The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. On February 28, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), "Management of Domestic Incidents," which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. This consistency provides the foundation for utilization of NIMS for all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. NIMS represents a core set of doctrines, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management. HSPD-5 requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS and to use it in their individual incident management programs and activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State, tribal, and local governments. The directive requires Federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by State, tribal, and local organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance (through grants, contracts, and other activities). NIMS recognizes the role that NGOs and the private sector have in preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents. Building on the foundation provided by existing emergency management and incident response systems used by jurisdictions, organizations, and functional disciplines at all levels, NIMS integrates best practices into a comprehensive framework for use nationwide by emergency management/response personnel in an all-hazards context. These best practices lay the groundwork for the components of NIMS and provide the mechanisms for the further development and refinement of supporting national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems, and technologies. NIMS fosters the development of specialized technologies that facilitate emergency management and incident response activities, and allows for the adoption of new approaches that will enable continuous refinement of the system over time. The Secretary of Homeland Security, through the National Integration Center (NIC), Incident Management Systems Integration Division (formerly known as the NIMS Integration Center), publishes the standards, guidelines, and compliance protocols for determining whether a Federal, State, tribal, or local government has implemented NIMS.Additionally, the Secretary, through the NIC, manages publication and collaboratively, with other departments and agencies, develops standards, guidelines, compliance procedures, and protocols for all aspects of NIMS. This document was developed through a collaborative intergovernmental partnership with significant input from the incident management functional disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector.

Fires resulting from cooking continue to be the most common type of fire experienced by U.S. households. This is true for fires reported to fire departments and those handled by private individuals. Cooking fires are also the leading cause of home fire injuries. As a result, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) has partnered with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) "to research the types of behaviors and sequences of events that lead to cooking fires and develop sound recommendations for behavioral mitigation strategies that will reduce such fires and their resultant injuries and fatalities." This study of the causes of cooking fires and cooking injuries and the effectiveness of strategies to prevent them also considers as part of its scope cooking burns of all types from all types of products involved in preparing and serving food or drink. Although many cooking injuries result from knives or broken glass and many people are made ill by improperly handled food, these other issues are beyond the scope of this project.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed this Risk Assessment, A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, to provide a clear, flexible, and comprehensive methodology to prepare a risk assessment. The intended audience includes the building sciences community of architects and engineers working for private institutions, building owners/operators/managers, and State and local government officials working in the building sciences community. The objective of this How-To Guide is to outline methods for identifying the critical assets and functions within buildings, determining the threats to those assets, and assessing the vulnerabilities associated with those threats. Based on those considerations, the methods presented in this How-To Guide provide a means to assess the risk to the assets and to make risk-based decisions on how to mitigate those risks. The scope of the methods includes reducing physical damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related infrastructure, and reducing resultant casualties during conventional bomb attacks, as well as chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents. This document is written as a How-To Guide. It presents five steps and multiple tasks within each step that will lead you through a process for conducting a risk assessment and selecting mitigation options. It discusses what information is required to conduct a risk assessment, how and where to obtain it, and how to use it to calculate a risk score against each selected threat. This is one of a series of publications that address security issues in high-population, private sector buildings. This document is a companion to the Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426) and the Building Design for Homeland Security Training Course (FEMA E155). This document also leverages information contained within the Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks (FEMA 427). The primary use of this risk assessment methodology is for buildings, although it could be adapted for other types of critical infrastructure. The foundation of the risk assessment methodology presented in this document is based on the approach that was developed for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) through the National Institute for Building Sciences (NIBS). Over 150 buildings have been successfully assessed using this technique. The risk assessment methodology presented in this publication has been refined by FEMA for this audience. The purpose of this How-To Guide is to provide a methodology for risk assessment to the building sciences community working for private institutions. It is up to the decision-makers to decide which types of threats they wish to protect against and which mitigation options are feasible and cost-effective. This How-To Guide views as critical that a team created to assess a particular building will be composed of professionals capable of evaluating different parts of the building. They should be senior individuals who have a breadth and depth of experience in the areas of civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering; architecture; site planning and security engineering; and how security and antiterrorism considerations affect site and building design.

Over the last decade, the overall cost of disasters to the United States has grown significantly. From 1989 to 1993, the average annual losses from disasters were $3.3 billion. Over the last 4 years, the average annual losses have increased to $13 billion. On the Federal side alone, disasters have cost over $20 billion over the last four years. The disaster losses are equally as staggering for the American public. Since 1993, over 1.4 million Americans have been impacted by Presidentially declared disasters, resulting in the loss of their homes, property, communities, jobs, and in some cases their lives. This figure does not include the hundreds of thousands of people impacted by natural hazard events that were managed entirely at the State and local levels, and involved the personal savings and private resources of property owners. Indeed, the impacts of major disasters on Americans go well beyond those damages that are directly sustained. Recovery from disasters requires resources to be diverted from other important public and private programs, and adversely impacts the productivity of economic systems. To many, the rising costs associated with natural disasters have become unacceptable. To address this growing problem, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under Director James L. Witt, has encouraged the emergency management community to become more proactive in reducing the potential for losses before an event occurs. This proactive strategy is commonly known as mitigation. Hazard mitigation is defined as sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to people and property from hazards and their effects. This distinguishes mitigation from other major emergency management functions such as preparedness and training, response, and short-term recovery. This emphasis on mitigation led FEMA to introduce a National Mitigation Strategy in December of 1995 to encourage a national focus on hazard mitigation. The strategy is based on the objective of strengthening the partnership among all levels of government and the private sector and to empower all Americans to fulfill their responsibilities for ensuring safer communities. The strategy was developed with input from State and local officials, as well as individuals and organizations with expertise in hazard mitigation. The strategy has two goals: to substantially increase the public awareness of natural hazard risk so that the public demands safer communities in which to live and work; and to significantly reduce the risk of loss of life, injury, economic costs, and destruction of natural and cultural resources that result from natural hazards. The reason for the emphasis on mitigation is clear. Experience at the Federal, State, and local levels during natural disasters, and a growing body of associated research, have demonstrated that the losses from such events (in terms of life, property, and community resources) can be substantially reduced when mitigation techniques and technologies are applied. This paper was prepared to illustrate the comparative benefits and costs associated with the implementation of a variety of mitigation measures by Federal, State, and local government, and private sector entities. To accomplish this, this paper will identify, through a series of case studies, the mitigation tools used to achieve cost-effective hazard mitigation benefits. The case studies are representative of the types of mitigation measures that are, or could be, performed elsewhere in the nation under similar conditions.

This document describes baseline and additional EMS criteria for the National Emergency Response Credentialing System. The EMS Working Group determined the job titles listed herein to be the most commonly requested EMS personnel in a state-to-state, mutual aid-based response. Considering existing, nationally-accepted standards and/guidelines, the EMS Working Group extracted relevant education, training, experience, physical/medical fitness, certification, and licensing criteria to define the baseline criteria for each job title listed. These baseline criteria represent the minimum requirements for EMS personnel to participate in the Incident Management Integration Systems Division's National Emergency Responder Credentialing System. The EMS Working Group identified additional recommended criteria relating to education, training, certification, experience, and physical/medical fitness where it believed such standards and baseline criteria might enhance job performance. These criteria are not required and represent the EMS Working Group's recommendations for EMS personnel to participate in the Incident Management Systems Integration Division's Emergency Responder Credentialing System. Many nationally recognized clinically-based certification/verification courses such as Advanced Cardiac Life Support are appropriate and essential resources for field personnel.

The National Disaster Housing Strategy (the Strategy) serves two purposes. First, it describes how we as a Nation currently provide housing to those affected by disasters. It summarizes, for the first time in a single document, the many sheltering and housing efforts we have in the United States and the broad array of organizations that are involved in managing these programs. The Strategy also outlines the key principles and policies that guide the disaster housing process. Second, and more importantly, the Strategy charts the new direction that our disaster housing efforts must take if we are to better meet the emergent needs of disaster victims and communities. Today we face a wider range of hazards and potentially catastrophic events than we have ever faced before. These include terrorist attacks and major natural disasters that could destroy large sections of the Nation's infrastructure. This new direction must address the disaster housing implications of all these risks and hazards and, at the same time, guide development of essential, baseline capabilities to overcome existing limitations. The new direction for disaster housing must leverage emerging technologies and new approaches in building design to provide an array of housing options. It must also be cost effective and draw on lessons learned and best practices. Above all, this new direction must institutionalize genuine collaboration and cooperation among the various local, State, tribal, and Federal partners, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to meet the needs of all disaster victims. Current practices in disaster housing vary based on the nature and scope of a disaster and can range from providing short-term shelters to arranging temporary and, in some cases, permanent housing. Establishing emergency shelters is generally a well-choreographed effort that unfolds smoothly at the local level as emergency management officials and nongovernmental organizations execute their emergency plans. The challenges increase when disaster victims are displaced from their homes for longer periods of time and temporary housing must be provided. The process of meeting individual and household needs becomes more challenging, and the responsibilities and roles of those involved must be absolutely clear. States monitor and support local government efforts and activate their capabilities as needed to augment local capabilities. The Federal Government stands alongside the States as an engaged partner, maintaining disaster housing resources and ready to deploy those resources, if required, to fill any emerging gap. While this process generally works very well, it broke down in August 2005 when Hurricane Katrina struck the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi and overwhelmed the capabilities of responders at all jurisdictional levels. And now, more than 3 years after Hurricane Katrina, we are still wrestling with many technical and policy issues related to disaster housing that Katrina brought to light. This Strategy outlines a vision, supported by specific goals, that will point the Nation in a new direction to meet the disaster housing needs of individuals and communities.

The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school that is safe from terrorist attacks and at the same time is functional, aesthetically pleasing, and meets the needs of the students, staff, administration, and general public. Protecting a school building and grounds from physical attack is a significant challenge because the ability to design, construct, renovate, operate, and maintain the facility is spread across numerous building users, infrastructure systems, and many building design codes. There is a strong interest in the United States (U.S.) in ensuring the safety of students, faculty, and staff in our schools. Schools are integral parts of their communities. Many schools are used as shelters, command centers, or meeting places in times of crisis. Schools are also used widely for polling and voting functions. In some communities, schools are places of health care delivery. Schools may or may not be the targets of terrorism, but they are certain to be affected by terrorism, whether directly or indirectly. On September 11, 2001, four elementary schools and three high schools located within 6 blocks of the World Trade Center were just beginning classes when the first plane hit the north tower. Thousands of children were exposed to the dust clouds from the collapsing buildings. Even those children not in the immediate vicinity experienced a great deal of anxiety. Children in at least three states (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) had parents working in or around the World Trade Center that day. In the Washington, DC, area, schools faced similar situations after the Pentagon was attacked. Many Americans feel that schools should be the safest place our children can be, perhaps at times even safer than the homes in which they live. Security is not a standalone capability; it is a critical design consideration that should be constantly reviewed and scrutinized from the design phase through construction or rehabilitation and onto building use. The focus of this primer will be on the threats posed by potential physical attacks on a school by terrorists. Attacking schools and school children could be a highly emotional and high profile event. At the time of publication of this primer, there have been no direct terrorist threats against a school known to the public; however, schools could be indirectly threatened by collateral damage from a terrorist attack directed at nearby facilities. Protecting a school against terrorist attack is a challenging task. A school may have considerable vulnerabilities, because of its well defined periods of use, designated access points, storage of sensitive personal information, minimal security forces, and numerous avenues of penetration and escape for attackers. This primer should be used in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, and FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks. This primer presents an approach to protecting schools at risk from terrorist attacks. The information presented is intended primarily for architects and engineers, or school administrators with a technical background. This publication is designed to meet the needs of all schools, including those with serious security concerns. Because security concerns of individual schools vary greatly, some users with modest security concerns may feel beleaguered by the amount of information and technical approach presented. They should feel free to select the methods and measures that best meet their individual situations while gaining a general appreciation of security concerns and risk management.

Our society places great importance on the education system and its schools, and has a tremendous investment in current and future schools. Nearly 50 million students were expected to attend approximately 99,000 public elementary and secondary schools in the fall of 2009, with an additional 5.8 million expected to attend private schools. The sizes of these school facilities range from one-room rural schoolhouses to citywide and mega schools that house 5,000 or more students. The school is both a place of learning and an important community resource and center. This publication is concerned with the protection of schools and their occupants against natural hazards. Architects and engineers deal with natural hazards in building design and construction and building codes have provisions for protection against natural hazards. This manual addresses two core concepts: multi-hazard design and performance-based design. Multi-hazard design recognizes the fundamental characteristics of hazards and how they interact, so that design for protection becomes integrated with all the other design demands; and Performance-based design suggests conducting a systematic investigation to ensure that the specific concerns of building owners and occupants are addressed, rather than relying on only the minimum requirements of the building code for protection against hazards. Building codes focus on providing life safety, while property protection is secondary. Performance-based design provides additional levels of protection that cover property damage and functional interruption within a financially-feasible context. This publication stresses that the identification of hazards and their frequency and careful consideration of design to resist these hazards must be integrated with all other design issues, and be included from the inception of the site selection and building design process. Although the basic issues to be considered in planning a school construction program are more or less common to all school districts, the specific processes differ greatly because each school district has its own approach. Districts vary in size, from a rural district responsible for only a few schools, to a city district or statewide system overseeing a complex program of all school types and sizes. Any of these districts may be responsible for new design and construction, renovations, and additions. While one district may have a long-term program of school construction and be familiar with programming, financing, hiring designers, bidding procedures, contract administration, and commissioning a new building, another district may not have constructed a new school for decades, and have no staff members familiar with the process. This publication is intended to provide design guidance for the protection of school buildings and their occupants against natural hazards. It focuses on the design of elementary and secondary schools (K-12), as well as repair, renovation, and additions to existing schools. It is one of a series of publications in which multi-hazard and performance-based design are addressed (FEMA 577, Design Guide for Improving Hospital Safety in Earthquakes, Floods, and High Winds, and FEMA 543, Design Guide for Improving Critical Facility Safety from Flooding and High Winds). This publication considers the safety of school buildings to occupants, and the economic losses and social disruption caused by building damage and destruction. The volume covers three natural hazards that have the potential to result in unacceptable risk and loss: earthquakes, floods and high winds. A companion volume, FEMA 428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks, covers the manmade hazards of physical, chemical, biological, and radiological attacks. This publication is intended to assist design professionals and school officials involved in the technical and financial decisions related to school construction, repair, and renovations.

This publication helps to develop a comprehensive juvenile firesetter prevention training workshop for the various agency professionals who work with juvenile firesetters. Juveniles are responsible for a significant proportion of both the accidental and intentional fires that occur each year in the United States. Since the mid-1970's, national, state, and local officials have been turning more attention to the problem of juvenile firesetting and have experimented with various approaches to reducing it. Nonetheless, many experts believe that there are significant gaps in our knowledge and practice. In response to these concerns, in 1987 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) began a new research and development program intended to conceptualize, design, develop, and evaluate a variety of community-based approaches to prevent and control juvenile firesetting. The initiative was known as the National Juvenile Firesetter/Arson Control and Prevention Program (NJF/ACP). This Users' Guide is designed to accompany The Juvenile Firesetter/Arson Control and Prevention Program (JFACPP) Program Materials. The Users' Guide is intended to accomplish the following objectives: 1. To provide a summary of how to plan and implement a juvenile firesetter/arson control and prevention program. This is achieved by outlining critical decision points in building each component of the juvenile firesetter/arson program. The result is a cookbook format that guides the reader from the planning to the execution of an effective community program. 2. To highlight the key information contained in The JFACPP Guidelines for Implementation.

The residential portion of the fire problem continues to account for the vast majority of civilian casualties. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) estimates show that, while residential structure fires account for only 25 percent of fires nationwide, they account for a disproportionate share of losses: 83 percent of fire deaths, 77 percent of fire injuries, and 64 percent of direct dollar losses. Analyses of the residential structure fire problem were published formerly as a chapter in each edition of Fire in the United States. The most recent edition of Fire in the United States, the fourteenth edition published in August 2007, featured an abbreviated chapter on residential structures. This full report is the most current snapshot of the residential fire problem as reflected in the 2005 National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) data and the 2005 NFPA survey data. In this report, as in previous chapters in Fire in the United States, an attempt has been made to keep the data presentation and analysis as straightforward as possible. It is also the desire of the United States Fire Administration (USFA) to make the report widely accessible to many different users, so it avoids unnecessarily complex methodology.

For the first time, the truth about who blew "Pan AM 103" out of the sky over Lockerbie Scotland, is revealed by the man who risks all to tell. Find out how and why the United States, Great Britain and Scotland have conspired to cover-up the true identities of those responsible for one of the most heinous terrorist attacks against innocent civilians. Dr. Chasey was contracted to normalize relations between the United States and Libya. He tells about his secret meeting with two of the world's most wanted men. He introduces us to the two Libyan intelligence officers accused of blowing up "Pan AM 103". He details his meeting with Col. Muammar Qadhafi, the man Time Magazine called, "the most dangerous man in the world". Chasey names the terrorists actually responsible for the Lockerbie bombing. This book is packed with political intrigue and reveals an FBI sting operation designed to destroy Chasey's reputation and life. Learn why Dr. Chasey says, "I love my country, but I fear my government".

This Juvenile Firesetter Intervention Handbook is designed to teach communities how to develop an effective juvenile firesetter intervention program. The chapters of this Handbook can be viewed as the six building blocks essential to construct a successful program. The cornerstone of the blueprint is understanding the personality profiles of juvenile firesetters and their families. The next step is identifying at-risk youth and assessing the likelihood that they will become involved in future firesetting incidents. The identification of the three levels of firesetting risk-little, definite, and extreme-leads to specific types of intervention, including evaluation, education, referral, and follow up. These are the critical components of a juvenile firesetter program To provide a complete complement of services to juvenile firesetters and their families, the juvenile firesetter program must be part of a community network. This network consists of a continuum of care designed to provide a range of intervention services, including prevention, immediate treatment, and graduated sanctions to juvenile firesetters and their families. Finally, there is a specific set of programmatic tasks that will ensure the delivery of swift and effective intervention to at-risk youth and their families. A planned an coordinated effort on the part of the fire service and human service organizations is the best way to reduce juvenile involvement in firesetting and arson and to protect and preserve lives and property in our communities.

The range of services provided by America's fire service continues to expand. In many areas, the local fire department is responsible for mitigating hazardous materials incidents, performing technical rescues, and providing emergency medical services. The threat of terrorist incidents further increases the fire department's responsibility, as firefighters must be taught to recognize the signs of a chemical or biological attack and the proper response. This expansion of the fire service's responsibilities means that less time and energy are available to focus on basic fire suppression skills and scenarios. Also, some of the newer missions present their own, inherent training dangers. In addition, the personal protective gear being worn by firefighters today is excellent; some say that it is even too protective. Firefighters now can advance deeper into structures and get closer to the seat of a fire than in years past because the turnout gear protects well against heat, but this can create problems. A longer exposure to fire will rapidly deplete a firefighter's energy and air supply; and the firefighter will have a greater distance to travel to an exit in an emergency situation. Furthermore, as firefighters progress farther into a structure, more time elapses, which means the fire is more devel-oped, hotter, and often closer to flashover. Due to the increased use of synthetic and polycarbonate construction materials, fires are burning hotter and faster than in the past, resulting in a higher potential for building collapse and flashover. Collapse becomes more likely because of the increased damage from the fire. Safe, effective, and realistic firefighter training is essential in preparing the fire service to achieve its mission of preserving life and property. The dilemma posed by conducting realistic fire training is that fires, even in a training setting, are inherently dangerous. Yet, the fire service needs realistic scenarios to fully experience the environment of a fire and how to combat it. Even without the presence of live fire, training on the physically challenging and labor-intensive tasks of hose handling, tool work, and ladder operations pose a high potential for injuries. From 1987-2001 there has been a 31 percent decrease in the incidence of structure fires throughout the United States. As a result of the decline in fires, firefighters on the whole have less fireground experience than their predecessors had a generation ago. As many of the more experienced firefighters and officers retire, they are replaced by young officers with comparably less fire experience. As today's firefighters' collective, direct experience in fighting fires continues to diminish, there is great concern in the fire service that the inability to recognize flashover and building collapse-and to react quickly enough to avoid being caught by these two potentially fatal conditions-will continue to result in injuries and fatalities to firefighters. Complicating this situation is that live fire training with Class A combustible materials (especially in acquired structures) is being replaced by temperature-controlled, fuel-fed fires in non-combustible structures. Departments are relying less on live fire training for myriad reasons, including among others, environmental, safety, and cost. This report examines recent injurious and fatal incidents involving training to determine lessons that can be used to prevent future injuries and deaths. The emphasis in this report is on fire-related training, particularly live-fire evolutions. It is, however, important to note that training-related injuries can and do occur during a variety of types of training. Also included is a discussion of training standards and common hazards as well as a brief analysis of the available data on the number and cause of training-related injuries and deaths.

This report compiles the best practices and common problems of fire protection and criminal justice agencies in identifying, investigating, prosecuting, and preventing arson. Commonly, the crime of arson is motivated by spite and revenge. Perpetrators strike with fire at buildings where people live, work, or socialize-causing injury, property loss, and death. Civilians and firefighters alike die in arson fires every year. Thirty years ago, arson captured media attention because so-called arson-for-profit rings were burning down decaying urban neighborhoods that had ceased to be profitable, and then rebuilding them at a substantial profit. Other high-profile cases involved arsonists who were connected to gangs and drug lords, and who set fires to intimidate their rivals or as retribution for deals gone bad. Some of the most publicized cases occurred in the cities of New York, Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Baltimore, and others. There even were situations where neighborhood vigilantes, who were frustrated with crime and run-down buildings, took it upon themselves to torch structures to rid the neighborhood of vagrants, prostitutes, and drug dealers. Insurance companies were perceived as the main victims from intentional fires. As a crime com-mitted against property, the economics of arson played center stage to the less well-defined statistics on injuries and deaths. Since arson fires do, on average, cause proportionately higher losses than fires from other causes, insurance companies committed many resources toward investigation and control. From establishing tip reward programs, training accelerant detection canines (ADC's), supporting arson reporting immunity legislation, and establishing the property insurance loss register (PILR), the insurance industry was a strong partner at that time. There is a dichotomy between arson as a property crime and arson as a crime against people, and that lies at the heart of today's challenges with cases of arson. As a crime, arson's long-standing definition as the willful and malicious burning of property does not do justice to the fact that today arson is usually a personal crime that is directed intentionally against specific victims. It is time for arson to be dealt with as a violent crime against persons, not just a crime against property. Today, spite and revenge dominate as the motives in intentional property fires, especially where there are casualties. Revenge-minded arsonists torch nightclubs, occupied residences, hotels, and other settings where their intended victims, and often other innocent people, are injured and killed. First responders get injured or die battling these blazes and trying to save others. Even though a portion of incendiary fires are motivated by other reasons (e.g., excitement, economic relief, peer pressure, a cry for help, and so forth) most set fires happen because someone wanted to inflict harm on another person using fire as the weapon of choice. Fire investigation units from The U.S. Fire Administration's (USFA's) project indicated that spite and revenge were the most common motives behind incendiary fires. Among project sites from the past 5 years, spite and revenge ranked as the highest leading motives, when investigation units were queried about prevailing motives.

This report, America at Risk, builds on the meetings of America Burning, Recommissioned, and is based on statements, discussions and recommendations that were issued on May 3rd by the Commission as the "Principal Findings and Recommendations." One hundred years ago, American cities faced a devastating challenge from the threat of urban fires. Whole cities had become the victims of these events. Entire neighborhoods lived with the very real threat that an ignited fire would take everything, including their lives. Today, the threat of fires is still with us. But we have done a lot to address the risk, minimize the incidence and severity of losses, and prevent fires from spreading. Our states and localities have an improving system of codes and standards; most of us are aware of the risks; our communities have everyday heroes who provide the first response to emergency calls; some of our homes and buildings have alarms or sprinkler systems; and our water distribution system for fire suppression stretches further than many imagined in 1900. We have accomplished a lot, but we have much more to do. Our community fire departments and firefighters are at the vanguard of the long-term effort to address our fire risks. Not only are they the first responders to fire and other natural and man-made disasters, but also they have been strong advocates of effective codes and standards; they visited our schools and neighborhoods with educational material on fire risks, and they have put their lives on the line countless times. They will continue to do so. There is ample proof that the word hero is a correct attribute of our Nation's firefighters. As this report very clearly indicates, the success of America's fire services over the past 100 years is instructive for the strength and sustainability of America's communities for the next 100 years as well. Today, we must not only continue and reinvigorate our successes, but also expand them to include the natural and man-made threats that each of our counties, cities, towns and villages face every day - floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, hazardous material spills, highway accidents, acts of terrorism, and so much more. As the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Project Impact: Building Disaster Resistant Communities has shown, community-based partnerships among local government, public safety services, businesses and residents will provide us the best set of priorities and implementation strategies, as well as the longest lasting commitments with respect to disaster prevention. That is why FEMA and national fire service organizations have formed a Project Impact partnership to support communities' efforts to become disaster resistant. Project Impact depends on our first responders, our neighborhood fire departments, and without them, our communities would all be more vulnerable to disaster losses.

This Wildfire Prevention Guide is a project of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. This is one in a series designed to provide information and guidance for personnel who have interests and/or responsibilities in fire prevention. Each guide in the series addresses an individual component of a fire prevention program. In addition to providing insight and useful information, each guide suggests implementation strategies and examples for utilizing this information. Each Wildfire Prevention Guide has been developed by Fire Prevention Specialists and subject-matter experts in the appropriate area. The goal of this series is to improve and enhance wildfire prevention programs and to facilitate the achievement of NWCG program goals.

The 2005 Fire Service Needs Assessment Survey was conducted as a stratified random sample survey. The NFPA used its own list of local fire departments as the mailing list and sampling frame of all fire departments in the US that report on fire incidents attended. In all, 15,545 fire departments - just over half the total in NFPA Fire Service Inventory (FSI) database, including all departments protecting communities of at least 50,000 population - were mailed survey forms, and 4,709 responded, for a 30% response rate. Because of time constraints, this second survey limited its second mailing to larger departments and states with unusually low response rates, whereas the first survey in 2001 had included a second mailing to all first-mailing non-respondents. This response rate is similar to the response rate in the 2001 survey's first mailing and is sufficient for reliable results at the national and state levels, overall and by community size. The second mailing to small states with low response rates had minimal impact on national estimates. The content of the survey was developed by NFPA in the 2001 survey, in collaboration with an ad hoc technical advisory group consisting of representatives of the full spectrum of national organizations and related disciplines associated with the management of fire and related hazards and risks in the U.S. The survey form was used without modification in order to maximize comparability of results and development of valid timelines.

Hurricane Sandy caused extensive human suffering and damage to public and private property. In response to this catastrophic event, Congress considered legislation to provide supplemental appropriations to federal disaster assistance programs. In addition, Congress considered revisions to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended), which is the primary source of authorities for disaster assistance programs for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a result, Congress passed the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, which was included as Division B of the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2). Division A of P.L. 113-2 provided a $50.7 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy. Additionally, Congress increased the National Flood Insurance Program's borrowing authority by $9.7 billion (from $20.725 billion to $30.425 billion) (P.L. 113-1). Both of these supplemental relief law are discussed separately in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief. This report analyzes the provisions of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013. In general, these provisions amend the Stafford Act with a stated goal of improving the efficiency and quality of disaster assistance provided by FEMA. Briefly, the amendments to the Stafford Act include: Establishing a new set of alternative procedures for administering the Public Assistance Program, which provides assistance for debris removal and the repair and restoration of eligible facilities (Section 1102 of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013); Authorizing FEMA to enter into agreements with private owners of multi-family rental properties to expand post-disaster housing resources (Section 1103); Revising the administration of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, to include a possible advancement of 25% of grant funds (Section 1104); Directing the establishment of alternative dispute resolution procedures (including binding arbitration), building on FEMA's current appeals process, to resolve federal and state disagreements on costs and eligibility questions (Section 1105); Directing the creation of a joint process for environmental and historical review for disaster recovery projects with the goal of increasing the speed of the process (Section 1106); Directing FEMA to study, and report to Congress, whether it is appropriate to increase the dollar size of "small projects" eligible for simplified procedures (Section 1107); Including child care as an eligible expense under the "other needs assistance" provided in certain disasters (Section 1108(a)); Specifically authorizing the reimbursement of the base wages of government employees providing emergency work under certain circumstances (Section 1108(b)); Directing FEMA to update the factors considered when assessing the need for Individual Assistance in the declaration process (Section 1109); Authorizing the chief executive of a tribal government to directly request disaster or emergency declarations from the President, much as a governor can for a state (Section 1110); and Directing FEMA to create a comprehensive national strategy for reducing the cost of future disasters (Section 1111). Prospectively, the changes in law apply to disasters declared on or after the date of enactment, January 29, 2013. Further, support can be found in the text and legislative history of the bill for applying at least some of these amendments retrospectively to Hurricane Sandy-related disaster declarations. However, it is less clear whether, and to what extent, some of these revisions will apply to disasters declared before Hurricane Sandy.

Families trust schools to keep their children safe during the day. Thanks to the efforts of millions of teachers, principals, and staff across America, the majority of schools remain safe havens for our nation's youth. The unfortunate reality is, however, that school districts in this country may be touched either directly or indirectly by a crisis of some kind at any time. Natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, fires, and tornadoes can strike a community with little or no warning. An influenza pandemic, or other infectious disease, can spread from person-to-person causing serious illness across the country, or around the globe, in a very short time. School shootings, threatened or actual, are extremely rare but are horrific and chilling when they occur. The harrowing events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax scares have ushered in a new age of terrorism. Communities across the country are struggling to understand and avert acts of terror. Children and youth rely on and find great comfort in the adults who protect them. Teachers and staff must know how to help their students through a crisis and return them home safely. Knowing what to do when faced with a crisis can be the difference between calm and chaos, between courage and fear, between life and death. There are thousands of fires in schools every year, yet there is minimal damage to life and property because staff and students are prepared. This preparedness needs to be extended to all risks schools face. Schools and districts need to be ready to handle crises, large and small, to keep our children and staff out of harm's way and ready to learn and teach. Taking action now can save lives, prevent injury, and minimize property damage in the moments of a crisis. The importance of reviewing and revising school and district plans cannot be underscored enough, and Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities is designed to help you navigate this process. The Guide is intended to give schools, districts, and communities the critical concepts and components of good crisis planning, stimulate thinking about the crisis preparedness process, and provide examples of promising practices. This document does not provide a cookbook approach to crisis preparedness. Each community has its own history, culture, and way of doing business. Schools and districts are at risk for different types of crises and have their own definitions of what constitutes a crisis. Crisis plans need to be customized to communities, districts, and schools to meet the unique needs of local residents and students. Crisis plans also need to address state and local school safety laws. Experts recommend against cutting and pasting plans from other schools and districts. Other plans can serve as useful models, but what is effective for a large innercity school district where the population is concentrated may be ineffective for a rural community where schools and first responders are far apart.

Hurricane Ivan made landfall on Thursday, September 16, 2004, just west of Gulf Shores, Alabama. The hurricane brought sustained wind speeds, torrential rains, coastal storm surge flooding, and large and battering waves along the western Florida Panhandle and Alabama coastline. After landfall, Hurricane Ivan gradually weakened over the next week, moving northeastward over the Southeastern United States and eventually emerging off the Delmarva Peninsula as an extratropical low on September 19, 2004. On September 18, 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Mitigation Division deployed a Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) to Alabama and Florida to evaluate building performance during Hurricane Ivan and the adequacy of current building codes, other construction requirements, and building practices and materials. This report presents the MAT's observations, conclusions, and recommendations as a result of those field investigations. Several maps in Chapter 1 illustrate the path of the storm, the depth of storm surge along the path, and the wind field estimates. Hurricane Ivan approximated a design flood event on the barrier islands and exceeded design flood conditions in sound and back bay areas. This provided a good opportunity to assess the adequacy of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) floodplain management requirements as well as current construction practices in resisting storm surge and wave damage. FEMA was particularly interested in evaluating damages to buildings in coastal A Zones where V-Zone construction methods are not required. The recommendations in this report are based solely on the observations and conclusions of the MAT, and are intended to assist the State of Alabama, the State of Florida, local communities, businesses, and individuals in the reconstruction process and to help reduce damage and impact from future natural events similar to Hurricane Ivan. The report and recommendations also will help FEMA assess the adequacy of its flood hazard mapping and floodplain management requirements and determine whether changes are needed or additional guidance required. The general recommendations are presented in Sections 8.1 and 8.2. They relate to policies and education/outreach that are needed to ensure that designers, contractors, and building officials understand the requirements for disaster-resistant construction in hurricane-prone regions. Proposed changes to codes and standards are presented in Section 8.3. Specific recommendations for improving the performance of the building structural system and envelope, and the protection of critical and essential facilities (to prevent loss of function) are provided in Chapter 8. Implementing these specific recommendations, in combination with the general recommendations of Section 8.1 and 8.2 and the code and standard recommendations of Section 8.3, will significantly improve the ability of buildings to resist damage from hurricanes. Recommendations specific to structural issues, building envelope issues, critical and essential facilities, and education and outreach have also been provided. As the people of Alabama and Florida rebuild their lives, homes, and businesses, there are a number of ways they can minimize the effects of future hurricanes.

Following the two damaging California earthquakes in1989 (Loma Prieta) and 1994 (Northridge), many concrete wall and masonry wall buildings were repaired using federal disaster assistance funding. The repairs were based on inconsistent criteria, giving rise to controversy regarding criteria for the repair of cracked concrete and masonry wall buildings. To help resolve this controversy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated a project on evaluation and repair of earthquake-damaged concrete and masonry wall buildings in 1996. The ATC-43 project addresses the investigation and evaluation of earthquake damage and discusses policy issues related to the repair and upgrade of earthquake-damaged buildings. The project deals with buildings whose primary lateral-force-resisting systems consist of concrete or masonry bearing walls with flexible or rigid diaphragms, or whose vertical-load-bearing systems consist of concrete or steel frames with concrete or masonry infill panels. The intended audience is design engineers, building owners, building regulatory officials, and government agencies. The project results are reported in three documents. TheFEMA306report, Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings, Basic Procedures Manual, provides guidance on evaluating damage and analyzing future performance. Included in the document are component damage classification guides, and test and inspection guides. FEMA 307, Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings, Technical Resources, contains supplemental information including results from a theoretical analysis of the effects of prior damage on single-degree-of-freedom mathematical models, additional background information on the component guides, and an example of the application of the basic procedures. FEMA 308, The Repair of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings, discusses the policy issues pertaining to the repair of earthquake-damaged buildings and illustrates how the procedures developed for the project can be used to provide a technically sound basis for policy decisions. It also provides guidance for the repair of damaged components.