Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, was intended to be his magnum opus, the book in which he would finally establish his logicist philosophy of arithmetic. But because of the disaster of Russell's Paradox, which undermined Frege's proofs, the more mathematical parts of the book have rarely been read. Richard G. Heck, Jr., aims to change that, and establish it as a neglected masterpiece that must be placed at the center of Frege's philosophy. Part I of Reading Frege's Grundgesetze develops an interpretation of the philosophy of logic that informs Grundgesetze, paying especially close attention to the difficult sections of Frege's book in which he discusses his notorious 'Basic Law V' and attempts to secure its status as a law of logic. Part II examines the mathematical basis of Frege's logicism, explaining and exploring Frege's formal arguments. Heck argues that Frege himself knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox, and presents Frege's arguments in a way that makes them available to a wide audience. He shows, by example, that careful attention to the structure of Frege's arguments, to what he proved, to how he proved it, and even to what he tried to prove but could not, has much to teach us about Frege's philosophy.

Our conception of logical space is the set of distinctions we use to navigate the world. In The Construction of Logical Space Agustin Rayo defends the idea that one's conception of logical space is shaped by one's acceptance or rejection of 'just is'-statements: statements like 'to be composed of water just is to be composed of H2O', or 'for the number of the dinosaurs to be zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs'. The resulting picture is used to articulate a conception of metaphysical possibility that does not depend on a reduction of the modal to the non-modal, and to develop a trivialist philosophy of mathematics, according to which the truths of pure mathematics have trivial truth-conditions.

Wittgenstein: Comparisons and Context is a collection of P. M. S. Hacker's papers on Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian themes written over the last decade. It presents Hacker's own (Wittgensteinian) conception of philosophy, and defends it against criticisms. Two essays compare Wittgenstein with Kant on transcendental arguments, and offer a Wittgensteinian critique of Kant's transcendental deduction. Two further essays trace the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology, and examine his anthropological and ethnological approach to philosophical problems. This leads naturally to a synoptic comparison of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language with formal, truth-conditional conceptions of language. A further two clarificatory essays follow these comparative ones: the first concerns Wittgenstein's conception of grammar, and his exclusion of theses, doctrines, dogmas, and opinions in philosophy; the second concerns his treatment of intentionality. The penultimate essay examines Quine's epistemological naturalism, which is often presented as a more scientific approach to philosophical problems than Wittgenstein's. The final essay offers a synoptic view of analytic philosophy and its history, in which Wittgenstein played so notable a part. The volume complements Hacker's previous collection, Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies (OUP, 2001), but stands as an independent contribution to work in the field.

An engaging account of the titan of political philosophy and the development of his most important work, A Theory of Justice, coming at a moment when its ideas are sorely needed. It is hard to overestimate the influence of John Rawls on political philosophy and theory over the last half-century. His books have sold millions of copies worldwide, and he is one of the few philosophers whose work is known in the corridors of power as well as in the halls of academe. Rawls is most famous for the development of his view of "justice as fairness," articulated most forcefully in his best-known work, A Theory of Justice. In it he develops a liberalism focused on improving the fate of the least advantaged, and attempts to demonstrate that, despite our differences, agreement on basic political institutions is both possible and achievable. Critics have maintained that Rawls's view is unrealistic and ultimately undemocratic. In this incisive new intellectual biography, Andrius Galisanka argues that in misunderstanding the origins and development of Rawls's central argument, previous narratives fail to explain the novelty of his philosophical approach and so misunderstand the political vision he made prevalent. Galisanka draws on newly available archives of Rawls's unpublished essays and personal papers to clarify the justifications Rawls offered for his assumption of basic moral agreement. Galisanka's intellectual-historical approach reveals a philosopher struggling toward humbler claims than critics allege. To engage with Rawls's search for agreement is particularly valuable at this political juncture. By providing insight into the origins, aims, and arguments of A Theory of Justice, Galisanka's John Rawls will allow us to consider the philosopher's most important and influential work with fresh eyes.

This book is the product of a major British Academy Symposium held in 2007 to mark the centenary of the birth of H.L.A. Hart, the most important legal philosopher and one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth century.
The book brings together contributions from eighteen of the world's foremost legal and political philosophers who explore the many subjects in which Hart produced influential work. Each essay engages in an original analysis of philosophical problems that were tackled by Hart, some essays including extended critical discussions of his major works: The Concept of Law, Punishment and Responsibility, Causation in the Law and Law, Liberty and Morality. All the main topics of Hart's philosophical writings are featured: general jurisprudence and legal positivism; criminal responsibility and punishment; theories of rights; toleration and liberty; theories of justice; and causation in the law.

This classic collection of essays, first published in 1968, has had an enduring impact on academic and public debates about criminal responsibility and criminal punishment. Forty years on, its arguments are as powerful as ever. H.L.A. Hart offers an alternative to retributive thinking about criminal punishment that nevertheless preserves the central distinction between guilt and innocence. He also provides an account of criminal responsibility that links the distinction between guilt and innocence closely to the ideal of the rule of law, and thereby attempts to by-pass unnerving debates about free will and determinism. Always engaged with live issues of law and public policy, Hart makes difficult philosophical puzzles accessible and immediate to a wide range of readers.
For this new edition, otherwise a reproduction of the original, John Gardner adds an introduction engaging critically with Hart's arguments, and explaining the continuing importance of Hart's ideas in spite of the intervening revival of retributive thinking in both academic and policy circles.
Unavailable for ten years, the new edition of Punishment and Responsibility makes available again the central text in the field for a new generation of academics, students and professionals engaged in criminal justice and penal policy.

Crispin Wright is widely recognised as one of the most important and influential analytic philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This volume is a collective exploration of the major themes of his work in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mathematics. It comprises specially written chapters by a group of internationally renowned thinkers, as well as four substantial responses from Wright. In these thematically organized replies, Wright summarizes his life's work and responds to the contributory essays collected in this book. In bringing together such scholarship, the present volume testifies to both the enormous interest in Wright's thought and the continued relevance of Wright's seminal contributions in analytic philosophy for present-day debates;

This book examines the significance of Whitehead's first year of lectures at Harvard, recently published in the first volume of The Edinburgh Critical Edition of the Complete Works of Alfred North Whitehead.In these newly commissioned essays, leading Whitehead scholars ask a range of important questions: Do these lectures challenge or confirm previous understandings of Whitehead's published works? What is revealed about the development of Whitehead's thought in the crucial period after London but before the publication of Science and the Modern World? What should we make of concepts and terms that were introduced in these lectures but were never incorporated into subsequent publications? The lectures published in The Harvard Lectures of Alfred North Whitehead, 1924-1925: Philosophical Presuppositions of Science represent Whitehead's first American lectures in philosophy after a long career in England as a mathematician and throw new light on the development of his philosophy.Also included in this volume is the text of Whitehead's first lecture at Harvard, recently gifted to the Critical Edition of Whitehead, allowing for a clearer understanding of Whitehead's plans and goals for his first course of lectures in philosophy than has previously been possible. Brian G. Henning, Founding Executive Editor of the Critical Edition of Whitehead, is Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington.

Wittgenstein was one of the most powerful influences on contemporary philosophy, yet he shunned publicity and was essentially a private man. This remarkable, vivid, personal memoir is written by one of his friends, the eminent philosopher Norman Malcolm. Reissued in paperback, this edition includes the complete text of fifty-seven letters which Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm over a period of eleven years. Also included is a concise biographical sketch by another of Wittgenstein's philosopher friends, Georg Henrik von Wright.

'A reader does not need to care about philosophy to be excited by Mr Malcolm's book; it is about Wittgenstein as a man, and its interest is human interest'. (From a review of the first edition in the Manchester Guardian)

This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell's Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program's agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy, the program's acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russell's feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein's demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4-6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.

Drawing on the work of James Joyce, the story of Sigmund Freud's 'Dora' and the case of Oscar Schindler, Richard Kearney skilfully illuminates how stories are deep at work in fictional writing, autobiography and psychoanalysis and above all, in attempts to talk of the "self". Throughout the text stresses that far from heralding the demise of the story, the digital and supposedly 'postmodern' era opens up powerful new ways of thinking about narrative. Imaginative and wide-ranging, On Stories is essential reading for anyone who wants to think clearly about the role of stories in our future.

Translated by:
J.N. Findlay

This book addresses controversies concerning the epistemological foundations of data science: Is it a genuine science? Or is data science merely some inferior practice that can at best contribute to the scientific enterprise, but cannot stand on its own? The author proposes a coherent conceptual framework with which these questions can be rigorously addressed. Readers will discover a defense of inductivism and consideration of the arguments against it: an epistemology of data science more or less by definition has to be inductivist, given that data science starts with the data. As an alternative to enumerative approaches, the author endorses Federica Russo's recent call for a variational rationale in inductive methodology. Chapters then address some of the key concepts of an inductivist methodology including causation, probability and analogy, before outlining an inductivist framework. The inductivist framework is shown to be adequate and useful for an analysis of the epistemological foundations of data science. The author points out that many aspects of the variational rationale are present in algorithms commonly used in data science. Introductions to algorithms and brief case studies of successful data science such as machine translation are included. Data science is located with reference to several crucial distinctions regarding different kinds of scientific practices, including between exploratory and theory-driven experimentation, and between phenomenological and theoretical science. Computer scientists, philosophers and data scientists of various disciplines will find this philosophical perspective and conceptual framework of great interest, especially as a starting point for further in-depth analysis of algorithms used in data science.

Contents:
The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis;
Introduction (Michael Levine);
1. Mind * Psychoanalysis, Metaphor and the Concept of Mind (Jim Hopkins)
* Freud and Intentionality: How Far Down Does The Will Go? (Graeme Marshall)
* Freudian Wish-Fulfilment and Sub-Intentional Explanation (Tamas Pataki)
* Keeping Time: Freud on the Temporality of Mind (Marcia Cavell)
* Subject, Object, World: Some Reflections on the Kleinian Origins of the Mind (David Snelling)
* Freud's Theory of Consciousness (Paul Redding)

2. Ethics * Aristotelian Akrasia and Psychoanalytic Regression (Michael Stocker)
* Emotional Agents (Nancy Sherman)
* Moral Authenticity and the Unconscious (Grant Gillett)

3. Sexuality * Freud on Unconscious Affects, Mourning and the Erotic Mind (Amelie Rorty)
* Love and Loss in Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia': A Rereading (Jennifer Radden)
* Lucky in Love: Love and Emotion (Michael Levine)

4. Civilisation * Sublimation, Love and Creativity (Marguerite La Caze)
* Freud and the Rule of Law: From Totem and Taboo to Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence (Jose Brunner)
* The Joke, the 'As If' and the Statement (Edmond Wright)

Surveying the history, latest developments and potential future directions of contemporary analytic philosophy, this is an essential one-volume reference guide for all those working in the field. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy brings together a team of internationally renowned scholars to explore all the major areas of inquiry, key concepts and most important thinkers in the analytic tradition. Topics covered include: * The history of analytic philosophy, from Frege, Moore and Russell to Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and beyond * Philosophy of mind and language from early developments to the most recent advances * Perspectives in moral and political philosophy * Contemporary metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science and mathematics * The latest thinking on perception, free will and personal identity The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy also includes a historical chronology and a full guide to further reading and available resources, making this an invaluable library or desktop reference guide for anyone working in the discipline today.

Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of character traits of agents, such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. This volume brings together ten new essays on virtue epistemology, with contributions to both of its key strands, written by leading authors in the field. It will advance the state of the art and provide readers with a valuable overview of what virtue epistemology has achieved.

A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. * Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others * Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts * Includes listings of suggested further readings * Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy

This book investigates the impact of misinformation and the role of truth in political struggle. It develops a theory of objective truth for political controversy over topics such as racism and gender, based on the insights of intersectionality, the Black feminist theory of interlocking systems of oppression. Truth is defined using the tools of model theory and formal semantics, but the theory also captures how social power dynamics strongly influence the operation of the concept of truth within the social fabric. Systemic ignorance, propagated through false speech and misinformation, sustains oppressive power structures and perpetuates systemic inequity. Truth tends to empower marginalized groups precisely because oppressive systems are maintained through systemic ignorance. If the truth sets people free, then power will work to obscure it. Hence, the rise of misinformation as a political weapon is a strategy of dominant power to undermine the political advancement of marginalized groups.

This book sets out to identify the nature and implications of a proper understanding of pluralism in a original and illuminating way. Isaiah Berlin believed that a recognition of pluralism is vital to a free, decent and civilised society. By looking below at the often neglected foundations of Berlin's celebrated account of moral pluralism, Lyons reveals the more philosophically profound aspects of his undogmatic and humanistic liberal vision. He achieves this by comparing Berlin's core ideas with those of several of his most distinguished philosophical contemporaries, an exercise which yields not only a deeper grasp of Berlin and several major twentieth-century thinkers, principally A. J. Ayer, J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, Bernard Williams and Quentin Skinner, but, more broadly, a keener appreciation of the power of history and philosophy to help us make sense of our predicament.

Das Studienbuch enthalt grundlegende Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Geistes. In chronologischer Reihenfolge stellt es eine Auswahl der wichtigsten Gestalten dieser Philosophietradition aus der Perspektive analytischer Philosophen vor: Platon, Aristoteles, Plotin, Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Descartes, Malebranche, Hume, Kant und Husserl. Jedes Kapitel orientiert sich an einer systematischen Fragestellung. So vermittelt der Band zugleich einen Einblick in die Grundfragen der modernen Philosophie des Geistes: Welche Relation besteht zwischen mentalen und physischen Zustanden? Welchen ontologischen Status hat das Ich? Verfugen wir uber Selbstwissen und wenn ja, in welchem Sinne?

This book develops a new Wittgenstein interpretation called Wittgenstein's Metametaphysics. The basic idea is that one major strand in Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy can be described as undermining the dichotomy between realism and idealism. The aim of this book is to contribute to a better understanding of the relation between language and reality and to open up avenues of dialogue to overcome deep divides in the research literature. In the course of developing a comprehensive and in-depth interpretation, the author provides fresh and original analyses of the latest issues in Wittgenstein scholarship and gives new answers to both major exegetical and philosophical problems. This makes the book an illuminating study for scholars and advanced students alike.

This book is an edited collection of essays in celebration of the centenary of Samuel Alexander's Space, Time and Deity, published in 1920. Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) was a leading figure of British philosophy in the early twentieth century. He was partly responsible for the 'new realism' movement along with G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. However, his work has been overlooked in developments of twentieth century philosophy and yet his theories and style of theorising are in vogue. This book begins with three previously unpublished papers by Alexander that shed light on his metaphysical commitments about time, universals, God, knowledge of past truths, grounding, and inference in logic and science. There are also two important posthumous chapters by philosophers of the mid-twentieth century, who elaborate on his life and most significant contributions. The second half of the book contains new essays by current scholars, discussing Alexander on metaphysical realism, idealism, naturalism, space and time, process ontology, ontological categories, epistemology, perception, philosophy of history, emergentism, and empiricism.

This is the first book to systematically study the weak systems of mereology. In its chapters, the author critically analyzes and explains core topics related to mereology, such as parthood without antisymmetry, non-existence of the zero element, and Lesniewski's notion of class and set. The book also delves into three theories of parthood: two concern the sum existence axioms, and the third contends with transitivity of parthood. This is the first systematic analysis of systems of mereology of its kind and is suitable for students, scholars, logicians, and mathematicians who wish to further their knowledge of mereology. Original polish publication "Podstawy teorii czesci" by The Nicolaus Copernicus University Press

This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.

The book Fate, Time, and Language: An Essay on Free Will, published in 2010 by Columbia University Press, presented David Foster Wallace's challenge to Richard Taylor's argument for fatalism. In this anthology, notable philosophers engage directly with that work and assess Wallace's reply to Taylor as well as other aspects of Wallace's thought. With an introduction by Steven M. Cahn and Maureen Eckert, this collection includes essays by William Hasker (Huntington University), Gila Sher (University of California, San Diego), Marcello Oreste Fiocco (University of California, Irvine), Daniel R. Kelly (Purdue University), Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham University), Justin Tosi (University of Arizona), and Maureen Eckert. These thinkers explore Wallace's philosophical and literary work, illustrating remarkable ways in which his philosophical views influenced and were influenced by themes developed in his other writings, both fictional and nonfictional. Together with Fate, Time, and Language, this critical set unlocks key components of Wallace's work and its traces in modern literature and thought.