While it is generally accepted that animal welfare matters morally, it is less clear how to morally evaluate the ending of an animal's life. It seems to matter for the animal whether it experiences pain or pleasure, or enjoyment or suffering. But does it also matter for the animal whether it lives or dies? Is a longer life better for an animal than a shorter life? If so, under what conditions is this so, and why is this the case? Is it better for an animal to live rather than never to be born at all? The Ethics of Killing Animals addresses these value-theoretical questions about animal life, death and welfare. It also discusses whether and how answers to these questions are relevant for our moral duties towards animals. Is killing animals ever morally acceptable and, if so, under what conditions? Do animals have moral rights, such as the right to life and should they be accorded legal rights? How should our moral duties towards animals inform our individual behavior and policy-making? This volume presents a collection of contributions from major thinkers in ethics and animal welfare, with a special focus on the moral evaluation of killing animals.

Virtually everyone supports religious liberty, and virtually everyone opposes discrimination. But how do we handle the hard questions that arise when exercises of religious liberty seem to discriminate unjustly? How do we promote the common good while respecting conscience in a diverse society? This point-counterpoint book brings together leading voices in the culture wars to debate such questions: John Corvino, a longtime LGBT-rights advocate, opposite Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis, prominent young social conservatives. Many such questions have arisen in response to same-sex marriage: How should we treat county clerks who do not wish to authorize such marriages, for example; or bakers, florists, and photographers who do not wish to provide same-sex wedding services? But the conflicts extend well beyond the LGBT rights arena. How should we treat hospitals, schools, and adoption agencies that can't in conscience follow antidiscrimination laws, healthcare mandates, and other regulations? Should corporations ever get exemptions? Should public officials? Should we keep controversial laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or pass new ones like the First Amendment Defense Act? Should the law give religion and conscience special protection at all, and if so, why? What counts as discrimination, and when is it unjust? What kinds of material and dignitary harms should the law try to fight-and what is dignitary harm, anyway? Beyond the law, how should we treat religious beliefs and practices we find mistaken or even oppressive? Should we tolerate them or actively discourage them? In point-counterpoint format, Corvino, Anderson and Girgis explore these questions and more. Although their differences run deep, they tackle them with civility, clarity, and flair. Their debate is an essential contribution to contemporary discussions about why religious liberty matters and what respecting it requires.

Meaning (significance) and nature are this book's principal topics. They seem an odd couple, like raisins and numbers, though they elide when meanings of a global sort-ideologies and religions, for example-promote ontologies that subordinate nature. Setting one against the other makes reality contentious. It signifies workmates and a coal face to miners, gluons to physicists, prayer and redemption to priests. Are there many realities, or many perspectives on one? The answer I prefer is the comprehensive naturalism anticipated by Aristotle and Spinoza: "natura naturans, natura naturata." Nature naturing is an array of mutually conditioning material processes in spacetime. Each structure or event-storm clouds forming, nature natured-is self-differentiating, self-stabilizing, and sometimes self-disassembling; each alters or transforms a pre-existing state of affairs. This surmise anticipated discoveries and analyses to which neither thinker had access, though physics and biology confirm their hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the question this book considers: Is reality divided:nature vrs. lived experience? Or is experience, with all its meanings and values, the complex expression of natural processes?

Philosophical and ethical discussions of warfare are often tied to emerging technologies and techniques. Today we are presented with what many believe is a radical shift in the nature of war-the realization of conflict in the cyber-realm, the so-called "fifth domain " of warfare. Does an aggressive act in the cyber-realm constitute an act of war? If so, what rules should govern such warfare? Are the standard theories of just war capable of analyzing and assessing this mode of conflict? These changing circumstances present us with a series of questions demanding serious attention. Is there such a thing as cyberwarfare? How do the existing rules of engagement and theories from the just war tradition apply to cyberwarfare? How should we assess a cyber-attack conducted by a state agency against private enterprise and vice versa? Furthermore, how should actors behave in the cyber-realm? Are there ethical norms that can be applied to the cyber-realm? Are the classic just war constraints of non-combatant immunity and proportionality possible in this realm? Especially given the idea that events that are constrained within the cyber-realm do not directly physically harm anyone, what do traditional ethics of war conventions say about this new space? These questions strike at the very center of contemporary intellectual discussion over the ethics of war. In twelve original essays, plus a foreword from John Arquilla and an introduction, Binary Bullets: The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, engages these questions head on with contributions from the top scholars working in this field today.