass graves. Wounded, he was sent home in May but returned with the 1st Cavalry Division a year later, this time leading a rucksack company of light infantry. Inserted into far-flung landing zones, Gioia and his men patrolled the jungles and rubber plantations along the Cambodian border, looking for a furtive enemy who preferred ambushes to set-piece battles and nighttime raids to daylight attacks. Danger Close! recounts the Vietnam War from the unique boots-on-the-ground perspective of a young officer who served two tours in two different divisions. He tells his story thoughtfully, straightforwardly, and always vividly, from the raw emotions of unearthing massacred human beings to the terrors of fighting in the dark, with red and green tracers slicing the air. Hard to put down and hard to forget, Danger Close! will remind readers of the best Vietnam memoirs, like Guns Up! and Baptism.

How American soldiers opposed and resisted the war in Vietnam While mainstream narratives of the Vietnam War all but marginalize anti-war activity of soldiers, opposition and resistance from within the three branches of the military made a real difference to the course of America's engagement in Vietnam. By 1968, every major peace march in the United States was led by active duty GIs and Vietnam War veterans. By 1970, thousands of active duty soldiers and marines were marching in protest in US cities. Hundreds of soldiers and marines in Vietnam were refusing to fight; tens of thousands were deserting to Canada, France and Sweden. Eventually the US Armed Forces were no longer able to sustain large-scale offensive operations and ceased to be effective. Yet this history is largely unknown and has been glossed over in much of the written and visual remembrances produced in recent years. Waging Peace in Vietnam shows how the GI movement unfolded, from the numerous anti-war coffee houses springing up outside military bases, to the hundreds of GI newspapers giving an independent voice to active soldiers, to the stockade revolts and the strikes and near-mutinies on naval vessels and in the air force. The book presents first-hand accounts, oral histories, and a wealth of underground newspapers, posters, flyers, and photographs documenting the actions of GIs and veterans who took part in the resistance. In addition, the book features fourteen original essays by leading scholars and activists. Notable contributors include Vietnam War scholar and author, Christian Appy, and Mme Nguyen Thi Binh, who played a major role in the Paris Peace Accord. The book originates from the exhibition Waging Peace, which has been shown in Vietnam and the University of Notre Dame, and will be touring the eastern United States in conjunction with book launches in Boston, Amherst, and New York.

This is the last volume, although published out of chronological sequence, in the nine-volume operational history series covering the Marine Corps' participation in the Vietnam War. A separate functional series complements the operational histories. This book is the capstone volume of the entire series in that 1968, as the title indicates, was the defining year of the war. While originally designed to be two volumes, it was decided that unity and cohesion required one book. The year 1968 was the year of the Tet Offensive including Khe Sanh and Hue City. These were momentous events in the course of the war and they occurred in the first three month s of the year. This book, however, documents that 1968 was more than just the Tet Offensive. The bloodiest month of the war for the U.S. forces was not January, nor February 1968, but May 1968 when the Communists launched what was called their "Mini-Tet" offensive. This was followed by a second "Mini-Tet" offensive during the late summer which also was repulsed at heavy cost to both sides. By the end of the year, the U.S. forces in South Vietnam's I Corps, under the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), had regained the offensive. By December, enemy-initiated attacks had fallen to their lowest level in two years. Still, there was no talk of victory. The Communist forces remained a formidable foe and a limit had been drawn on the level of American participation in the war. Although largely written from the perspective of III MAF and the ground war in I Corps, the volume also treats the activities of Marines with the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force, activities of Marine advisors to South Vietnamese forces, and other Marine involvement in the war. Separate chapters cover Marine aviation and the single manager controversy, artillery, logistics, manpower, and pacification. Like most of the volumes in this series, this has been a cumulative history.

Going beyond the dominant orthodox narrative to incorporate insight from revisionist scholarship on the Vietnam War, Michael G. Kort presents the case that the United States should have been able to win the war, and at a much lower cost than it suffered in defeat. Presenting a study that is both historiographic and a narrative history, Kort analyzes important factors such as the strong nationalist credentials and leadership qualities of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem; the flawed military strategy of 'graduated response' developed by Robert McNamara; and the real reasons South Vietnam collapsed in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion in 1975. Kort shows how the US commitment to defend South Vietnam was not a strategic error but a policy consistent with US security interests during the Cold War, and that there were potentially viable strategic approaches to the war that might have saved South Vietnam.

The Vietnam War was an immense national tragedy that played itself out in the individual experiences of millions of Americans. The conflict tested and tormented the country collectively and individually in ways few historical events have. The Human Tradition in the Vietnam Era provides window into some of those personal journeys through that troubled time. The poor and the powerful, male and female, hawk and dove, civilian and military, are all here. This rich collection of original biographical essays provides contemporary readers with a sense of what it was like to be an American in the 1960s and early 1970s, while also helping them gain an understanding of some of the broader issues of the era. The diverse biographies included in this book put a human face on the tensions and travails of the Vietnam Era. Students will gain a better understanding of how individuals looked at and lived through this contro-versial conflict in American history.

Reprint of 1982 book from the US Army Center of Military History. An account of Army helicopter ambulances in Vietnam that evaluates leadership, procedures, and logistical support.

In 1966 a young Army lieutenant from small-town Oklahoma set foot in the Central Highlands of Vietnam as a raw, inexperienced Huey pilot. Ray Clark would serve two harrowing tours in Vietnam, developing his piloting skills in combat. Clark has written an engrossing, poignant, and often humorous account of America's combat helicopter pilots and crew members: their adventures, triumphs and tragedies as they fought in a war like no other in America's history. A natural and masterful storyteller, Clark shares a personal memoir of war that Americans should heed carefully. Just Let Me Walk Away is a chronicle of a defining point in U.S. history, a tale of an unpopular war and the soldiers charged to fight it. This riveting, personal story is written with passion, dignity, and a commitment to truth. A day in the life of these American veterans is a story largely untold, an uncelebrated truth that Clark is compelled to reveal.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1972 study. This study documents the conception, birth, death and resurrection of gunship beacon offset firing techniques. Two entirely different systems--Pave Mace and Combat Rendezvous--are discussed. These systems enabled USAF fixed wing gunships to deliver safe, sustained, and effective aerial fire on enemy ground forces in close proximity to friendly forces when both are invisible from the air. The primary purpose of this report is to show from well-documented experience that these systems represent an in-being, revolutionary, all-weather, close air support capability never before achieved. The report also examines the sometimes unconventional, often torturous, and almost always frustrating process by which the USAF developed, tested, introduced, and finally used these systems in combat. In so doing it suggests some obvious lessons which may facilitate more systematic management of future weapons systems. The report also shows how interservice rivalry, roles and missions considerations, and force structure issues impeded and almost prevented the introduction of systems who rapid deployment would have been in the best interest of both services. Hopefully, this experience may suggest how such opposition can be overcome in the future by showing how it was overcome in this instance. The report seeks to provide sufficient technical information about each system to enable the reader to understand how each system operates and to compare their relative merits and shortcomings. In so doing it reveals a number of problems with both systems which have not yet been overcome and discussed possible solutions that have been advanced. Finally, this study shows how each system has saved the lives of friendly ground forces who would otherwise have died had it not been for these systems.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. The unique demands of the operational environment in Southeast Asia dictated that the United States Air Force meet many mission requirements for which hardware did not exist. The lateral firing gunship evolved from this environment, and it constituted an immediate and effective solution for several tactical problems. This weapon system performed significantly in Southeast Asia. AC-47 gunship activity during 1965 and early 1966 was documented in four previous CHECO reports. Another CHECO report, Night Close Air Support in RVN, also dealt in detail with AC-47 combat operations. The Role of Gunships in SEA, a CHECO report dated 30 August 1969, recounts the continuing mission of the AC-47 as well as the introduction and employment of AC-119G, AC-119K, and AC-130A gunships in 1968 and 1969. The effectiveness of this unique weapon system generated significant interest at all command levels, and the combat role of gunships merits further attention and analysis. This report updates previous gunship studies with special emphasis on new developments in the AC-130 weapon system. This report also examines the current performance and effectiveness of the AC-47, long noted for its role in providing close air support for troops in contact; the AC-119G/K which functioned in armed reconnaissance and close air support roles; and the AC-130 which covered the whole spectrum of gunship operations but performed primarily as a night interdiction weapon system.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. Combine adverse effects of darkness and weather conditions on air operations in a combat situation, and a very hazardous operational environment is likely to prevail. This CHECO report investigates problems and limitations of the impact which darkness and weather have on air operations in Southeast Asia. Throughout this report, special emphasis is placed on tactics, techniques, and innovations developed to counteract unfavorable effects of night and weather on mission accomplishment.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the effects of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) on each of the Vietnamese Air Divisions (ADs). Each chapter of this report was written by a different author. Thus, the reader has not one, but five views of American efforts to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Each author presents the results of his own investigation, and while they generally agree on the overall success of the program, they sometimes differ on details. Problems and achievements that were significant to one author were sometimes less important to another. Therefore, each chapter of this report should be evaluated on its own merit as well as by comparison to the other four. The history of the VNAF and the United States Air Force (USAF) advisory role in its development has been traced in three previous CHECO reports: Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force, 1949-1968; VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program 1968-1970]; and The Vietnamization of the Air War, 1970-1971. The Vietnamization of the Air War is a companion volume to The VNAF Air Divisions: Reports on Improvement and Modernization. The former describes VNAF improvement and modernization (I&M) by mission function-- airlift" for example, or "logistics,"--and thus deals with the broad out lines of the entire VNAF. The VNAF Air Divisions, on the other hand, focuses on one Air Division in each chapter and investigates the details of I&M at the unit level. Together, these two volumes describe the VNAF as it developed between January 1970 and July 1971.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) from January 1970 to July 1971. The growth and development of the VNAF during this period was an integral part of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP). The goal of CRIMP was to assure the self-sufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) after the withdrawal of United States combat forces. Self-sufficiency in this context implied that the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. This did not mean that United States assistance would no longer be required to protect South Vietnamese independence. South Vietnam did not possess or plan to develop the industrial capacity to produce the equipment necessary for defense. The United States would continue to provide the materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, as well as a military team to advise the RVNAF--but the RVNAF would have the capability of effectively using that equipment to maintain the security of South Vietnam without the active armed assistance of United States military forces. Though the United States advisory effort would still be needed, the United States would no longer be required to bear arms in defense of South Vietnam. That is the meaning of the term "self-sufficiency" as it is used in this study.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. The period from July 1971 through the end of 1973 was a time of transition, growth, and profound challenge for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). As U.S. personnel continued to withdraw from South Vietnam (SVN), the VNAF was faced with growing combat requirements and demanding force expansions. Then, following a massive Communist offensive in the Spring of 1972, VNAF personnel, support, and operational capabilities were pushed to the limit to respond to intensified combat needs, force structure increases, and accelerated squadron activation schedules. These difficulties were overshadowed in late 1972 when, in anticipation of a cease-fire and an accompanying total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, there was an unprecedented infusion of aircraft and equipment into South Vietnam, and a massive transfer of remaining U.S. facilities to the South Vietnamese. Once more the VNAF force structure was expanded and activation schedules were accelerated. Shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1973, the Agreement to End the War and Restore Peace in Vietnam was signed, and during the next 60 days U.S. forces and advisors were withdrawn from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the "cease-fire' did not bring with it a period of peace and stability, thus necessitating continuing VNAF combat requirements in addition to its monumental transition, expansion, and training tasks. The combination of these factors--marked VNAF growth, continuing combat requirements, and withdrawal of U.S. forces and advisors--presented the VNAF with its greatest challenge of the conflict. This report examines the events which occurred, the goals pursued, the problems encountered, and the achievements attained in the program to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force between July 1971 and December 1973. It also addresses the limitations which, as of the end of 1973, remained to be overcome on the road toward VNAF self-sufficiency.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1970 study. The French founded the VNAF in 1951 as a liaison flight. Manned by Vietnamese, it was part of the French Air Force under the command of French officers. In 1953, two observation squadrons manned by Vietnamese were added, but command, administration, and logistics support remained in French hands. The departure of the French in 1955 left the VNAF with an inventory of aging Morane-Saulnier observation aircraft, Grumman F-8F Bearcats, and C-47s. The new VNAF staff organized these resources into two liaison squadrons, two fighter squadrons, a special-airlift-mission squadron, and a transport squadron. Throughout South Vietnam's first year of independence, the advisors to the VNAF were French. In May 1956, a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) assumed responsibility for training the South Vietnamese Army and entered into a joint arrangement with the French to advise and train the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. The Franco-American association lasted a year. At a time when unification of North and South Vietnam began to appear more and more impossible, the U.S. took action to expand the South Vietnamese armed forces. The next five years saw a remodeling of the force following the organization of the USAF, with English-language training and American management techniques. Expansion of the VNAF was still relatively modest. In November 1961, the USAF established a special unit at Bien Hoa VNAF AS to train Vietnamese pilots and maintenance personnel--Operation FARM GATE. For nearly three years, there were joint, operations under this program, with VNAF personnel required on each mission. As VNAF officers and airmen became familiar with USAF equipment and techniques from 1956 to 1961, the air effort became standardized, with more efficient aid possible under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The period also laid the foundation for a much more extensive and accelerated expansion program over the next three years.

This recently declassified 1967 report traces the development of the Assault Airlift capability from its inception through June, 1966. its growth, and the problems associated therewith including equipment, support, facilities and personnel are discussed. Operations during the French/Indo China War are briefly covered in the Introduction as well as "interim" operations following the close of that conflict and up to 1 January 1961. From the latter date, forward, the accomplishments of the 315th Air Division in its assault airlift role are more detailed. To examine the role of assault airlift in Southeast Asia without considering the effects of "out-country," or inter-theater airlift efforts would leave unexplained many of the logistical handicaps under which assault airlift operates today. Hence, the reader will find several references to "out-country" airlift and to organization and control beyond the geographical limits of South Vietnam.

Once Upon a Distance War tells the stories of such young Vietnam war correspondents as Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett, and David Halberstam, providing a riveting chronicle of high adventure and brutal slapstick, gallantry and cynicism, as well as a vital addition to the history they shaped. "Prochnau . . . tells a Vietnam story we haven't heard before. . . . Complex, witty, and humane."--Tobias Wolff. of photos.

Artillery XO...back into the Ia Drang Valley is my story of entering the Vietnam War in January 1966 as a young artillery officer and volunteer. It follows my adventures and experiences with the people I meet through my assignment as an executive officer of a 105mm howitzer battery and a bloody contest with a hard core North Vietnamese unit at the base of Chu Pong Mountain on the Cambodian border, in the same area where the 1st Air Cav became famous in a similar but more prolonged fight six months earlier, now recounted in a popular book "We Were Soldiers...and Young" (Random House 1992)

Vietnam veteran Don Yost explores the pain and rage of his experience as a correspondent near Mai Laid in 1968, transforming it through writing to a elegaic and powerful memoir, imbued with a significant message for our time.

Originally published in 1976. This narrative describes the evacuation of more than 1,400 American soldiers, Marines, and airmen, and Vietnamese men, women, and children from the Kham Duc Special Forces camp in southern I Corps on 12 May 1968. It treats the geographical and topographical setting, the threat to the camp posed by two regiments of the North Vietnamese Army, and the danger to the camp and its inhabitants from the communist seizure of all the high ground around the camp. The monograph devotes individual chapters to the US Army and Marine helicopter rescue efforts, tactical air support, and tactical airlift. The final chapter deals with the attempts to rescue the last three men at Kham Duc. American aircraft losses were severe during the evacuation, and the successful outcome of the mass rescue depended upon the skill and courage of American aircrews. Had command and control been better, losses probably would have been less severe.