A noted World War I scholar examines the critical decisions and events that led to Germany's defeat, arguing that the German loss was caused by collapse at home as well as on the front. Much has been written about the causes for the outbreak of World War I and the ways in which the war was fought, but few historians have tackled the reasons why the Germans, who appeared on the surface to be winning for most of the war, ultimately lost. This book, in contrast, presents an in-depth examination of the complex interplay of factors-social, cultural, military, economic, and diplomatic-that led to Germany's defeat. The highly readable work begins with an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the two coalitions and points out how the balance of forces was clearly on the side of the Entente in a long and drawn-out war. The work then probes the German plan to win the war quickly and the resulting campaigns of August and September 1914 that culminated in the devastating defeat in the First Battle of the Marne. Subsequent chapters discuss the critical factors and decisions that led to Germany's loss, including the British naval blockade, the role of economic factors in maintaining a consensus for war, and the social impact of material deprivation. Starts a new and fuller discussion of Germany's defeat that goes beyond the battlefields of the Western Front Argues that Germany's defeat was caused by a complex interplay of domestic, social, and economic forces as well as by military and diplomatic factors Integrates the internal problems the German people experienced with Germany's defeats at sea and on land Highlights the critical role played by Britain and the United States in bringing about Germany's defeat Discusses the failures of German military planning and the failure of the nation's political leaders and military leaders to understand that war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means

How is foreign policy made in Iraq? Based on dozens of interviews with senior officials and politicians, this book provides a clear analysis of the development of domestic Iraqi politics since 2003. Zana Gulmohamad explains how the federal government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have functioned and worked together since toppling Saddam to reveal in granular detail the complexity of their foreign policy making. The book shows that the ruling elites and political factions in Baghdad and in the capital of the Kurdistan Region, Erbil, create foreign policies according to their agendas. The formulation and implementation of the two governments' foreign policies is to a great extent uncoordinated. Yet Zana Gulmohamad places this incoherent model of foreign policy making in the context of the country's fragmented political and social context and explains how Iraq's neighbouring countries - Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria before the civil war - have each influenced its internal affairs. The book is the first study dedicated to the contemporary dynamics of the Iraqi state - outside the usual focus on the "great powers" - and it explains exactly how Iraqi foreign policy is managed alongside the country's economic and security interests.