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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research > Military intelligence
With a Foreword by Lord Hague of Richmond The Intelligence Corps is one of the smallest and most secretive elements of the British Army. It has existed in various guises since the early twentieth century, but it was only formally constituted in July 1940. In this book, Michael Ashcroft tells the astonishing stories of some of its most courageous and ingenious figures, who have operated all over the world from the First World War to the present day. Whether carrying out surveillance work on the street, monitoring and analysing communications, working on overseas stakeouts, receiving classified information from a well-placed contact or interrogating the enemy in the heat of war, a hugely diverse range of people have served in the Corps, often supplementing their individual professional skills with original thinking and leadership in the name of the Crown. This book pays tribute to them and shows why, in the words of the 1st Duke of Marlborough, 'No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence.'
In his bestselling Station X, Michael Smith brought us the astonishing true story of the breaking of the Enigma Code. In The Emperor's Codes, he continues the tale as he examines how Japan's codes were broken and explores the consequences for the Second World War. The Emperor's Codes tells the stories of John Tiltman, the eccentric British soldier turned codebreaker who made many of the early breaks into Japanese diplomatic and military codes; Eric Nave, the Australian sailor recruited to work for the British who pioneered breakthroughs in Japanese naval codes; and Hiroshi Oshima, the hard-drinking Japanese ambassador to Berlin whose candid reports to Tokyo of his conversations with Hitler and other high-ranking Nazis were a major source of intelligence in the war against Germany. Many of these revelations have been made possible only thanks to recently declassified British files, privileged access to Australian secret official histories and interviews with an unprecedented number of British, American and Australian codebreakers.
In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA and its partners had been engaging in warrantless mass surveillance, using the internet and cellphone data, and driven by fear of terrorism under the sign of security . In this compelling account, surveillance expert David Lyon guides the reader through Snowden s ongoing disclosures: the technological shifts involved, the steady rise of invisible monitoring of innocent citizens, the collusion of government agencies and for-profit companies and the implications for how we conceive of privacy in a democratic society infused by the lure of big data. Lyon discusses the distinct global reactions to Snowden and shows why some basic issues must be faced: how we frame surveillance, and the place of the human in a digital world. Surveillance after Snowden is crucial reading for anyone interested in politics, technology and society.
ORBIT (Observing Rapport Based Interpersonal Techniques) is an approach to interviewing high-value detainees, encompassing not only analysis and research into the methodology, but also a framework for training. ORBIT: The Science of Rapport-Based Interviewing for Law Enforcement, Security, and Military offers comprehensive treatment of ORBIT's unique perspective on human rapport and the role it plays in the interrogation of difficult subjects, including suspects, detainees, and high value targets. Alison and colleagues provide an overview of ORBIT, which was developed from analysis of nearly 2000 hours of recorded interrogations. They go on to define rapport, explaining how and why it works by reference to this corpus of data-by far the largest of its kind in the world. ORBIT reveals what this data shows: that rapport-based methods work, and that coercion, persuasion, and threats do not. Outlining the development of their own unique stance on rapport and its influences, the authors demonstrate, through real-life examples and careful analysis, why harsh methods must be rejected and why compassion and understanding work.
Published specially by After the Battle to coincide with the suspension of Allied occupation rights in Berlin in October 1990, this map was produced in 1944 by the War Office and lists the location and use of all important buildings in Berlin to be used in the occupation of the city. Every building associated with the Reich Government, NSDAP, police, fire service, Reichsbahn, U-Bahn, hospitals, telephone exchanges, embassies, prisons, etc., is numbered and referenced to an index printed on the reverse of the map. This sheet covers the central area at 1:12500.
From the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning history The Dead Hand comes the riveting story of a spy who cracked open the Soviet military research establishment and a penetrating portrait of the CIA's Moscow station, an outpost of daring espionage in the last years of the Cold War While driving out of the American embassy in Moscow on the evening of February 16, 1978, the chief of the CIA's Moscow station heard a knock on his car window. A man on the curb handed him an envelope whose contents stunned U.S. intelligence: details of top-secret Soviet research and developments in military technology that were totally unknown to the United States. In the years that followed, the man, Adolf Tolkachev, an engineer in a Soviet military design bureau, used his high-level access to hand over tens of thousands of pages of technical secrets. His revelations allowed America to reshape its weapons systems to defeat Soviet radar on the ground and in the air, giving the United States near total superiority in the skies over Europe. One of the most valuable spies to work for the United States in the four decades of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, Tolkachev took enormous personal risks--but so did the Americans. The CIA had long struggled to recruit and run agents in Moscow, and Tolkachev was a singular breakthrough. Using spy cameras and secret codes as well as face-to-face meetings in parks and on street corners, Tolkachev and his handlers succeeded for years in eluding the feared KGB in its own backyard, until the day came when a shocking betrayal put them all at risk. Drawing on previously secret documents obtained from the CIA and on interviews with participants, David Hoffman has created an unprecedented and poignant portrait of Tolkachev, a man motivated by the depredations of the Soviet state to master the craft of spying against his own country. Stirring, unpredictable, and at times unbearably tense, The Billion Dollar Spy is a brilliant feat of reporting that unfolds like an espionage thriller.
Large data sets arriving at every increasing speeds require a new set of efficient data analysis techniques. Data analytics are becoming an essential component for every organization and technologies such as health care, financial trading, Internet of Things, Smart Cities or Cyber Physical Systems. However, these diverse application domains give rise to new research challenges. In this context, the book provides a broad picture on the concepts, techniques, applications, and open research directions in this area. In addition, it serves as a single source of reference for acquiring the knowledge on emerging Big Data Analytics technologies.
Irish neutrality during the Second World War presented Britain with
significant challenges to its security. Exploring how British
agencies identified and addressed these problems, this book reveals
how Britain simultaneously planned sabotage in and spied on
Ireland, and at times sought to damage the neutral state's
reputation internationally through black propaganda operations. It
analyses the extent of British knowledge of Axis and other
diplomatic missions in Ireland, and shows the crucial role of
diplomatic code-breaking in shaping British policy. The book also
underlines just how much Ireland both interested and irritated
Churchill throughout the war.
This first history of British Imperial interventions in widely distant geographic areas in north and south Russia at the end of World War I describes the invention of a new kind of intelligence system. This careful study based on an extensive use of documents provides interesting lessons for dealing with Russia today at a similar turning point. Historians, Russian specialists, intelligence professionals, and others will find this a fascinating account of dirty deeds and a helpful analysis of intelligence planning and coordination. This history shows how intelligence was used as a substitute for open diplomacy and how the interventions were turned to economic advantage for both Britain and Canada. The system of intelligence is analyzed in terms of planning, tactics, communications, trade, transport, field operations and networks and coordination. Each of the interventions in the north and south are described in detail. Notes and a lengthy bibliography also offer important evidence of the remarkable events that took place.
This book provides the first ever intelligence history of Iraq from 1941 to 1945, and is the third and final volume of a trilogy on regional intelligence and counterintelligence operations that includes Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2014), and Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2015). This account of covert operations in Iraq during the Second World War is based on archival documents, diaries, and memoirs, interspersed with descriptions of all kinds of clandestine activity, and contextualized with analysis showing the significance of what happened regionally in terms of the greater war. After outlining the circumstances of the rise and fall of the fascist Gaylani regime, Adrian O'Sullivan examines the activities of the Allied secret services (CICI, SOE, SIS, and OSS) in Iraq, and the Axis initiatives planned or mounted against them. O'Sullivan emphasizes the social nature of human intelligence work and introduces the reader to a number of interesting, talented personalities who performed secret roles in Iraq, including the distinguished author Dame Freya Stark.
Incels. Anti Vaxxers. Conspiracy theorists. Neo-Nazis. Once, these groups all belonged on the fringes of the political spectrum. Today, accelerated by a pandemic, global conflict and rapid technological change, their ideas are becoming more widespread: QAnon proponents run for U.S. Congress, neo-fascists win elections in Europe, and celebrity influencers like Kanye West spread dangerous myths to millions. Going Mainstream asks the question: What is happening here? Going undercover online and in person, UK counter-extremism expert Julia Ebner reveals how, united by a shared sense of grievance and scepticism about institutions, radicalised individuals are influencing the mainstream as never before. Hidden from public scrutiny, they leverage social media to create alternative information ecosystems and build sophisticated networks funded by dark money. Ebner's candid conversations with extremists offer a nuanced and gripping insight into why people have turned to the fringes. She explores why outlandish ideas have taken hold and disinformation is spreading faster than ever. And she speaks to the activists and educators who are fighting to turn the tide. Going Mainstream is a dispatch from the darkest front of the culture wars, and a vital wake-up call.
How did German intelligence agents in the First World War use dead fish to pass on vital information to their operatives? What did an advertisement for a dog in The Times have to do with the movement of British troops into Egypt? And why did British personnel become suspicious about the trousers hanging on a Belgian woman's washing line? During the First World War, spymasters and their networks of secret agents developed many ingenious - and occasionally hilarious - methods of communication. Puffs of smoke from a chimney, stacks of bread in a bakery window, even knitted woollen jumpers were all used to convey secret messages decipherable only by well-trained eyes. Melanie King retells the astonishing story of these and many other tricks of the espionage trade, now long forgotten, through the memoirs of eight spies. Among them are British intelligence officers working undercover in France and Germany, including a former officer from the Metropolitan Police who once hunted Jack the Ripper. There is also the German Secret Service officer, codenamed Agricola, who spied on the Eastern Front, an American newspaperman and an Austrian agent who disguised himself as everything from a Jewish pedlar to a Russian officer. Drawing on the words of many of the spies themselves, Secrets in a Dead Fish is a fascinating compendium of clever and original ruses that casts new light into the murky world of espionage during the First World War.
Khe Sanh remains to this day, an extremely controversial and emotional aspect of the war in Vietnam. The U.S. Armed Forces fought to defend Khe Sanh in early 1968 and then abandoned the base after a 77-day siege by the North Vietnamese. This book contains fromerly Top Secret messages to President Lyndon Johnson from National Security Advisor W.W. "Walt" Rostow, Gen. William Westmoreland and many others. The siege and loss of Khe Sanh is the tragedy of the war in Vietnam in microcosm.
Despite publicity given to the successes of British and American codebreakers during the Second World War, the study of signals intelligence is still complicated by governmental secrecy over even the most elderly peacetime sigint. This book, first published in 1986, lifts the veil on some of these historical secrets. Christopher Andrew and Keith Neilson cast new light on how Tsarist codebreakers penetrated British code and cypher systems. John Chapman's study of German military codebreaking represents a major advance in our understanding of cryptanalysis during the Weimar Republic. The history of the Government Code and Cypher School - forerunner of today's GCHQ - by its operational head, the late A.G. Denniston, provides both a general assessment of the achievements of British cryptanalysis between the wars and a tantalising glimpse of what historians may one day find in GCHQ's forbidden archives. The distinguished cryptanalyst of Bletchley Park, the late Gordon Welchman, describes in detail how the Ultra programme defeated the German Enigma machine, while another Bletchley Park cryptographer, Christopher Morris, reminds us in his account of the valuable work on hand cyphers that wartime sigint consisted of much more than Ultra. Roger Austin's study of surveillance under the Vichy regime shows the continuing importance of older and simpler methods of message interception such as letter-opening. Taken together, the articles establish sigint as an essential field of study for both the modern historian and the political scientist.
The history of China is a history of warfare. Wars have caused dynasties to collapse, fractured the thin facade of national unity, and brought decades of alien occupation. But throughout Chinese history, its warfare has been guided by principles different from those that governed Europe. Chinese strategists followed the concept, first articulated by Sun-tzu in "The Art of War," of "qi (ch'i)," or unorthodox, warfare. The concept of "qi" involves creating tactical imbalances in order to achieve victory against even vastly superior forces. Ralph D. Sawyer, translator of "The Art of War" and one of America's preeminent experts on Chinese military tactics, here offers a comprehensive guide to the ancient practice of unorthodox warfare. He describes, among many other tactics, how Chinese generals have used false rumors to exploit opposing generals' distrust of their subordinates; dressed thousands of women as soldiers to create the illusion of an elite attack force; and sent word of a false surrender to lure enemy troops away from a vital escape route. "The Tao of Deception" is the book that military tacticians and military historians will turn to as the definitive guide to a new, yet ancient, way of thinking about strategy.
You know about MI5. You know about MI6.
This book examines India's foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India 'thinks about' and 'does' intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India's foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.
Familiar to anyone versed in the history of World War II or
interested in the study of modern intelligence work, Bletchley Park
was arguably the most successful intelligence operation in world
history, the top secret workplace of the remarkable people who
cracked Germany's vaunted Enigma Code. Almost to the end of the
war, the Germans had firm faith in the Enigma ciphering machine,
but in fact the codebreakers were deciphering nearly 4,000 German
transmissions daily by 1942, reaping a wealth of information on
such important matters as the effort to resupply Rommel's army in
North Africa and the effect of Allied attempts to mislead the
Germans about the location of D-Day landings. Indeed, Winston
Churchill hailed the work of Bletchley Park as the "secret weapon"
that won the war.
This edited volume argues that producers of analysis need to shift from producing static, narrative products to much more dynamic, digitally-based platforms in order to remain competitive and relevant.
This book examines the United States neoconservative movement, arguing that its support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was rooted in an intelligence theory shaped by the policy struggles of the Cold War. The origins of neoconservative engagement with intelligence theory are traced to a tradition of labour anti-communism that emerged in the early 20th century and subsequently provided the Central Intelligence Agency with key allies in the state-private networks of the Cold War era. Reflecting on the break-up of Cold War liberalism and the challenge to state-private networks in the 1970s, the book maps the neoconservative response that influenced developments in United States intelligence policy, counterintelligence and covert action. With the labour roots of neoconservatism widely acknowledged but rarely systematically pursued, this new approach deploys the neoconservative literature of intelligence as evidence of a tradition rooted in the labour anti-communist self-image as allies rather than agents of the American state. This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, Cold War history, United States foreign policy and international relations.
This book sheds new light on the origins and nature of modern military thinking. The ideas of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) - which remain at the heart of strategic analysis today - have hitherto been examined largely in isolation from their cultural and philosophical roots in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Azar Gat now demonstrates the extent to which culture affects military theory. Dr Gat relates a series of military thinkers to their cultural background, demonstrating how the major currents of modern military thought have evolved from the world-view of the Enlightenment on the one hand and Romanticism on the other. Tracing the development of Clausewitz's ideas, he provides a provocative critique of Clausewitz's classic work, On War. In the process, he offers an illuminating insight into a great period of European culture and into warfare in the age of Napoleon.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has elaborated its own philosophy of security. Driven by emergencies and increasing risks, both in the region and globally, Emirati authorities have developed a sense of anticipation as well as an agility to react promptly to new threats through the ability to assess the risks in any given situation. War and the avatars of conflict are a constant reality in the Middle East. Transnational threats, including the regional context, the war in Yemen, insecurity in the Levant and tensions with Iran affect the overall stability of the Peninsula and consequently that of the UAE. Owing to the inclusion of the UAE in the networks of globalization, non-traditional security issues are not relegated to the background. Issues such as COVID-19, immigration, cybersecurity and human trafficking need to be addressed domestically as well as globally. This volume offers a comprehensive and multifaceted examination of the traditional and non-traditional security measures present in the UAE that allow the country to remain politically stable in an otherwise volatile region, and aims to offer a comprehensive overview of all forms of security in the UAE.
'Soft' Counterinsurgency reviews the promise and actual achievement of Human Terrain Teams, the small groups of social scientists that were eventually embedded in every combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book, based on interviews with both HTT personnel and their military commanders, examines the military's need for sociocultural information, the ethical issues surrounding research carried out in combat zones, and the tensions between military and social science organizational cultures. The account provides a close, detailed account of HTT activities, a critical reflection on the possibilities of creating a 'softer, ' less violent counterinsurgency, and the difficulty of attempting to make war more 'intelligent' and discriminating.
Israel's flawed intelligence assessment in October 1973 has been studied intensively and been the subject of much public and professional debate. This book adds a unique dimension to previously disclosed material, as its author served as head of the Research Branch of Israeli Military Intelligence on the eve of and during the Yom Kippur War and as such was responsible for the national intelligence assessment at the time. Drawing on his personal records, and on interviews and extensive research conducted in the intervening decades, Aryeh Shalev examines the preconceptions and common beliefs that prevailed among Israeli intelligence officials and ultimately contributed to their flawed assessment: the excessive self-confidence in Israel's prowess, particularly in the aftermath of the Six Day War; the confidence that any surprise attack could be repelled with the regular army until the reserves were mobilised; the accepted profile of Sadat as a weak leader with limited powers and initiative; and the belief in Israel's correct understanding of Egyptian and Syrian operational plans . . . Beyond explaining where Israeli intelligence erred, the book probes expectations of military intelligence in general and the relationship between military and political assessments. It considers what kind of assessment an intelligence branch is capable of producing with a great degree of certainty, and conversely, what kind of assessment it should not be asked to produce. Based on the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War, this book also reviews possible organisational changes and methodological improvements to guard as much as possible against surprise attacks in the future, relevant not only to Israel's circumstances but to all countries with enemies capable of launching an attack. Published in association with the Institute for National Strategic Studies. |
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