Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. The majority of this manual, however, is now finally available to the general public. An abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, was published, but this original document goes into much greater detail about the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. It discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo writes in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, this book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time.

How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

In the spring of 1944, Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the Allies would invade the Continent by landing troops on the beaches of Normandy, but anti-Nazi officers in German Intelligence ultimately persuaded him that Normandy would be a mere diversion. The "real" invasion, Hitler was assured, would be at Calais. "Righteous Deception" focuses on the activities of two officers whose consciences kept them from siding with Hitler and the Nazis. Their campaign of misinformation and deception convinced Hitler to keep half of the German forces in northern France to defend against an invasion that would never come. This decision ultimately cost Hitler the war.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German Military Intelligence, turned against Hitler within a year after he had come to power. Canaris and his circle of friends in an opposition movement known as the "Schwarze Kapelle" (Black Orchestra) did everything possible to prevent Hitler from winning the war, which believed would be a catastrophe. Colonel Alexis von Roenne headed the "Fremde Heere West," the branch of Intelligence responsible for evaluating the strength of Allied forces. In a key position to alter findings and other information pertaining to Allied forces in Britain, he doubled the estimated number of troops assembling for D-Day, giving the impression that the Allies had enough men and equipment in Britain for both an invasion in Calais and a diversion in Normandy.

In this concise introduction to the complexities of contemporary western intelligence and its dynamics during an era of globalization, Adam Svendsen discusses intelligence cooperation in the early 21st century, with a sharp focus on counter-terrorism and WMD counter-proliferation during the 'War on Terror.'

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) is a systematic technique for predicting short-term, unique behaviors. Using primarily qualitative empirical data, LAMP allows the analyst to predict the most likely outcomes for specific research questions across a wide range of intelligence problems, such as cyber threats in the U.S., the possibility of an Al Qaeda attack, the likelihood of Iran providing nuclear capability to terrorist groups, or the future actions of the Mexican drug cartel. LAMP offers an innovative and powerful method for organizing all available information based on the perceptions of the national actors, using it to make relevant predictions as to which alternate future is most likely to occur at a given moment in time. Its transparent structure enables anyone to see how an analyst gets from point A to point B to produce an intelligence estimate. LAMP differs from other analytical techniques in that it is based on determining the relative probability of a range of alternate futures, rather than attempting to determine the quantitative probability of their occurrence. After explaining its theoretical framework, the text leads the reader through the process of predictive analysis before providing practical case studies showing how LAMP is applied against real world problems, such as the possible responses of Israel, the U.S., and Lebanon to the behavior of Hezbollah or the competing visions of the future of Afghanistan. Evaluation of the method is provided with the case studies to show the effectiveness of the LAMP predictions over time. The book is complemented by a website with downloadable software for use by students of intelligence in conducting their own predictive analysis. It will be an essential tool for the analyst and the student, not only for national security issues but also for competitive intelligence.

I have tried to give the public some idea of what was done by Boer women, during the great Anglo-Boer war, to keep their men in the field and to support them in what proved to be a hopeless struggle for independence and liberty.

As far as I was able I have also described the perils and hardships connected with the Secret Service of the Boers and the heroism and resource displayed by the men.

Although it is with the knowledge and consent of the Boer leaders that I give publicity to what is known to me of the methods employed in the Secret Service of the Boers, I do not wish to convey the impression that these events of the war at any time bore an official character.

It is a purely personal narrative and has only been written at the repeated request, during the last ten years, of the many friends associated with the experiences of the diarist and of the principal characters appearing in this book. In order to preserve the historical value of the book no fictitious names have been employed.

There are, as far as we know, very few records of this nature in existence, owing to the dangers connected with keeping a diary under martial law, and it seemed a pity, therefore, to withhold from the public materials which may be of use to those who are interested in studying or writing the history of those critical years.

I cannot vouch for the truth of every war rumour related here, nor for the accuracy of the information which I have obtained from other people, but the experiences of the diarist, as they were recorded from day to day, are correct in every detail.

My Dutch edition of this book, Die Kappie Kommando, is now appearing in the Dutch South African bi-monthly journal, Die Brandwag, and will, when completed, be published in book form in Holland.

--The Author

A highly valuable resource for students of intelligence studies, strategy and security, and foreign policy, this volume provides readers with an accessible and comprehensive exploration of U.S. espionage activities that addresses both the practical and ethical implications that attend the art and science of spying. Essentials of Strategic Intelligence investigates a subject unknown to or misunderstood by most American citizens: how U.S. foreign and security policy is derived from the information collection operations and data analysis by the sixteen major U.S. intelligence agencies. The essays in this work draw back the curtain on the hidden side of America's government, explaining the roles of various intelligence missions, justifying the existence of U.S. intelligence agencies, and addressing the complex moral questions that arise in the conduct of secret operations. After an introductory overview, the book presents accessibly written essays on the key topics: intelligence collection-and-analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, and intelligence accountability. Readers will understand how intelligence directly informs policymakers and why democracies need secret agencies; learn how the CIA has become deeply involved in the war-like assassination operations that target suspected foreign terrorists, even some individuals who are American citizens; and appreciate how the existence of-and our reliance on-these intelligence agencies poses challenges for democratic governance. Provides a comprehensive, up-to-date examination of all aspects of intelligence by experts in the field, from collection-and-analysis and counterintelligence to covert action and accountability Probes into how the United States' intelligence agencies attempt to protect the nation from cyberattacks by foreign nations and terrorist groups-and documents the successes and failures Documents the involvement of the National Security Agency (NSA) in bulk "metadata" collection of information on the telephone records and social media communications of American citizens Examines the effects that have resulted from major leaks in the U.S. government, from Wikileaks to the NSA Snowden leaks

This is the first description of the formation of America's nulcear surveillance system. Drawing on interviews with participants and the little documentation available under the Freedom of Information Act, Ziegler and Jacobson tell a story not told before. They shed new light on questions raised in earlier interpretations of the early Cold War years and reveal the origins of a surveillance activity that is implied, but not explained, in today's headlines. This book provides the first documented description of the genesis and institutionalization of America's nuclear surveillance system. It traces the development of covert technical methods for assessing the nuclear capability of foreign powers from the introduction of these techniques in World War II to 1949, when they were successfully employed to detect the test of Russia's first atomic bomb. Ziegler and Jacobson examine the planning for the system as well as the technical and organizational obstacles that had to be overcome before it could be implemented. They describe the government decision-making processes and the ways individuals and groups with different beliefs and interests were mobilized in support of the program. They also explore the relationships between the intelligence and scientific communities that were forged in this process.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

This book gives the true inside picture of the CIA during the Cold War and how the agency saw the events in which it was involved. Breckinridge started his career with the CIA as a briefing officer (and within a year had become White House Briefing Officer) in 1953 and concluded it as Deputy Inspector General in 1979. The issues Breckinridge reports on--the Bay of Pigs, the Warren Commission Report, Vietnam, Watergate, Chile, plots against foreign leaders, the Ramparts controversy, Laos, the Church and Pike committees--are among the most controversial in the lives of Americans since the mid-twentieth century. Breckinridge demostrates that the CIA was not a "rogue elephant" but an agency acting under high level policy directives, and he reveals a great deal about the internal life of the CIA.

Many studies have covered aspects of military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during the Second World War. This distinguished book provides a succinct and authoritative survey of the vital role Ultra played in achieving final victory., When war began Britain was as ill-prepared in intelligence as armaments. Civilian scientists had discovered the principle of radar in the mid-1930s, but everything had to be learned from scratch in the heat of emergency. First signs of improvement came in mid-1941, when Ultra targeted naval vessels and bomber aircraft onto so many of Rommel's supply ships that the Africa Corps almost withered on the vine. From then on intelligence played an increasingly indispensable part in final victory. Ultra won the Battle of the Atlantic, driving U-boats back to coastal waters by June 1943. Ultra confirmed the whereabouts of the German tanks as Montgomery planned the breakthrough to Alamein. Only 'Bomber' Harris refused to give intelligence the credit it deserved; on the basis of new evidence this fascinating book strongly reinforces criticism this costly mistake.

This book tells of intelligence successes never before reported, each involving the author during a most unusual career spanning three wars. It gives first-hand accounts which counter the recent bad press received by fine intelligence organizations.

By utilising the latest research, readers will be given a complete picture of the way Britain fought the Cold War, moving the focus away from the now familiar crises of Suez and Cuba and onto the themes that underpinned the British war strategy. Intelligence, civil defence and nuclear diplomacy are all examined within the context of modern British history at a time of national decline. There is a growing interest in the contexts of the Cold War and this collection will establish itself as the leading volume on the UK's wartime strategy.

With intensified threats to global security from international terrorism worldwide, education systems themselves face these same unprecedented security threats. Schools and universities have become marked loci of interest for the monitoring of extremism and counter-terrorism by security and intelligence agencies. The relationship between education systems and national security is nothing new though - it extends in surprising and unexpected ways into territory which is by turns open and covert, even secret. Acknowledging the genuine political and security concerns which have drawn educational systems ever closer to the intelligence community, this book shows how and why this has happened, and explains why the relationship between education and the security and intelligence communities extends beyond contemporary concerns with counter-terrorism. As the title of this book demonstrates, this is as much an intellectual challenge as a security struggle. Education, Security and Intelligence Studies thus critically engages with multi-disciplinary perspectives on a complex and contentious interface: between systems of often secret and covert national security and intelligence and open systems of national education. Delving into difficult to access and often closely guarded aspects of public life, the book provides the pathfinding groundwork and theoretical modelling for research into a complex of little explored institutional and epistemological interconnectedness between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. This book was originally published as a special issue of the British Journal of Educational Studies.

In the winter of 1875, a young British officer set out across central Asia on an unofficial mission to investigate the latest Russian moves in the Great Game. His goal was the mysterious Central Asian city of Khiva, closed to all European travellers by the Russians following their seizure of it two years earlier. His aim was to discover whether this remote and dangerous oasis could be used as a springboard for an invasion of India. An immediate bestseller when first published in 1877, Burnaby s delight in a life of risk and adventure still burns through the pages, as does his spontaneous affection for the Cossack troopers and Tartar, Khirgiz and Turkoman tribesmen that he encounters on his way.

Irish neutrality during the Second World War presented Britain with significant challenges to its security. Exploring how British agencies identified and addressed these problems, this book reveals how Britain simultaneously planned sabotage in and spied on Ireland, and at times sought to damage the neutral state's reputation internationally through black propaganda operations. It analyses the extent of British knowledge of Axis and other diplomatic missions in Ireland, and shows the crucial role of diplomatic code-breaking in shaping British policy. The book also underlines just how much Ireland both interested and irritated Churchill throughout the war.
Rather than viewing this as a uniquely Anglo-Irish experience, Eunan O'Halpin argues that British activities concerning Ireland should be placed in the wider context of intelligence and security problems that Britain faced in other neutral states, particularly Afghanistan and Persia. Taking a comparative approach, he illuminates how Britain dealt with challenges in these countries through a combination of diplomacy, covert gathering of intelligence, propaganda, and intimidation. The British perspective on issues in Ireland becomes far clearer when discussed in terms of similar problems Britain faced with neutral states worldwide.
Drawing heavily on British and American intelligence records, many disclosed here for the first time, Eunan O'Halpin presents the first country study of British intelligence to describe and analyse the impact of all the secret agencies during the war. He casts fresh light on British activities in Ireland, and on the significance of both espionage and cooperation between intelligence agencies fordeveloping wider relations between the two countries.

This edited book provides an insight into the new approaches, challenges and opportunities that characterise open source intelligence (OSINT) at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It does so by considering the impacts of OSINT on three important contemporary security issues: nuclear proliferation, humanitarian crises and terrorism.

"Spies of the Kaiser" examines the scope and objectives of German covert operations in Great Britain before and during the First World War. It assesses the effect of German espionage on Anglo-German relations and discusses the extent to which the fear of German espionage in the United Kingdom shaped the British intelligence community in the early twentieth century. The study is based on original archival material, including hitherto unexploited German records and recently declassified British documents.

This is the first full-length study of the role played by British Intelligence in influencing policy towards Japan from the decline of the Alliance to the outbreak of the Pacific War. Using many previously classified records it describes how the image of Japan generated by Intelligence during this period led Britain to underestimate Japanese military capabilities in 1941. The book shows how this image was derived from a lack of adequate intelligence resources and racially driven assumptions about Japanese national characteristics.

Nineteen months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt sent twelve "vice consuls" to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia on a classified assignment. Their objective? To prepare the groundwork for what eventually became Operation TORCH - the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa that repelled the Nazis and also enabled the liberation of Italy.The twelve Americans included an ex-Cartier jewel salesman and wine merchant from a patrician family; a madcap Harvard anthropologist; a Coca-Cola salesman and Paris playboy who ran with Ernest Hemingway and the Lost Generation crowd; a rather Elizabethan adventurer-cum-interpreter; a construction expert; a distinguished lawyer; some American ex-French Foreign Legionnaires and Paris bankers; and an Annapolis graduate and hero of WWI. These vice consuls were soon caught up in a web of espionage and treachery that included double-dealing mistresses, Gaullist and Vichy agents, and a homicidal French monk.Based on recently declassified foreign records, as well as the memoirs of Ridgeway Brewster Knight (one of the twelve "apostles"), FDR'S 12 Apostles is a fascinating account of international intrigue.Set in exotic locales from Paris to Casablanca to Tangier, the story takes us through the pivotal TORCH invasion and the eventual assassination of Vichy French leader Francois Darlan. Hal Vaughan's fast-paced narrative is a potent cocktail of heroic acts and bizarre twists and turns - involving Christians, Muslims, and Jews - in an arena of conspiracy and backstabbing. Hal Vaughan provides the first true look at the intricate and covert planning that planted the seeds of victory in the Mediterranean Theater.

Codenames were a vital feature of World War II, serving as mental shorthand for those in the know, and obscuring the issues for those who were not. Codenames were used from the highest level, in the planning of grand strategic moves affecting the conduct of the whole war, to the lowest command divisions, in the conduct of small-scale tactical operations. This encyclopedia, first published in 1986, removes the mystery surrounding many of the important code names from the era. With around 3,000 entries drawn from all sides - the U.K., U.S.A., Germany, the U.S.S.R. and Japan - Christopher Chant's work provides a uniquely comprehensive and full overview of major operations, names and code words. Thorough and exciting, this key reference reissue is an exceptionally valuable resource for military historians, enthusiasts and general readers with an interest in World War II.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the most important CIA spymaster in history, singlehandedly led America's intelligence service from the age of Mata Hari into the space age. Under his guidance the U-2 spy-plane, the SR-71 "Blackbird," and the Corona spy satellite were developed, and the agency rose to the pinnacle of its power. Bissell was also, however, the architect of the infamous Bay of Pigs operation that failed to overthrow Castro in 1961 and led to the decline of the CIA. In this compelling memoir, Bissell gives us an insider's view of the personalities, policies, and historical forces surrounding these and other covert operations and the lessons learned during those times of conflict. Bissell begins by describing his early years as a member of America's unofficial aristocracy. Born in a house that his father bought from Samuel Clemens, he was educated at Groton and Yale and befriended by Charles and Anne Morrow Lindbergh, among others. Bissell recounts how he became acting head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, the agency in charge of the Marshall Plan after World War II, and helped to create the European Payments Union. Bissell was brought into the CIA in 1954, where he initiated a revolution in intelligence-gathering techniques. He reveals the details of these developments, as well as of the unique CIA-Lockheed partnership he pioneered, his participation in the CIA-sponsored coup to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala, and his involvement in crises in Laos and the Congo. Bissell's memoir sheds light not only on pivotal points of American foreign policy but also on America's evolution from isolationist to interventionist superpower.

There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis.

No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.

Reliable information on potential security threats is not just the result of diligent intelligence work but also a product of context and culture. The volume explores the nexus between the intelligence process and strategic culture. How can and does the strategic outlook of the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, influence the intelligence gathering, assessment and dissemination process?

This book contains an assessment of how political agendas and ideological outlook have significant influence on both the content and process of intelligence. It looks in particular at the premise of hearts and minds policies, culture and intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency operations; at case studies from imperial Malaya and Iran in the 1950s and at instances of intelligence failure, e.g. the case of Iraq in 2003. How was intelligence, or the lack thereof, a product of political culture and how did it play a role in the political praxis?

The book shows that political agendas and the ideological outlook have a significant influence upon both the content and process of intelligence.

This book was originally published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.