In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

Health Security Intelligence introduces readers to the world of health security, to threats like COVID-19, and to the many other incarnations of global health security threats and their implications for intelligence and national security. Disease outbreaks like COVID-19 have not historically been considered a national security matter. While disease outbreaks among troops have always been a concern, it was the potential that arose in the first half of the twentieth century to systematically design biological weapons and to develop these at an industrial scale, that initially drew the attention of security, defence and intelligence communities to biology and medical science. This book charts the evolution of public health and biosecurity threats from those early days, tracing how perceptions of these threats have expanded from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, the unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, and the convergence of emerging technologies. This spectrum of threats has led to an expansion of the stakeholders, tools and sources involved in intelligence gathering and threat assessments. This edited volume is a landmark in efforts to develop a multidisciplinary, empirically informed, and policy-relevant approach to intelligence-academia engagement in global health security that serves both the intelligence community and scholars from a broad range of disciplines. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal, Intelligence and National Security.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

Published specially by After the Battle to coincide with the suspension of Allied occupation rights in Berlin in October 1990, this map was produced in 1944 by the War Office and lists the location and use of all important buildings in Berlin to be used in the occupation of the city. Every building associated with the Reich Government, NSDAP, police, fire service, Reichsbahn, U-Bahn, hospitals, telephone exchanges, embassies, prisons, etc., is numbered and referenced to an index printed on the reverse of the map. This sheet covers the central area at 1:12500.

By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.

Exploratio is the first ever survey of Roman military and civil intelligence. The authors examine in detail the operation and gradual development of Roman intelligence-gathering from shaky beginnings to a high level of excellence. They identify who gathered it, and for whom.
This study shows the effects of intelligence on policy formation at various levels from the purely local through to the global. The consequences of various instances of the mishandling of information are uncovered. Austin and Rankov also demonstrate that intelligence gathering was not necessarily directed from Rome, but had for practical reasons to be carried out and processed on the frontiers themselves.
Exploratio is important reading for all students and teachers of Roman history. It will also appeal to those with a general interest in military or diplomatic history.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.

This book traces the history of Australia's highly secret Intelligence Security Organisation. Established in the early days of the Cold War, like most intelligence organisations working under covert conditions, it exceeded the vague powers entrusted to it. It has been the subject of two Royal Commissions in Australia and in recent times several acts of Parliament have been passed in order to make it more accountable to Australia's government and its citizens.

During the decade that preceded Mikhail Gorbachev's era of glasnost and perestroika, the KGB headquarters in Moscow was putting out a constant stream of instructions to its Residencies abroad. These top secret documents were principally concerned with agent recruitment, infiltration of key foreign organizations, intelligence collection and interpretation, and influence operations, while endeavouring at all times to promote and protect the interests of the Soviet Union against countries seen as enemies.
Unknown to the KGB, many of these highly classified documents were being secretly copied by Oleg Gordievsky, at that time not only a high-ranking KGB officer based in London but also a long-serving undercover agent for the British.
The selected documents in this volume offer a revealing insight into the attitudes, prejudices and fears of the KGB during what were to prove its declining years.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

From a systematic point of view, all intelligence work can be studied on three levels: Acquisition, analysis, and acceptance. The author focuses on the third of these levels, studying the attitudes and behavioural patterns developed by leaders during their political careers, their willingness to consider information and ideas contrary to their own, their ability to admit mistakes and change course in the implementation of a failing policy and their capacity to cooperate.

The history of Special Operations Executive (SOE) seems to spring a never-ending run of surprises, and here are some more. This book explores the mysterious world of the tools SOE used for their missions of subversion and sabotage. An often grim reality is confronted that is more akin with the world of James Bond and Q's workshop than previously believed. Written by two scientists, one of whom served in the SOE and one who was tasked with clearing up after it was disbanded; their insider knowledge presents a clear account of the way in which SOE's inventors worked. From high explosive technology to chemical and biological devices; from the techniques of air supply to incendiarism; from camouflage to underwater warfare; and from radio communications to weaponry. SOE: The Scientific Secrets is a revelation about the tools that allowed the murky world of spying and spies to operate during wartime.

This book examines India's foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India 'thinks about' and 'does' intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India's foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.

In 1953, Ian Fleming's literary sensation James Bond emerged onto the world's stage. Nearly seven decades later, he has become a multi-billion-pound film franchise, now equipped with all the gizmos of the modern world. Yet Fleming's creation, who battled his way through the fourteen novels from 1953 to 1966, was a maverick - a man out of place. Bond even admits it, wishing he was back in the real war ... the Second World War. Indeed, the thread of the Second World War runs through the whole of the Bond series, and many were inspired by the real events and people Fleming came across during his time in Naval Intelligence. In Ian Fleming's War, Mark Simmons explores these remarkable similarities, from Fleming's scheme to capture a German naval codebook that appears in Thunderball as Plan Omega, to the exploits of 30 Assault Unit, the commando team he helped to create, which inspired Moonraker.

Despite publicity given to the successes of British and American codebreakers during the Second World War, the study of signals intelligence is still complicated by governmental secrecy over even the most elderly peacetime sigint. This book, first published in 1986, lifts the veil on some of these historical secrets. Christopher Andrew and Keith Neilson cast new light on how Tsarist codebreakers penetrated British code and cypher systems. John Chapman's study of German military codebreaking represents a major advance in our understanding of cryptanalysis during the Weimar Republic. The history of the Government Code and Cypher School - forerunner of today's GCHQ - by its operational head, the late A.G. Denniston, provides both a general assessment of the achievements of British cryptanalysis between the wars and a tantalising glimpse of what historians may one day find in GCHQ's forbidden archives. The distinguished cryptanalyst of Bletchley Park, the late Gordon Welchman, describes in detail how the Ultra programme defeated the German Enigma machine, while another Bletchley Park cryptographer, Christopher Morris, reminds us in his account of the valuable work on hand cyphers that wartime sigint consisted of much more than Ultra. Roger Austin's study of surveillance under the Vichy regime shows the continuing importance of older and simpler methods of message interception such as letter-opening. Taken together, the articles establish sigint as an essential field of study for both the modern historian and the political scientist.

This book examines the United States neoconservative movement, arguing that its support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq was rooted in an intelligence theory shaped by the policy struggles of the Cold War. The origins of neoconservative engagement with intelligence theory are traced to a tradition of labour anti-communism that emerged in the early 20th century and subsequently provided the Central Intelligence Agency with key allies in the state-private networks of the Cold War era. Reflecting on the break-up of Cold War liberalism and the challenge to state-private networks in the 1970s, the book maps the neoconservative response that influenced developments in United States intelligence policy, counterintelligence and covert action. With the labour roots of neoconservatism widely acknowledged but rarely systematically pursued, this new approach deploys the neoconservative literature of intelligence as evidence of a tradition rooted in the labour anti-communist self-image as allies rather than agents of the American state. This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, Cold War history, United States foreign policy and international relations.