Not many people realize it, but the world is coming apart-and it's probably not going to get better anytime soon. Terrorism, natural disasters, economic collapses, riots, and civil unrest continue to spread throughout cities, states, and nations. It's more important than ever to prepare to survive such events.

David Browne, a Vietnam veteran who was assigned to the CIA and flew out of Udorn Thailand along the Ho Chi Minh trail with Air America, relies on his experiences during the war and after to help you survive the tough times ahead. As the former operator of Pioneer Survival School, he has lived "off the grid" with his family for twelve years, and he's an expert on survival.

This guidebook to family preparedness can teach you how to survive riots and civil unrest; decide when to ignore governmental orders; plan an escape from the city where you live; and protect your family even when you don't have guns.

You'll also learn what foods and other tangible goods to have on hand in order to keep yourself and your loved ones alive. When the going gets tough, this guide can help you to survive this new millennium.

Veterans in rural communities face unique challenges, who will step up to help?
Beginning with a brief scenario of a more gentle view of rural life, the book moves through learned information about families, children, and our returning National Guard and Reserve civilian military members. Return experiences will necessarily be different in rural and frontier settings than they are in suburban and urban environments. Our rural and frontier areas, especially in Western states with more isolated communities, less developed communication and limited access to medical, psychological and social services remain an important concern. This book helps provide some informed direction in working toward improving these as a general guide for mental health professionals working with Guard and Reserve members and families in rural/frontier settings. An appendix provides an in-depth list of online references for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI).
Specific areas of concern include: Morale, deployment abroad, and stress factors Effects of terrorism on children and families at home Understanding survivor guilt Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and suicide Preventing secondary traumatization Resiliency among refugee populations and military families Adjustment and re-integration following the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Vicarious trauma and its effects on children and adults How rural and remote communities differ from more urban ones following war experiences in readjusting military members Characteristics important in therapists/counselors working with returning military
Doherty's second volume in this new series "Crisis in the American Heartland" explores these and many other issues. Each volume available in trade paper, hardcover, and eBook formats.
Learn more at www.RMRInstitute.org
PSY022040 Psychology: Psychopathology - Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
SOC040000 Social Science: Disasters & Disaster Relief
HIS027170 Military - Iraq War (2003-)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) encourages State and local governments, tribal authorities, and private non-profit organizations to take a proactive approach to coordinating and managing debris removal operations as part of their overall emergency management plan. Communities with a debris management plan are better prepared to restore public services and ensure the public health and safety in the aftermath of a disaster, and they are better positioned to receive the full level of assistance available to them from FEMA and other participating entities. The core components of a comprehensive debris management plan incorporate best practices in debris removal, reflect FEMA eligibility criteria, and are tailored to the specific needs and unique circumstances of each applicant. FEMA developed this guide to provide applicants with a programmatic and operational framework for structuring their own debris management plan or ensuring that their existing plan is consistent with FEMA's eligibility criteria. This framework: 1. Identifies and explains the debris removal eligibility criteria that applicants must meet in order to receive assistance under the FEMA Public Assistance (PA) Program; 2. Provides a blueprint for assembling an effective and responsive plan for the entire debris management cycle; 3. Outlines the FEMA Public Assistance debris removal organizational structure and strategy.

The official Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) is a guide for use by transporters, firefighters, police, and other emergency services personnel who may be the first to arrive at the scene of a transportation incident involving a hazardous material. It is used by first responders in (1) quickly identifying the specific or generic classification of the material(s) involved in the incident, and (2) protecting themselves and the general public during this initial response phase of the incident. The ERG is updated every three to four years to accommodate new products and technology.

GAO-11-700. Cyclone Nargis hit Burma's impoverished Irrawaddy Delta on May 2, 2008, leaving nearly 140,000 people dead or missing and severely affecting about 2.4 million others, according to the UN. The Burmese military government initially blocked most access to the affected region; however, amid international pressure, it slowly began allowing international aid workers entry into the region. Since 1997, the United States has imposed sanctions to prohibit, among other things, the exportation of financial services to Burma and transactions with Burmese officials. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO (1) described the assistance UN and U.S. agencies have provided in response to Cyclone Nargis, (2) assessed USAID actions to help ensure funds are used as intended and do not benefit sanctioned entities, and (3) described the challenges responders experienced and the lessons learned. GAO reviewed financial and program documents; interviewed U.S., UN, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials; and traveled to Thailand and Burma. UN and U.S. agencies provided about $335 million for emergency response and recovery activities after Cyclone Nargis. Of that total, 11 UN agencies obligated roughly $288 million for assistance in various sectors, including food, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture. The U.S. government provided about $38 million of the UN's total as part of its roughly $85 million in obligations for emergency response and longer-term recovery activities. Of the $85 million U.S. response, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which led U.S. efforts, obligated about $72 million. The Department of Defense obligated about $13 million to procure and deliver emergency relief supplies. USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but had some monitoring weaknesses. USAID took actions prior to the delivery of assistance, including selecting partners experienced in working with USAID and in Burma and providing extra guidance to help ensure funds were not misused. To monitor assistance, USAID has conducted some site visits. However, USAID's monitoring contains little financial oversight and we found that two grantees charged USAID for unapproved international travel. Also, in some cases site visits were not sufficiently documented. USAID relies on external audits of grantees, but relevant USAID staff were not aware of audit findings related to one grantee's cash payments to villagers in Burma. The grantee subsequently addressed the audit findings. Lastly, U.S. and UN agencies said they examined reports of misuse of assistance in their programs and found no evidence that assistance had been misused. GAO's review of 16 after-action reports from donors, NGOs, and UN agencies, showed that those responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar challenges and developed lessons learned in four main areas: access, coordination, implementation, and limited in-country disaster response capacity. Responders found it difficult to reach affected areas because the Burmese government limited their travel and the infrastructure was poor. Responders also had difficulty coordinating between headquarters and field offices for several reasons, including limited telecommunication services. A U.S. report highlighted coordination challenges amongst U.S. agencies, stating that agencies' conflicting agendas resulted in difficulties related to the appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid. Implementation challenges include supplies that were incompatible with local conditions, such as medicines with instructions printed in non-Burmese languages and difficulties monitoring aid.