Intelligence was a central element of the Cold War and the need for it was expected to diminish after the USSR's collapse, yet in recent years it has been in greater demand than ever. The atrocities of 11 September and the subsequent "war on terrorism" now call for an even more intensive effort. Important questions arise on how intelligence fits into the world of increased threats, globalization and expanded international action. This volume contains the recent work on this subject by Michael Herman, British intelligence professional for 35 years and Oxford University academic. It compares intelligence with other government information services, and discusses the British intelligence system and the case for its reform. It also addresses the ethical issues raised by intelligence's methods and results: "do they on balance make for a better world or a worse one?." Other chapters explore a wide range of intelligence topics past and present, including the transatlantic relationship, the alliance strategies of Norway and New Zealand, Mrs Thatcher's "de-unionization" of British Sigint, and personal memories of the British Cabinet Office in the 1970s.
Michael Herman argues for intelligence professionalism as a contribution to international security and for its encouragement as a world standard. The modern challenge is for intelligence to support international cooperation in ways originally developed to advance national interests, while at the same time developing some restraint and international "rules of the game," in the use of intrusive and covert methods on its traditional targets. The effects of 11 September on this challenge are discussed in a thoughtful afterword.

From the 1930's to the 1950's a significant number of left-wing men and women in the United States, Britain, Europe, Australia and Canada were recruited to the Soviet intellgence services.
These people were amateurs, rather than professional intelligence workers and the reason for their success is intriguing and has never been satisfactorily explained.
Using recently released Soviet archives, this book seeks to explore the foundations for these successes in the deliberately concealed tradition of underground political activity which was part of the communist movement. This tradition, which became extremely useful to Soviet intelligence, also explains the origins of the "tradecraft" of espionage. The book seeks to contribute to the study of the causes of the early Cold War, by explaining how this underground tradition lead to espionage.
This title shows that while allegations of disloyalty during the Cold War were often part of a witch-hunt, the Left and their liberal allies sometimes unwittingly had a number of skeletons in their closet.

Contrary to popular misconceptions and public branding as "dirty tricks," covert action and counterintelligence can have considerable value. Democracies, while wary of these instruments, have benefited significantly from their use, saving lives, treasure, and gaining strategic advantage. As liberal democracies confront the post-Cold War mix of rogue states and non-state actors, such as criminals and terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, these clandestine arts may prove to be important tools of statecraft, and perhaps trump cards in the twenty-first century.

Godson defines covert action as influencing events in other parts of the world without attribution, and counterintelligence as identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting the secret activities of others. Together they provide the capability to resist manipulation and control others to advantage. Counterintelligence protects U.S. military, technological, and diplomatic secrets and turns adversary intelligence to U.S. advantage. Covert action enables the United States to weaken adversaries and to assist allies who may be hampered by open acknowledgment of foreign support.

Drawing on contemporary and historical literature, broad-ranging contacts with senior intelligence officials in many countries, as well as his own research and experience as a longtime consultant to the U.S. government, Godson traces the history of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence since 1945, showing that covert action works well when it is part of a well-coordinated policy and when policy makers are committed to succeeding in the long-term. Godson argues that the best counterintelligence is an offensive defense. His exposition of the essential theoretical foundations of both covert action and counterintelligence, supported by historical examples, lays out the ideal conditions for their use, as well as demonstrating why they are so difficult to attain.

This book will be of interest to students and general readers interested in political science, national security, foreign policy, and military policy.

This work considers, for the first time, the intelligence relationship between three important North Atlantic powers in the Twenty-first century, from WWII to post-Cold War. As demonstrated in the case studies in this volume, World War II cemented loose and often informal inter-allied agreements on security intelligence that had preceded it, and created new and important areas of close and formal co-operation in such areas as codebreaking and foreign intelligence.

Asia represented the "hottest" theatre of the Cold War, with several declared and undeclared wars always in progress. Examining the Asian dimension of this struggle, this volume describes and analyzes a range of clandestine activities from intelligence and propaganda to special operations and security support. It draws on documents declassified after the end of the Cold War.

This is the first description of the formation of America's nulcear surveillance system. Drawing on interviews with participants and the little documentation available under the Freedom of Information Act, Ziegler and Jacobson tell a story not told before. They shed new light on questions raised in earlier interpretations of the early Cold War years and reveal the origins of a surveillance activity that is implied, but not explained, in today's headlines. This book provides the first documented description of the genesis and institutionalization of America's nuclear surveillance system. It traces the development of covert technical methods for assessing the nuclear capability of foreign powers from the introduction of these techniques in World War II to 1949, when they were successfully employed to detect the test of Russia's first atomic bomb. Ziegler and Jacobson examine the planning for the system as well as the technical and organizational obstacles that had to be overcome before it could be implemented. They describe the government decision-making processes and the ways individuals and groups with different beliefs and interests were mobilized in support of the program. They also explore the relationships between the intelligence and scientific communities that were forged in this process.

This is a history of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) during the Cold War, based on its secret archives. The author presents detailed descriptions of the build-up of a network of Norwegian signals intelligence stations in the north; border crossings by clandestine agents; the reporting of Norwegian merchant mariners from ports behind the Iron Curtain; the intimate co-operation between the NIS and the secret services of the United States and other countries; as well as the establishment of a stay behind network.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Audley End House in Essex - or Station 43 as it was known during the Second World War - was used as the principal training school for SOE's Polish Section between 1942 and 1944. Polish agents at the stately home undertook a series of arduous training courses in guerilla warfare before being parachuted into occupied Europe. In 1943, Audley End was placed exclusively under polish control, a situation unique within SOE. The training was tough and the success rate low, but a total of 527 agents passed through Audley End between 1942 and 1944. Ian Valentine has consulted a wide range of primary sources and interviewed Polish instructors and former agents who trained at Audley End to write the definitive account of this Essex country house and the vital but secret part it played in defeating Hitler. He examines the comprehensive training agents at Audley End and describes the work undertaken by Station 43's agents in Europe, set against the background of Polish wartime history. He also covers the vital link with the RAF's Special Duties squadrons, whose crews risked their lives dropping agents into occupied Europe. Station 43 breaks new ground in telling the hitherto until story of Audley End house and its role as a vital SOE training school.

Little attention has been paid to the murky, ultra-business of gathering intelligence among and forming estimates about friendly powers, and friendly or allied military forces. How rarely have scholars troubled to discover when states entered into coalitions or alliances mainly and explicitly because their intelligence evaluation of the potential partner concluded that making the alliance was, from the originator's national security interest, the best game in town. The twentieth century has been chosen to enhance the coherence of and connections between, the subject matter of this under-explored part of intelligence studies.

Little attention has been paid to the murky, ultra-business of gathering intelligence among and forming estimates about friendly powers, and friendly or allied military forces. How rarely have scholars troubled to discover when states entered into coalitions or alliances mainly and explicitly because their intelligence evaluation of the potential partner concluded that making the alliance was, from the originator's national security interest, the best game in town. The twentieth century has been chosen to enhance the coherence of and connections between, the subject matter of this under-explored part of intelligence studies.

Exploratio is the first ever survey of Roman military and civil intelligence. The authors examine in detail the operation and gradual development of Roman intelligence-gathering from shaky beginnings to a high level of excellence. They identify who gathered it, and for whom.
This study shows the effects of intelligence on policy formation at various levels from the purely local through to the global. The consequences of various instances of the mishandling of information are uncovered. Austin and Rankov also demonstrate that intelligence gathering was not necessarily directed from Rome, but had for practical reasons to be carried out and processed on the frontiers themselves.
Exploratio is important reading for all students and teachers of Roman history. It will also appeal to those with a general interest in military or diplomatic history.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203033051

Richard Sorge was a spy, a Russian spy and an extraordinarily successful one. Two quotes illustrate this. The first is by Larry Collins, 'Richard Sorge's brilliant espionage work saved Stalin and the Soviet Union from defeat in the fall of 1941, probably prevented a Nazi victory in World War Two and thereby assured the dimensions of the world we live in today.' The second is by Frederick Forsyth, 'The spies in history who can say from their graves, the information I supplied to my masters, for better or worse, altered the history of our planet, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Richard Sorge was in that group.' Masquerading as a Nazi journalist, Richard Sorge worked undetected as head of a Red Army spy ring until he was arrested and executed in Japan during the Second World War. Such an astonishing story as Sorge's is bound to attract attention but not only was this the first book to offer an authoritative account, it has, in many ways, not least in the quality of its writing, never been superseded. The authors rejected legend and found facts that were even stranger. They provide an account as reliable as it is enthralling of possibly the most successful spy who ever operated; a man who for eight years transmitted from Japan a continuous stream of the most valuable information, often derived from the highest quarters, culminating in precise advance information of Hitler's invasion of Russia, of Japan's decision not to attack Russia in 1941, and of the near certainty of war against America that October or November instead. Jointly written books sometimes jar, but not this one. The authors had complementary skills, F. W. Deakin being an authority on twentieth-century European history and G. R Storry no less of an authority on twentieth-century Japan. Together they do justice to 'the man whom I regard as the most formidable spy in history,' (Ian Fleming).

A Cross of Iron provides the fullest account yet of the national security state that emerged in the first decade of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan traces the process of state-making through struggles to unify the armed forces, harness science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, control the defense budget, and distribute the cost of defense across the economy. President Harry S. Truman and his successor were in the middle of a fundamental contest over the nation's political identity and postwar purpose, and their efforts determined the size and shape of the national security state that finally emerged.

Seizing the Enigma tells the story of one of the great dramas of World War II. A multinational corps of cryptologists struggled to break the German U-boat codes that were helping Nazi submarine wolfpacks tear at the lifeline between America and Britain. But these codebreakers realised that German messages could not be read without obtaining the encryption keys from the ships that held them. Several daring captures at sea of critical documents and encryption machines by the Royal Navy finally led to mastering the U-boat codes. Kahn begins his narrative with the creation of the Enigma machine in 1918 and its refinement during the two decades leading up to World War II. He introduces key figures on both sides of the battle including: Arthur Scherbius, who gave the Germans a boost in the race between codemaker and codebreaker and Polish mathematician Marian Rejewski, who reconstructed the Enigma keys. Since its original publication in 1961, Seizing the Enigma has remained a vital source of information about Enigma and the art of codebreaking.

'Fascinating.' "Daily Telegraph"

Of the many functions carried out by intelligence agencies, analysis and assessment has received comparatively little scholarly attention. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays may be divided into four self-contained sets. The first examines critically the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. The second looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

Exploratio is the first ever survey of Roman military and civil intelligence. The authors examine in detail the operation and gradual development of Roman intelligence-gathering from shaky beginnings to a high level of excellence. They identify who gathered it, and for whom.
This study shows the effects of intelligence on policy formation at various levels from the purely local through to the global. The consequences of various instances of the mishandling of information are uncovered. Austin and Rankov also demonstrate that intelligence gathering was not necessarily directed from Rome, but had for practical reasons to be carried out and processed on the frontiers themselves.
Exploratio is important reading for all students and teachers of Roman history. It will also appeal to those with a general interest in military or diplomatic history.

An explosive expose of how British military intelligence really works-from the inside. This book presents the stories of two undercover agents: Brian Nelson, who worked for the Force Research Unit (FRU), aiding loyalist terrorists and murderers in their bloody work; and the man known as Stakeknife, deputy head of the IRA's infamous "Nutting Squad," the internal security force that tortured and killed suspected informers.
This book is copublished with O'Brien Press, Dublin and is for sale only in the United States, it's territories and dependencies, Canada, and the Philippines.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations," "deep battle," and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

Nicholas Eftimiades examines the infiltration of Chinese espionage agents into foreign governments and private businesses. These efforts have been going on mostly uninterrupted for decades, while Western intelligence services focused on the Soviet Union. He draws on his expertise as a counterintelligence analyst to examine the structure, objectives and methodology of Chinese clandestine activities. The book specifically addresses the human source in intelligence operations, such as agent and double-agent recruitment, and how these tactics fit into the conduct of internal and foreigh affairs in China.

This book traces the history of Australia's highly secret Intelligence Security Organisation. Established in the early days of the Cold War, like most intelligence organisations working under covert conditions, it exceeded the vague powers entrusted to it. It has been the subject of two Royal Commissions in Australia and in recent times several acts of Parliament have been passed in order to make it more accountable to Australia's government and its citizens.

What was Britain's reaction to the death of Stalin? How has Britain reconciled a modern nuclear strategy with its traditional imperial defence commitments around the world? How has secret intelligence affected the Special Relationship' since 1945? Certain clear questions and perennial themes run through British overseas policy since 1945. This book examines them, drawing on new research by leading historians and scholars in the field.

In 1942, Lieutenant-Commander Ian Fleming was personal assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence - the dynamic figure behind James Bond's fictional chief, 'M'. Here, Fleming had a brilliant idea: why not set up a unit of authorised looters, men who would go in hard with the front-line troops and steal enemy intelligence? Known as '30 Assault Unit', they took part in the major campaigns of the Second World War, landing on the Normandy beaches and helping to liberate Paris. 30AU's final amazing coup was to seize the entire archives of the German Navy - thirty tons of documents. Ian Fleming flew out in person to get the loot back to Britain, where it was combed for evidence to use in the Nuremburg trials. In this gripping and highly enjoyable book, Nicholas Rankin, author of the best-selling Churchill's Wizards, puts 30 Assault Unit's fascinating story in a strategic and intelligence context. He also argues that Ian Fleming's Second World War service was one of the most significant periods of his life - without this, the most popular spy fiction of the twentieth century would not have been written.

What was Britain's reaction to the death of Stalin? How has Britain reconciled a modern nuclear strategy with its traditional imperial defence commitments around the world? How has secret intelligence affected the Special Relationship' since 1945? Certain clear questions and perennial themes run through British overseas policy since 1945. This book examines them, drawing on new research by leading historians and scholars in the field.

Numerous allegations of abuse of power have been made against the domestic security intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom - police special branches and MI5. These include the improper surveillance of trade unionists and peace activists, campaigns of disinformation against elected politicians and, most serious of all, the summary shooting of people believed to be engaged in political violence. Although in recent years far-reaching inquiries have been conducted into similar agencies in other liberal democracies, and the end of the Cold War has brought dramatic change to security agencies in Eastern Europe, the UK agencies have remained aloof from anything more than marginal organisational change. Drawing on extensive foreign material and making use of the social science concepts of information, power and law, this book develops a framework for the comparative analysis of these agencies. This provides, first, a systematic discussion of what is known about the operations of security intelligence agencies in liberal democracies and, second, an agenda for research into the UK agencies, including: the ambiguous nature of their mandate regarding 'national security', 'subversion' and 'terrorism'; the ways in which the agencies penetrate society and what they do with the information they gather; internal organisational questions such as recruitment and culture; the extent to which the agencies are controlled by ministers; and how the agencies' activities might be overseen by outside political bodies such as parliamentary committees, and by citizens in general. Concluding that not enough is known about how these agencies operate in the UK, the book argues the need for a thorough inquiry toinvestigate the disturbing allegations that have been made, and to make proposals for a more democratic system of security intelligence.