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Books > Humanities > History > Asian / Middle Eastern history > From 1900 > Postwar, from 1945
Colonel Pat Proctor's long overdue critique of the Army's
preparation and outlook in the all-volunteer era focuses on a
national security issue that continues to vex in the twenty-first
century: Has the Army lost its ability to win strategically by
focusing on fighting conventional battles against peer enemies? Or
can it adapt to deal with the greater complexity of
counterinsurgent and information-age warfare? In this blunt
critique of the senior leadership of the U.S. Army, Proctor
contends that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Army
stubbornly refused to reshape itself in response to the new
strategic reality, a decision that saw it struggle through one
low-intensity conflict after another-some inconclusive, some
tragic-in the 1980s and 1990s, and leaving it largely unprepared
when it found itself engaged-seemingly forever-in wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The first book-length study to connect the
failures of these wars to America's disastrous performance in the
war on terror, Proctor's work serves as an attempt to convince Army
leaders to avoid repeating the same mistakes.
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