Buddhist philosophy in India in the early sixth century C. E. took an important tum away from the traditional methods of explaining and systematizing the teachings in Siitra literature that were attributed to the Buddha. The new direction in which several Indian Buddhist philosophers began to move was that of following reasoning to its natural conclusions, regardless whether the conclusions conflicted with traditional teachings. The central figure in this new movement was DiIinaga, a native of South India who found his way to the centre of Buddhist education at Nalanda, studied the treatises that were learned by the Buddhist intellectuals of his day, and eventually wrote works of his own that formed the core of a distinctly new school of Buddhist thought. Inasmuch as virtually every Indian philosopher after the sixth century had either to reject Dirinaga's methods or build upon the foundations provided by his investigations into logic, epistemology and language, his influence on the evolution of Indian philosophy was considerable, and indeed some familiarity with Dirinaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought. Moreover, since the approach to Buddhism that grew out of Dirinaga's meditations on language and the limits of knowledge dominated the minds of many of the scholars who took Buddhism to Tibet, some familiarity with Dirinaga is also essential to those who wish to understand the intellectual infrastructure of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and practice.

"An elegant and comprehensive critical edition of the Dao De Jing." KIRKUS Review This book examines one of the world's most enduring and influential literary works through the timeless art of qigong. In his words, Lao Tzu (or Laozi), author of the Dao De Jing, embodies qigong principles, advocating the cultivation of mind and body. Only when we know qigong can we know Lao Tzu-and only when we know Lao Tzu can we know the Dao De Jing. Lao Tzu's writing has been read, translated, and discussed around the globe. It deals with principles that transcend time and culture. That is why this ancient text has been reimagined countless times in books on business, relationships, and parenting-but never with a focus on the art of qigong. This makes the Dao De Jing: A Qigong Interpretation unique and indispensible. Many chapters in the Dao De Jing purely talk about qigong, especially the practices of regulating the body, breathing, mind, qi, and spirit. Dr. Yang, a renowned author, scholar, and martial artist, devoted decades to researching and writing this book. He interprets and analyzes the 81 chapters of the Dao De Jing. His commentary will bring new insight, inspiration, and depth to your understanding of Lao Tzu's words-and to your qigong practice. This book includes The complete Dao De Jing in English and its original Chinese text Dr. Yang, Jwing-Ming's commentary and analysis of each chapter Numerous illustrations and diagrams The Dao De Jing: A Qigong Interpretation is not a book of instruction. It is about the Way-the path before us, in qigong and in life, where what you achieve comes through your own understanding.

Avicenna's Metaphysics (in Arabic: Ilahiyyat) is the most important and influential metaphysical treatise of classical and medieval times after Aristotle. This volume presents studies on its direct and indirect influence in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin culture from the time of its composition in the early eleventh century until the sixteenth century. Among the philosophical topics which receive particular attention are the distinction between essence and existence, the theory of universals, the concept of God as the necessary being and the theory of emanation. It is shown how authors such as Averroes, Abraham ibn Daud, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus react to Avicenna's metaphysical theories. The studies also address the philological and historical circumstances of the textual tradition in three different medieval cultures. The studies are written by a distinguished international team of contributors, who convened in 2008 to discuss their research in the Villa Vigoni, Italy.

This study is mainly the outcome of work completed as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Queensland. However, it has been revised in many ways since its preparation in dissertation form. Many people have contributed to the study and I am concerned that I may fail to mention everyone who has assisted me. My first introduction to The Introduction to the Middle Way (Madhyamakavatara) came through a course I attended at a Buddhist Centre in Queensland called Chenrezig Institute. The course was given by Ven. Geshe Loden, originally of Sera Monastery in India, and was translated by Ven. Zasep Tulku. Besides participating in this course I also attended a number of other courses on Madhyamika presented by these and other lamas in Australia and in Nepal. I was also fortunate to spend a semester at the University of Wisconsin - Madison studying with Professor Geshe Lhundup Sopa. At different times I had the opportunity to discuss, in person or through correspondence, aspects of the study with a number of leading scholars. Professors J.W. de Jong, Robert Thurman, Jeffrey Hopkins and Paul Williams gave freely of their expertise although in some cases I know that I was unable to take full advantage of their suggestions. Special mention and thanks go Professor Fred Streng who supported the study and gave most graciously of his time. In Australia I would like to thank my advisers at the University of Queensland, Drs. Ross Reat, Arvind Sharma and Richard Hutch.

Books dealing with individual philosophers as well as annotated translations of their works are very much in need in the field of classical Indian philos- ophy. Hence the research efforts of modern scholars should increasingly be devoted to this objective. Professor M. Tachikawa has selected a very short elementary treatise of Udayana as well as some portions of a larger work of the same author to supplement the first. His aim is to present to us, in Udayana's own term, how he (Udayana) sees the Nyaya-VaiSe~ika system in a synoptic fashion. I wish to take this opportunity to say a few things about Udayana and the Nyaya-Vaise~ika system. UDAYANA Udayana was a pre-eminent philosopher and an astute logician of the eleventh- twelfth century India. He belonged to the Mithila region of the present Bihar 1 state. In the history of the Nyaya-V aise~a, he holds a very crucial position. In fact, two different schools of philosophy, Nyaya and Vaise~a, belonging to ancient India, merged into one in the writings of Udayana. As it has been said, in Udayana, the happy marriage between Nyaya and Vaise~ika was com- plete - the Vai e~ika ontological scheme (padiirthas or system of categories) was in this way combined with the pramiir:za doctrine (logic and a theory of knowledge) of Nyaya to produce what later came to be designated as Navya- nyaya.

One is always struck by the brilliant work of George Sefa Dei but nothing so far has demonstrated his pedagogical leadership as much as the current project. With a sense of purpose so pure and so thoroughly intellectual, Dei shows why he must be credited with continuing the motivation and action for justice in education. He has produced in this powerful volume, Teaching Africa, the same type of close reasoning that has given him credibility in the anti-racist struggle in education. Sustaining the case for the democratization of education and the revising of the pedagogical method to include Indigenous knowledge are the twin pillars of his style. A key component of this new science of pedagogy is the crusade against any form of hegemonic education where one group of people assumes that they are the masters of everyone else. Whether this happens in South Africa, Canada, United States, India, Iraq, Brazil, or China, Dei's insights suggest that this hegemony of education in pluralistic and multi-ethnic societies is a false construction. We live pre-eminently in a world of co-cultures, not cultures and sub-cultures, and once we understand this difference, we will have a better approach to education and equity in the human condition.

How do ordinary Muslims deal with and influence the increasingly pervasive Islamic norms set by institutions of the state and religion? Becoming Better Muslims offers an innovative account of the dynamic interactions between individual Muslims, religious authorities, and the state in Aceh, Indonesia. Relying on extensive historical and ethnographic research, David Kloos offers a detailed analysis of religious life in Aceh and an investigation into today's personal processes of ethical formation. Aceh is known for its history of rebellion and its recent implementation of Islamic law. Debunking the stereotypical image of the Acehnese as inherently pious or fanatical, Kloos shows how Acehnese Muslims reflect consciously on their faith and often frame their religious lives in terms of gradual ethical improvement. Revealing that most Muslims view their lives through the prism of uncertainty, doubt, and imperfection, he argues that these senses of failure contribute strongly to how individuals try to become better Muslims. He also demonstrates that while religious authorities have encroached on believers and local communities, constraining them in their beliefs and practices, the same process has enabled ordinary Muslims to reflect on moral choices and dilemmas, and to shape the ways religious norms are enforced. Arguing that Islamic norms are carried out through daily negotiations and contestations rather than blind conformity, Becoming Better Muslims examines how ordinary people develop and exercise their religious agency.

overall title and the commentary of Narboni, but in which the treatise is given a close association rath De Substantia Orbis VII, which immedi ately follows it in the text. This third version is the sole case in which a Hebrew translator can be named: the translation was made by Todros Todrosi in the year 1340. The only conclusion to be drawn from his translation is that Todrosi may definitively be eliminated as the translator of any of the other ver sions. However, we may be able to draw a tentative conclusion as to the formation of the Hebrew collection. The earliest evidence for the existence of the nine treatise collec tion is the commentary of Narboni, completed in 1349. The fact that nine years earlier one treatise could be attached to a work outside the corpus may indicate that the Hebrew collection of nine treatises was formed during those nine years, or mar even indicate that Narboni him self collected the various treatises. 5 Narboni, however, was not the translator of these works In fact, no 1 definitive indication of the translator's identity exists. 6 3. The Nature of the Question-Form Steinschneider offered the following general characterization of Aver roes' Quaestiones: These are mostly brief discussions, more or less answers to questions; they may be partially occasioned by topics i9 his commentaries and may be considered as appendices to them."

To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things." It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program."

Dr PurusQttama Bilimoria's book on sabdapramaIJa is an important one, and so is likely to arouse much controversy. I am pleased to be able to write a Foreword to this book, at a stage in my philosophical thinking when my own interests have been turning towards the thesis of sabdapramaIJa as the basis of Hindu religious and philosophical tradition. Dr Bilimoria offers many novel interpretations of classical Hindu theories about language, meaning, understanding and knowing. These interpretations draw upon the conceptual resources of contemporary analytic and phenomenological philosophies, without sacrificing the authentIcity that can arise only out of philologically grounded scholarship. He raises many issues, and claims to have resolved some of them. Certainly, he advances the overall discussion, and this is the best one could hope for in writing on a topic to which the best minds of antiquity and modern times have applied themselves. In this Foreword, I wish to focus on one of the issues which I have raised on earlier occasions, and on which Dr Bilimoria has several important things to say. The issue is: is sabdabodha eo ipso a linguistic knowing, i. e., sabdapramll, or does Sabdabodha amount to knowing only when certain specifiable conditions are satisfied. It the second alternative be accepted, these additional conditions could not be the same as the familiar Ilsatti (contiguity), yogyata (semantic fitness), dka;, k ll (expectancy) and tlltparya (intention), for these are, on the theory, conditions of sabdabodha itself.

Srihar a is recognised as one of the greatest exponents of what is generally known as the Sarpkara school of Advaita Vedanta. The Advaita Vedanta of Sarpkara has been commented upon, explained, expounded and developed in its various ramifications by several generations of scholars, commentators and original thinkers for over a thousand years. Even today it is claimed to be one of the two traditional schools of Indian Philosophy which have survived and have modern adherents while most other schools have died of old age on Indian soil. The only other school that has survived is the Nyaya-Vaise ika or what is now called the Navya-nyaya. Both Advaita Vedanta and Navya-nyaya have attracted the attention of modern scholars and philosophers (of both India and abroad), who are acquainted with Western philosophy and whose interest in the study of Indian philosophy has not simply been limited to the history of Indian thought or Indology. Modern exponents of Advaita Vedanta are numerous. With a few notable exceptions, however, most modern authors of Vedanta try to expound and modernise the Advaita system from either a speculative and personal point of view or from a superficial viewpoint of Kantian philosophy or Hegelian Absolutism. Such a method has seldom achieved the sophistication and respectability that is normally expected in the context of modern (chiefly western) philosophic activity.

With a few notable exceptions, analytical philosophy of religion in the West still continues to focus almost entirely on the Iudaeo-Christian tradition. In particular, it is all too customary to ignore the rich fund of concepts and arguments supplied by the Indian religious tradition. This is a pity, for it gratuitously impoverishes the scope of much contemporary philosophy of religion and precludes the attainment of any insights into Indian religions comparable to those that the clarity and rigour of analytic philosophy has made possible for the Iudaeo-Christian tradition. This volume seeks to redress the imbalance. The original idea was to invite a number of Indian and Western philosophers to contribute essays treating of Indian religious concepts in the style of contemporary analytical philosophy of religion. No further restrietion was placed upon the contributors and the resulting essays (all previously unpublished) exhibit a diversity of themes and approaches. Many arrangements of the material herein are doubtless defensible. The rationale for the one that has been adopted is perhaps best presented through some introductory remarks about the essays themselves.

The answer to philosophical questions will often depend on the position one takes regarding the fact-value problem. It is, therefore, not surprising that, in the tradition of western philosophy, the past 200 years or so record an animated discussion of it. In the present collection the debate is continued by representatives of various "schools" in contemporary western thought. A number of philosophers from non-western cultures, too, enter into it. The contributions do not all reflect on the same theme, nor do they use the same approach. Essays written by philosophers sympathetic to the analytical tradition are followed by reflections on the part of those inspired by phe nomenology. A third group of contributions is by non-western thinkers, who are more likely to approach the problem in terms of culture. Their engage ment with the issue clearly shows, among other things, that it is almost exclusively in the western tradition that the fact-value distinction is often understood as an outright dichotomy. The occasion for the publication of this collection is Dr. Cornelis Anthonie van Peursen's retirement as Professor of Philosophy. This year he leaves the Free University, Amsterdam; until 1982 he was professor at the University of Leyden as well. In the Netherlands and beyond he has become known for his concern with constructive comparison of diverging philosophical trends and the cross-cultural fertilization of thought. Characteristic of his career are his efforts to render the results of academic philosophizing understand able to a broader audience."

The Viikyapadiya of Bhartrhari and the Pramii1Jasamuccaya of Dignaga * are seminal texts in the history of ancient Indian philosophy. One text deals with grammar, the other with logic, both are the work of committed metaphysicians. Written within a span of less than a hundred years, between the fifth and the sixth centuries A.D., these texts have generally been treated separately, as representing independent schools of thought. This essay attempts to interpret these texts jointly, as a dialogue between a grammarian and a logician. This way of approaching these texts highlights unexpected facets of Bhartrhari's and Dignaga's theories of language and is intended to identify the individual achievements of each. Above all, this treatment is an exercise in writing the intellectual history of a period in time, rather than a history of a school of philosophy. The prevailing view of Bhartrhari holds that his linguistic techniques are not intrinsic to his metaphysics. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Bhartrhari's metaphysics underlie his linguistic techniques and articulate their presuppositions. The prevailing view of Dignaga maintains that for him language deals with illusory entities and must falsify what is real. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Dignaga's logical rules are designed to ensure that in using language one is not committed to a belief in fictional entities. My debt to modern scholarship in the field is considerable.

Readers of Spinoza's philosophy have often been daunted, and sometimes been enchanted, by the geometrical method which he employs in his philosophical masterpiece the Ethics. In Meaning in Spinoza's Method Aaron Garrett examines this method and suggests that its purpose, in Spinoza's view, was not just to present claims and propositions but also in some sense to change the readers and allow them to look at themselves and the world in a different way. His discussion draws not only on Spinoza's works but also on those of the philosophers who influenced Spinoza most strongly, including Hobbes, Descartes, Maimonides and Gersonides. This controversial book will be of interest to historians of philosophy and to anyone interested in the relation between form and content in philosophical works.

Modern Jewish philosophy emerged in the seventeenth century, with the impact of the new science and modern philosophy on thinkers who were reflecting upon the nature of Judaism and Jewish life. This collection of new essays examines the work of several of the most important of these figures, from the seventeenth to the late-twentieth centuries, and addresses themes central to the tradition of modern Jewish philosophy: language and revelation, autonomy and authority, the problem of evil, messianism, the influence of Kant, and feminism. Included are essays on Spinoza, Mendelssohn, Cohen, Buber, Rosenzweig, Fackenheim, Soloveitchik, Strauss, and Levinas. Other thinkers discussed include Maimon, Benjamin, Derrida, Scholem, and Arendt. The sixteen original essays are written by a world-renowned group of scholars especially for this volume and give a broad and rich picture of the tradition of modern Jewish philosophy over a period of four centuries.

In this book Bryan W. Van Norden examines early Confucianism as a form of virtue ethics and Mohism, an anti-Confucian movement, as a version of consequentialism. The philosophical methodology is analytic, in that the emphasis is on clear exegesis of the texts and a critical examination of the philosophical arguments proposed by each side. Van Norden shows that Confucianism, while similar to Aristotelianism in being a form of virtue ethics, offers different conceptions of 'the good life', the virtues, human nature, and ethical cultivation. Mohism is akin to Western utilitarianism in being a form of consequentialism, but distinctive in its conception of the relevant consequences and in its specific thought-experiments and state-of-nature arguments. Van Norden makes use of the best research on Chinese history, archaeology, and philology. His text is accessible to philosophers with no previous knowledge of Chinese culture and to Sinologists with no background in philosophy.

Modern Jewish philosophy emerged in the seventeenth century, with the impact of the new science and modern philosophy on thinkers who were reflecting upon the nature of Judaism and Jewish life. This collection of new essays examines the work of several of the most important of these figures, from the seventeenth to the late-twentieth centuries, and addresses themes central to the tradition of modern Jewish philosophy: language and revelation, autonomy and authority, the problem of evil, messianism, the influence of Kant, and feminism. Included are essays on Spinoza, Mendelssohn, Cohen, Buber, Rosenzweig, Fackenheim, Soloveitchik, Strauss, and Levinas. Other thinkers discussed include Maimon, Benjamin, Derrida, Scholem, and Arendt. The sixteen original essays are written by a world-renowned group of scholars especially for this volume and give a broad and rich picture of the tradition of modern Jewish philosophy over a period of four centuries.

Chinese and Greco-Roman ethics present highly articulate views on how one should live; both of these traditions remain influential in modern philosophy. The question arises how these traditions can be compared with one another. Comparative ethics is a relatively young discipline, and this volume is a major contribution to the field. Fundamental questions about the nature of comparing ethics are treated in two introductory chapters, followed by chapters on core issues in each of the traditions : harmony, virtue, friendship, knowledge, the relation of ethics to morality, relativism. The volume closes with a number of comparative studies on emotions, being and unity, simplicity and complexity, and prediction.

This unique book explores how graphocentrism affects Chinese education and culture. It moves away from the contemporary educational practices in China of following the Western model of phonocentrism, to demonstrate that each perspective interacts and counteracts with each other, creating a dialogue between Eastern and Western thought. Chapters explore the consonances and dissonances between the two, problematizing the educational practices of Chinese tradition and proposing a dialectical thinking of post-graphocentrism, based on the concepts of Dao and deconstruction. The volume creates a unique area in the field of philosophy of education by questioning the writing/speaking relationship in Chinese tradition, complete with educational ideas and practices that consider the uniqueness of Chinese character writing. A pioneering study of its kind, Education between Speech and Writing provides a valuable source for students of philosophy of education, as well as students and academics in the field of Chinese Studies. The book will also appeal to anyone interested in dialogues between Chinese and Western thoughts, especially negotiating between Daoism and deconstruction.

This volume collects the published essays of the late Professor Hourani on Islamic ethics in the earlier classical and formative periods of Islamic civilization. Ethics was from the start at the core of Islam, and the construction of philosophical theories to support normative ethics made those centuries among the most profound and intensely active in the history of ethical thought. The book opens with two general and contextual pieces and thereafter it is organized by schools of thought in a broadly chronological order. The essays centre around two related debates in Islamic philosophy: over the ontological status of value, and over the sources of our knowledge of value. The answers developed follow similar lines to the rational theology and philosophy of the West, and Professor Hourani brings out the frequent parallels. As a whole, the volume will introduce and establish the importance of the Islamic tradition of thought about ethics.

The "interest contiguity theory," which is the book's centerpiece, holds that rather than a smooth, one-way cruise through history, humankind's journey from the inception to the present has brought him/her face to face with broadly three types of interests. The first is the individual interest, which, strange as it may sound, tends to be internally contradictory. The second is society's (or "national") interest which, due to the clash of wills, is even more difficult than personal interest to harmonize. The third is the interest espoused to justify the establishment and maintenance of supranational institutions. Though conflicting, some interests are, due to their relative closeness (or contiguity), more easily reconcilable than others.

In tracing the links between and among the three broad types of interests, the book begins with a brief philosophical discussion and then proceeds to examine the implications of human knowledge for individual liberty. Against the backdrop of the epistemological and ontological questions raised in the first chapter, the book examines the contending perspectives on the theory of the state, and in particular, the circumstances under which it is justified to place the interest of society over that of the individual. The focus of the fourth chapter is on the insertion of the supranational governance constant in the sovereignty equation, and on the conflict between idealist and realist, and between both and theKantian explanations for the new order. The adequacy or otherwise of the conflicting explanations of the change from anarchy to a 'new world order' is the subject taken up in the succeeding chapters. Besides suggesting a new analytical tool for the study of politics and international relations, the contiguity theoryoffers statespersonsnew lenses with which to capturethe seismic, perplexing andsometimes disconcertingchangesunfolding before their eyes.

A world ever more extensively interlinked is calling out for serving human interests broader and more compelling than those inspiring our technological welfare. The interface between cultures - at the moment especially between the Occident and Islam - presents challenges to mutual understandings and calls for restoring the resources of our human beings forgotten in the struggle of competition and rivalry at the vital spheres of existence. In the evolutionary progress of the living beings the strictly vital concerns, emotions, attributes become sublimed and elevated to the spiritual sphere at which human beings encounter each other and share. Studies presented here bring forth sublimity, generosity, forgiveness, beauty, and are exalting the quest after ciphers and symbols which lead to our sharing the common deepest stream of fraternal reality.

As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, I am necessarily concerned about the future role of Communist China in world affairs. A true understanding of Peking's foreign policy motives and objectives is possible only if one has a grasp of the ideological foundations and conflicts of the contemporary leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Therein lies the value of Professor Yung Ping Chen's revised edition Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. Within a compact number of pages, Professor Chen's book provides the rt ader with a clear and ready grasp of the fundamentals of Com munist Chinese ideology. Although its scholarship is evident, the work's interpretation do not overwhelm the reader with lengthy quotations or confuse him with excessive speculations-difficulties sometimes associa ted with books about China. Instead, Professor Chen appears to have the ability to reduce complicated ideas to manageable proportions. In his revised edition, the author makes use of source material which recently has become available outside China to clarify issues involved in the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." That phenomenon, which has caused so much wonder and speculation in the West, is analyzed by Professor Chen. He describes for the reader the underlying ideological factors which have emerged from the great turmoil in China, placing them within a framework of verified historical events while avoiding the pitfall of endless theorizing about situations and events inside China about which too little is yet known."

Never before, in any anthology, have contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of language come together to address the single most neglected important issue at the confluence of these two branches of philosophy, namely: Can we know facts from reliable reports? Besides Hume's subversive discussion of miracles and the literature thereon, testimony has been bypassed by most Western philosophers; whereas in classical Indian (Pramana) theories of evidence and knowledge philosophical debates have raged for centuries about the status of word-generated knowledge. Is the response "I was told by an expert on the subject" as respectable as "I saw" or "I inferred" in answer to "How do you know?"' is a question answered in diverse and subtle ways by Buddhists, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas. For the first time this book makes available the riches of those debates, translating from Sanskrit some contemporary Indian Pandits' reactions to Western analytic accounts of meaning and knowledge. For advanced undergraduates in philosophy, for researchers - in Australia, Asia, Europe or America - on epistemology, theory of meaning, Indian or comparative philosophy, as well as for specialists interested in this relatively fresh topic of knowledge transmission and epistemic dependence this book will be a feast. After its publication analytic philosophy and Indian philosophy will have no excuse for shunning each other.