Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005, but in the subsequent ten years, the city has demonstrated both remarkable resilience and frustrating stagnation. In Reforming New Orleans, Peter F. Burns and Matthew O. Thomas chart the city's recovery and assess how successfully officials at the local, state, and federal levels transformed the Big Easy in the wake of disaster. Focusing on reforms in four key sectors of urban governance-economic development, education, housing, and law enforcement-both before and after Katrina, they find lessons for cities hit by sudden shocks, such as natural disasters or large-scale financial crises.One of their key insights is that post-disaster recovery tends to limit local control. State and federal officials, national foundations, and local actors excluded by pre-Katrina politics used their resources and authority to displace entrenched local interests and implement a public agenda focused on institutional and governmental change. Burns and Thomas also make clear reform in New Orleans was already underway before Katrina hit, but that it had focused largely on upper- and middle-class residents, a trend that accelerated after the storm. The market-centered nature of the reforms have ensured that they largely benefited city and regional elites while not significantly aiding the city's working-class and impoverished populations. Thus reform has come at a cost and that cost, in the long term, could undermine the political gains of the post-Katrina era.

According to available information, landsliding in the United States causes an average of 25 to 50 deaths and $1 to $2 billion in economic losses annually. Although all 50 states are subject to landslide activity, the Rocky Mountain, Appalachian, and Pacific Coast regions generally suffer the greatest landslide losses. The costs of landsliding can be direct or indirect and range from the expense of cleanup and repair or replacement of structures to lost tax revenues and reduced productivity and property values. Landslide losses are growing in the United States despite the availability of successful techniques for landslide management and control. The failure to lessen the problem is primarily due to the ever-increasing pressure of development in areas of geologically hazardous terrain and the failure of responsible government entities and private developers to recognize landslide hazards and to apply appropriate measures for their mitigation, even though there is overwhelming evidence that landslide hazard mitigation programs serve both public and private interests by saving many times the cost of implementation. The high cost of landslide damage will continue to increase if community development and capital investments continue without taking advantage of the opportunities that currently exist to mitigate the effects of landslides. The widespread occurrence of landsliding, together with the potential for catastrophic statewide and regional impacts, emphasizes the need for cooperation among federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. Although annual landslide losses in the U.S. are extremely high, significant reductions in future losses can be achieved through a combination of landslide hazard mitigation and emergency management. Landslide hazard mitigation consists of those activities that reduce the likelihood of occurrence of damaging landslides and minimize the effects of the landslides that do occur. The goal of emergency management is to minimize loss of life and property damage through the timely and efficient commitment of available resources. Despite their common goals, emergency management and hazard mitigation activities have historically been carried out independently. The integration of these two efforts is most often demonstrated in the recovery phase following a disaster, when decisions about reconstruction and future land uses in the community are made. The development and implementation of landslide loss-reduction strategies requires the cooperation of many public and private institutions, all levels of government, and private citizens. Coordinated and comprehensive systems for landslide hazard mitigation do not currently exist in most states and communities faced with the problem. In most states, local governments often take the lead by identifying goals and objectives, controlling land use, providing hazard information and technical assistance to property owners and developers, and implementing mitigation projects as resources allow. State and federal agencies play supporting roles-primarily financial, technical, and administrative. In some cases, however, legislation originating at the state or federal level is the sole impetus for stimulating effective local mitigation activity. In many states there remains a need to develop long-term organizational systems at state and local levels to deal with landslide hazard mitigation in a coordinated and systematic manner. The development of a landslide hazard mitigation plan can be the initial step in the establishment of state and local programs that promote long-term landslide loss reduction. The purpose of this guidebook is to provide a practical, politically feasible guide for state and local officials involved in landslide hazard mitigation. The guidebook presents concepts and a framework for the preparation of state and local landslide hazard mitigation plans.

During the past few decades, the number of large public warehouse stores (often referred to as big-box stores) across the nation has grown significantly, changing both consumer buying habits and the public's risk of injury during earthquakes. During an earthquake, occupant safety in a big-box store depends on both the structural performance of the building and on the performance of the storage racks and their contents. Earthquake ground motions can cause storage racks to collapse or overturn if they are not properly designed, installed, maintained, and loaded. In addition, goods stored on the racks may spill or topple off. Both occurrences pose a life-safety risk to the exposed shopping public. The immediate stimulus for the project that resulted in this report was a 2003 request from the State of Washington to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for guidance concerning the life-safety risk posed by the storage racks in publicly accessible areas of retail stores, especially the risk of rack collapse of loss of stored goods during an earthquake. FEMA asked the Building Seismic Safety Council (BSSC) to develop the requested guidance. To do so, the BSSC established a Rack Project Task Group composed of practicing engineers, storage rack designers, researchers, representatives of the Rack Manufacturers Institute (RMI) and the Retail Industry Leaders Association, and members of applicable technical subcommittees responsible for updating the NEHRP Recommended Provisions. In developing this guidance document, the Task Group focused primarily on steel single selective pallet storage racks. It reviewed available information on storage rack performance during earthquakes and the background on the development of standards and code requirements for storage racks; assessed seismic requirements for storage racks and current practices with respect to rack design, maintenance and operations, quality assurance, and post-earthquake inspections; and examined available research and testing data. Based on its study, the Task Group developed short-term recommendations to improve current practice and formulated long-term recommendations to serve as the basis for improved standards documents such as the NEHRP Recommended Provisions, ASCE 7, and the RMI-developed storage rack specification. Over the near term, the Task Group recommends that the 2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions requirements for steel single selective pallet storage rack design be followed and that connections be checked in accordance with a procedure to be developed by RMI. The Task Group also recommends that additional guidance presented in this report be voluntarily adopted by store owners and operators. Further, given the fact that maintenance and use of storage racks is a key element to their acceptable performance during earthquakes, store owners and operators should adopt an appropriate quality assurance plan; as a minimum, the best self-imposed practices of store owners and operators should be maintained. The Task Group's primary long-term recommendation is that the RMI specification be brought into conformance with the 2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions, which is the basis for seismic requirements found in current seismic design standards and model building codes. The Task Group also recommends that optional performance-based and limit state procedures and component cyclic testing procedures be incorporated into the RMI-developed specification. Compliance with these procedures will demonstrate that the storage racks have the capacity to resist maximum considered earthquake ground motions without collapse. It also is recommended that regulatory bodies periodically review the quality assurance programs of stores and implement any regulations needed to satisfy life-safety concerns that relate to the securing of rack contents and rack maintenance and use.

Lifelines (e.g., communication, electric power, liquid fuels, natural gas, transportation, water and sewer systems, etc.) are presently being sited in "utility or transportation corridors" to reduce their right-of-way environmental, aesthetic, and cost impacts on the community and on land use. The individual lifelines are usually constructed or modified at different time periods, resulting in their being built to different standards and in different siting criteria being applied to different segments of an individual lifeline or to different lifelines that provide similar functions. Presently, the siting review usually does not consider the impact of the proximity or collocation of one lifeline upon the risk to or vulnerability of other lifelines from natural or manmade hazards or disasters, either because the other lifelines have not yet been installed or because such a consideration has not been identified as a factor in the siting evaluation. In August 1988, a train derailment in northern California also damaged a petroleum pipeline which was buried along the railroad right-of-way. The result was a spill of the pipeline fluids in addition to the derailment (but no significant loss of property and no injuries to or casualties). When another derailment in San Bernardino occurred in May l989, which resulted in severe property damage and the loss of life, the Office of the Fire Marshall also responded to see if the derailment had impacted a petroleum products pipeline that was buried along the railroad right-of-way. It was decided that the pipeline was not damaged, and the fire and safety personnel turned over the site to the railroad to allow them to clean up the site. About a week later the pipeline ruptured and the resulting fire caused considerable property damage and loss of life. The subsequent investigations concluded that the pipeline may have been damaged during the derailment, but that the most probable cause of its damage was the derailment clean up operations. In a similar sense, communication lines along a highway bridge would be vulnerable to failure if the bridge were to displace or fail during a disaster event. In fact, frequently highway bridges and overpasses are used to route other lifelines, such as communications and pipelines, over causeways and water bodies. Such lifelines can be damaged by failure of the superstructure, bridge foundation movement, or ground deformation along the approaches to the bridge. Settlement and lateral displacement adjacent to abutments have been especially troublesome because such movements tend to impose deformations on the lifelines where they are locally constrained at the attachment or penetration of the abutment. There are many such examples of lifeline interdependency that occurred during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. In response to these types of situations, FEMA is focusing attention on the use of such corridors, and they initiated this study to examine the impacts of siting multiple lifeline systems in confined and at-risk areas. The overall FEMA project goals are to develop, for multiple lifeline systems in confined and at-risk areas, a managerial tool that can be used to increase the understanding of the lifeline systems' vulnerabilities and to help identify potential mitigation approaches that could be used to reduce those vulnerabilities. The goals also are to identify methods to enhance the transfer of the resulting information to lifeline system providers, designers, builders, managers, operators, users, and regulators. To provide a specific example of how the managerial tool can be used, it was decided that the methods should be applied to the lifelines in the Cajon Pass, California, for an assumed earthquake event at the Pass. The purpose of this report is to provide an inventory of the major lifeline systems in the Cajon Pass and the earthquake and geologic analysis tools available to identify and define the level of seismic risk to those lifelines.

An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is one of the primary safeguards against the loss of life and property damage that can result from the failure of a high-hazard potential dam. Today, there are approximately 8,300 state-regulated high-hazard potential dams in the United States. Of these 8.300 dams, approximately 40 percent do not have an EAP. Since the establishment of the National Dam Safety Program in 1979, both the state and federal sectors have made significant progress in increasing the number of state-regulated high-hazard potential dams with EAP's. The dam safety community recognizes, however, that much more must be done to reach the goal established in January 2006 by the National Dam Safety Review Board: achieve 100 percent compliance for EAP's for high-hazard potential dams. When the National Dam Safety Review Board met in October 2005, the losses from Hurricane Katrina had just exposed significant failures in all aspects of the Nation's emergency mitigation, planning, and response. The failure of the emergency management system to respond quickly and effectively to the disaster brought to the forefront the need for all hazard areas, including dam safety, to refocus their attention on this critical requirement. For the dam infrastructure, the need for emergency action planning is heightened by the aging of dams in the United States. The 2005 Report Card for America's Infrastructure (American Society of Civil Engineers, March 2005) states that the number of unsafe or deficient dams in the United States has risen by more than 33 percent since 1998, to more than 3,500. To address these issues, the National Dam Safety Review Board established the Task Group on Emergency Action Planning and Response. The Task Group, which began its work in January 2006, recognized that the success of its effort would require the involvement of all of the sectors with an interest in its outcome. As a result, the sectors represented on the Task Group include state and federal dam safety professionals and engineers, the emergency management community, the security and protection community, and emergency response organizations. Appendix D includes the list of Task Group members. This document provides the Task Group's findings, recommendations, and strategies for significantly increasing the number of EAP's for state-regulated high-hazard potential dams.

The Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, caused widespread building damage throughout some of the most heavily populated communities of Southern California including the San Fernando Valley, Santa Monica and West Los Angeles, resulting in estimated economic losses exceeding $30 billion. Much of the damage sustained was quite predictable, occurring in types of buildings that engineers had previously identified as having low seismic resistance and significant risk of damage in earthquakes. This included older masonry and concrete buildings, but not steel framed buildings. Surprisingly, however, a number of modern, welded, steel, moment-frame buildings also sustained significant damage. This damage consisted of a brittle fracturing of the steel frames at the welded joints between the beams (horizontal framing members) and columns (vertical framing members). A few of the most severely damaged buildings could readily be observed to be out-of plumb (leaning to one side). However, many of the damaged buildings exhibited no outward signs of these fractures, making damage detection both difficult and costly. Then, exactly one year later, on January 17, 1995, the city of Kobe, Japan also experienced a large earthquake, causing similar unanticipated damage to steel moment-frame buildings. Prior to the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes, engineers believed that steel moment-frames would behave in a ductile manner, bending under earthquake loading, but not breaking. As a result, this became one of the most common types of construction used for major buildings in areas subject to severe earthquakes. The discovery of the potential for fracturing in these frames called to question the adequacy of the building code provisions dealing with this type of construction and created a crisis of confidence around the world. Engineers did not have clear guidance on how to detect damage, repair the damage they found, assess the safety of existing buildings, upgrade buildings found to be deficient or design new steel moment-frame structures to perform adequately in earthquakes. The observed damage also raised questions as to whether buildings in cities affected by other past earthquakes had sustained similar undetected damage and were now weakened and potentially hazardous. In response to the many concerns raised by these damage discoveries, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sponsored a program of directed investigation and development to identify the cause of the damage, quantify the risk inherent in steel structures and develop practical and effective engineering criteria for mitigation of this risk. As the project progressed, interim guidance documents were published to provide practicing engineers and the construction industry with important information on the lessons learned, as well as recommendations for investigation, repair, upgrade, and design of steel moment frame buildings. Many of these recommendations have already been incorporated into recent building codes. This project culminated with the publication of four engineering practice guideline documents. These four volumes include state-of-the-art recommendations that should be included in future building codes, as well as guidelines that may be applied voluntarily to assess and reduce the earthquake risk in our communities. This policy guide has been prepared to provide a nontechnical summary of the valuable information contained in the FEMA/SAC publications, an understanding of the risk associated with steel moment-frame buildings, and the practical measures that can be taken to reduce this risk. It is anticipated that this guide will be of interest to building owners and tenants, members of the financial and insurance industries, and to government planners and the building regulation community.

One of the activities authorized by the Dam Safety and Security Act of 2002 is research to enhance the Nation's ability to assure that adequate dam safety programs and practices are in place throughout the United States. The Act of 2002 states that the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation with the National Dam Safety Review Board (Review Board), shall carry out a program of technical and archival research to develop and support: improved techniques, historical experience, and equipment for rapid and effective dam construction, rehabilitation, and inspection; devices for continued monitoring of the safety of dams; development and maintenance of information resources systems needed to support managing the safety of dams; and initiatives to guide the formulation of effective policy and advance improvements in dam safety engineering, security, and management. With the funding authorized by the Congress, the goal of the Review Board and the Dam Safety Research Work Group (Work Group) is to encourage research in those areas expected to make significant contributions to improving the safety and security of dams throughout the United States. The Work Group (formerly the Research Subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety) met initially in February 1998. To identify and prioritize research needs, the Subcommittee sponsored a workshop on Research Needs in Dam Safety in Washington D.C. in April 1999. Representatives of state and federal agencies, academia, and private industry attended the workshop. Seventeen broad area topics related to the research needs of the dam safety community were identified. To more fully develop the research needs identified, the Research Subcommittee subsequently sponsored a series of nine workshops. Each workshop addressed a broad research topic (listed) identified in the initial workshop. Experts attending the workshops included international representatives as well as representatives of state, federal, and private organizations within the United States. Impacts of Plants and Animals on Earthen Dams; Risk Assessment for Dams; Spillway Gates; Seepage through Embankment Dams; Embankment Dam Failure Analysis; Hydrologic Issues for Dams; Dam Spillways; Seismic Issues for Dams; Dam Outlet Works. Based on the research workshops, research topics have been proposed and pursued. Several topics have progressed to products of use to the dam safety community, such as technical manuals and guidelines. For future research, it is the goal of the Work Group to expand dam safety research to other institutions and professionals performing research in this field. The proceedings from the research workshops present a comprehensive and detailed discussion and analysis of the research topics addressed by the experts participating in the workshops. The participants at all of the research workshops are to be commended for their diligent and highly professional efforts on behalf of the National Dam Safety Program. The National Dam Safety Program research needs workshop on Embankment Dam Failure Analysis was held on June 26-28, 2001, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, would like to acknowledge the contributions of the Agricultural Research Service and the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in organizing the workshop and developing these workshop proceedings.

In 1999, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) jointly conducted research and a workshop to shed light on the national problem of animal intrusion damage to earthen dams and the resulting safety issues. The FEMA/ASDSO survey and workshop united dam owners, engineers, state and federal regulators, wildlife managers, foresters, and academia to form an educated and experienced front against the growing problem of earthen dam damage and failures due to animal intrusion. The infor-mation generated by roundtable discussions and survey answers indicates that while most states recognize animal intrusion as a problem, only a handful know of guidance on dams and wildlife management practices available to the dam professionals and owners. Based on input from the dam communities, FEMA/ASDSO's mission to develop a guidance manual on the proper management of nuisance wildlife in the earthen dam environment became clear. To determine the information needs of the dam community-and therefore the most appropriate focus of this manual-FEMA/ASDSO issued a survey in 1999 and used the survey input from the 48 state dam safety officials representatives and 11 federal agencies representing the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS). Additionally, a second survey was issued in 2003 to identify the current needs of each state, determine what nuisance wildlife and damages the states encounter, and understand which miti-gation methods are being used with success or failure. This manual provides technical guidance to dam specialists (including dam owners, operators, inspectors, state dam officials, and consulting engineers) in areas of focus identified through the two survey efforts and workshop. The purposes of this manual are to: Assist dam specialists in understanding the impacts wildlife can have on earthen dams; Provide dam specialists with basic information on habitat, range, description, and behavior of common nuisance wildlife to aid in their proper identification at the dam; Describe state-of-practice methods to prevent and mitigate adverse wildlife impacts on earthen dams. Provide state-of-practice design guidance for repair and preventive design associated with nuisance wildlife intrusion. It is envisioned that the entire dam specialist community will use this manual to augment their routine duties in earthen dam management. This manual is presented as a process toward dam inspection and management that includes wildlife damage identification and control. This manual provides technical information and guidance on: How wildlife damage adversely affects the safe operation of earthen dams; specifically, hydraulic alteration, internal and external erosion, and structural integrity losses (Chapter 2.0); Dam inspections that incorporate a biological component to sensitize dam specialists to the aspects of their dams that attract wildlife and to understand where nuisance wildlife are likely to occur on the dam (Chapter 3.0); Biological data for specific nuisance wildlife to assist the dam specialist in identifying which nuisance wildlife inhabits the dam. Biological data will also assist in controlling nuisance wildlife (e.g., listed food sources can be removed to encourage the animal to leave the area) (Chapter 4.0); Dam design specifications and methods that can be incorporated into repair of existing dams or new dam designs to prevent wildlife intrusions (Chapter 5.0); Guidelines to determine when wildlife management should occur at a dam (beyond dam repair and prevention actions) and wildlife management methods that can be implemented when control of specific nuisance wild-life populations is deemed necessary. Specific methods discussed include habitat modification, use of toxicants and fumigants, trapping, and shooting (Chapter 6.0); The fiscal issues related to appropriate and timely wildlife management at earthen dams (Chapter 7.0).

Disaster preparedness became a renewed priority for our Nation as a direct response to the devastation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Following the tragedies of that day, government at all levels has embedded stronger collaboration with nongovernmental civic and private sector organizations and the general public in policies and practices. The Citizen Corps grassroots model of community preparedness has spread across the country, and Americans have been asked to become fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to respond to potential threats and hazards. To evaluate the Nation's progress on personal preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Community Preparedness Division conducts Citizen Corps National Surveys to measure the public's knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors relative to preparing for a range of hazards. This report provides a summary of the findings from the 2009 Citizen Corps National Survey. The research objectives and survey questions for the Citizen Corps National Survey were developed based on previous research, preparedness modeling, and policy and guidance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2003, Citizen Corps conducted a national survey to provide baseline data on individual preparedness for disasters. In 2007, the Citizen Corps National Survey was designed to incorporate additional areas of examination and to refine the questioning, while retaining several specific questions from the 2003 survey to provide trend data. The 2009 Citizen Corps National Survey includes several more small refinements. Comparisons between the findings from the 2003, 2007, and 2009 surveys are noted throughout the report. FEMA's Community Preparedness Division publishes the Citizen Preparedness Review to highlight specific areas of research regarding community preparedness and to summarize research findings from multiple sources. To assess the research landscape on preparedness, Citizen Corps has developed and maintains the Citizen Preparedness Surveys Database of surveys on personal and business preparedness conducted in the United States since September 11, 2001. As of August 2009, the database contains 102 surveys on individual preparedness, 29 surveys on business, and 11 surveys on school preparedness. Analyzing research from this wide variety of sources allows larger preparedness trends and research gaps to be identified. Citizen Preparedness Review Issue 3, Patterns in Current Research and Future Research Opportunities (published summer 2006), made several recommendations for future research that were taken into consideration in the development of the Citizen Corps National Survey implemented in 2007 and 2009. These recommendations included: More fully explore participants' knowledge of the correct preparedness measures and appropriate responses for different types of hazards; Investigate a more comprehensive range of knowledge, supplies, and skills related to disaster preparedness, such as knowledge of warning systems, evacuation routes, and training for specific skills; More fully explore motivational barriers to preparedness, such as the degree of uncertainty about ability to perform recommended measures or perceptions that recommended measures will not make a difference in disaster situations; Investigate demographic and contextual characteristics as they relate to preparedness including: prior experience with disasters, disability/ability factors, and community engagement; Examine individuals' preparedness in multiple locations in addition to their homes, such as the school, workplace, and community. An important finding from the Citizen Preparedness Surveys Database is that perceived preparedness can be very different from the specific preparedness measures taken. In nearly all cases, these surveys substantiate that the proportion of those who have taken appropriate preparedness measures is much lower than those that indicate that they are prepared.

Blanco County, Texas has been awarded, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Homeland Security Program Grant (HSGP) authorization to construct a three hundred (300) foot new communications tower, a total of three hundred twenty (320) feet with the planned attached antennae. This communications tower will enhance the interoperable communications among all first responder disciplines in response to terrorist attacks and during times of natural or man-made disasters. The HSGP provides grant funding to public safety agencies for the protection of critical communications infrastructure from terrorism, natural disasters and routine operations. HSGP supports the implementation of State Homeland Security Strategies to address the identified planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and other catastrophic events. This Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared according to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as applied to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at 44 CFR Part 10. This section of the federal code requires that FEMA take into account environmental considerations when authorizing or approving actions, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. This phased project, is a joint venture between Burnet (1,021 Sq. Mi.), Llano (966 Sq. Mi.) and Blanco (713 Sq. Mi.) Counties will build a P25 Regional VHF Digital Trunking Communications System that allows for a link back to the Austin Master Site Controller making it an element of a much larger Capital Area Council of Governments (CAPCOG) Regional Radio System. The terrain of the three counties consists of 2,700 Square Miles of rural, rugged hills, valleys, and lakes over the three county areas. The new system will increase coverage from nonexistent in numerous locations to approximately 94% AREA Portable Inbound coverage. The Project is being installed in Phases beginning with FY 2007 Grant Year thru FY 2010 Grant Year. The link back to the Austin Master Site Controller making it an element of a much larger CAPCOG Regional Radio System is being planned for FY 2011 Grant Year. This project will assist Burnet, Llano and Blanco Counties in completing our P25 Communications System for our CAPCOG Regional Interoperable project and is fully compliant with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) January 1, 2013 Narrowband mandate for VHF Frequencies. In support of the proposed project, the Blanco County Commissioners Court conducted a public meeting on August 9, 2011 that included discussions regarding the funding for the Round Mountain Tower site. The purpose of this EA is to analyze the potential environmental impacts of the proposed construction of a communications tower facility. FEMA will use the findings in this EA to determine whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).

Experience with recent disaster recovery efforts highlights the need for additional guidance, structure and support to improve how we as a Nation address recovery challenges. This experience prompts us to better understand the obstacles to disaster recovery and the challenges faced by communities that seek disaster assistance. The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) is a guide to promote effective recovery, particularly for those incidents that are large-scale or catastrophic. The NDRF provides guidance that enables effective recovery support to disaster-impacted States, Tribes and local jurisdictions. It provides a flexible structure that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and collaborative manner. It also focuses on how best to restore, redevelop and revitalize the health, social, economic, natural and environmental fabric of the community and build a more resilient Nation. The NDRF defines: Core recovery principles; Roles and responsibilities of recovery coordinators and other stakeholders; A coordinating structure that facilitates communication and collaboration among all stakeholders; Guidance for pre- and post-disaster recovery planning; The overall process by which communities can capitalize on opportunities to rebuild stronger, smarter and safer. These elements improve recovery support and expedite recovery of disaster-impacted individuals, families, businesses and communities. While the NDRF speaks to all who are impacted or otherwise involved in disaster recovery, it concentrates on support to individuals and communities. The NDRF introduces four new concepts and terms: Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC); State or Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (SDRC or TDRC); Local Disaster Recovery Managers (LDRM); Recovery Support Functions (RSFs). The FDRC, SDRC, TDRC and LDRM provide focal points for incorporating recovery considerations into the decisionmaking process and monitoring the need for adjustments in assistance where necessary and feasible throughout the recovery process. The RSFs are six groupings of core recovery capabilities that provide a structure to facilitate problem solving, improve access to resources, and foster coordination among State and Federal agencies, nongovernmental partners and stakeholders. The concepts of the FDRCs, SDRCs, TDRCs and RSFs are scalable to the nature and size of the disaster. The NDRF aligns with the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF primarily addresses actions during disaster response. Like the NRF, the NDRF seeks to establish an operational structure and to develop a common planning framework. Fundamentally, the NDRF is a construct to optimally engage existing Federal resources and authorities, and to incorporate the full capabilities of all sectors in support of community recovery. The effective implementation of the NDRF, whether or not in the context of a Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) declaration, requires strong coordination across all levels of government, NGOs and the private sector. It also requires an effective, accessible public information effort so that all stakeholders understand the scope and the realities of recovery. The NDRF provides guidance to assure that recovery activities respect the civil rights and civil liberties of all populations and do not result in discrimination on account of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age or disability. Understanding legal obligations and sharing best practices when planning and implementing recovery strategies to avoid excluding groups on these bases is critical. The NDRF is a guide to promote effective recovery. It is a concept of operations and not intended to impose new, additional or unfunded net resource requirements on Federal agencies.

In the last decade, disasters have affected university and college campuses with disturbing frequency, sometimes causing death and injury, but always imposing monetary losses and disruption of the institution's teaching, research, and public service. Damage to buildings and infrastructure and interruption to the institutional mission result in significant losses that can be measured by faculty and student departures, decreases in research funding, and increases in insurance premiums. These losses could have been substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive pre-disaster planning and mitigation actions. September 11, 2001 reminded everyone of the importance of taking steps to mitigate the consequences of disasters. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, many higher education institutions reviewed their disaster plans and began to reconsider issues of safety and security. Natural and man-made disasters represent a wide array of threats to the instructional, research, and public service missions of higher education institutions. This publication provides planning guidance to these institutions as they prepare to identify their risks, assess their vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards, and develop a hazard mitigation plan. Its purposes are to encourage higher education institutions to take hazard mitigation seriously and to illustrate a course of action for implementing a mitigation program to permanently reduce vulnerability to future disasters. This publication is both a how-to guide and a distillation of the experiences of six universities and colleges across the country that have been working over the past several years to become more disaster-resistant. It complements the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) State and Local Mitigation Planning how-to guides that provide planning guidance for creating and implementing a hazard mitigation planning process. These how-to guides are excellent resources for higher education institutions and are referenced in this publication whenever appropriate. This guide provides basic information designed for institutions just getting started as well as concrete ideas, suggestions, and practical experiences for institutions that have already begun to take steps to becoming more disaster-resistant.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) mission is "to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a Nation, we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards." As the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) floodplain mapping program has evolved, Flood Insurance Study (FIS) data and maps have become more detailed and more accurate through improved computer models and greater use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). In addition, the technical requirements of the FEMA Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program have resulted in an expansion of the amount of useful flood data. As the data have improved, the use of the data has extended beyond floodplain management permits and flood insurance. For example, the data are being used to increase the flood resistance in the design of new buildings and retrofits of existing buildings. Design information, which is available in the FEMA Building Science Branch library, includes enhanced design, siting, construction, and retrofit guidance and requirements for buildings in or adjacent to Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). The library consists of publications, technical bulletins, training descriptions, and tools, all of which are available online. The flood risk data available from the Risk MAP program provides FEMA with additional resources to inform communities, property owners, and other interested parties about the vast library of Building Science resources. The resources can be used together with flood risk maps and other flood hazard products to reduce the loss of life, number of injuries, and property damage from flood events. The purpose of this report is to present the best practices for incorporating Building Science flood mitigation information into the Risk MAP program and strategies for informing interested parties of the Building Science resources.

The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is a multiagency center that provides overall Federal support coordination for major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic incidents and emergency management program implementation. Staffed by the National Response Coordination Staff (NRCS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), maintains the NRCC as a functional component of the National Operations Center (NOC) in support of incident support operations at the regional-level. Upon activation, the NRCS provides national-level emergency management by coordinating and integrating resources, policy guidance, situational awareness, and planning in order to support the affected region(s).The FEMA National Incident Support Manual describes how FEMA national staff support FEMA incident operations and briefly discusses steady-state activities pertinent to incident operations. This manual defines the activities of Federal assistance-across the nation and within FEMA's statutory authority-supporting citizens and first responders in responding to, recovering from, and mitigating all hazards. It includes definitions and descriptions of roles and responsibilities, functions, and organizational structures for those conducting FEMA incident support duties, thus forming the basis from which FEMA personnel plan and execute their assigned missions. This manual also serves as the basis for developing related guidance (procedures, handbooks, incident guides, training materials, etc.). This manual will also discuss how NRCS procedures are relevant to all personnel (FEMA, other Federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector) who are either assigned to or coordinating with the NRCS. The NRCS is aligned by the functions it performs to meet the FEMA mission. This has the following advantages: NRCC structure is aligned to its primary Missions; Planning support, situational awareness, resources support, and National Response Center and Staff support are addressed as separate functions; No redundancy of function exists between incident, the regional-level, and the national-level; The alignment makes resource support efficient; The alignment promotes unity of effort.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directs the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a National Incident Management System (NIMS). Initially published in March 2004, and revised in December 2008, the NIMS provides a consistent national approach for Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to work together to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. HSPD-5 directs Federal agencies to adopt NIMS and encourages adoption of NIMS by all other stakeholders-State, tribal, and local governments; private sector organizations; critical infrastructure owners and operators; and NGOs involved in emergency management. In addition, the adoption and implementation of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations is a condition for receiving Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, and other activities, as stated in HSPD-5. Based upon emergency management and incident response practices, NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. The institutionalization of these elements nationwide through training helps to mitigate risk by achieving greater preparedness. Incident after-action reports and NIMS both emphasize that successful implementation relies upon development and maintenance of a national NIMS training program. Furthermore, NIMS implementation relies upon comprehensive NIMS training and standardized personnel qualification. The primary goal of this guidance is to facilitate training and qualification of emergency management personnel to all NIMS concepts and principles. The NIMS Training Program identifies a deliberate method to develop and maintain a complete NIMS core curriculum and, concurrently, to provide training guidance to stakeholders for developing their training plans. To meet this goal, the NIMS Training Program has the following three objectives: 1. Support NIMS education and training for all emergency management personnel; 2. Adapt the functional capabilities defined by NIMS into guidelines, courses, and a curriculum that help stakeholders to develop personnel training and credentialing plans that yield the desired capabilities; 3. Define the minimum personnel qualifications required for service on complex multijurisdictional incidents nationwide. The NIMS Training Program lays out a conceptual framework that maintains a systematic process for the development of training courses and personnel qualifications. This process produces trained and qualified emergency management personnel. The framework facilitates the systematic development of these courses and qualifications by translating functional capabilities (defined in NIMS) into positions, core competencies, training, and personnel qualifications. The NIMS Training Program sets a sequence of goals, objectives, and action items for the NIC, which administers NIMS training nationally, and for stakeholders, who run their respective NIMS training and education programs.

In 1931, China suffered a catastrophic flood that claimed millions of lives. This was neither a natural nor human-made disaster. Rather, it was created by an interaction between the environment and society. Regular inundation had long been an integral feature of the ecology and culture of the middle Yangzi, yet by the modern era floods had become humanitarian catastrophes. Courtney describes how the ecological and economic effects of the 1931 flood pulse caused widespread famine and epidemics. He takes readers into the inundated streets of Wuhan, describing the terrifying and disorientating sensory environment. He explains why locals believed that an angry Dragon King was causing the flood, and explores how Japanese invasion and war with the Communists inhibited both official relief efforts and refugee coping strategies. This innovative study offers the first in-depth analysis of the 1931 flood, and charts the evolution of one of China's most persistent environmental problems.

The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) provides an opportunity for States, Tribal governments, and local jurisdictions to significantly reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards. It also allows them to streamline the receipt and use of Federal disaster assistance through pre-disaster hazard mitigation planning. DMA 2000 places new emphasis on State, Tribal, and local mitigation planning by requiring these entities to develop and submit mitigation plans as a condition of receiving various types of pre- and post-disaster assistance (such as the Pre-Disaster Mitigation PDM] program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program HMGP]) under the Stafford Act. On February 26, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) published an Interim Final Rule (the Rule) to implement the mitigation planning requirements of DMA 2000. The Rule outlines the requirements for State, Tribal and local mitigation plans. FEMA has developed a series of guides, called the Mitigation Planning "How-To" Guides, to provide State, Tribal, and local governments with easy-to-understand information needed to initiate and maintain a hazard mitigation planning process and meet the requirements of the Rule. The first four How-To Guides are known as the "core four" guides. They provide the basic instructions for preparing a natural hazard mitigation plan. They are: Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-1); Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2); Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3); Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing the Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4); This How-To Guide, Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-5), supplements FEMA 386-3 and focuses on guidance for using Benefit-Cost Review when prioritizing mitigation actions in a hazard mitigation plan. The purpose of a mitigation plan is to reduce the community's vulnerability to hazards. After assessing its risks, a community may consider many mitigation options. However, due to monetary as well as other limitations, it is often impossible to implement all mitigation actions. Hence, the Planning Team needs to select the most cost-effective actions for implementation first, not only to use resources efficiently, but to make a realistic start toward mitigating risks. The Rule supports the principle of cost-effectiveness by requiring hazard mitigation plans to have an action plan that includes a prioritization process that demonstrates a special emphasis on maximization of benefits over costs. The requirement states: The mitigation strategy section shall include] an action plan describing how the actions identified in section (c)(3)(ii) will be prioritized, implemented, and administered by the local jurisdiction. Prioritization shall include a special emphasis on the extent to which benefits are maximized according to a cost benefit review of the proposed projects and their associated costs. 201.6(c)(3)(iii)] The purpose of this guide is to help local jurisdictions understand how to apply the concepts of Benefit-Cost Review to the prioritization of mitigation actions, and thereby meet the requirement of the Rule.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) and Grant Programs Directorate (GPD), Technical Assistance (TA) Program seeks to build and sustain capabilities through specific services and analytical capacities across two primary functional areas: Preparedness TA activities in support of the four homeland security mission areas (prevention, protection, response, and recovery); Homeland security program management This two-pronged approach ensures that initiatives measurably contribute to the enhancement of homeland security capabilities through State and local homeland security programs. The TA program addresses the areas of greatest State and local need by institutionalizing knowledge at the State and local level and providing a dynamic menu of services that is responsive to national priorities. The TA Program is driven by the following three core tenets: TA must support the National Preparedness Guidelines (Guidelines), National Priorities, and associated national strategies and doctrine that maintain homeland security; TA must be flexible and adaptable to fully address current national threats and the present day needs of homeland security personnel; TA must include a layered range of products ranging from guidance and templates to specialized on-site support that apply to States, regions, Urban Areas, counties, tribal entities, and private interests with a role in homeland security TA service deliveries may take a variety of forms that can be combined or modified to meet the specific needs of each requesting State or local jurisdiction. To best accommodate the wide variety of TA needs and deliverables, NPD and GPD support the following three levels of TA: Level 1 - Information Resources: General information to raise awareness or enhance familiarity with best practices/protocols required within all jurisdictions. Level 2 - Models, Templates, and Samples: Delivery of solution packages and performance models drawn from Federal, state, and local studies, best practices, and experience that guides the implementation of various initiatives. Level 3 - On-site Workshops: Delivery of rigorous, customized solutions through direct, on-site support, including workshops, guidance, and facilitation efforts to maximize direct interaction between TA providers and TA recipients and ensure the successful implementation of the most complex initiatives. Preparedness TA services seek to build and sustain capabilities in support of the four homeland security mission areas (prevention, protection, response, and recovery) and the suite of priorities and capabilities outlined in the Guidelines. As capability gaps are identified within State and local jurisdictions, Preparedness TA services are designed, developed, and delivered to address those needs and build capabilities in the most critical areas. The GPD Program Management TA services provide direct assistance in the establishment and enhancement of the overall homeland security administrative framework within State and local jurisdictions. These TA services help build the infrastructure at the State and local levels in which preparedness purchases, training activities, exercises, and additional assistance can accurately be managed, administered, tracked, and measured. This component of the overall TA Program includes services focused on grant reporting, grants management, overall homeland security program management, and resource management strategies for special needs jurisdictions.

The National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative supports the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by establishing a comprehensive, integrated national mutual aid and resource management system that provides the basis to type, order, and track all (Federal, State, and local) response assets. For ease of ordering and tracking, response assets need to be categorized via resource typing. Resource typing is the categorization and description of resources that are commonly exchanged in disasters via mutual aid, by capacity and/or capability. Through resource typing, disciplines examine resources and identify the capabilities of a resource's components (i.e., personnel, equipment, and training). During a disaster, an emergency manager knows what capability a resource needs to have to respond efficiently and effectively. Resource typing definitions will help define resource capabilities for ease of ordering and mobilization during a disaster. As a result of the resource typing process, a resource's capability is readily defined and an emergency manager is able to effectively and efficiently request and receive resources through mutual aid during times of disaster.