Gottlob Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, or Basic Laws of Arithmetic, was intended to be his magnum opus, the book in which he would finally establish his logicist philosophy of arithmetic. But because of the disaster of Russell's Paradox, which undermined Frege's proofs, the more mathematical parts of the book have rarely been read. Richard G. Heck, Jr., aims to change that, and establish it as a neglected masterpiece that must be placed at the center of Frege's philosophy. Part I of Reading Frege's Grundgesetze develops an interpretation of the philosophy of logic that informs Grundgesetze, paying especially close attention to the difficult sections of Frege's book in which he discusses his notorious 'Basic Law V' and attempts to secure its status as a law of logic. Part II examines the mathematical basis of Frege's logicism, explaining and exploring Frege's formal arguments. Heck argues that Frege himself knew that his proofs could be reconstructed so as to avoid Russell's Paradox, and presents Frege's arguments in a way that makes them available to a wide audience. He shows, by example, that careful attention to the structure of Frege's arguments, to what he proved, to how he proved it, and even to what he tried to prove but could not, has much to teach us about Frege's philosophy.

Systems of units still fail to attract the philosophical attention they deserve, but this could change with the current reform of the International System of Units (SI). Most of the SI base units will henceforth be based on certain laws of nature and a choice of fundamental constants whose values will be frozen. The theoretical, experimental and institutional work required to implement the reform highlights the entanglement of scientific, technological and social features in scientific enterprise, while it also invites a philosophical inquiry that promises to overcome the tensions that have long obstructed science studies.

Originally published in 1937. This book is a classic work on the philosophy of time, looking at the pshychology, physics and logic of time before investigating the views of Kant, Bergson, Alexander, McTaggart and Dunne. The second half of the book contains more indepth consideration of prediction, the concepts of past and future, and reality.

Originally published in 1964. This lively, challenging book, written with enthusiasm, conviction and clarity, sets out to elucidate the shadowy concept of Time. This involves central philosophical issues, which are vigorously discussed. Also relativity theory, in a clear-cut exposition, is made intelligible in a new light. All who are interested in science and its philosophical implications will find this book highly controversial but certainly readable. The author believes philosophy to be important, not only for its professionals, but for everyman. He believes that the fact that this is no longer realised shows that something is wrong with professional philosophy; he also indicates what this is. The book ends, surprisingly but pertinently, with a bold plunge into the questions of telepathy, precognition and psychical research generally. Whilst the phenomena are reasonably admitted, trenchant criticism of their significance confronts parapsychologists.

Kurt Godel (1906-1978) was an Austrian-American mathematician, who is best known for his incompleteness theorems. He was the greatest mathematical logician of the 20th century, with his contributions extending to Einstein's general relativity, as he proved that Einstein's theory allows for time machines. The Godel incompleteness theorem - the usual formal mathematical systems cannot prove nor disprove all true mathematical sentences - is frequently presented in textbooks as something that happens in the rarefied realms of mathematical logic, and that has nothing to do with the real world. Practice shows the contrary though; one can demonstrate the validity of the phenomenon in various areas, ranging from chaos theory and physics to economics and even ecology. In this lively treatise, based on Chaitin's groundbreaking work and on the da Costa-Doria results in physics, ecology, economics and computer science, the authors show that the Godel incompleteness phenomenon can directly bear on the practice of science and perhaps on our everyday life.This accessible book gives a new, detailed and elementary explanation of the Godel incompleteness theorems and presents the Chaitin results and their relation to the da Costa-Doria results, which are given in full, but with no technicalities. Besides theory, the historical report and personal stories about the main character and on this book's writing process, make it appealing leisure reading for those interested in mathematics, logic, physics, philosophy and computer sciences. See also: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=REy9noY5Sg8

A foundational work on historical and social studies of quantification What accounts for the prestige of quantitative methods? The usual answer is that quantification is desirable in social investigation as a result of its successes in science. Trust in Numbers questions whether such success in the study of stars, molecules, or cells should be an attractive model for research on human societies, and examines why the natural sciences are highly quantitative in the first place. Theodore Porter argues that a better understanding of the attractions of quantification in business, government, and social research brings a fresh perspective to its role in psychology, physics, and medicine. Quantitative rigor is not inherent in science but arises from political and social pressures, and objectivity derives its impetus from cultural contexts. In a new preface, the author sheds light on the current infatuation with quantitative methods, particularly at the intersection of science and bureaucracy.

In Alan Lightman's new book, a verse narrative, we meet a man who has lost his faith in all things following a mysterious personal tragedy. After decades of living "hung like a dried fly," emptied and haunted by his past, the narrator awakens one morning revitalized and begins a Dante-like journey to find something to believe in, first turning to the world of science and then to the world of philosophy, religion, and human life. As his personal story is slowly revealed, little by little, we confront the great questions of the cosmos and of the human heart, some questions with answers and others without.

This comprehensive text shows how various notions of logic can be viewed as notions of universal algebra providing more advanced concepts for those who have an introductory knowledge of algebraic logic, as well as those wishing to delve into more theoretical aspects.

From an infant's first grasp of quantity to Einstein's theory of relativity, the human experience of number has intrigued researchers for centuries. Numeracy and mathematics have played fundamental roles in the development of societies and civilisations, and yet there is an essential mystery to these concepts, evidenced by the fear many people still feel when confronted by apparently simple sums. Including perspectives from anthropology, education and psychology, The Nature and Development of Mathematics addresses three core questions: Is maths natural? What is the impact of our culture and environment on mathematical thinking? And how can we improve our mathematical ability? Examining the cognitive processes that we use, the origins of these skills and their cultural context, and how learning and teaching can be supported in the classroom, the book contextualises each issue within the wider field, arguing that only by taking a cross-disciplinary perspective can we fully understand what it means to be numerate, as well as how we become numerate in our modern world. This is a unique collection including contributions from a range of renowned international researchers. It will be of interest to students and researchers across cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology and educational research.

First published in 1974. Despite the tendency of contemporary analytic philosophy to put logic and mathematics at a central position, the author argues it failed to appreciate or account for their rich content. Through discussions of such mathematical concepts as number, the continuum, set, proof and mechanical procedure, the author provides an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and an internal criticism of the then current academic philosophy. The material presented is also an illustration of a new, more general method of approach called substantial factualism which the author asserts allows for the development of a more comprehensive philosophical position by not trivialising or distorting substantial facts of human knowledge.

Theory of Conics, Geometrical Constructions and Practical Geometry: A History of Arabic Sciences and Mathematics Volume 3, provides a unique primary source on the history and philosophy of mathematics and science from the mediaeval Arab world. The present text is complemented by two preceding volumes of A History of Arabic Sciences and Mathematics, which focused on founding figures and commentators in the ninth and tenth centuries, and the historical and epistemological development of 'infinitesimal mathematics' as it became clearly articulated in the oeuvre of Ibn al-Haytham. This volume examines the increasing tendency, after the ninth century, to explain mathematical problems inherited from Greek times using the theory of conics. Roshdi Rashed argues that Ibn al-Haytham completes the transformation of this 'area of activity,' into a part of geometry concerned with geometrical constructions, dealing not only with the metrical properties of conic sections but with ways of drawing them and properties of their position and shape. Including extensive commentary from one of world's foremost authorities on the subject, this book contributes a more informed and balanced understanding of the internal currents of the history of mathematics and the exact sciences in Islam, and of its adaptive interpretation and assimilation in the European context. This fundamental text will appeal to historians of ideas, epistemologists and mathematicians at the most advanced levels of research.

Mathematical Puzzle Tales from Mount Olympus uses fascinating tales from Greek Mythology as the background for introducing mathematics puzzles to the general public. A background in high school mathematics will be ample preparation for using this book, and it should appeal to anyone who enjoys puzzles and recreational mathematics. Features: Combines the arts and science, and emphasizes the fact that mathematics straddles both domains. Great resource for students preparing for mathematics competitions, and the trainers of such students.

Not all scientific explanations work by describing causal connections between events or the world's overall causal structure. Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems being proved hold. In this book, Marc Lange proposes philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics. These topics have been unjustly neglected in the philosophy of science and mathematics. One important kind of non-causal scientific explanation is termed explanation by constraint. These explanations work by providing information about what makes certain facts especially inevitable - more necessary than the ordinary laws of nature connecting causes to their effects. Facts explained in this way transcend the hurly-burly of cause and effect. Many physicists have regarded the laws of kinematics, the great conservation laws, the coordinate transformations, and the parallelogram of forces as having explanations by constraint. This book presents an original account of explanations by constraint, concentrating on a variety of examples from classical physics and special relativity. This book also offers original accounts of several other varieties of non-causal scientific explanation. Dimensional explanations work by showing how some law of nature arises merely from the dimensional relations among the quantities involved. Really statistical explanations include explanations that appeal to regression toward the mean and other canonical manifestations of chance. Lange provides an original account of what makes certain mathematical proofs but not others explain what they prove. Mathematical explanation connects to a host of other important mathematical ideas, including coincidences in mathematics, the significance of giving multiple proofs of the same result, and natural properties in mathematics. Introducing many examples drawn from actual science and mathematics, with extended discussions of examples from Lagrange, Desargues, Thomson, Sylvester, Maxwell, Rayleigh, Einstein, and Feynman, Because Without Cause's proposals and examples should set the agenda for future work on non-causal explanation.

Frege's Theorem collects eleven essays by Richard G Heck, Jr, one of the world's leading authorities on Frege's philosophy. The Theorem is the central contribution of Gottlob Frege's formal work on arithmetic. It tells us that the axioms of arithmetic can be derived, purely logically, from a single principle: the number of these things is the same as the number of those things just in case these can be matched up one-to-one with those. But that principle seems so utterly fundamental to thought about number that it might almost count as a definition of number. If so, Frege's Theorem shows that arithmetic follows, purely logically, from a near definition. As Crispin Wright was the first to make clear, that means that Frege's logicism, long thought dead, might yet be viable.
Heck probes the philosophical significance of the Theorem, using it to launch and then guide a wide-ranging exploration of historical, philosophical, and technical issues in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, and of their connections with metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of language and mind, and even developmental psychology. The book begins with an overview that introduces the Theorem and the issues surrounding it, and explores how the essays that follow contribute to our understanding of those issues. There are also new postscripts to five of the essays, which discuss changes of mind, respond to published criticisms, and advance the discussion yet further.

Emily Grosholz offers an original investigation of demonstration in mathematics and science, examining how it works and why it is persuasive. Focusing on geometrical demonstration, she shows the roles that representation and ambiguity play in mathematical discovery. She presents a wide range of case studies in mechanics, topology, algebra, logic, and chemistry, from ancient Greece to the present day, but focusing particularly on the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. She argues that reductive methods are effective not because they diminish but because they multiply and juxtapose modes of representation. Such problem-solving is, she argues, best understood in terms of Leibnizian "analysis"--the search for conditions of intelligibility. Discovery and justification are then two aspects of one rational way of proceeding, which produces the mathematician's formal experience.
Grosholz defends the importance of iconic, as well as symbolic and indexical, signs in mathematical representation, and argues that pragmatic, as well as syntactic and semantic, considerations are indispensable fore mathematical reasoning. By taking a close look at the way results are presented on the page in mathematical (and biological, chemical, and mechanical) texts, she shows that when two or more traditions combine in the service of problem solving, notations and diagrams are subtly altered, multiplied, and juxtaposed, and surrounded by prose in natural language which explains the novel combination. Viewed this way, the texts yield striking examples of language and notation that are irreducibly ambiguous and productive because they are ambiguous. Grosholtz's arguments, which invoke Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant, will be of considerable interest to philosophers and historians of mathematics and science, and also have far-reaching consequences for epistemology and philosophy of language.

This volume contains six new and fifteen previously published essays -- plus a new introduction -- by Storrs McCall. Some of the essays were written in collaboration with E. J. Lowe of Durham University. The essays discuss controversial topics in logic, action theory, determinism and indeterminism, and the nature of human choice and decision. Some construct a modern up-to-date version of Aristotle's bouleusis, practical deliberation. This process of practical deliberation is shown to be indeterministic but highly controlled and the antithesis of chance. Others deal with the concept of branching four-dimensional space-time, explain non-local influences in quantum mechanics, or reconcile God's omniscience with human free will. The eponymous first essay contains the proof of a fact that in 1931 Kurt Godel had claimed to be unprovable, namely that the set of arithmetic truths forms a consistent system."

There is a long tradition, in the history and philosophy of science, of studying Kant's philosophy of mathematics, but recently philosophers have begun to examine the way in which Kant's reflections on mathematics play a role in his philosophy more generally, and in its development. For example, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant outlines the method of philosophy in general by contrasting it with the method of mathematics; in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant compares the Formula of Universal Law, central to his theory of moral judgement, to a mathematical postulate; in the Critique of Judgement, where he considers aesthetic judgment, Kant distinguishes the mathematical sublime from the dynamical sublime. This last point rests on the distinction that shapes the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts at the heart of Kant's Critical philosophy, that between the mathematical and the dynamical categories. These examples make it clear that Kant's transcendental philosophy is strongly influenced by the importance and special status of mathematics. The contributions to this book explore this theme of the centrality of mathematics to Kant's philosophy as a whole. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Twentieth-century China has been caught between a desire to increase its wealth and power in line with other advanced nations, which, by implication, means copying their institutions, practices and values, whilst simultaneously seeking to preserve China's independence and historically formed identity. Over time, Chinese philosophers, writers, artists and politicians have all sought to reconcile these goals and this book shows how this search for a Chinese way penetrated even the most central, least contested area of modernity: science. Reviving Ancient Chinese Mathematics is a study of the life of one of modern China's most admired scientific figures, the mathematician Wu Wen-Tsun. Negotiating the conflict between progress and tradition, he found a path that not only ensured his political and personal survival, but which also brought him renown as a mathematician of international status who claimed that he stood outside the dominant western tradition of mathematics. Wu Wen-Tsun's story highlights crucial developments and contradictions in twentieth -century China, the significance of which extends far beyond the field of mathematics. On one hand lies the appeal of radical scientific modernity, "mechanisation" in all its forms, and competitiveness within the international scientific community. On the other is an anxiety to preserve national traditions and make them part of the modernisation project. Moreover, Wu's intellectual development also reflects the complex relationship between science and Maoist ideology, because his turn to history was powered by his internalisation of certain aspects of Maoist ideology, including its utilitarian philosophy of science. This book traces how Wu managed to combine political success and international scientific eminence, a story that has wider implications for a new century of increasing Chinese activity in the sciences. As such, it will be of great interest to students and scholars of Chinese history, the history of science and the history and philosophy of mathematics.

This collection presents the first sustained examination of the nature and status of the idea of principles in early modern thought. Principles are almost ubiquitous in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the term appears in famous book titles, such as Newton's Principia; the notion plays a central role in the thought of many leading philosophers, such as Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason; and many of the great discoveries of the period, such as the Law of Gravitational Attraction, were described as principles. Ranging from mathematics and law to chemistry, from natural and moral philosophy to natural theology, and covering some of the leading thinkers of the period, this volume presents ten compelling new essays that illustrate the centrality and importance of the idea of principles in early modern thought. It contains chapters by leading scholars in the field, including the Leibniz scholar Daniel Garber and the historian of chemistry William R. Newman, as well as exciting, emerging scholars, such as the Newton scholar Kirsten Walsh and a leading expert on experimental philosophy, Alberto Vanzo. The Idea of Principles in Early Modern Thought: Interdisciplinary Perspectives charts the terrain of one of the period's central concepts for the first time, and opens up new lines for further research.

Think of a number, any number, or properties like fragility and humanity. These and other abstract entities are radically different from concrete entities like electrons and elbows. While concrete entities are located in space and time, have causes and effects, and are known through empirical means, abstract entities like meanings and possibilities are remarkably different. They seem to be immutable and imperceptible and to exist "outside" of space and time. This book provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the problems raised by abstract entities and the debates about existence, truth, and knowledge that surround them. It sets out the key issues that inform the metaphysical disagreement between platonists who accept abstract entities and nominalists who deny abstract entities exist. Beginning with the essentials of the platonist-nominalist debate, it explores the key arguments and issues informing the contemporary debate over abstract reality: arguments for platonism and their connections to semantics, science, and metaphysical explanation the abstract-concrete distinction and views about the nature of abstract reality epistemological puzzles surrounding our knowledge of mathematical entities and other abstract entities. arguments for nominalism premised upon concerns about paradox, parsimony, infinite regresses, underdetermination, and causal isolation nominalist options that seek to dispense with abstract entities. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, Abstract Entities is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and authoritative introduction to the problems raised by abstract entities.

The Quantum of Explanation advances a bold new theory of how explanation ought to be understood in philosophical and cosmological inquiries. Using a complete interpretation of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophical and mathematical writings and an interpretive structure that is essentially new, Auxier and Herstein argue that Whitehead has never been properly understood, nor has the depth and breadth of his contribution to the human search for knowledge been assimilated by his successors. This important book effectively applies Whitehead's philosophy to problems in the interpretation of science, empirical knowledge, and nature. It develops a new account of philosophical naturalism that will contribute to the current naturalism debate in both Analytic and Continental philosophy. Auxier and Herstein also draw attention to some of the most important differences between the process theology tradition and Whitehead's thought, arguing in favor of a Whiteheadian naturalism that is more or less independent of theological concerns. This book offers a clear and comprehensive introduction to Whitehead's philosophy and is an essential resource for students and scholars interested in American philosophy, the philosophy of mathematics and physics, and issues associated with naturalism, explanation and radical empiricism.

Quantum gravity is the name given to a theory that unites general relativity - Einstein's theory of gravitation and spacetime - with quantum field theory, our framework for describing non-gravitational forces. The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity brings together philosophers and physicists to discuss a range of conceptual issues that surface in the effort to unite these theories, focusing in particular on the ontological nature of the spacetime that results. Although there has been a great deal written about quantum gravity from the perspective of physicists and mathematicians, very little attention has been paid to the philosophical aspects. This volume closes that gap, with essays written by some of the leading researchers in the field. Individual papers defend or attack a structuralist perspective on the fundamental ontologies of our physical theories, which offers the possibility of shedding new light on a number of foundational problems. It is a book that will be of interest not only to physicists and philosophers of physics but to anyone concerned with foundational issues and curious to explore new directions in our understanding of spacetime and quantum physics.

This book addresses the logical aspects of the foundations of scientific theories. Even though the relevance of formal methods in the study of scientific theories is now widely recognized and regaining prominence, the issues covered here are still not generally discussed in philosophy of science. The authors focus mainly on the role played by the underlying formal apparatuses employed in the construction of the models of scientific theories, relating the discussion with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theories. The book describes the role played by this metamathematical framework in three main aspects: considerations of formal languages employed to axiomatize scientific theories, the role of the axiomatic method itself, and the way set-theoretical structures, which play the role of the models of theories, are developed. The authors also discuss the differences and philosophical relevance of the two basic ways of aximoatizing a scientific theory, namely Patrick Suppes' set theoretical predicates and the "da Costa and Chuaqui" approach. This book engages with important discussions of the nature of scientific theories and will be a useful resource for researchers and upper-level students working in philosophy of science.

The Philosophy of Mathematics Today gives a panorama of the best current work in this lively field, through twenty essays specially written for this collection by leading figures. The topics include indeterminacy, logical consequence, mathematical methodology, abstraction, and both Hilbert's and Frege's foundational programmes. The collection will be an important source for research in the philosophy of mathematics for years to come.

Contributors Paul Benacerraf, George Boolos, John P. Burgess, Charles S. Chihara, Michael Detlefsen, Michael Dummett, Hartry Field, Kit Fine, Bob Hale, Richard G. Heck, Jnr., Geoffrey Hellman, Penelope Maddy, Karl-Georg Niebergall, Charles D. Parsons, Michael D. Resnik, Matthias Schirn, Stewart Shapiro, Peter Simons, W.W. Tait, Crispin Wright.

First published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.