In the aftermath of the Edward Snowden leaks, the Obama administration has been hard pressed to yield to greater transparency and openness to constructive change. This book provides a catalyst toward greater transparency, increased public awareness of the urgent need for constructive change, and the insight into what such change would require.

In 1974, the British government admitted that its WWII secret intelligence organization had read Germany's ciphers on a massive scale. The intelligence from these decrypts influenced the Atlantic, the Eastern Front and Normandy. Why did the Germans never realize the Allies had so thoroughly penetrated their communications? As German intelligence experts conducted numerous internal investigations that all certified their ciphers' security, the Allies continued to break more ciphers and plugged their own communication leaks. How were the Allies able to so thoroughly exploit Germany's secret messages? How did they keep their tremendous success a secret? What flaws in Germany's organization allowed this counterintelligence failure and how can today's organizations learn to avoid similar disasters? This book, the first comparative study of WWII SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), analyzes the characteristics that allowed the Allies SIGINT success and that fostered the German blindness to Enigma's compromise.

This book offers a wide array of legal approaches to regulating the private military corporation, including international, corporate, constitutional and administrative law. It covers a new important topic - private military corporations. It is the first examination focused on regulatory problems and potential of private military corporations. It places the private military corporation in a contemporary global context.Private military organizations are a new and important feature of the international landscape. They offer control of potential massive violence to the highest bidder with very limited accountability. This book offers critical insights into both the phenomenon and the challenges of and potential for regulation.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufkl?rung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence.

The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA's underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion's share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA's East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany.

This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general.

Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark's Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut M?ller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

During the last two decades, the infrastructure of the U.S. economy has undergone a fundamental set of changes. It has steadily increased its reliance on its service sector and high-technology economy. The U.S. has come to depend on computers, electronic data storage and transfers, and highly integrated communications networks. The result is the rapid development of a new form of critical infrastructure--and one that is exceedingly vulnerable to a new family of threats, loosely grouped together as information warfare. This detailed volume examines these threats and the evolving U.S. policy response. After examining the dangers posed by information warfare and efforts at threat assessment, Cordesman considers the growing policy response on the part of various federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. The changing nature of the threats is leading these actors to reassess the role they must play in critical infrastructure protection. Government at all levels, industry, and even friendly and neutral foreign governments are learning that an effective response requires coordination in deterrence, defense, and counterattack.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization's activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.

This is the first book to describe British wartime success in breaking Japanese codes of dazzling variety and great complexity which contributed to the victory in Burma three months before Hiroshima. Written for the general reader, this first-hand account describes the difficulty of decoding one of the most complex languages in the world in some of the most difficult conditions. The book was published in 1989 to avoid proposed legislation which would prohibit those in the security services from publishing secret information.

This volume covers European intelligence in the first half of the 20th century. It reveals that the Imperial German Government had a remarkable source at the Russian Embassy in London prior to the outbreak of the World War I; describes in detail Swedish-German cryptanalytical co-operation during the Great War in intercepting and solving Russian diplomatic telegram traffic; adds an intriguing new twist to the murder of the Tsar and his family; provides an authoritative account of Swedish cryptanalytical success against German and Soviet traffic during the World War II; and includes an anecdote suggesting that Allied security surrounding Overlord may have in fact been breached, while at the same time offering a reason as to why this leak led nowhere.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

This book examines how the war crime legacy resulting from the Yugoslav war of the 1990s on political and military transformation in Serbia was an impediment to security reform, democratization and the achievement of Western standards in the Belgrade armed forces.Using original empirical research, it traces the processes of restructuring, civilianisation, legal framework and democratic control and security policy communities, in relation to reforming the Serbian military. Crucially, the book focuses on the war crimes legacy from the 1990s, not as a matter of international conditionality, but as a key factor obstructing successful reform. This book, for the first time, examines the networks linked to security, intelligence and military agencies that protected war crimes suspects, such as General Ratko Mladic, delaying democratic control of the armed forces. Only when that network was broken, could the process of democratization begin to be complete.This unique book linking war crimes and security sector reform will appeal to scholars working on Serbia/former Yugoslavia, law and conflict, security and development, civil-military relations and Central and Eastern European politics.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.

Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.

Published specially by After the Battle to coincide with the suspension of Allied occupation rights in Berlin in October 1990, this map was produced in 1944 by the War Office and lists the location and use of all important buildings in Berlin to be used in the occupation of the city. Every building associated with the Reich Government, NSDAP, police, fire service, Reichsbahn, U-Bahn, hospitals, telephone exchanges, embassies, prisons, etc., is numbered and referenced to an index printed on the reverse of the map. This sheet covers the central area at 1:12500.