What does it really mean to be modern? The contributors to this collection offer critical attempts both to re-read Max Weber's historical idea of disenchantment and to develop further his understanding of what the contested relationship between modernity and religion represents. The approach is distinctive because it focuses on disenchantment as key to understanding those aspects of modern society and culture that Weber diagnosed. This is in opposition to approaches that focus on secularization, narrowly construed as the rise of secularism or the divide between religion and politics, and that then conflate this with modernization as a whole. Other novel contributions are discussions of temporality - meaning the sense of time or of historical change that posits a separation between an ostensibly secular modernity and its religious past - and of the manner in which such a sense of time is constructed and disseminated through narratives that themselves may resemble religious myths. It reflects the idea that disenchantment is a narrative with either Enlightenment, Romantic, or Christian roots, thereby developing a conversation between critical studies in the field of secularism (such as those of Talal Asad and Gil Anidjar) and conceptual history approaches to secularization and modernity (such as those of Karl Loewith and Reinhart Koselleck), and in the process creates something that is more than merely the sum of its parts.

Reason, the Only Oracle of Man is Colonel Ethan Allen's polemical treatise wherein he argues for the power of reason, and reason's nature as a God-given attribute of man. Received to a negative reception during its original publication in 1785, Reason, the Only Oracle of Man divided opinion on the grounds of its rejection of traditional, Christian religious beliefs. At the time, the fledgling nation of the United States was deeply devoted to the traditional Christian establishment, with many suspicious of the recent progress of science in many fields. Ethan Allen rejected many traditional beliefs of the Christian church. He considered much of the Bible to be mythical superstition, and held great contempt for organised religion which he viewed as corrupt and sinful, with the priesthood in particular targeted for its inadequacies. While not an atheist, Allen believed strongly in the power and capacity of reason, and considered its use to be virtuous.

Representing the highest quality of scholarship, Gilles Emery offers a much-anticipated introduction to Catholic doctrine on the Trinity. His extensive research combined with lucid prose provides readers a resource to better understand the foundations of Trinitarian reflection. The book is addressed to all who wish to benefit from an initiation to Trinitarian doctrine. The path proposed by this introductory work comprises six steps. First the book indicates some liturgical and biblical ways for entering into Trinitarian faith. It then presents the revelation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the New Testament, by inviting the reader to reflect upon the signification of the word "God." Next it explores the confessions of Trinitarian faith, from the New Testament itself to the Creed of Constantinople, on which it offers a commentary. By emphasizing the Christian culture inherited from the fourth-century Fathers of the Church, the book presents the fundamental principles of Trinitarian doctrine, which find their summit in the Christian notion of "person." On these foundations, the heart of the book is a synthetic exposition of the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in their divine being and mutual relations, and in their action for us. Finally, the last step takes up again the study of the creative and saving action of the Trinity: the book concludes with a doctrinal exposition of the "missions" of the Son and Holy Spirit, that is, the salvific sending of the Son and Holy Spirit that leads humankind to the contemplation of the Father.

This book offers a rigorous analysis of why commitment matters and the challenges it presents to a range of believers. Peter Forrest treats commitment as a response to lost innocence. He considers the intellectual consequences of this by demonstrating why, for example, we should not believe in angels. He then explores why humans are attached to reason and to humanism, recognising the different commitments made by theist and non-theist humanists. Finally, he analyses religious faith, specifically fideism, defining it by way of contrast to Descartes, Pascal and William James, as well as contemporary philosophers including John Schellenberg and Lara Buchak. Of particular interest to scholars working on the philosophy of religion, the book makes the case both for and against committing to God, recognising that God's divine character sets up an emotional rather than an intellectual barrier to commitment to worship.

Hegel's philosophy of religion contains an implicit political theology. When viewed in connection with his wider work on subjectivity, history and politics, this political theology is a resource for apocalyptic thinking. In a world of climate change, inequality, oppressive gender roles and racism, Hegel can be used to theorise the hope found in the end of that world. Histories of apocalyptic thinking draw a line connecting the medieval prophet Joachim of Fiore and Marx. This line passes through Hegel, who transforms the relationship between philosophy and theology by philosophically employing theological concepts to critique the world. Jacob Taubes provides an example of this Hegelian political theology, weaving Christianity, Judaism and philosophy to develop an apocalypticism that is not invested in the world. Taubes awaits the end of the world knowing that apocalyptic destruction is also a form of creation. Catherine Malabou discusses this relationship between destruction and creation in terms of plasticity. Using plasticity to reformulate apocalypticism allows for a form of apocalyptic thinking that is immanent and materialist. Together Hegel, Taubes and Malabou provide the resources for thinking about why the world should end. The resulting apocalyptic pessimism is not passive, but requires an active refusal of the world.