To know the work of Jitendra Nath Mohanty even slightly is to commence to appreciate it immensely. Lucidity and sagacity have been its armor; originality and ingenuity have been its strength. And wearing the former and wielding the latter have become so persistent a mark of his work as to suggest that their appeal for Mohanty lies altogether more in the refmed reaches of philosophical craftsmanship than on the coarse ground of intellectual partisanship. The multifaceted character of his work in phenomenology and Indian philosophy has never left us palled by its significance and, as a consequence, has always left us conceding its command on our philosophical discourse. It has fulfilled the most welcomed promise of striking the chords of both imagination and reason by exposing Husserlian phenomenology to the concerns of both the so-called "analytical" and "continental" traditions and by exposing the philosophical tradition of Indian thought to the intricacies of Husserl. Although charting and periodizing the body ofMohanty' s work in phenomeno logy may be the function of a memory inconspicuous for originality and liveli ness, they nonetheless offer a precis conspicuous for the variety of topics that Mohanty has both engaged and enriched. Mohanty's career in phenomenology can be characterized by three phases, each concentrating on different themes, but with the latter two also epitomizing a more incisive and deeper discussion of the issues raised in the first.

What can the philosophy of language learn from the classical Indian philosophical tradition? As recently as twenty or thirty years ago this question simply would not have arisen. If a practitioner of analytic philosophy of language of that time had any view of Indian philosophy at all, it was most likely to be the stereotyped picture of a gaggle of navel gazing mystics making vaguely Bradley-esque pronouncements on the oneness of the one that was one once. Much work has been done in the intervening years to overthrow that stereotype. Thanks to the efforts of such scholars as J. N. Mohanty, B. K. Matilal, and Karl Potter, philoso phers working in the analytic tradition have begun to discover something of the range and the rigor of classical Indian work in epistemolgy and metaphysics. Thus for instance, at least some recent discussions of personal identity reflect an awareness that the Indian Buddhist tradition might prove an important source of insights into the ramifications of a reductionist approach to personal identity. In philosophy of language, though, things have not improved all that much. While the old stereotype may no longer prevail among its practitioners, I suspect that they would not view classical Indian philoso phy as an important source of insights into issues in their field. Nor are they to be faulted for this."

For the first time in recent history, seventeen scholars from allover the world (India, Japan, Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) collaborated here to produce a volume containing an in-depth study of Buddhist log ical theory in the background of Buddhist epistemology. The Tibetan tradition identifies this important chapter in the history of Buddhist philosophy as the prama a school. It owes its origin to the writings of the great Buddhist master, Dih naga (circa A. D. 480-540), whose influence was to spread far beyond India, as well as to his celebrated interpreter of sev enth century A. D., Dharmakirti, whose texts presented the standard version of the school for the later Buddhist and non Buddhist authors for a long time. The history of Buddhist and Indian logical and epistemo logical theories constitutes an interesting study not only for the Buddhist scholars but also for philosophers as well as historians of philosophy in general. Each author of this anthology combines historical and philological scholarship with philosophical acumen and linguistic insight. Each of them uses original textual (Tibetan or Sanskirt) material to resolve logical issues and philosophical questions. Attention has been focused upon two crucial philosophical concepts: trairupya (the "triple" character of evidence) and apoha (meaning as "exclusion"). Broadly the issues are concerned with the problems of inductive logic and the problem of mean ing and universals."

This pathbreaking work argues that the major intellectual trend in China from the seventeenth through the early nineteenth century was Confucian ritualism, as expressed in ethics, classical learning, and discourse on lineage.
Reviews
"Chow has produced a work of superb scholarship, fluently written and beautifully researched. . . . One of the landmarks of the current reconstruction of the social philosophy of the Qing dynasty. . . . Chow's book is indispensable. It has illuminating analyses of many mainstream writers, institutions, and social categories in eighteenth-century China which have never previously been examined."
--Canadian Journal of History
"Chow's monograph moves ritual to center stage in late imperial social and intellectual history, and the author makes a powerful case for doing so. . . . Because the author understands the intellectual history of late Ming and Qing as the history of a movement, or successive movements, of fundamental social reform, he has also made an important contribution to social and political history as these were related to intellectual history."
--Journal of Chinese Religion
"Chow's book is an excellent contribution to recent scholarship on the intellectual history of the Confucian tradition and provides a balance for other studies that have emphasized ideas to the exclusion of symbols."
--The Historian

The role of women in Islamic societies, not to mention in the religion itself, is a defining issue. It is also one that remains resistant to universal dogma, with a wide range of responses to women's social roles across the Islamic world. Reflecting this heterogeneity, the editor of this volume has assembled the latest research on the issue, which combines contemporary with historical data.

The material comes from around the world as well as from Muslim and non-Muslim researchers. It takes in work from majority Muslim nations such as Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Tunisia and Turkey, as well as countries with troubled interfaith relations such as India and Israel. Nations with minority Muslim populations such as France, the UK, Canada and Australia, are also represented. The work also features varying Islamic sub-groups such as the two main ones, Sunni and Shi'a, as well as less well known populations such as the Ismaili Muslims. In each case, the work is underpinned by the very latest socio-theological insights and empirical data."

This book investigates the re-discovery of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed by the Wissenschaft des Judentums movement in Germany of the nineteenth and beginning twentieth Germany. Since this movement is inseparably connected with religious reforms that took place at about the same time, it shall be demonstrated how the Reform Movement in Judaism used the Guide for its own agenda of historizing, rationalizing and finally turning Judaism into a philosophical enterprise of 'ethical monotheism'. The study follows the reception of Maimonidean thought, and the Guide specifically, through the nineteenth century, from the first beginnings of early reformers in 1810 and their reading of Maimonides to the development of a sophisticated reform-theology, based on Maimonides, in the writings of Hermann Cohen more then a hundred years later.

Contrasting with conventional Neo-Confucian attempts to recast the Confucian heritage in light of modern Western values, this book offers a Reconstructionist Confucian project to reclaim Confucian resources to meet contemporary moral and public policy challenges. Ruiping Fan argues that popular accounts of human goods and social justice within the dominant individualist culture of the West are too insubstantial to direct a life of virtue and a proper structure of society. Instead, he demonstrates that the moral insights of Confucian thought are precisely those needed to fill the moral vacuum developing in post-communist China and to address similar problems in the West. The book has a depth of reflection on the Confucian tradition through a comparative philosophical strategy and a breadth of contemporary issues addressed unrivaled by any other work on these topics. It is the first in English to explore not only the endeavor to revive Confucianism in contemporary China, but also brings such an endeavor to bear upon the important ethical, social, and political difficulties being faced in 21st century China. The book should be of interest to any philosopher working in application of traditional Chinese philosophy to contemporary issues as well as any reader interested in comparative cultural and ethical studies.

The ancient Chinese wisdom of emperor Fu Hsi's I Ching or The Book of Changes has served as a guide to human behaviour for millennia. Pondering the highly visual images imparted in the hexagrams of the I Ching, the seeker finds complex responses to questions or situations imbedded in the multiple layers of images that must be deciphered and applied to one's individual circumstances. Among the I Ching's remarkable qualities is its capacity to speak universally through lyrical allegories of the natural and human worlds. Photographers and collaborators Janet Russek and David Scheinbaum have long been students of the I Ching. As landscape photographers accustomed to the teachings of the natural world, the relationship between their work as visual artists and their personal experiences working with the I Ching naturally led them to create this visual companion to the hexagrams. Their photographic interpretation of the Chinese Oracle -- featuring sixty-four duotone landscape portraits paired with text from the I Ching -- offers an additional metaphorical dimension to consultations with the book.

Since the Enlightenment period, German-Jewish intellectuals have been prominent voices in the multi-facetted discourse on the reinterpretation of Jewish tradition in light of modern thinking. Paul Mendes-Flohr, one of the towering figures of current scholarship on German-Jewish intellectual history, has made invaluable contributions to a better understanding of the religious, cultural and political dimensions of these thinkers' encounter with German and European culture, including the tension between their loyalty to Judaism and the often competing claims of non-Jewish society and culture. This volume assembles essays by internationally acknowledged scholars in the field who intend to honor Mendes-Flohr's work by portraying the abundance of religious, philosophical, aesthetical and political aspects dominating the thinking of those famous thinkers populating German Jewry's rich and complex intellectual world in the modern period. It also provides a fresh theoretical outlook on trends in Jewish intellectual history, raising new questions concerning the dialectics of assimilation. In addition to that, the volume sheds light on thinkers and debates that hitherto have not been accorded full scholarly attention.

I have been thinking about the philosophical issue of truth for more than two decades. It is one of several fascinating philosophical issues that motivated me to change my primary re ective interest to philosophy after receiving BS in mathem- ics in 1982. Some serious academic work in this connection started around the late eighties when I translated into Chinese a dozen of Donald Davidson's representative essays on truth and meaning and when I assumed translator for Adam Morton who gave a series of lectures on the issue in Beijing (1988), which was co-sponsored by my then institution (Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Science). I have loved the issue both for its own sake (as one speci c major issue in the phil- ophy of language and metaphysics) and for the sake of its signi cant involvement in many philosophical issues in different subjects of philosophy. Having been attracted to the analytic approach, I was then interested in looking at the issue both from the points of view of classical Chinese philosophy and Marxist philosophy, two major styles or frameworks of doing philosophy during that time in China, and from the point of view of contemporary analytic philosophy, which was then less recognized in the Chinese philosophical circle.

The present volume is a continuation of the series Contemporary Philosophy. As with the earlier volumes in the series, the present Chronicles purport to give a survey of significant trends in contemporary philosophy. The need for such surveys has, I believe, increased rather than decreased over the years. The philosophical scene appears, for various reasons, more complex than ever before. The continuing process of specialization in most branches, the increasing contact between p- losophers from various cultures, the emergence of new schools of thought, particularly in philosophical logic and in the philosophy of language and ethics, and the increasing attention being paid to the h- tory of philosophy in discussions of contemporary problems, are the most important contributing factors. Surveys of the present kind are a valuable source of knowledge of this complexity. The surveys may therefore help to strengthen the Socratic element of modern philosophy, the intercultural dialogue or Kommunikationsgemeinschaft. So far, nine volumes have been published in this series, viz. P- losophy of Language and Philosophical Logic (Volume 1), Philosophy of Science (Volume 2), Philosophy of Action (Volume 3), Philosophy of Mind (Volume 4), African Philosophy (Volume 5), Medieval Age P- losophy (Volumes 6/1 and 6/2), Asian Philosophy (Volume 7), Philo- phy of Latin America (Volume 8), and Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art (Volume 9).

There seems to have been a view that different cultures experience happiness differently. The West is considered materialistic, and happiness comes from achievement and acquisition. The East is said to be more people-oriented, where happiness is a result of deep personal interactions. Thus, poor people can be happier in the East than the West, because they are not so concerned with possession and more with society. It is certainly true that people experience happiness differently. Some people are resilient, and can put difficult times behind them easily; others cling to sorrow and hard times. Some are philosophically inclined to accept their situation the glass is half full not half empty. Whether this is a matter of culture or personality is hard to gauge; most likely it is a combination of both. This book will explore notions of happiness in different non-Western cultures. Some of the essays will do some comparison with the East, but I have tried to keep the essays culture-specific when possible. There are also some cross-cultural essays and some philosophical and scientific studies that are not related to one culture only. There are some obvious problems. Most obvious is the fact that no political state has one culture. In a country the size of China, almost any explanation of one group might not apply to another. I have tried to include a few chapters on China to correct for this. This is even the case in a country as small as Bhutan; there is a mixture of Buddhist and Hindu people in the country, and there ideas of what makes one happy could be quite different. In South America, there is more likely a connection between mountain dwellers in different nations and rainforest dwellers than with, say, all Peruvians."

One is always struck by the brilliant work of George Sefa Dei but nothing so far has demonstrated his pedagogical leadership as much as the current project. With a sense of purpose so pure and so thoroughly intellectual, Dei shows why he must be credited with continuing the motivation and action for justice in education. He has produced in this powerful volume, Teaching Africa, the same type of close reasoning that has given him credibility in the anti-racist struggle in education. Sustaining the case for the democratization of education and the revising of the pedagogical method to include Indigenous knowledge are the twin pillars of his style. A key component of this new science of pedagogy is the crusade against any form of hegemonic education where one group of people assumes that they are the masters of everyone else. Whether this happens in South Africa, Canada, United States, India, Iraq, Brazil, or China, Dei's insights suggest that this hegemony of education in pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies is a false construction. We live pre-eminently in a world of co-cultures, not cultures and sub-cultures, and once we understand this difference, we will have a better approach to education and equity in the human condition.

This book was written as a doctoral thesis. It was submitted to and accepted by the University of Poona in 1979. Several people contributed to the creation of this book, in various ways. Prof. S. D. Joshi, my supervisor, introduced me to the study of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. His unfailing skepticism towards and disagreement with the ideas worked out in this book contributed more to their development than he may have been aware. Prof. Paul Kiparsky gave encouragement when this was badly needed. In the years following 1979 Dr. Dominik Wujastyk was kind enough to read the manuscript and suggest improvements in language and style. To all of these lowe a debt of gratitude, but most of all lowe such a debt to Pandit Shivarama Krishna Shastri. In the course of several years he read with me many portions of Nagesa's grammatical and other works, and much besides. His ability to understand difficult grammatical and philosophical texts in Sanskrit was unequalled, and without his help it would have taken far longer to write this book and indeed might very well have proved impossible. Shivarama Krishna Shastri never saw the result of our reading; he died before this book could appear in print. I dedicate it to his memory. J. BRONKHORST Xl INTRODUCTION In the following pages an attempt will be made to establish that the part of Nagesa's Paribha$endusekhara (PS) which deals with Par.

Buddhist philosophy in India in the early sixth century C. E. took an important tum away from the traditional methods of explaining and systematizing the teachings in Siitra literature that were attributed to the Buddha. The new direction in which several Indian Buddhist philosophers began to move was that of following reasoning to its natural conclusions, regardless whether the conclusions conflicted with traditional teachings. The central figure in this new movement was DiIinaga, a native of South India who found his way to the centre of Buddhist education at Nalanda, studied the treatises that were learned by the Buddhist intellectuals of his day, and eventually wrote works of his own that formed the core of a distinctly new school of Buddhist thought. Inasmuch as virtually every Indian philosopher after the sixth century had either to reject Dirinaga's methods or build upon the foundations provided by his investigations into logic, epistemology and language, his influence on the evolution of Indian philosophy was considerable, and indeed some familiarity with Dirinaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought. Moreover, since the approach to Buddhism that grew out of Dirinaga's meditations on language and the limits of knowledge dominated the minds of many of the scholars who took Buddhism to Tibet, some familiarity with Dirinaga is also essential to those who wish to understand the intellectual infrastructure of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and practice.

Books dealing with individual philosophers as well as annotated translations of their works are very much in need in the field of classical Indian philos- ophy. Hence the research efforts of modern scholars should increasingly be devoted to this objective. Professor M. Tachikawa has selected a very short elementary treatise of Udayana as well as some portions of a larger work of the same author to supplement the first. His aim is to present to us, in Udayana's own term, how he (Udayana) sees the Nyaya-VaiSe~ika system in a synoptic fashion. I wish to take this opportunity to say a few things about Udayana and the Nyaya-Vaise~ika system. UDAYANA Udayana was a pre-eminent philosopher and an astute logician of the eleventh- twelfth century India. He belonged to the Mithila region of the present Bihar 1 state. In the history of the Nyaya-V aise~a, he holds a very crucial position. In fact, two different schools of philosophy, Nyaya and Vaise~a, belonging to ancient India, merged into one in the writings of Udayana. As it has been said, in Udayana, the happy marriage between Nyaya and Vaise~ika was com- plete - the Vai e~ika ontological scheme (padiirthas or system of categories) was in this way combined with the pramiir:za doctrine (logic and a theory of knowledge) of Nyaya to produce what later came to be designated as Navya- nyaya.

This study is mainly the outcome of work completed as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Queensland. However, it has been revised in many ways since its preparation in dissertation form. Many people have contributed to the study and I am concerned that I may fail to mention everyone who has assisted me. My first introduction to The Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara) came through a course I attended at a Buddhist Centre in Queensland called Chenrezig Institute. The course was given by Ven. Geshe Loden, originally of Sera Monastery in India, and was translated by Ven. Zasep Tulku. Besides participating in this course I also attended a number of other courses on Madhyamika presented by these and other lamas in Australia and in Nepal. I was also fortunate to spend a semester at the University of Wisconsin - Madison studying with Professor Geshe Lhundup Sopa. At different times I had the opportunity to discuss, in person or through correspondence, aspects of the study with a number of leading scholars. Professors J.W. de Jong, Robert Thurman, Jeffrey Hopkins and Paul Williams gave freely of their expertise although in some cases I know that I was unable to take full advantage of their suggestions. Special mention and thanks go Professor Fred Streng who supported the study and gave most graciously of his time. In Australia I would like to thank my advisers at the University of Queensland, Drs. Ross Reat, Arvind Sharma and Richard Hutch.

Avicenna's Metaphysics (in Arabic: Ilahiyyat) is the most important and influential metaphysical treatise of classical and medieval times after Aristotle. This volume presents studies on its direct and indirect influence in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin culture from the time of its composition in the early eleventh century until the sixteenth century. Among the philosophical topics which receive particular attention are the distinction between essence and existence, the theory of universals, the concept of God as the necessary being and the theory of emanation. It is shown how authors such as Averroes, Abraham ibn Daud, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus react to Avicenna's metaphysical theories. The studies also address the philological and historical circumstances of the textual tradition in three different medieval cultures. The studies are written by a distinguished international team of contributors, who convened in 2008 to discuss their research in the Villa Vigoni, Italy.

One is always struck by the brilliant work of George Sefa Dei but nothing so far has demonstrated his pedagogical leadership as much as the current project. With a sense of purpose so pure and so thoroughly intellectual, Dei shows why he must be credited with continuing the motivation and action for justice in education. He has produced in this powerful volume, Teaching Africa, the same type of close reasoning that has given him credibility in the anti-racist struggle in education. Sustaining the case for the democratization of education and the revising of the pedagogical method to include Indigenous knowledge are the twin pillars of his style. A key component of this new science of pedagogy is the crusade against any form of hegemonic education where one group of people assumes that they are the masters of everyone else. Whether this happens in South Africa, Canada, United States, India, Iraq, Brazil, or China, Dei's insights suggest that this hegemony of education in pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies is a false construction. We live pre-eminently in a world of co-cultures, not cultures and sub-cultures, and once we understand this difference, we will have a better approach to education and equity in the human condition.

How do ordinary Muslims deal with and influence the increasingly pervasive Islamic norms set by institutions of the state and religion? Becoming Better Muslims offers an innovative account of the dynamic interactions between individual Muslims, religious authorities, and the state in Aceh, Indonesia. Relying on extensive historical and ethnographic research, David Kloos offers a detailed analysis of religious life in Aceh and an investigation into today's personal processes of ethical formation. Aceh is known for its history of rebellion and its recent implementation of Islamic law. Debunking the stereotypical image of the Acehnese as inherently pious or fanatical, Kloos shows how Acehnese Muslims reflect consciously on their faith and often frame their religious lives in terms of gradual ethical improvement. Revealing that most Muslims view their lives through the prism of uncertainty, doubt, and imperfection, he argues that these senses of failure contribute strongly to how individuals try to become better Muslims. He also demonstrates that while religious authorities have encroached on believers and local communities, constraining them in their beliefs and practices, the same process has enabled ordinary Muslims to reflect on moral choices and dilemmas, and to shape the ways religious norms are enforced. Arguing that Islamic norms are carried out through daily negotiations and contestations rather than blind conformity, Becoming Better Muslims examines how ordinary people develop and exercise their religious agency.

overall title and the commentary of Narboni, but in which the treatise is given a close association rath De Substantia Orbis VII, which immedi ately follows it in the text. This third version is the sole case in which a Hebrew translator can be named: the translation was made by Todros Todrosi in the year 1340. The only conclusion to be drawn from his translation is that Todrosi may definitively be eliminated as the translator of any of the other ver sions. However, we may be able to draw a tentative conclusion as to the formation of the Hebrew collection. The earliest evidence for the existence of the nine treatise collec tion is the commentary of Narboni, completed in 1349. The fact that nine years earlier one treatise could be attached to a work outside the corpus may indicate that the Hebrew collection of nine treatises was formed during those nine years, or mar even indicate that Narboni him self collected the various treatises. 5 Narboni, however, was not the translator of these works In fact, no 1 definitive indication of the translator's identity exists. 6 3. The Nature of the Question-Form Steinschneider offered the following general characterization of Aver roes' Quaestiones: These are mostly brief discussions, more or less answers to questions; they may be partially occasioned by topics i9 his commentaries and may be considered as appendices to them."

Dr PurusQttama Bilimoria's book on sabdapramaIJa is an important one, and so is likely to arouse much controversy. I am pleased to be able to write a Foreword to this book, at a stage in my philosophical thinking when my own interests have been turning towards the thesis of sabdapramaIJa as the basis of Hindu religious and philosophical tradition. Dr Bilimoria offers many novel interpretations of classical Hindu theories about language, meaning, understanding and knowing. These interpretations draw upon the conceptual resources of contemporary analytic and phenomenological philosophies, without sacrificing the authentIcity that can arise only out of philologically grounded scholarship. He raises many issues, and claims to have resolved some of them. Certainly, he advances the overall discussion, and this is the best one could hope for in writing on a topic to which the best minds of antiquity and modern times have applied themselves. In this Foreword, I wish to focus on one of the issues which I have raised on earlier occasions, and on which Dr Bilimoria has several important things to say. The issue is: is sabdabodha eo ipso a linguistic knowing, i. e., sabdapramll, or does Sabdabodha amount to knowing only when certain specifiable conditions are satisfied. It the second alternative be accepted, these additional conditions could not be the same as the familiar Ilsatti (contiguity), yogyata (semantic fitness), dka;, k ll (expectancy) and tlltparya (intention), for these are, on the theory, conditions of sabdabodha itself.

To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things." It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program."

Srihar a is recognised as one of the greatest exponents of what is generally known as the Sarpkara school of Advaita Vedanta. The Advaita Vedanta of Sarpkara has been commented upon, explained, expounded and developed in its various ramifications by several generations of scholars, commentators and original thinkers for over a thousand years. Even today it is claimed to be one of the two traditional schools of Indian Philosophy which have survived and have modern adherents while most other schools have died of old age on Indian soil. The only other school that has survived is the Nyaya-Vaise ika or what is now called the Navya-nyaya. Both Advaita Vedanta and Navya-nyaya have attracted the attention of modern scholars and philosophers (of both India and abroad), who are acquainted with Western philosophy and whose interest in the study of Indian philosophy has not simply been limited to the history of Indian thought or Indology. Modern exponents of Advaita Vedanta are numerous. With a few notable exceptions, however, most modern authors of Vedanta try to expound and modernise the Advaita system from either a speculative and personal point of view or from a superficial viewpoint of Kantian philosophy or Hegelian Absolutism. Such a method has seldom achieved the sophistication and respectability that is normally expected in the context of modern (chiefly western) philosophic activity.