The United States and Mexico share a history shaped in the 19th century by numerous US forces interventions into Mexican territory and US expropriation of considerable swaths of Mexican territory. However, in spite of structural impediments and a history of resentment by Mexico of US intervention into its affairs and territory, the levels of cooperation and understanding slowly began to improve following a series of international and domestic factors. The decline of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall at a global level, coupled with major political and economic challenges and reforms within Mexico are a starting point from which to assess the evolution of the bilateral defense relationship between the United States and Mexico. The American and Mexican militaries have evolved differently over the past 100 years and they each have very different responsibilities, mission sets, orientations, and capabilities. Yet in recent years, the Mexican armed forces have cooperated more closely with their US counterparts. This may be due to explicit direction coming from senior levels of the Mexican government and to operational requirements of the armed forces themselves as they seek to increase their capability and capacity to confront the growing levels in drug trafficking related violence. Today, both countries are dealing with the effects of this increased violence and insecurity in Mexico. Relying primarily on one-on-one interviews with senior practitioners and analysts on both sides of the border, the text examines the evolution of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral defense relationship to better understand how and why this unique relationship has improved, in fits and starts, over the past 25 years. It offers a new understanding of how defense policymakers from each respective country perceive the other, as well as how the lack of trust and understanding between the two neighbors has delayed greater cooperation.

Intelligence agencies spend huge sums of money to collect and analyze vast quantities of national security data for their political leaders. How well is this intelligence analyzed, how often is it acted on by policymakers, and does it have a positive or negative effect on decision making? Drawing on declassified documents, interviews with intelligence veterans and policymakers, and other sources, The Image of the Enemy breaks new ground as it examines how seven countries analyzed and used intelligence to shape their understanding of their main adversary. The cases in the book include the Soviet Union's analysis of the United States (and vice versa), East Germany's analysis of West Germany (and vice versa), British intelligence in the early years of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Israeli intelligence about the Palestinians, Pakistani intelligence on India, and US intelligence about Islamist terrorists. These rivalries provide rich case studies for scholars and offer today's analysts and policymakers the opportunity to closely evaluate past successes and failures in intelligence analysis and the best ways to give information support to policymakers. Using these lessons from the past, they can move forward to improve analysis of current adversaries and future threats.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

This is a study of the British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's, need for information on the enemy, and traces the subsequent development of the system.

This book is a fascinating new examination of one of the most feared and efficient secret services the world has ever known, the Stasi.

The East German Stasi was a jewel among the communist secret services, the most trusted by its Russian mother organization the KGB, and even more efficient. In its attempt at total coverage of civil society, the Ministry for State Security came close to realizing the totalitarian ideal of a political police force. Based on research in archival files unlocked just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and available to few German and Western readers, this volume details the Communist Party s attempt to control all aspects of East German civil society, and sets out what is known of the regime s support for international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.

STASI will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, German politics and international relations."

Codenames were a vital feature of World War II, serving as mental shorthand for those in the know, and obscuring the issues for those who were not. Codenames were used from the highest level, in the planning of grand strategic moves affecting the conduct of the whole war, to the lowest command divisions, in the conduct of small-scale tactical operations. This encyclopedia, first published in 1986, removes the mystery surrounding many of the important code names from the era. With around 3,000 entries drawn from all sides - the U.K., U.S.A., Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan - Christopher Chant's work provides a uniquely comprehensive and full overview of major operations, names and code words. Thorough and exciting, this key reference reissue is an exceptionally valuable resource for military historians, enthusiasts and general readers with an interest in World War II.

From the 1930s to the 1950s a large number of left-wing men and women in the USA, Britain, Europe, Australia and Canada were recruited to the Soviet intelligence services. They were amateurs and the reason for their success is intriguing. Using Soviet archives, this work explores these successes.

This volume discusses the challenges the future holds for different aspects of the intelligence process and for organisations working in the field.

The main focus of Western intelligence services is no longer on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead, at present, there is a plethora of threats and problems that deserve attention. Some of these problems are short-term and potentially acute, such as terrorism. Others, such as the exhaustion of natural resources, are longer-term and by nature often more difficult to foresee in their implications.

This book analyses the different activities that make up the intelligence process, or the 'intelligence cycle', with a focus on changes brought about by external developments in the international arena, such as technology and security threats. Drawing together a range of key thinkers in the field, "The Future of Intelligence" examines possible scenarios for future developments, including estimations about their plausibility, and the possible consequences for the functioning of intelligence and security services.

This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

Based on OSS records only recently released to US National Archives, and on evidence from British archival sources, this is a thoroughly researched study of the Office of Strategic Services in London. The OSS was a critical liaison and operational outpost for American intelligence during World War II. Dr MacPherson puts the activities of the OSS into the larger context of the Anglo-American relationship and the various aspects of intelligence theory, while examining how a modern American intelligence capability evolved.

Moran concentrates on three aims: to provide an overview of British military intelligence operations in the last 30 years which concentrates on operational not strategic intelligence; to examine the debates over ethics and effectiveness that have followed these operations; and to examine the increasing attempts to place military intelligence under the same type of regulation that police and security intelligence operations have been subject to. As such, he provides a timely overview of intelligence effectiveness and ethics in this area of heightened interest and relevance in terms of the recent UK deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the light of the UK Strategic Defence Review. This book is not a philosophical discussion of military ethics; nor is it a study of operations alone. In the light of experiences from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan, it examines the debates over effectiveness which have surrounded British military intelligence activities whilst tying these debates closely to the ethical issues they raise. Each stage of operations is evaluated in context. Interest will cut across disciplines and as such this book will appeal to intelligence, counter-terrorism, military studies, politics, human rights and philosophy practitioners, scholars and students.

"Another Man's Shoes" is a gripping first-hand account of a Norwegian scientist's escape from German custody during the Second World War after his arrest for spying. Written just after the war, Sven Somme vividly describes his 200-mile trek across the mountains, pursued by German soldiers, in a bid to reach Sweden and freedom in 1944. Sixty years later, his daughter Ellie set out on foot with her sister to retrace their father's flight from Nazi-occupied Norway, meeting some of the people who helped him along the way. She recounts the emotional moment when a pair of her father's shoes, exchanged for mountain boots, were returned to her by one family who sheltered him along the way and pays special tribute to her uncle Iacob who was also arrested and later executed.

Health Security Intelligence introduces readers to the world of health security, to threats like COVID-19, and to the many other incarnations of global health security threats and their implications for intelligence and national security. Disease outbreaks like COVID-19 have not historically been considered a national security matter. While disease outbreaks among troops have always been a concern, it was the potential that arose in the first half of the twentieth century to systematically design biological weapons and to develop these at an industrial scale, that initially drew the attention of security, defence and intelligence communities to biology and medical science. This book charts the evolution of public health and biosecurity threats from those early days, tracing how perceptions of these threats have expanded from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, the unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, and the convergence of emerging technologies. This spectrum of threats has led to an expansion of the stakeholders, tools and sources involved in intelligence gathering and threat assessments. This edited volume is a landmark in efforts to develop a multidisciplinary, empirically informed, and policy-relevant approach to intelligence-academia engagement in global health security that serves both the intelligence community and scholars from a broad range of disciplines. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal, Intelligence and National Security.

In the aftermath of the Edward Snowden leaks, the Obama administration has been hard pressed to yield to greater transparency and openness to constructive change. This book provides a catalyst toward greater transparency, increased public awareness of the urgent need for constructive change, and the insight into what such change would require.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence. The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA's underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion's share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA's East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany. This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general. Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark's Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut Muller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

This book examines how international intelligence cooperation has come to prominence post-9/11 and introduces the main accountability, legal and human rights challenges that it poses. Since the end of the Cold War, the threats that intelligence services are tasked with confronting have become increasingly transnational in nature -- organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The growth of these threats has impelled intelligence services to cooperate with contemporaries in other states to meet these challenges. While cooperation between certain Western states in some areas of intelligence operations (such as signals intelligence) is longstanding, since 9/11 there has been an exponential increase in both their scope and scale. This edited volume explores not only the challenges to accountability presented by international intelligence cooperation but also possible solutions for strengthening accountability for activities that are likely to remain fundamental to the work of intelligence services. The book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, international law, global governance and IR in general.

This book on intelligence analysis written by intelligence expert Dr. Stephen Marrin argues that scholarship can play a valuable role in improving intelligence analysis. Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Compared to the more established academic disciplines of political science and international relations, intelligence studies scholarship is generally quite relevant to practice. Yet a substantial gap exists nonetheless. Even though there are many intelligence analysts, very few of them are aware of the various writings on intelligence analysis which could help them improve their own processes and products. If the gap between scholarship and practice were to be bridged, practitioners would be able to access and exploit the literature in order to acquire new ways to think about, frame, conceptualize, and improve the analytic process and the resulting product. This volume contributes to the broader discussion regarding mechanisms and methods for improving intelligence analysis processes and products. It synthesizes these articles into a coherent whole, linking them together through common themes, and emphasizes the broader vision of intelligence analysis in the introduction and conclusion chapters. The book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, US national security, US foreign policy, security studies and political science in general,as well as professional intelligence analysts and managers.

Israel's flawed intelligence assessment in October 1973 has been studied intensively and been the subject of much public and professional debate. This book adds a unique dimension to previously disclosed material, as its author served as head of the Research Branch of Israeli Military Intelligence on the eve of and during the Yom Kippur War and as such was responsible for the national intelligence assessment at the time. Drawing on his personal records, and on interviews and extensive research conducted in the intervening decades, Aryeh Shalev examines the preconceptions and common beliefs that prevailed among Israeli intelligence officials and ultimately contributed to their flawed assessment: the excessive self-confidence in Israel's prowess, particularly in the aftermath of the Six Day War; the confidence that any surprise attack could be repelled with the regular army until the reserves were mobilised; the accepted profile of Sadat as a weak leader with limited powers and initiative; and the belief in Israel's correct understanding of Egyptian and Syrian operational plans . . . Beyond explaining where Israeli intelligence erred, the book probes expectations of military intelligence in general and the relationship between military and political assessments. It considers what kind of assessment an intelligence branch is capable of producing with a great degree of certainty, and conversely, what kind of assessment it should not be asked to produce. Based on the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War, this book also reviews possible organisational changes and methodological improvements to guard as much as possible against surprise attacks in the future, relevant not only to Israel's circumstances but to all countries with enemies capable of launching an attack. Published in association with the Institute for National Strategic Studies.

Of German stock dating back to 1530 in Saxony, Eric George Ackermann GM was born on the Isle of Wight in 1919 and became a leading figure in the world of signals and electronic intelligence. As a Junior Scientific Officer at the Telecommunication Research Establishment, Boscombe Down, with an honorary commission in the Royal Air Force, he made numerous flights over occupied territory searching for, monitoring and destroying Germany's Wuerzburg, Knickebein and X Band radar systems. Much of his research was passed to the highest levels of wartime government, and was highly prized, ensuring that tactical plans could be executed that took full advantage of known, top secret German intelligence. A host of secret missions to assess the enemy's radar capabilities were carried out in North Africa, Gibraltar and Italy. This new and engaging biography explores the various highs and lows of his operational deployment at the vanguard of tactical intelligence operations in these exciting theaters of war. Winner of the George Medal for conspicuous gallantry, his efforts weren't confined to the offices of war. He saw conflict up close and personal, and was therefore aware of the urgency of his endeavours, and the extent to which his findings made a difference. The end of the war was a cause of great celebration, but it did not signal the end of Ackermann's role, far from it. He was to play a major part in the setting up and implementation of a string of listening stations built along the borders of Soviet Bloc countries which were destined to glean a wealth of invaluable post-war intelligence. Further work in aeronautics and satellite construction in the States followed, meaning the reach of Ackermann's influence could be allowed to stretch yet further. Yet despite the might and scale of his achievement, he has never before been the subject of a book-length study. The authors, Peter Jackson and David Haysom, have made every effort to rectify that in this new publication which is sure to appeal to aviation enthusiasts, as well as the more general reader curious to gain new insights into twentieth century intelligence practices and their often far-reaching consequences.

This book brings together leading counterterrorism experts, from academia and practice, to form an interdisciplinary assessment of the terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom and the European Union, focusing on how terrorists and terrorist organisations communicate in the digital age. Perspectives drawn from criminological, legalistic, and political sciences, allow the book to highlight the problems faced by the state and law enforcement agencies in monitoring, accessing, and gathering intelligence from the terrorist use of electronic communications, and how such powers are used proportionately and balanced with human rights law. The book will be a valuable resource for scholars and students of terrorism and security, policing and human rights. With contributions from the fields of both academia and practice, it will also be of interest to professionals and practitioners working in the areas of criminal law, human rights and terrorism.

Decision makers matching wits with an adversary want intelligence -- good, relevant information to help them win. Intelligence can gain these advantages through directed research and analysis, agile collection, and the timely use of guile and theft. Counterintelligence is the art and practice of defeating these endeavors. Its purpose is the same as that of positive intelligence -- to gain advantage -- but it does so by exploiting, disrupting, denying, or manipulating the intelligence activities of others. The tools of counterintelligence include security systems, deception, and disguise: vaults, mirrors, and masks.

In one indispensable volume, top practitioners and scholars in the field explain the importance of counterintelligence today and explore the causes of -- and practical solutions for -- U.S. counterintelligence weaknesses. These experts stress the importance of developing a sound strategic vision in order to improve U.S. counterintelligence and emphasize the challenges posed by technological change, confused purposes, political culture, and bureaucratic rigidity. "Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks" skillfully reveals that robust counterintelligence is vital to ensuring America's security.

Published in cooperation with the Center for Peace and Security Studies and the George T. Kalaris Memorial Fund, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

"Of all the books on Native American service in the U.S. armed forces, this is the best.... Readers will find the story of the Comanche Code Talkers compelling, humorous, thought-provoking, and inspiring." -- Tom Holm, author of Strong Hearts, Wounded Souls: Native American Veterans of the Vietnam War

Among the allied troops that came ashore in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944, were thirteen Comanches in the 4th Infantry Division, 4th Signal Company. Under German fire they laid communications lines and began sending messages in a form never before heard in Europe-- coded Comanche. For the rest of World War II, the Comanche Code Talkers played a vital role in transmitting orders and messages in a code that was never broken by the Germans.

This book tells the full story of the Comanche Code Talkers for the first time. Drawing on interviews with all surviving members of the unit, their original training officer, and fellow soldiers, as well as military records and news accounts, William C. Meadows follows the group from their recruitment and training to their active duty in World War II and on through their postwar lives up to the present. He also provides the first comparison of Native American code talking programs, comparing the Comanche Code Talkers with their better-known Navajo counterparts in the Pacific and with other Native Americans who used their languages, coded or not, for secret communication. Meadows sets this history in a larger discussion of the development of Native American code talking in World Wars I and II, identifying two distinct forms of Native American code talking, examining the attitudes of the American military toward Native American codetalkers, and assessing the complex cultural factors that led Comanche and other Native Americans to serve their country in this way.

This book describes and analyzes the history of the Mediterranean "Double-Cross System" of the Second World War, an intelligence operation run primarily by British officers which turned captured German spies into double agents. Through a complex system of coordination, they were utilized from 1941 to the end of the war in 1945 to secure Allied territory through security and counter-intelligence operations, and also to deceive the German military by passing false information about Allied military planning and operations. The primary questions addressed by the book are: how did the double-cross-system come into existence; what effects did it have on the intelligence war and the broader military conflict; and why did it have those effects? The book contains chapters assessing how the system came into being and how it was organized, and also chapters which analyze its performance in security and counter-intelligence operations, and in deception.

This edited volume brings together a range of essays by individuals who are centrally involved in the debate about the role and utility of theory in intelligence studies.

The volume includes both classic essays and new articles that critically analyse some key issues: strategic intelligence, the place of international relations theory, theories of a ~surprisea (TM) and a ~failurea (TM), organisational issues, and contributions from studies of policing and democratisation. It concludes with a chapter that summarises theoretical developments, and maps out an agenda for future research. This volume will be at the forefront of the theoretical debate and will become a key reference point for future research in the area.

This book will be of much interest for students of Intelligence Studies, Security Studies and Politics/International Relations in general.

Spies, secret messages, and military intelligence have fascinated readers for centuries but never more than today, when terrorists threaten America and society depends so heavily on communications. Much of what was known about communications intelligence came first from David Kahn's pathbreaking book, The Codebreakers. Kahn, considered the dean of intelligence historians, is also the author of Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II and Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943, among other books and articles. Kahn's latest book, How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code, provides insights into the dark realm of intelligence and code that will fascinate cryptologists, intelligence personnel, and the millions interested in military history, espionage, and global affairs. It opens with Kahn telling how he discovered the identity of the man who sold key information about Germany's Enigma machine during World War II that enabled Polish and then British codebreakers to read secret messages. Next Kahn addresses the question often asked about Pearl Harbor: since we were breaking Japan's codes, did President Roosevelt know that Japan was going to attack and let it happen to bring a reluctant nation into the war? Kahn looks into why Nazi Germany's totalitarian intelligence was so poor, offers a theory of intelligence, explicates what Clausewitz said about intelligence, tells-on the basis of an interview with a head of Soviet codebreaking-something about Soviet Comint in the Cold War, and reveals how the Allies suppressed the second greatest secret of WWII. Providing an inside look into the efforts to gather and exploit intelligence during the past century, this book presents powerful ideas that can help guide present and future intelligence efforts. Though stories of WWII spying and codebreaking may seem worlds apart from social media security, computer viruses, and Internet surveillance, this book offers timeless lessons that may help today's leaders avoid making the same mistakes that have helped bring at least one global power to its knees. The book includes a Foreword written by Bruce Schneier.

Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book * exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services; * analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism; * presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency; * incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina; * exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks; * critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President; * emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes. The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution