Many contemporary philosophers assume that, before one can discuss prayer, the question of whether there is a God or not must be settled. In this title, first published in 1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that to understand prayer is to understand what is meant by the reality of God. Beginning by placing the problem of prayer within a philosophical context, Phillips goes on to discuss such topics as prayer and the concept of talking, prayer and dependence, superstition and the concept of community. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of religion, prayer and religious studies more generally.

First published in 1935, this book compares and examines what John Laird termed the 'three most important notions in ethical science': the concepts of virtue, duty and well-being. Laird poses the question of whether any one of these three concepts is capable of being the foundation of ethics and of supporting the other two. This is an interesting reissue, which will be of particular value to students researching the philosophy of ethics and morality.

Wittgenstein once said, "I cannot help seeing every problem from a 'religious point of view'. "However, since he never advocated any one religion many people have wondered just what this religious point of view could be. This book answers this question by clarifying the overall nature(s) of his philosophies (the early and the later) and then by exploring the idea of a religious point of view as an analogy for a philosophy. As a result, the author reveals the concordance between the later Wittgenstein and central aspects of Hebraic thought. Although perhaps this ought not to be surprising (Wittgenstein himself described his thought as "one hundred per cent Hebraic"), the truth of the matter has been obscured by popular supposition that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic.

Assembling an unprecedented range of considered responses to the noted contributions to philosophy made by Marcelo Dascal, this collection comprises the work of his many friends, colleagues and former students. Beginning with a series of articles on Dascal's influential insights on philosophical controversy, this volume continues with explorations of Dascal's celebrated scholarship on Liebnitz, before moving on to papers dealing with his philosophy of language, including interpretations by Dresner and Herring on the phenomenon of emoticons. Taken as a whole, they provide a compelling commentary on Dascal's prolific and voluminous publications and include fresh perspectives on the theory of argumentation and the ethics of communication.

The material collected here extends to political philosophy, such as Morris-Reich's paper exploring the ways in which German social scientists confront issues of antisemitism, the psychology of genius, and the origins of norms in society and culture. Much of the analysis is directly connected to, or influenced by, the philosophical themes, ideas and concepts developed throughout the years by Marcelo Dascal, while others have a looser connection to his work. All of them, however, attest to the remarkable and multifaceted philosophical persona of Marcelo Dascal, who is the guiding light of the rich conceptual dialogue running through this book. "

Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution explores the relation between language and reality without embracing Linguistic Realism and without courting any form of Linguistic Idealism either. It argues that this is precisely what Wittgenstein does. This book also examines some well known contemporary philosophers who have been concerned with this same question.

Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind is the third volume of a four-volume analytical commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, consisting of two parts. Part 1 is a sequence of fifteen essays that examine in detail all the major topics discussed in Philosophical Investigations 243-427. These include the private language arguments, privacy, private ostensive definition, the nature of the mind, the inner and the outer, behaviour and behaviourism, thought, imagination, the self, consciousness, and criteria. Published in 1990 to widespread acclaim as a scholarly tour de force, the first edition of this volume of essays provides a comprehensive survey of these themes, the history of their treatment in early modern and modern philosophy, the development of Wittgenstein's ideas on these subjects from 1929 onwards, and an elaborate analysis of his definitive arguments in the Investigations. The new second edition has been thoroughly revised by the author and features four new essays. These include a survey of the evolution of the private language arguments in Wittgenstein's oeuvre and their role within the developing argument of the Investigations, a comprehensive essay on private ownership of experience and its pitfalls, a detailed examination and defence of Wittgenstein's repudiation of subjective knowledge of one's experience, and an overview of the achievement and importance of the private language arguments. Revised essays examine new objections to Wittgenstein's arguments - which are found wanting- and incorporate new materials from the Nachlass that were not known to exist in 1990. All references have been adjusted to the revised fourth edition of the Investigations, but previous pagination in the first and second editions has been retained in parentheses. These revisions bring the book up to the high standard of the extensively revised editions of Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning (Blackwell, 2005) and Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity (Wiley Blackwell, 2009). They ensure that this survey of Wittgenstein's private language arguments and of his accounts of thought, imagination, consciousness, the self, and criteria will remain the essential reference work on the Investigations for the foreseeable future.

The author draws on lesser known archival materials, including Marx's notebooks on women and patriarchy and technology to offer a new interpretation of Marx's concept of alienation as this concept develops in his later works.

This book discusses the legal thought of Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), undoubtedly one of the titans of social sciences who greatly influenced not only the shape of modern cultural anthropology but also the social sciences as a whole. This is the first comprehensive work to focus on his legal conceptions: while much has been written about his views on language, magic, religion, and culture, his views on law have not been fairly reconstructed or recapitulated. A glance at the existing literature illustrates how little has been written about Malinowski's understanding of law, especially in the legal sciences. This becomes even more evident given the fact that Malinowski devoted much of his scholarly work to studying law, especially in the last period of his life, during which he conducted broad research on law and "primitive jurisprudence". The main aim of this book is to address this gap and to present in detail Malinowski's thoughts on law. The book is divided into two parts. Part I focuses largely on the impact that works of two distinguished professors from his alma mater (L. Dargun and S. Estreicher) had on Malinowski's legal thoughts, while Part II reconstructs Malinowski's inclusive, broad and multidimensional understanding of law and provides new readings of his legal conceptions mainly from the perspective of reciprocity. The book offers a fresh look at his views on law, paving the way for further studies on legal issues inspired by his methodological and theoretical achievements. Malinowski's understanding of law provides a wealth of fodder from which to formulate interesting research questions and a solid foundation for developing theories that more accurately describe and explain how law functions, based on new findings in the social and natural sciences.

This book deals with the entrenched misunderstandings of Feyerabend's philosophy, brings together the positive elements to be found in Feyerabend's work, and presents these elements as a coherent alternative conception of scientific rationality. It is the first book-length study of Feyerabend's post-1970 philosophy and will be an invaluable resource for philosophers of science, students of the philosophy of science, and anyone who wants to understand the views of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century.

"Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment" is an eclectic mix of essays that reposition Murdoch's work in relation to current debates in philosophy, theology, literature, gender and sexuality, and authorship. The essays refine, develop or contest previous readings, and blur the distinction between liberal humanist and theoretical positions, suggesting negotiations between them. The book not only questions established critical and philosophical positions, but also Murdoch's own pronouncements about her work. It suggests fresh influences and interpretations, and celebrates Murdoch's interdisciplinary modernity.

This volume collects thirteen original essays that address the concept of will in Classical German Philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer. During this short, but prolific period, the concept of will underwent various transformations. While Kant identifies the will with pure practical reason, Fichte introduces, in the wake of Reinhold, an originally biological concept of drive into his ethical theory, thereby expanding on the Kantian notion of the will. Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer take a step further and conceive the will either as a primal being (Schelling), as a socio-ontological entity (Hegel), or as a blindly striving, non-rational force (Schopenhauer). Thus, the history of the will is marked by a complex set of tensions between rational and non-rational aspects of practical volition. The book outlines these transformations from a historical and systematic point of view. It offers an overview of the most important theories of the will by the major figures of Classical German Philosophy, but also includes interpretations of conceptions developed by lesser-studied philosophers such as Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Bouterwek.

The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry.

The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry.

The works of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757 1823) were a major factor in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, yet his exact contribution is still under discussion. This book investigates how Reinhold s background in Enlightenment influenced his reception of Kant? s critical philosophy. From his pre-Kantian efforts up to the point where he began distancing himself from the master, Reinhold s own philosophical development takes center stage. This development, rather than critical philosophy, was the main ingredient of Reinhold s contribution to post-Kantian philosophy."

There is no adequate understanding of contemporary Jewish and Christian theology without reference to Martin Buber. Buber wrote numerous books during his lifetime (1878-1965) and is best known for I and Thou and Good and Evil. Buber has influenced important Protestant theologians like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr. His appeal is vast--not only is he renowned for his translations of the Hebrew Bible but also for his interpretation of Hasidism, his role in Zionism, and his writings in psychotherapy and political philosophy.In addition to a general introduction, each chapter is individually introduced, illuminating the historical and philosophical context of the readings. Footnotes explain difficult concepts, providing the reader with necessary references, plus a selective bibliography and subject index.

This volume makes a significant contribution to both the study of Derrida and of modernist studies. The contributors argue, first, that deconstruction is not "modern"; neither is it "postmodern" nor simply "modernist." They also posit that deconstruction is intimately connected with literature, not because deconstruction would be a literary way of doing philosophy, but because literature stands out as a "modern" notion. The contributors investigate the nature and depth of Derrida's affinities with writers such as Joyce, Kafka, Antonin Artaud, Georges Bataille, Paul Celan, Maurice Blanchot, Theodor Adorno, Samuel Beckett, and Walter Benjamin, among others. With its strong connection between philosophy and literary modernism, this highly original volume advances modernist literary study and the relationship of literature and philosophy.

This book explores how far some leading philosophers, from Montaigne to Hume, used Academic Scepticism to build their own brand of scepticism or took it as its main sceptical target. The book offers a detailed view of the main modern key figures, including Sanches, Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal, Foucher, Huet, and Bayle. In addition, it provides a comprehensive assessment of the role of Academic Scepticism in Early Modern philosophy and a complete survey of the period. As a whole, the book offers a basis for a new, balanced assessment of the role played by scepticism in both its forms. Since Richard Popkin's works, there has been considerable interest in the role played by Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy. Comparatively, Academic Scepticism was much neglected by scholars, despite some scattered important contributions. Furthermore, a general assessment of the presence of Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy is lacking. This book fills the void.

Do we really need philosophy? The present collection of jargon-free essays aims at answering the question of why philosophy matters. Each essay considers the central question (Why Philosophy?) from different angles: the unavoidability of doing philosophy, the practical consequences of philosophy, philosophy as a therapy for the whole person, the benefits of philosophy for improving public policy, etc.