Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Codenames were a vital feature of World War II, serving as mental shorthand for those in the know, and obscuring the issues for those who were not. Codenames were used from the highest level, in the planning of grand strategic moves affecting the conduct of the whole war, to the lowest command divisions, in the conduct of small-scale tactical operations. This encyclopedia, first published in 1986, removes the mystery surrounding many of the important code names from the era. With around 3,000 entries drawn from all sides - the U.K., U.S.A., Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan - Christopher Chant's work provides a uniquely comprehensive and full overview of major operations, names and code words. Thorough and exciting, this key reference reissue is an exceptionally valuable resource for military historians, enthusiasts and general readers with an interest in World War II.

Based on OSS records only recently released to US National Archives, and on evidence from British archival sources, this is a thoroughly researched study of the Office of Strategic Services in London. The OSS was a critical liaison and operational outpost for American intelligence during World War II. Dr MacPherson puts the activities of the OSS into the larger context of the Anglo-American relationship and the various aspects of intelligence theory, while examining how a modern American intelligence capability evolved.

From the 1930s to the 1950s a large number of left-wing men and women in the USA, Britain, Europe, Australia and Canada were recruited to the Soviet intelligence services. They were amateurs and the reason for their success is intriguing. Using Soviet archives, this work explores these successes.

This book is a fascinating new examination of one of the most feared and efficient secret services the world has ever known, the Stasi.

The East German Stasi was a jewel among the communist secret services, the most trusted by its Russian mother organization the KGB, and even more efficient. In its attempt at total coverage of civil society, the Ministry for State Security came close to realizing the totalitarian ideal of a political police force. Based on research in archival files unlocked just after the fall of the Berlin Wall and available to few German and Western readers, this volume details the Communist Party s attempt to control all aspects of East German civil society, and sets out what is known of the regime s support for international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.

STASI will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, German politics and international relations."

This volume discusses the challenges the future holds for different aspects of the intelligence process and for organisations working in the field.

The main focus of Western intelligence services is no longer on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead, at present, there is a plethora of threats and problems that deserve attention. Some of these problems are short-term and potentially acute, such as terrorism. Others, such as the exhaustion of natural resources, are longer-term and by nature often more difficult to foresee in their implications.

This book analyses the different activities that make up the intelligence process, or the 'intelligence cycle', with a focus on changes brought about by external developments in the international arena, such as technology and security threats. Drawing together a range of key thinkers in the field, "The Future of Intelligence" examines possible scenarios for future developments, including estimations about their plausibility, and the possible consequences for the functioning of intelligence and security services.

This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

A CUNNING CHRONICLE OF THE 50 CODES THAT ALTERED THE COURSE OF HISTORY AND CHANGED THE WORLD From the bestselling author of Bletchley Park Brainteasers and The Scotland Yard Puzzle Book. There have been secret codes since before the Old Testament, and there were secret codes in the Old Testament too. Almost as soon as writing was invented, so too were the devious means to hide messages and keep them under the wraps of secrecy. In 50 Codes that Changed the World, Sinclair McKay explores these uncrackable codes, secret cyphers and hidden messages from across time to tell a new history of a secret world. From the temples of Ancient Greece to the court of Elizabeth I; from antique manuscripts whose codes might hold prophecies of doom to the modern realm of quantum mechanics, you will see how a few concealed words could help to win wars, spark revolutions and even change the faces of great nations. Here is the complete guide to the hidden world of codebreaking, with opportunities for you to see if you could have cracked some of the trickiest puzzles and lip-chewing codes ever created. ----------------------- Praise for Sinclair McKay's books: 'This book [The Secret Life of Bletchley Park] seems a remarkably faithful account of what we did, why it mattered, and how it all felt at the time by someone who couldn't possibly have been born then. - THE GUARDIAN [Bletchley Park Brainteasers] is outrageously difficult but utterly fascinating. - THE EXPRESS 'Sinclair McKay's account of this secret war of the airwaves in [Secret Listeners] is as painstakingly researched and fascinating as his bestselling The Secret Life Of Bletchley Park, and an essential companion to it.' - DAILY MAIL

Moran concentrates on three aims: to provide an overview of British military intelligence operations in the last 30 years which concentrates on operational not strategic intelligence; to examine the debates over ethics and effectiveness that have followed these operations; and to examine the increasing attempts to place military intelligence under the same type of regulation that police and security intelligence operations have been subject to. As such, he provides a timely overview of intelligence effectiveness and ethics in this area of heightened interest and relevance in terms of the recent UK deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the light of the UK Strategic Defence Review. This book is not a philosophical discussion of military ethics; nor is it a study of operations alone. In the light of experiences from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan, it examines the debates over effectiveness which have surrounded British military intelligence activities whilst tying these debates closely to the ethical issues they raise. Each stage of operations is evaluated in context. Interest will cut across disciplines and as such this book will appeal to intelligence, counter-terrorism, military studies, politics, human rights and philosophy practitioners, scholars and students.

In the aftermath of the Edward Snowden leaks, the Obama administration has been hard pressed to yield to greater transparency and openness to constructive change. This book provides a catalyst toward greater transparency, increased public awareness of the urgent need for constructive change, and the insight into what such change would require.

This edited book examines the East German foreign intelligence service (Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung, or HVA) as a historical problem, covering politics, scientific-technical and military intelligence and counterintelligence. The contributors broaden the conventional view of East German foreign intelligence as driven by the inter-German conflict to include its targeting of the United States, northern European and Scandinavian countries, highlighting areas that have previously received scant attention, like scientific-technical and military intelligence. The CIA's underestimation of the HVA was a major intelligence failure. As a result, East German intelligence served as a stealth weapon against the US, West German and NATO targets, acquiring the lion's share of critical Warsaw Pact intelligence gathered during the Cold War. This book explores how though all of the CIA's East German sources were double agents controlled by the Ministry of State Security, the CIA was still able to declare victory in the Cold War. Themes and topics that run through the volume include the espionage wars; the HVA's relationship with the Russian KGB; successes and failures of the BND (West German Federal Intelligence Service) in East Germany; the CIA and the HVA; the HVA in countries outside of West Germany; disinformation and the role and importance of intelligence gathering in East Germany. This book will be of much interest to students of East Germany, Intelligence Studies, Cold War History and German politics in general. Kristie Macrakis is Professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta. Thomas Wegener Friis is an Assistant Professor at the University of Southern Denmark's Centre for Cold War Studies. Helmut Muller-Enbergs is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of Southern Denmark and holds a tenured senior staff position at the German Federal Commission for the STASI Archives in Berlin.

This book on intelligence analysis written by intelligence expert Dr. Stephen Marrin argues that scholarship can play a valuable role in improving intelligence analysis. Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Compared to the more established academic disciplines of political science and international relations, intelligence studies scholarship is generally quite relevant to practice. Yet a substantial gap exists nonetheless. Even though there are many intelligence analysts, very few of them are aware of the various writings on intelligence analysis which could help them improve their own processes and products. If the gap between scholarship and practice were to be bridged, practitioners would be able to access and exploit the literature in order to acquire new ways to think about, frame, conceptualize, and improve the analytic process and the resulting product. This volume contributes to the broader discussion regarding mechanisms and methods for improving intelligence analysis processes and products. It synthesizes these articles into a coherent whole, linking them together through common themes, and emphasizes the broader vision of intelligence analysis in the introduction and conclusion chapters. The book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, US national security, US foreign policy, security studies and political science in general,as well as professional intelligence analysts and managers.

Health Security Intelligence introduces readers to the world of health security, to threats like COVID-19, and to the many other incarnations of global health security threats and their implications for intelligence and national security. Disease outbreaks like COVID-19 have not historically been considered a national security matter. While disease outbreaks among troops have always been a concern, it was the potential that arose in the first half of the twentieth century to systematically design biological weapons and to develop these at an industrial scale, that initially drew the attention of security, defence and intelligence communities to biology and medical science. This book charts the evolution of public health and biosecurity threats from those early days, tracing how perceptions of these threats have expanded from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, the unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, and the convergence of emerging technologies. This spectrum of threats has led to an expansion of the stakeholders, tools and sources involved in intelligence gathering and threat assessments. This edited volume is a landmark in efforts to develop a multidisciplinary, empirically informed, and policy-relevant approach to intelligence-academia engagement in global health security that serves both the intelligence community and scholars from a broad range of disciplines. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal, Intelligence and National Security.

This book examines how international intelligence cooperation has come to prominence post-9/11 and introduces the main accountability, legal and human rights challenges that it poses. Since the end of the Cold War, the threats that intelligence services are tasked with confronting have become increasingly transnational in nature -- organised crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The growth of these threats has impelled intelligence services to cooperate with contemporaries in other states to meet these challenges. While cooperation between certain Western states in some areas of intelligence operations (such as signals intelligence) is longstanding, since 9/11 there has been an exponential increase in both their scope and scale. This edited volume explores not only the challenges to accountability presented by international intelligence cooperation but also possible solutions for strengthening accountability for activities that are likely to remain fundamental to the work of intelligence services. The book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, international law, global governance and IR in general.

Decision makers matching wits with an adversary want intelligence -- good, relevant information to help them win. Intelligence can gain these advantages through directed research and analysis, agile collection, and the timely use of guile and theft. Counterintelligence is the art and practice of defeating these endeavors. Its purpose is the same as that of positive intelligence -- to gain advantage -- but it does so by exploiting, disrupting, denying, or manipulating the intelligence activities of others. The tools of counterintelligence include security systems, deception, and disguise: vaults, mirrors, and masks.

In one indispensable volume, top practitioners and scholars in the field explain the importance of counterintelligence today and explore the causes of -- and practical solutions for -- U.S. counterintelligence weaknesses. These experts stress the importance of developing a sound strategic vision in order to improve U.S. counterintelligence and emphasize the challenges posed by technological change, confused purposes, political culture, and bureaucratic rigidity. "Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks" skillfully reveals that robust counterintelligence is vital to ensuring America's security.

Published in cooperation with the Center for Peace and Security Studies and the George T. Kalaris Memorial Fund, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

This edited volume brings together a range of essays by individuals who are centrally involved in the debate about the role and utility of theory in intelligence studies.

The volume includes both classic essays and new articles that critically analyse some key issues: strategic intelligence, the place of international relations theory, theories of a ~surprisea (TM) and a ~failurea (TM), organisational issues, and contributions from studies of policing and democratisation. It concludes with a chapter that summarises theoretical developments, and maps out an agenda for future research. This volume will be at the forefront of the theoretical debate and will become a key reference point for future research in the area.

This book will be of much interest for students of Intelligence Studies, Security Studies and Politics/International Relations in general.

While much has been disclosed about the CIA's cloak-and-dagger activities during the Cold War, relatively little is known about the origins of this secret organization. David Rudgers, a twenty-two-year CIA veteran, has written the first complete account of its creation, revealing how the idea of a centralized intelligence developed within the government and debunking the myth that former OSS chief William J. Donovan was the prime mover behind the agency's founding.

"Creating the Secret State" locates the CIA's origins in government-wide efforts to reorganize national security during the transition from World War II to the Cold War. Rudgers maintains that the creation of the CIA was not merely the brainchild of "Wild Bill" Donovan. Rather, it was the culmination of years of negotiation among numerous policy makers such as James Forrestal and Dean Acheson, each with strong opinions regarding the agency's mission and methods. He shows that Congress, the Departments of State and Justice, the Joint Chiefs, and even the Budget Bureau all had a hand in the establishment of this "secret state" that operates nearly invisibly outside the American political process.

Based almost entirely on archival and other primary sources, Rudgers's book describes in detail how the CIA evolved from its original purpose-as a watchdog to guard against a "nuclear Pearl Harbor"-to the role of clandestine warriors countering Soviet subversion, eventually engaging in more forms of intelligence gathering and covert operations than any of its counterparts. It suggests how the agency became a different organization than it might have been without the Communist threat and also shows how it both overexaggerated the dangers of the Cold War and failed to predict its ending.

Rudgers has written an accurate and balanced account that brings America's undercover army in from the cold and out from under the cult of personality. An indispensable resource for future studies of the CIA, Creating the Secret State tells the inside story of why and how the agency was called into existence as it stimulates thinking about the future relevance of the CIA in a rapidly changing world.

Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book * exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services; * analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism; * presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency; * incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina; * exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks; * critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President; * emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes. The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution

Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, Second Edition covers the history of Chinese Intelligence from 400 B.C. to modern times. The dictionary section has over 400 cross-referenced entries on the agencies and agents, the operations and equipment, the tradecraft and jargon, and many of the countries involved.

The mysterious life and career of Desmond Morton (1891-1971), Intelligence officer and personal adviser to Winston Churchill during World War II, is exposed for the first time in this study based on full access to official records. After distinguished service as artillery officer and aide-de-camp to General Haig during World War I, Morton worked for the Secret Intelligence Service from 1919-1934, involved in fascinating operations against Bolshevik Russia and a resurgent Germany. The fortunes of SIS in the interwar years are described here in unprecedented detail. As Director of the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s, Morton's warnings of Germany's military and industrial preparations for war were widely read in Whitehall, though they failed to accelerate British rearmament as much as Morton-and Churchill-considered imperative. Morton had met Churchill on the Western Front in 1916 and supported him throughout the "wilderness years," moving to Downing Street as the Prime Minister's Intelligence adviser in May 1940. There he remained in a liaison role, with the intelligence Agencies and with Allied resistance authorities, until the end of the war, when he became a "troubleshooter" for the Treasury in a series of tricky international assignments. Throughout Morton's career, myth, rumor and deliberate obfuscation have created a misleading picture of his role and influence. The story of this "man of mystery" shines a light into many hitherto shadowy corners of British history in the first half of the 20th century. This book will be of great interest to scholars and informed lay readers with an interest in World War II, intelligence studies and the life of Winston Churchill.

This book brings together leading counterterrorism experts, from academia and practice, to form an interdisciplinary assessment of the terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom and the European Union, focusing on how terrorists and terrorist organisations communicate in the digital age. Perspectives drawn from criminological, legalistic, and political sciences, allow the book to highlight the problems faced by the state and law enforcement agencies in monitoring, accessing, and gathering intelligence from the terrorist use of electronic communications, and how such powers are used proportionately and balanced with human rights law. The book will be a valuable resource for scholars and students of terrorism and security, policing and human rights. With contributions from the fields of both academia and practice, it will also be of interest to professionals and practitioners working in the areas of criminal law, human rights and terrorism.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization's activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization's activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.

Spies, secret messages, and military intelligence have fascinated readers for centuries but never more than today, when terrorists threaten America and society depends so heavily on communications. Much of what was known about communications intelligence came first from David Kahn's pathbreaking book, The Codebreakers. Kahn, considered the dean of intelligence historians, is also the author of Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II and Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939-1943, among other books and articles. Kahn's latest book, How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code, provides insights into the dark realm of intelligence and code that will fascinate cryptologists, intelligence personnel, and the millions interested in military history, espionage, and global affairs. It opens with Kahn telling how he discovered the identity of the man who sold key information about Germany's Enigma machine during World War II that enabled Polish and then British codebreakers to read secret messages. Next Kahn addresses the question often asked about Pearl Harbor: since we were breaking Japan's codes, did President Roosevelt know that Japan was going to attack and let it happen to bring a reluctant nation into the war? Kahn looks into why Nazi Germany's totalitarian intelligence was so poor, offers a theory of intelligence, explicates what Clausewitz said about intelligence, tells-on the basis of an interview with a head of Soviet codebreaking-something about Soviet Comint in the Cold War, and reveals how the Allies suppressed the second greatest secret of WWII. Providing an inside look into the efforts to gather and exploit intelligence during the past century, this book presents powerful ideas that can help guide present and future intelligence efforts. Though stories of WWII spying and codebreaking may seem worlds apart from social media security, computer viruses, and Internet surveillance, this book offers timeless lessons that may help today's leaders avoid making the same mistakes that have helped bring at least one global power to its knees. The book includes a Foreword written by Bruce Schneier.

"Another Man's Shoes" is a gripping first-hand account of a Norwegian scientist's escape from German custody during the Second World War after his arrest for spying. Written just after the war, Sven Somme vividly describes his 200-mile trek across the mountains, pursued by German soldiers, in a bid to reach Sweden and freedom in 1944. Sixty years later, his daughter Ellie set out on foot with her sister to retrace their father's flight from Nazi-occupied Norway, meeting some of the people who helped him along the way. She recounts the emotional moment when a pair of her father's shoes, exchanged for mountain boots, were returned to her by one family who sheltered him along the way and pays special tribute to her uncle Iacob who was also arrested and later executed.

The vital ingredient in the formulation and execution of a successful foreign policy is intelligence. For the USA, as the Bay of Pigs incident and the Iran-Contra affair have shown, controlling intelligence is a problem which policy-makers and concerned citizens have rarely examined and imperfectly understood. Of the seven contributors, five have direct experience of working with or in intelligence, and all have written extensively on the subject.