Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the most important CIA spymaster in history, singlehandedly led America's intelligence service from the age of Mata Hari into the space age. Under his guidance the U-2 spy-plane, the SR-71 "Blackbird," and the Corona spy satellite were developed, and the agency rose to the pinnacle of its power. Bissell was also, however, the architect of the infamous Bay of Pigs operation that failed to overthrow Castro in 1961 and led to the decline of the CIA. In this compelling memoir, Bissell gives us an insider's view of the personalities, policies, and historical forces surrounding these and other covert operations and the lessons learned during those times of conflict. Bissell begins by describing his early years as a member of America's unofficial aristocracy. Born in a house that his father bought from Samuel Clemens, he was educated at Groton and Yale and befriended by Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh, among others. Bissell recounts how he became acting head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the agency in charge of the Marshall Plan after World War II, and helped to create the European Payments Union. Bissell was brought into the CIA in 1954, where he initiated a revolution in intelligence-gathering techniques. He reveals the details of these developments, as well as of the unique CIA-Lockheed partnership he pioneered, his participation in the CIA-sponsored coup to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala, and his involvement in crises in Laos and the Congo. Bissell's memoir sheds light not only on pivotal points of American foreign policy but also on America's evolution from isolationist to interventionist superpower.

Spies and Saboteurs is the story of the origins of the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' in human intelligence collection and special operations, which took place amidst the global conflagration that was the Second World War. It is the story of William 'Wild Bill' Donovan - the father of America's Central Intelligence Agency - and of his relationship with legendary British spymasters like William Stephenson, code named 'Intrepid', Stewart Menzies ('C'), chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Admiral John Godfrey, the powerful and enigmatic director of Naval Intelligence, and General Colin Gubbins, Britain's master saboteur. Relying almost exclusively upon recently declassified OSS and British intelligence documents and survivor interviews, it examines the transatlantic association in espionage and sabotage, guerrilla warfare and disinformation. It explores the evolution of covert relations from a 'tutorial' arrangement with the U.S. as pupil, to an unequal then full partnership, and ultimately to competition and rivalry in the prosecution of the clandestine war.

Among the greatest developments in conventional war since 1914 has been the rise of air/land power the interaction between air forces and armies in military operations. This book examines the forging of an air support system that was used with success for the remainder of the war, the principles of which have applied ever since.

Interdoc was established in 1963 by Western intelligence services as a multinational effort to coordinate an anti-communist offensive. Drawing on exclusive sources and the memories of its participants, this book charts Interdoc's campaign, the people and ideas that lay behind it and the rise and fall of this remarkable network during the Cold War.

The Very Best Men tells the story of the four men who ran covert operations for the CIA from World War II to Vietnam. Frank Wisner was a wealthy southern gentleman who arrived in Washington via Wall Street and whose wife ran the most active salon in Georgetown. He was the creator of the Office of Policy Coordination, the CIA's covert action wing. Wisner helped foment the failed revolution in Hungary in 1956. Wisner had a breakdown, and committed suicide in 1965. Richard Bissell took over the OPC after Wisner's breakdown, and presided over the Agency's wildest days. He ordered the assassination of several foreign leaders and organised a series of attempted coups. When John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, Bissell introduced himself to the new president as 'your basic man-eating shark'. Five months later Bissell was forced to resign over the Bay of Pigs. Tracy Barnes served under Wisner and Bissell, and oversaw the Bay of Pigs operation. With Bissell he hired the mafia to kill Castro. He was never at a loss for ideas. Unfortunately, he had trouble telling the good ones from the bad. He was quietly dismissed from the Agency in 1966. Desmond Fitzgerald ran the secret wars in Laos and Tibet. Later, he organised assassination plots against Castro. He was also responsible for covering them up, fearing that the CIA would be linked to Kennedy's assassination. Drawing on extensive interviews with former operatives, Thomas has written a highly readable narrative that brings to life a crucial period of American history. About the Author Evan Thomas is assistant managing editor of Newsweek. He has written more than a hundred cover stories on national and international news. He has won two National Magazine Awards and he has taught writing at Harvard and Princeton. He has written seven books, one of which, John Paul Jones, was a New York Times bestseller. He is a fellow of the Society of American Historians. He lives in Washington DC.

This book offers a wide array of legal approaches to regulating the private military corporation, including international, corporate, constitutional and administrative law. It covers a new important topic - private military corporations. It is the first examination focused on regulatory problems and potential of private military corporations. It places the private military corporation in a contemporary global context.Private military organizations are a new and important feature of the international landscape. They offer control of potential massive violence to the highest bidder with very limited accountability. This book offers critical insights into both the phenomenon and the challenges of and potential for regulation.

This book examines the theoretical and conceptual foundation of effective modern intelligence collection-the strategies required to support intelligence analysis of the modern, complex operational environments of today's military conflicts or competitive civilian situations such as business. Just as the old rules of conventional warfare and intelligence analysis do not apply fully in the 21st-century environment, neither does the traditional methodology of collecting intelligence on these elusive, adapting foes operating as complex adaptive systems (CAS)-adversaries that excel in today's complex contexts. Intelligence Collection: How To Plan and Execute Intelligence Collection In Complex Environments proposes substantive improvements in the way the U.S. national security system collects intelligence and supports intelligence analysis. The work draws on the groundbreaking work of a diverge group of theorists ranging from Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to M. Mitchell Waldrop, General David Petraeus, and Orson Scott Card, communicating a unifying theory and ontology of thought for how America's intelligence collection professionals must learn to collect data as our country faces elusive, determined, and smart adversaries in nonlinear, dynamic environments. The new ideas presented will help the nation's intelligence collection specialists to amass a formidable, cumulative intelligence power, regardless of the level of war or the type of operational environment.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufkl?rung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence.

The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA's underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion's share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA's East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany.

This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general.

Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark's Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut M?ller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

During the last two decades, the infrastructure of the U.S. economy has undergone a fundamental set of changes. It has steadily increased its reliance on its service sector and high-technology economy. The U.S. has come to depend on computers, electronic data storage and transfers, and highly integrated communications networks. The result is the rapid development of a new form of critical infrastructure--and one that is exceedingly vulnerable to a new family of threats, loosely grouped together as information warfare. This detailed volume examines these threats and the evolving U.S. policy response. After examining the dangers posed by information warfare and efforts at threat assessment, Cordesman considers the growing policy response on the part of various federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. The changing nature of the threats is leading these actors to reassess the role they must play in critical infrastructure protection. Government at all levels, industry, and even friendly and neutral foreign governments are learning that an effective response requires coordination in deterrence, defense, and counterattack.

This book, first published in 1985, is an in-depth analysis of the Luftwaffe in the Second World War, using previously untapped German archives and newly-released 'Ultra' intelligence records. It looks at the Luftwaffe within the context of the overall political decision-making process within the Third Reich. It is especially valuable for its careful study of industrial production and pilot losses in the conduct of operations.

The most comprehensive history of Canadian military intelligence and its influence on key military operations Canadian intelligence has become increasingly central to the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Canadian Military Intelligence: Operations and Evolution from the October Crisis to the War in Afghanistan is the first comprehensive history that examines the impact of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence on the Canadian military. Drawing upon a wide range of original documents and interviews with participants in specific operations, author David A. Charters provides an inside perspective on the development of military intelligence since the Second World War. He shows how intelligence influenced key military operations, from domestic internal security to peacekeeping efforts to high-intensity air campaigns-including the October Crisis of 1970, the Oka Crisis, the Gulf War, peacekeeping and enforcement operations in the Balkans, and the war in Afghanistan. He describes how decades of experience, innovation, and increasingly close cooperation with its Five Eyes and NATO allies allowed Canada's military intelligence to punch above its weight. Its tactical effectiveness and ability to overcome challenges reshaped the outlook of military commanders, and intelligence emerged from the margins to become a central feature of military and defense operations. Canadian Military Intelligence offers lessons from the past and critical implications for future intelligence support with the creation of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command. This book will be essential to both intelligence history and military history readers and collections.

This is the first book to describe British wartime success in breaking Japanese codes of dazzling variety and great complexity which contributed to the victory in Burma three months before Hiroshima. Written for the general reader, this first-hand account describes the difficulty of decoding one of the most complex languages in the world in some of the most difficult conditions. The book was published in 1989 to avoid proposed legislation which would prohibit those in the security services from publishing secret information.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

This is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.