Ex nihilo nihil fit. Philosophy, especially great philosophy, does not appear out of the blue. In the current volume, a team of top scholars-both up-and-coming and established-attempts to trace the philosophical development of one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Featuring twenty new essays and an introduction, it is the first attempt of its kind in English and its appearance coincides with the recent surge of interest in Spinoza in Anglo-American philosophy. Spinoza's fame-or notoriety-is due primarily to his posthumously published magnum opus, the Ethics, and, to a lesser extent, to the 1670 Theological-Political Treatise. Few readers take the time to study his early works carefully. If they do, they are likely to encounter some surprising claims, which often diverge from, or even utterly contradict, the doctrines of the Ethics. Consider just a few of these assertions: that God acts from absolute freedom of will, that God is a whole, that there are no modes in God, that extension is divisible and hence cannot be an attribute of God, and that the intellectual and corporeal substances are modes in relation to God. Yet, though these claims reveal some tension between the early works and the Ethics, there is also a clear continuity between them. Spinoza wrote the Ethics over a long period of time, which spanned most of his philosophical career. The dates of the early drafts of the Ethics seem to overlap with the assumed dates of the composition of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being and precede the publication of Spinoza's 1663 book on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. For this reason, a study of Spinoza's early works (and correspondence) can illuminate the nature of the problems Spinoza addresses in the Ethics, insofar as the views expressed in the early works help us reconstruct the development and genealogy of the Ethics. Indeed, if we keep in mind the common dictum "nothing comes from nothing "-which Spinoza frequently cites and appeals to-it is clear that great works like the Ethics do not appear ex nihilo. In light of the preeminence and majesty of the Ethics, it is difficult to study the early works without having the Ethics in sight. Still, we would venture to say that the value of Spinoza's early works is not at all limited to their being stations on the road leading to the Ethics. A teleological attitude of such a sort would celebrate the works of the "mature Spinoza " at the expense of the early works. However, we have no reason to assume that on all issues the views of the Ethics are better argued, developed, and motivated than those of the early works. In other words, we should keep our minds open to the possibility that on some issues the early works might contain better analysis and argumentation than the Ethics.

For many years, philosophers and other scholars have commented on the remarkable similarity between Spinoza and the Stoics, with some even going so far as to speak of 'Spinoza the Stoic'. Until now, however, no one has systematically examined the relationship between the two systems. In Spinoza and the Stoics Jon Miller takes on this task, showing how key elements of Spinoza's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical psychology, and ethics relate to their Stoic counterparts. Drawing on a wide-range of secondary literature including the most up-to-date scholarship and a close examination of the textual evidence, Jon Miller not only reveals the sense in which Spinoza was, and was not, a Stoic, but also offers new insights into how each system should be understood in itself. His book will be of great interest to scholars and students of ancient philosophy, early modern philosophy, Spinoza, and the philosophy of the Stoics.

John Locke (1632-1704) has a good claim to the title of the greatest ever English philosopher, and was a founding father of both the empiricist tradition in philosophy and the liberal tradition in politics. This new book provides an accessible introduction to Locke's thought. Although its primary focus is on the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, it also discusses the Two Treatises on Government, the Essay on Toleration, and the Reasonableness of Christianity, and draws on materials from Locke's correspondence and notebooks to shed light on the contexts of these major works. Locke's arguments for his central claims are subjected to close scrutiny, and his replies to his main critics evaluated. A.J. Pyle takes as his guiding theme Locke's own maxim, that God has given humans enough knowledge for our needs. The philosopher who emerges from these pages is a strikingly modern figure, anti-metaphysical in his attitude both to science and to theology, anti-authoritarian in his politics, and cautiously optimistic about human progress. Locke is indeed one of the founding figures of the Enlightenment, but for Pyle the Lockean Enlightenment is a modest affair of slow and hesitant groping towards the light. As well as serving as an introduction to Locke for students, the book also helps to correct a number of significant errors and misunderstandings that have marred our understanding of Locke and will spark discussion and debate amongst scholars of his work.

The rhetoric of cultural identity generally goes in two potential directions: One a universal line that insists on an overall pattern of integration and harmony among all peoples regardless of their differences, and the other a line which suggests that various cultures are so specific and different that they will eventually enter into clash, violence and war. Drawing upon Derrida's concept of differance, I will point out that such rhetoric as examples of current political discourses fail to open the concept of cultural identity through redefining its relationship with otherness. This will be accompanied by poetry of Rumi and Whitman to suggest that their literary language through its non-dialectic characteristics is familiar with the problematic of identity and has the ability to form a cross-cultural dialogue. Sufism And Transcendentalism envisages the possibility of dialogue against the background of political conflict.

Although Kant sees the source of the basic concepts of our knowledge in understanding, it is still unclear whether he meant our capacity for thought or the totality of our epistemological powers.The author attempts to clarify the matter with an analysis of the pre-critical writings and the Critique of Pure Reason. In addition, he elucidates the system of these concepts. The author sets himself off against other interpreters, who place the source of the categories in the unity of apperception (like the post-Kantian idealists, Cohen, Henrich etc.) or in the imagination as the root of all ability (Heidegger) and then ascribe these doctrines to Kant himself.Rosales develops the system of these concepts from the relationship of apperception to imagination, and methodically distinguishes between his attempt as an independent development of Kantian potential and the philosopher's own work.

Georg Lukacs wrote that "there is autonomy and 'autonomy.' The one is a moment of life itself, the elevation of its richness and contradictory unity; the other is a rigidification, a barren self-seclusion, a self-imposed banishment from the dynamic overall connection. " Though Lukacs' concern was with the conditions for the possibility of art, his distinction also serves as an apt description of the way that Hegel and Hegelians have contrasted their own interpretations of self-determination with that of Kant. But it has always been difficult to see how elevation is possible without seclusion, or how rigidification can be avoided without making the boundaries of the self so malleable that its autonomy looks like a mere cover for the power of external forces. Yeomans explores Hegel's own attempts to grapple with this problem against the background of Kant's attempts, in his theory of virtue, to understand the way that morally autonomous agents can be robust individuals with qualitatively different projects, personal relations, and commitments that are nonetheless infused with a value that demands respect. In a reading that disentangles a number of different threads in Kant's approach, Yeomans shows how Hegel reweaves these threads around the central notions of talent and interest to produce a tapestry of self-determination. Yeomans argues that the result is a striking pluralism that identifies three qualitatively distinct forms of agency or accountability and sees each of these forms of agency as being embodied in different social groups in different ways. But there is nonetheless a dynamic unity to the forms because they can all be understood as practical attempts to solve the problem of autonomy, and each is thus worthy of respect even from the perspective of other solutions. "Everyone recognizes the importance of Hegel's critique of Kantian morality as empty, but until now there has not been a fully worked out presentation of how Hegel's views in his discussion of Sittlichkeit actually provide the missing content. Yeomans has finally provided us with a reconstruction of Hegel's mature position that makes good on all the promissory notes that Hegel (and his commentators) gives in his famous descriptions of his alternative to Kantian ethics. Yeomans offers a compelling account of Hegel's view of individuality, societal differentiation and its roots in Kantian and Fichtean moral theory. The book will be a major contribution to the scholarship on Hegel's practical philosophy. "-Dean Moyar, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University "Yeomans' book is a subtle, detailed and original explication of some key ideas having to do with how Hegel's general philosophy of action (or theory of the nature of agency) relates to his social and political philosophy. It is attentive to Hegel's texts, and it ties its discussions into all the relevant contemporary themes in philosophy. It is very ambitious in its attempt to make Hegel's theory into a real competitor to other views that are currently in wide play in the philosophical world. It will very likely become one of the key texts in the secondary literature on Hegel. "-Terry Pinkard, University Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown University

Alexander X. Douglas offers a new understanding of Spinoza's philosophy by situating it in its immediate historical context. He defends a thesis about Spinoza's philosophical motivations and then bases an interpretation of his major works upon it. The thesis is that much of Spinoza's philosophy was conceived with the express purpose of rebutting a claim about the limitations of philosophy made by some of his contemporaries. They held that philosophy is intrinsically incapable of revealing anything of any relevance to theology, or in fact to any study of direct practical relevance to human life. Spinoza did not. He believed that philosophy reveals the true nature of God, and that God is nothing like what the majority of theologians, or indeed of religious believers in general, think he is. The practical implications of this change in the concept of God were profound and radical. As Douglas shows, many of Spinoza's theories were directed towards showing how the separation his opponents endeavoured to maintain between philosophical and non-philosophical (particularly theological) thought was logically untenable.

The book surveys the key metaphysical contributions of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More (1614-1687). It deals with such interwoven topics as: the natures of body and spirit, and the question of whether or not there is a sharp ontological division between them; the nature of spatial extension in relation to each; the composition and governance of the physical world, including More's theories of Hyle, atoms, vacuum, and the Spirit of Nature; and the life of the human soul, including its pre-existence. It approaches these topics and the systematic connections between them both historically and analytically, and seeks to do justice to the ways in which More's system developed and changed-sometimes quite dramatically-over the course of his long career. It also explores More's intellectual relations with both his own inspirations (Plotinus, Origen, Ficino, Descartes, etc.) and with those who responded, whether positively or negatively, to his work (Leibniz, Locke, Boyle, Newton, etc.).

Kierkegaard is a fascinating author. Living shortly after the dawn of modernity in the Enlightenment, he restates classical Christianity in novel and dynamic fashion. His Lutheran heritage is pivotal here as he places 'faith' over against 'reason'. But we should recognise that decidedly pre-modern epistemological presuppositions lie behind Kierkegaard's theological contentions, giving us pause for thought. A profound thinker with eclectic interests, philosophical, theological, ethical, social and pastoral, Kierkegaard never ceases to engage the reader. His insights into human life - the matter of coherence of the self, the crucial category of the individual, or the significance of choice - are memorable. A fine writer with observant eye, Kierkegaard enthrals the reader with his flair, perspicacity and ready wit. After an initial chapter on Kierkegaard's intellectual milieu, the book considers seven of his major texts. An 'Exposition', with extensive quotation, sets the text in philosophical, theological and historical context. Following which a 'Critique' raises issues, ranging from Kierkegaard's indifference to biblical scholarship, to his lack of recognition of the regularity of causation, and his a-political outlook. A final chapter considers Kierkegaard as a person and evaluates the authorship. Lucidly written, Hampson's book provides a general introduction to Kierkegaard, while greatly aiding novice readers of his texts. It should also command the attention of scholars, for its forthright debate with Kierkegaard and for illuminating, as has no previous work, his Lutheran thought forms. Provocative and original, it will leave its mark on Kierkegaard scholarship, while raising seminal questions for the wider theological enterprise.

This book is the first collection of essays on Schelling in English that systematically explores the historical development of his philosophy. It addresses all four periods of Schelling's thought: his transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature, his system of identity (Identitatsphilosophie), his system of freedom, and his positive philosophy. The essays examine the constellation of philosophical ideas which motivated the formation of Schelling's thought, as well as those later ones for which his philosophy laid the foundation. They therefore relate Schelling's philosophy to a broad range of systematic issues that are of importance to us today: metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, our modern conceptions of individual autonomy, philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, political philosophy, and theology. The result is a new interpretation of Schelling's place in the history of German Idealism as an inventive and productive thinker."

By interweaving Hegelian dialectic and the middle voice, this book develops a holistic account of life, nature, and the ethical orientation of human beings with respect to them without falling into the trap of either subjecting human rights to totality or relegating non-human beings and their habitats to instrumentalism.

Attracting philosophers, politicians, artists as well as the educated reader, Edmund Burke s "Philosophical Enquiry," first published in 1757, was a milestone in western thinking. This edited volume will take the 250th anniversary of the "Philosophical Enquiry "as an occasion to reassess Burke s prominence in the history of ideas. Situated on the threshold between early modern philosophy and the Enlightenment, Burke s oeuvre combines reflections on aesthetics, politics and the sciences. This collection is the first book length work devoted primarily to Burke s "Philosophical Enquiry" in both its historical context and for its contemporary relevance. It will establish the fact that the "Enquiry" is an important philosophical and literary work in its own right."

Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy critically rethinks and extends Hegel's project for systematic philosophy without foundations, engaging the most important contemporary debates concerning logic, epistemology, metaphysics, nature, mind, economic justice, political freedom, globalization, and literary theory.

In his monumental "Critique of Pure Reason, " German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argues that human knowledge is limited by the capacity for perception. He attempts a logical designation of two varieties of knowledge: "a posteriori, " the knowledge acquired through experience; and "a priori, " knowledge not derived through experience. Kant maintains that the most practical forms of human knowledge employ the "a priori" judgments that are possible only when the mind determines the conditions of its own experience. This accurate translation by J. M. Meiklejohn offers a simple and direct rendering of Kant's work that is suitable for readers at all levels.

Since the early 1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in philosophy between Kant and Hegel, and in early German romanticism in particular. Philosophers have come to recognize that, in spite of significant differences between the contemporary and romantic contexts, romanticism continues to persist, and the questions which the romantics raised remain relevant today. The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on Early German Romantic Philosophy is the first collection of essays that offers an in-depth analysis of the reasons why philosophers are (and should be) concerned with romanticism. Through historical and systematic reconstructions, the collection offers a deeper understanding and more encompassing picture of romanticism as a philosophical movement than has been presented thus far, and explicates the role that romanticism plays - or can play - in contemporary philosophical debates. The volume includes essays by a number of preeminent international scholars and philosophers - Karl Ameriks, Frederick Beiser, Richard Eldridge, Michael Forster, Manfred Frank, Jane Kneller, and Paul Redding - who discuss the nature of philosophical romanticism and its potential to address contemporary questions and concerns. Through contributions from established and emerging philosophers, discussing key romantic themes and concerns, the volume highlights the diversity both within romantic thought and its contemporary reception. Part One consists of the first published encounter between Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser, in which the two major scholars directly discuss their vastly differing interpretations of philosophical romanticism. Part Two draws significant connections between romantic conceptions of history, sociability, hermeneutics and education and explores the ways in which these views can illuminate pressing questions in contemporary social-political philosophy and theories of interpretation. Part Three consists in some of the most innovative takes on romantic aesthetics, which seek to bring romantic thought into dialogue, with, for instance, contemporary Analytic aesthetics and theories of cognition/mind. The final part offers one of the few rigorous engagements with romantic conceptions science, and demonstrates ways in which the romantic views of nature, scientific experimentation and mathematics need not be relegated to historical curiosities.

In the digital world, Kierkegaard's thought is valuable in thinking about aesthetics as a component of human development, both including but moving beyond the religious context as its primary center of meaning. Seeing human formation as interrelated with aesthetics makes art a vital dimension of human existence. Contributing to the debate about Kierkegaard's conception of the aesthetic, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood argues that Kierkegaard's primary concern is to provocatively explore how a self becomes Christian, with aesthetics being a vital dimension for such self-formation. At a broader level, Peder Jothen also focuses on the role, authority, and meaning of aesthetic expression within religious thought generally and Christianity in particular.

During the last twenty years, Kant's theory of biology has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars and developed into a field which is growing rapidly in importance within Kant studies. The volumepresents fifteen interpretative essays written by experts working in the field, covering topics from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century biological theories, the development of the philosophy of biology in Kant's writings, the theory of organisms in Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, and current perspectives on the teleology of nature.

Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise is simultaneously a work of philosophy and a piece of practical politics. It defends religious pluralism, a republican form of political organisation, and the freedom to philosophise, with a determination that is extremely rare in seventeenth-century thought. But it is also a fierce and polemical intervention in a series of Dutch disputes over issues about which Spinoza and his opponents cared very deeply. Susan James makes the arguments of the Treatise accessible, and their motivations plain, by setting them in their historical and philosophical context. She identifies the interlocking theological, hermeneutic, historical, philosophical, and political positions to which Spinoza was responding, shows who he aimed to discredit, and reveals what he intended to achieve. The immediate goal of the Treatise is, she establishes, a local one. Spinoza is trying to persuade his fellow citizens that it is vital to uphold and foster conditions in which they can cultivate their capacity to live rationally, free from the political manifestations and corrosive psychological effects of superstitious fear. At the same time, however, his radical argument is designed for a broader audience. Appealing to the universal philosophical principles that he develops in greater detail in his Ethics, and drawing on the resources of imagination to make them forceful and compelling, Spinoza speaks to the inhabitants of all societies, including our own. Only in certain political circumstances is it possible to philosophise, and learn to live wisely and well.

This book discusses the impetus-based physics of the Jesuit natural philosopher and mathematician Honore Fabri (1608-1688), a senior representative of Jesuit scientists during the period between Galileo's death (1642) and Newton's Principia (1687). It shows how Fabri, while remaining loyal to a general Aristotelian outlook, managed to reinterpret the old concept of "impetus" in such a way as to assimilate into his physics building blocks of modern science, like Galileo's law of fall and Descartes' principle of inertia. This account of Fabri's theory is a novel one, since his physics is commonly considered as a dogmatic rejection of the New Science, not essentially different from the medieval impetus theory. This book shows how New Science principles were taught in Jesuit Colleges in the 1640s, thus depicting the sophisticated manner in which new ideas were settling within the lion's den of Catholic education.

From the shadow of the Kantian critique it to the Oxford debates over Darwinism that shook the discipline to the core, and from the death of God to the rise of new Evangelical movements, 19th-century theology was fundamentally reshaped by both internal struggles and external developments. This critical history charts this reshaping by focusing on the emerging theological themes of the period that cross authors, disciplines and nations. A team of internationally leading scholars map lines of thought from Romanticism through Hegelianism and positivism, exploring the richness of theology's interactions with anthropology, art, industry, literature, philosophy, science and society.

Terry Pinkard draws on Hegel's central works as well as his lectures on aesthetics, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history in this deeply informed and original exploration of Hegel's naturalism. As Pinkard explains, Hegel's version of naturalism was in fact drawn from Aristotelian naturalism: Hegel fused Aristotle's conception of nature with his insistence that the origin and development of philosophy has empirical physics as its presupposition. As a result, Hegel found that, although modern nature must be understood as a whole to be non-purposive, there is nonetheless a place for Aristotelian purposiveness within such nature. Such a naturalism provides the framework for explaining how we are both natural organisms and also practically minded (self-determining, rationally responsive, reason-giving) beings. In arguing for this point, Hegel shows that the kind of self-division which is characteristic of human agency also provides human agents with an updated version of an Aristotelian final end of life. Pinkard treats this conception of the final end of "being at one with oneself" in two parts. The first part focuses on Hegel's account of agency in naturalist terms and how it is that agency requires such a self-division, while the second part explores how Hegel thinks a historical narration is essential for understanding what this kind of self-division has come to require of itself. In making his case, Hegel argues that both the antinomies of philosophical thought and the essential fragmentation of modern life are all not to be understood as overcome in a higher order unity in the "State." On the contrary, Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions do not resolve such tensions any more than a comprehensive philosophical account can resolve them theoretically. The job of modern practices and institutions (and at a reflective level the task of modern philosophy) is to help us understand and live with precisely the unresolvability of these oppositions. Therefore, Pinkard explains, Hegel is not the totality theorist he has been taken to be, nor is he an "identity thinker," a la Adorno. He is an anti-totality thinker.

Although there is a huge literature on Nietzsche's philosophy, this is the first study in English that focuses on his ontology. Before proceeding to that ontology, Addis argues that, contrary to many commentators, Nietzsche defends both the possibility and the desirability of objectivity in the search for knowledge, including knowledge of the basic features of reality, that is, of ontology. In separate chapters, Addis then sets out, analyzes, and evaluates the five essential components of Nietzsche's ontology: constant change, substances and things, minds, causation, and will to power. In each case, Addis contributes an original understanding of the feature under discussion, with more detail than exists in other treatments, and defended with quotes from relevant texts of Nietzsche.

This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy. Many chapters articulate new, detailed methods of doing history of philosophy. These present conflicting visions of the history of philosophy as an autonomous sub-discipline of professional philosophy. Several other chapters offer new approaches to integrating history into one's philosophy. These do so by re-telling the history of recent philosophy. A number of chapters explore the relationship between history of philosophy and history of science. Among the topics discussed and debated in the volume are: the status of the principle of charity; the nature of reading texts; the role of historiography within the history of philosophy; the nature of establishing proper context.

The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century comprises twenty-six new essays by leading experts in the field. This unique scholarly resource provides advanced students and scholars with a comprehensive overview of the issues that are informing research on the subject, while at the same time offering new directions for research to take. The volume is ambitious in scope: it covers the whole of the seventeenth century, ranging from Francis Bacon to John Locke and Isaac Newton. The Handbook contains five parts: the introductory Part I examines the state of the discipline and the nature of its practitioners as the century unfolded; Part II discusses the leading natural philosophers and the philosophy of nature, including Bacon, Boyle, and Newton; Part III covers knowledge and the human faculty of the understanding; Part IV explores the leading topics in British moral philosophy from the period; and Part V concerns political philosophy. In addition to dealing with canonical authors and celebrated texts, such as Thomas Hobbes and his Leviathan, the Handbook discusses many less well-known figures and debates from the period, whose importance is only now being appreciated.