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Books > Social sciences > Sociology, social studies > Social issues > Social impact of disasters
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed this Risk
Assessment, A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
Against Buildings, to provide a clear, flexible, and comprehensive
methodology to prepare a risk assessment. The intended audience
includes the building sciences community of architects and
engineers working for private institutions, building
owners/operators/managers, and State and local government officials
working in the building sciences community. The objective of this
How-To Guide is to outline methods for identifying the critical
assets and functions within buildings, determining the threats to
those assets, and assessing the vulnerabilities associated with
those threats. Based on those considerations, the methods presented
in this How-To Guide provide a means to assess the risk to the
assets and to make risk-based decisions on how to mitigate those
risks. The scope of the methods includes reducing physical damage
to structural and non-structural components of buildings and
related infrastructure, and reducing resultant casualties during
conventional bomb attacks, as well as chemical, biological, and
radiological (CBR) agents. This document is written as a How-To
Guide. It presents five steps and multiple tasks within each step
that will lead you through a process for conducting a risk
assessment and selecting mitigation options. It discusses what
information is required to conduct a risk assessment, how and where
to obtain it, and how to use it to calculate a risk score against
each selected threat. This is one of a series of publications that
address security issues in high-population, private sector
buildings. This document is a companion to the Reference Manual to
Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426)
and the Building Design for Homeland Security Training Course (FEMA
E155). This document also leverages information contained within
the Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist
Attacks (FEMA 427). The primary use of this risk assessment
methodology is for buildings, although it could be adapted for
other types of critical infrastructure. The foundation of the risk
assessment methodology presented in this document is based on the
approach that was developed for the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) through the National Institute for Building Sciences (NIBS).
Over 150 buildings have been successfully assessed using this
technique. The risk assessment methodology presented in this
publication has been refined by FEMA for this audience. The purpose
of this How-To Guide is to provide a methodology for risk
assessment to the building sciences community working for private
institutions. It is up to the decision-makers to decide which types
of threats they wish to protect against and which mitigation
options are feasible and cost-effective. This How-To Guide views as
critical that a team created to assess a particular building will
be composed of professionals capable of evaluating different parts
of the building. They should be senior individuals who have a
breadth and depth of experience in the areas of civil, electrical,
and mechanical engineering; architecture; site planning and
security engineering; and how security and antiterrorism
considerations affect site and building design.
The National Disaster Housing Strategy (the Strategy) serves two
purposes. First, it describes how we as a Nation currently provide
housing to those affected by disasters. It summarizes, for the
first time in a single document, the many sheltering and housing
efforts we have in the United States and the broad array of
organizations that are involved in managing these programs. The
Strategy also outlines the key principles and policies that guide
the disaster housing process. Second, and more importantly, the
Strategy charts the new direction that our disaster housing efforts
must take if we are to better meet the emergent needs of disaster
victims and communities. Today we face a wider range of hazards and
potentially catastrophic events than we have ever faced before.
These include terrorist attacks and major natural disasters that
could destroy large sections of the Nation's infrastructure. This
new direction must address the disaster housing implications of all
these risks and hazards and, at the same time, guide development of
essential, baseline capabilities to overcome existing limitations.
The new direction for disaster housing must leverage emerging
technologies and new approaches in building design to provide an
array of housing options. It must also be cost effective and draw
on lessons learned and best practices. Above all, this new
direction must institutionalize genuine collaboration and
cooperation among the various local, State, tribal, and Federal
partners, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to
meet the needs of all disaster victims. Current practices in
disaster housing vary based on the nature and scope of a disaster
and can range from providing short-term shelters to arranging
temporary and, in some cases, permanent housing. Establishing
emergency shelters is generally a well-choreographed effort that
unfolds smoothly at the local level as emergency management
officials and nongovernmental organizations execute their emergency
plans. The challenges increase when disaster victims are displaced
from their homes for longer periods of time and temporary housing
must be provided. The process of meeting individual and household
needs becomes more challenging, and the responsibilities and roles
of those involved must be absolutely clear. States monitor and
support local government efforts and activate their capabilities as
needed to augment local capabilities. The Federal Government stands
alongside the States as an engaged partner, maintaining disaster
housing resources and ready to deploy those resources, if required,
to fill any emerging gap. While this process generally works very
well, it broke down in August 2005 when Hurricane Katrina struck
the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi and overwhelmed the
capabilities of responders at all jurisdictional levels. And now,
more than 3 years after Hurricane Katrina, we are still wrestling
with many technical and policy issues related to disaster housing
that Katrina brought to light. This Strategy outlines a vision,
supported by specific goals, that will point the Nation in a new
direction to meet the disaster housing needs of individuals and
communities.
This document describes baseline and additional EMS criteria for
the National Emergency Response Credentialing System. The EMS
Working Group determined the job titles listed herein to be the
most commonly requested EMS personnel in a state-to-state, mutual
aid-based response. Considering existing, nationally-accepted
standards and/guidelines, the EMS Working Group extracted relevant
education, training, experience, physical/medical fitness,
certification, and licensing criteria to define the baseline
criteria for each job title listed. These baseline criteria
represent the minimum requirements for EMS personnel to participate
in the Incident Management Integration Systems Division's National
Emergency Responder Credentialing System. The EMS Working Group
identified additional recommended criteria relating to education,
training, certification, experience, and physical/medical fitness
where it believed such standards and baseline criteria might
enhance job performance. These criteria are not required and
represent the EMS Working Group's recommendations for EMS personnel
to participate in the Incident Management Systems Integration
Division's Emergency Responder Credentialing System. Many
nationally recognized clinically-based certification/verification
courses such as Advanced Cardiac Life Support are appropriate and
essential resources for field personnel.
Over the last decade, the overall cost of disasters to the United
States has grown significantly. From 1989 to 1993, the average
annual losses from disasters were $3.3 billion. Over the last 4
years, the average annual losses have increased to $13 billion. On
the Federal side alone, disasters have cost over $20 billion over
the last four years. The disaster losses are equally as staggering
for the American public. Since 1993, over 1.4 million Americans
have been impacted by Presidentially declared disasters, resulting
in the loss of their homes, property, communities, jobs, and in
some cases their lives. This figure does not include the hundreds
of thousands of people impacted by natural hazard events that were
managed entirely at the State and local levels, and involved the
personal savings and private resources of property owners. Indeed,
the impacts of major disasters on Americans go well beyond those
damages that are directly sustained. Recovery from disasters
requires resources to be diverted from other important public and
private programs, and adversely impacts the productivity of
economic systems. To many, the rising costs associated with natural
disasters have become unacceptable. To address this growing
problem, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under
Director James L. Witt, has encouraged the emergency management
community to become more proactive in reducing the potential for
losses before an event occurs. This proactive strategy is commonly
known as mitigation. Hazard mitigation is defined as sustained
action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to people
and property from hazards and their effects. This distinguishes
mitigation from other major emergency management functions such as
preparedness and training, response, and short-term recovery. This
emphasis on mitigation led FEMA to introduce a National Mitigation
Strategy in December of 1995 to encourage a national focus on
hazard mitigation. The strategy is based on the objective of
strengthening the partnership among all levels of government and
the private sector and to empower all Americans to fulfill their
responsibilities for ensuring safer communities. The strategy was
developed with input from State and local officials, as well as
individuals and organizations with expertise in hazard mitigation.
The strategy has two goals: to substantially increase the public
awareness of natural hazard risk so that the public demands safer
communities in which to live and work; and to significantly reduce
the risk of loss of life, injury, economic costs, and destruction
of natural and cultural resources that result from natural hazards.
The reason for the emphasis on mitigation is clear. Experience at
the Federal, State, and local levels during natural disasters, and
a growing body of associated research, have demonstrated that the
losses from such events (in terms of life, property, and community
resources) can be substantially reduced when mitigation techniques
and technologies are applied. This paper was prepared to illustrate
the comparative benefits and costs associated with the
implementation of a variety of mitigation measures by Federal,
State, and local government, and private sector entities. To
accomplish this, this paper will identify, through a series of case
studies, the mitigation tools used to achieve cost-effective hazard
mitigation benefits. The case studies are representative of the
types of mitigation measures that are, or could be, performed
elsewhere in the nation under similar conditions.
Our society places great importance on the education system and its
schools, and has a tremendous investment in current and future
schools. Nearly 50 million students were expected to attend
approximately 99,000 public elementary and secondary schools in the
fall of 2009, with an additional 5.8 million expected to attend
private schools. The sizes of these school facilities range from
one-room rural schoolhouses to citywide and mega schools that house
5,000 or more students. The school is both a place of learning and
an important community resource and center. This publication is
concerned with the protection of schools and their occupants
against natural hazards. Architects and engineers deal with natural
hazards in building design and construction and building codes have
provisions for protection against natural hazards. This manual
addresses two core concepts: multi-hazard design and
performance-based design. Multi-hazard design recognizes the
fundamental characteristics of hazards and how they interact, so
that design for protection becomes integrated with all the other
design demands; and Performance-based design suggests conducting a
systematic investigation to ensure that the specific concerns of
building owners and occupants are addressed, rather than relying on
only the minimum requirements of the building code for protection
against hazards. Building codes focus on providing life safety,
while property protection is secondary. Performance-based design
provides additional levels of protection that cover property damage
and functional interruption within a financially-feasible context.
This publication stresses that the identification of hazards and
their frequency and careful consideration of design to resist these
hazards must be integrated with all other design issues, and be
included from the inception of the site selection and building
design process. Although the basic issues to be considered in
planning a school construction program are more or less common to
all school districts, the specific processes differ greatly because
each school district has its own approach. Districts vary in size,
from a rural district responsible for only a few schools, to a city
district or statewide system overseeing a complex program of all
school types and sizes. Any of these districts may be responsible
for new design and construction, renovations, and additions. While
one district may have a long-term program of school construction
and be familiar with programming, financing, hiring designers,
bidding procedures, contract administration, and commissioning a
new building, another district may not have constructed a new
school for decades, and have no staff members familiar with the
process. This publication is intended to provide design guidance
for the protection of school buildings and their occupants against
natural hazards. It focuses on the design of elementary and
secondary schools (K-12), as well as repair, renovation, and
additions to existing schools. It is one of a series of
publications in which multi-hazard and performance-based design are
addressed (FEMA 577, Design Guide for Improving Hospital Safety in
Earthquakes, Floods, and High Winds, and FEMA 543, Design Guide for
Improving Critical Facility Safety from Flooding and High Winds).
This publication considers the safety of school buildings to
occupants, and the economic losses and social disruption caused by
building damage and destruction. The volume covers three natural
hazards that have the potential to result in unacceptable risk and
loss: earthquakes, floods and high winds. A companion volume, FEMA
428, Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist
Attacks, covers the manmade hazards of physical, chemical,
biological, and radiological attacks. This publication is intended
to assist design professionals and school officials involved in the
technical and financial decisions related to school construction,
repair, and renovations.
The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and
school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to
make a school that is safe from terrorist attacks and at the same
time is functional, aesthetically pleasing, and meets the needs of
the students, staff, administration, and general public. Protecting
a school building and grounds from physical attack is a significant
challenge because the ability to design, construct, renovate,
operate, and maintain the facility is spread across numerous
building users, infrastructure systems, and many building design
codes. There is a strong interest in the United States (U.S.) in
ensuring the safety of students, faculty, and staff in our schools.
Schools are integral parts of their communities. Many schools are
used as shelters, command centers, or meeting places in times of
crisis. Schools are also used widely for polling and voting
functions. In some communities, schools are places of health care
delivery. Schools may or may not be the targets of terrorism, but
they are certain to be affected by terrorism, whether directly or
indirectly. On September 11, 2001, four elementary schools and
three high schools located within 6 blocks of the World Trade
Center were just beginning classes when the first plane hit the
north tower. Thousands of children were exposed to the dust clouds
from the collapsing buildings. Even those children not in the
immediate vicinity experienced a great deal of anxiety. Children in
at least three states (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) had
parents working in or around the World Trade Center that day. In
the Washington, DC, area, schools faced similar situations after
the Pentagon was attacked. Many Americans feel that schools should
be the safest place our children can be, perhaps at times even
safer than the homes in which they live. Security is not a
standalone capability; it is a critical design consideration that
should be constantly reviewed and scrutinized from the design phase
through construction or rehabilitation and onto building use. The
focus of this primer will be on the threats posed by potential
physical attacks on a school by terrorists. Attacking schools and
school children could be a highly emotional and high profile event.
At the time of publication of this primer, there have been no
direct terrorist threats against a school known to the public;
however, schools could be indirectly threatened by collateral
damage from a terrorist attack directed at nearby facilities.
Protecting a school against terrorist attack is a challenging task.
A school may have considerable vulnerabilities, because of its well
defined periods of use, designated access points, storage of
sensitive personal information, minimal security forces, and
numerous avenues of penetration and escape for attackers. This
primer should be used in conjunction with the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, and FEMA 427, Primer
for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks.
This primer presents an approach to protecting schools at risk from
terrorist attacks. The information presented is intended primarily
for architects and engineers, or school administrators with a
technical background. This publication is designed to meet the
needs of all schools, including those with serious security
concerns. Because security concerns of individual schools vary
greatly, some users with modest security concerns may feel
beleaguered by the amount of information and technical approach
presented. They should feel free to select the methods and measures
that best meet their individual situations while gaining a general
appreciation of security concerns and risk management.
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage to
the coast along the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in an unprecedented
relief, recovery, and reconstruction effort. This reconstruction
presents a unique opportunity to rebuild the communities and public
infrastructure using the latest hazard mitigation techniques proven
to be more protective of lives and property. Critical facilities
comprise all public and private facilities deemed by a community to
be essential for the delivery of vital services, protection of
special populations, and the provision of other services of
importance for that community. This manual concentrates on a
smaller group of facilities that are crucial for protecting the
health and safety of the population: health care, educational, and
emergency response facilities. The Design Guide for Improving
Critical Facility Safety from Flooding and High Winds (FEMA 543)
was developed with the support of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Region IV in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This
manual recommends incorporating hazard mitigation measures into all
stages and at all levels of critical facility planning and design,
for both new construction and the reconstruction and rehabilitation
of existing facilities. It provides building professionals and
decision makers with information and guidelines for implementing a
variety of mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability to
damage and disruption of operations during severe flooding and
high-wind events. The underlying theme of this manual is that by
building more robust critical facilities that will remain
operational during and after a major disaster, people's lives and
the community's vitality can be better preserved and protected. The
poor performance of many critical facilities in the affected areas
was not unique to Hurricane Katrina. It was observed in numerous
hurricanes dating back more than three decades. Several reasons may
explain this kind of performance. In many cases the damaged
facilities were quite old and were constructed well before the
introduction of modern codes and standards. Some of the older
facilities were damaged because building components had
deteriorated as a result of inadequate maintenance. Many
fa-cilities occupy unsuitable buildings that were never intended
for this type of use. Some newer facilities suffered damage as a
result of deficiencies in design and construction or the
application of inappropriate design criteria and standards. The
primary objective of this manual is to assist the building design
community and local officials and decision makers in adopting and
implementing sound mitigation measures that will decrease the
vulnerability of critical facilities to major disasters. The goals
of this manual are to: Present and recommend the use of building
design features and building materials and methods that can improve
the performance of critical facilities in hazard-prone areas during
and after flooding and high-wind events. m Introduce and provide
guidelines for implementing flooding and high-wind mitigation best
practices into the process of design, construction, and operation
and maintenance of critical facilities; and To aid in the
reconstruction of the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
this manual presents an overview of the principal planning and
design considerations for improving the performance of critical
facilities during, and in the aftermath of, flooding and high-wind
events. It provides design guidance and practical recommendations
for protecting critical facilities and their occupants against
these natural hazards. It presents incremental approaches that can
be implemented over time to decrease the vulnerability of
buildings, but emphasizes the importance of incorporating the
requirements for mitigation against flooding and high winds into
the planning and design of critical facilities from the very
beginning of the process.
The residential portion of the fire problem continues to account
for the vast majority of civilian casualties. National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) estimates show that, while
residential structure fires account for only 25 percent of fires
nationwide, they account for a disproportionate share of losses: 83
percent of fire deaths, 77 percent of fire injuries, and 64 percent
of direct dollar losses. Analyses of the residential structure fire
problem were published formerly as a chapter in each edition of
Fire in the United States. The most recent edition of Fire in the
United States, the fourteenth edition published in August 2007,
featured an abbreviated chapter on residential structures. This
full report is the most current snapshot of the residential fire
problem as reflected in the 2005 National Fire Incident Reporting
System (NFIRS) data and the 2005 NFPA survey data. In this report,
as in previous chapters in Fire in the United States, an attempt
has been made to keep the data presentation and analysis as
straightforward as possible. It is also the desire of the United
States Fire Administration (USFA) to make the report widely
accessible to many different users, so it avoids unnecessarily
complex methodology.
This publication helps to develop a comprehensive juvenile
firesetter prevention training workshop for the various agency
professionals who work with juvenile firesetters. Juveniles are
responsible for a significant proportion of both the accidental and
intentional fires that occur each year in the United States. Since
the mid-1970's, national, state, and local officials have been
turning more attention to the problem of juvenile firesetting and
have experimented with various approaches to reducing it.
Nonetheless, many experts believe that there are significant gaps
in our knowledge and practice. In response to these concerns, in
1987 the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) and the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) began a new
research and development program intended to conceptualize, design,
develop, and evaluate a variety of community-based approaches to
prevent and control juvenile firesetting. The initiative was known
as the National Juvenile Firesetter/Arson Control and Prevention
Program (NJF/ACP). This Users' Guide is designed to accompany The
Juvenile Firesetter/Arson Control and Prevention Program (JFACPP)
Program Materials. The Users' Guide is intended to accomplish the
following objectives: 1. To provide a summary of how to plan and
implement a juvenile firesetter/arson control and prevention
program. This is achieved by outlining critical decision points in
building each component of the juvenile firesetter/arson program.
The result is a cookbook format that guides the reader from the
planning to the execution of an effective community program. 2. To
highlight the key information contained in The JFACPP Guidelines
for Implementation.
For the first time, the truth about who blew "Pan AM 103" out of
the sky over Lockerbie Scotland, is revealed by the man who risks
all to tell. Find out how and why the United States, Great Britain
and Scotland have conspired to cover-up the true identities of
those responsible for one of the most heinous terrorist attacks
against innocent civilians. Dr. Chasey was contracted to normalize
relations between the United States and Libya. He tells about his
secret meeting with two of the world's most wanted men. He
introduces us to the two Libyan intelligence officers accused of
blowing up "Pan AM 103". He details his meeting with Col. Muammar
Qadhafi, the man Time Magazine called, "the most dangerous man in
the world". Chasey names the terrorists actually responsible for
the Lockerbie bombing. This book is packed with political intrigue
and reveals an FBI sting operation designed to destroy Chasey's
reputation and life. Learn why Dr. Chasey says, "I love my country,
but I fear my government".
From natural disaster areas to conflict zones, humanitarian workers
today find themselves operating in diverse and difficult
environments. While humanitarian work has always presented unique
ethical challenges, such efforts are now further complicated by the
impact of globalization, the escalating refugee crisis, and
mounting criticisms of established humanitarian practice. Featuring
contributions from humanitarian practitioners, health
professionals, and social and political scientists, this book
explores the question of ethics in modern humanitarian work,
drawing on the lived experience of humanitarian workers themselves.
Its essential case studies cover humanitarian work in countries
ranging from Haiti and South Sudan to Syria and Iraq, and address
issues such as gender based violence, migration, and the growing
phenomenon of 'volunteer tourism'. Together, these contributions
offer new perspectives on humanitarian ethics, as well as insight
into how such ethical considerations might inform more effective
approaches to humanitarian work.
This report compiles the best practices and common problems of fire
protection and criminal justice agencies in identifying,
investigating, prosecuting, and preventing arson. Commonly, the
crime of arson is motivated by spite and revenge. Perpetrators
strike with fire at buildings where people live, work, or
socialize-causing injury, property loss, and death. Civilians and
firefighters alike die in arson fires every year. Thirty years ago,
arson captured media attention because so-called arson-for-profit
rings were burning down decaying urban neighborhoods that had
ceased to be profitable, and then rebuilding them at a substantial
profit. Other high-profile cases involved arsonists who were
connected to gangs and drug lords, and who set fires to intimidate
their rivals or as retribution for deals gone bad. Some of the most
publicized cases occurred in the cities of New York, Boston,
Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Baltimore, and others. There even were
situations where neighborhood vigilantes, who were frustrated with
crime and run-down buildings, took it upon themselves to torch
structures to rid the neighborhood of vagrants, prostitutes, and
drug dealers. Insurance companies were perceived as the main
victims from intentional fires. As a crime com-mitted against
property, the economics of arson played center stage to the less
well-defined statistics on injuries and deaths. Since arson fires
do, on average, cause proportionately higher losses than fires from
other causes, insurance companies committed many resources toward
investigation and control. From establishing tip reward programs,
training accelerant detection canines (ADC's), supporting arson
reporting immunity legislation, and establishing the property
insurance loss register (PILR), the insurance industry was a strong
partner at that time. There is a dichotomy between arson as a
property crime and arson as a crime against people, and that lies
at the heart of today's challenges with cases of arson. As a crime,
arson's long-standing definition as the willful and malicious
burning of property does not do justice to the fact that today
arson is usually a personal crime that is directed intentionally
against specific victims. It is time for arson to be dealt with as
a violent crime against persons, not just a crime against property.
Today, spite and revenge dominate as the motives in intentional
property fires, especially where there are casualties.
Revenge-minded arsonists torch nightclubs, occupied residences,
hotels, and other settings where their intended victims, and often
other innocent people, are injured and killed. First responders get
injured or die battling these blazes and trying to save others.
Even though a portion of incendiary fires are motivated by other
reasons (e.g., excitement, economic relief, peer pressure, a cry
for help, and so forth) most set fires happen because someone
wanted to inflict harm on another person using fire as the weapon
of choice. Fire investigation units from The U.S. Fire
Administration's (USFA's) project indicated that spite and revenge
were the most common motives behind incendiary fires. Among project
sites from the past 5 years, spite and revenge ranked as the
highest leading motives, when investigation units were queried
about prevailing motives.
This Wildfire Prevention Guide is a project of the National
Wildfire Coordinating Group. This is one in a series designed to
provide information and guidance for personnel who have interests
and/or responsibilities in fire prevention. Each guide in the
series addresses an individual component of a fire prevention
program. In addition to providing insight and useful information,
each guide suggests implementation strategies and examples for
utilizing this information. Each Wildfire Prevention Guide has been
developed by Fire Prevention Specialists and subject-matter experts
in the appropriate area. The goal of this series is to improve and
enhance wildfire prevention programs and to facilitate the
achievement of NWCG program goals.
The 2005 Fire Service Needs Assessment Survey was conducted as a
stratified random sample survey. The NFPA used its own list of
local fire departments as the mailing list and sampling frame of
all fire departments in the US that report on fire incidents
attended. In all, 15,545 fire departments - just over half the
total in NFPA Fire Service Inventory (FSI) database, including all
departments protecting communities of at least 50,000 population -
were mailed survey forms, and 4,709 responded, for a 30% response
rate. Because of time constraints, this second survey limited its
second mailing to larger departments and states with unusually low
response rates, whereas the first survey in 2001 had included a
second mailing to all first-mailing non-respondents. This response
rate is similar to the response rate in the 2001 survey's first
mailing and is sufficient for reliable results at the national and
state levels, overall and by community size. The second mailing to
small states with low response rates had minimal impact on national
estimates. The content of the survey was developed by NFPA in the
2001 survey, in collaboration with an ad hoc technical advisory
group consisting of representatives of the full spectrum of
national organizations and related disciplines associated with the
management of fire and related hazards and risks in the U.S. The
survey form was used without modification in order to maximize
comparability of results and development of valid timelines.
Hurricane Sandy caused extensive human suffering and damage to
public and private property. In response to this catastrophic
event, Congress considered legislation to provide supplemental
appropriations to federal disaster assistance programs. In
addition, Congress considered revisions to the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act,
P.L. 93-288 as amended), which is the primary source of authorities
for disaster assistance programs for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). As a result, Congress passed the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, which was included as Division B
of the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2).
Division A of P.L. 113-2 provided a $50.7 billion package of
disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane
Sandy. Additionally, Congress increased the National Flood
Insurance Program's borrowing authority by $9.7 billion (from
$20.725 billion to $30.425 billion) (P.L. 113-1). Both of these
supplemental relief law are discussed separately in CRS Report
R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief. This
report analyzes the provisions of the Sandy Recovery Improvement
Act of 2013. In general, these provisions amend the Stafford Act
with a stated goal of improving the efficiency and quality of
disaster assistance provided by FEMA. Briefly, the amendments to
the Stafford Act include: Establishing a new set of alternative
procedures for administering the Public Assistance Program, which
provides assistance for debris removal and the repair and
restoration of eligible facilities (Section 1102 of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act of 2013); Authorizing FEMA to enter into
agreements with private owners of multi-family rental properties to
expand post-disaster housing resources (Section 1103); Revising the
administration of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, to include a
possible advancement of 25% of grant funds (Section 1104);
Directing the establishment of alternative dispute resolution
procedures (including binding arbitration), building on FEMA's
current appeals process, to resolve federal and state disagreements
on costs and eligibility questions (Section 1105); Directing the
creation of a joint process for environmental and historical review
for disaster recovery projects with the goal of increasing the
speed of the process (Section 1106); Directing FEMA to study, and
report to Congress, whether it is appropriate to increase the
dollar size of "small projects" eligible for simplified procedures
(Section 1107); Including child care as an eligible expense under
the "other needs assistance" provided in certain disasters (Section
1108(a)); Specifically authorizing the reimbursement of the base
wages of government employees providing emergency work under
certain circumstances (Section 1108(b)); Directing FEMA to update
the factors considered when assessing the need for Individual
Assistance in the declaration process (Section 1109); Authorizing
the chief executive of a tribal government to directly request
disaster or emergency declarations from the President, much as a
governor can for a state (Section 1110); and Directing FEMA to
create a comprehensive national strategy for reducing the cost of
future disasters (Section 1111). Prospectively, the changes in law
apply to disasters declared on or after the date of enactment,
January 29, 2013. Further, support can be found in the text and
legislative history of the bill for applying at least some of these
amendments retrospectively to Hurricane Sandy-related disaster
declarations. However, it is less clear whether, and to what
extent, some of these revisions will apply to disasters declared
before Hurricane Sandy.
Families trust schools to keep their children safe during the day.
Thanks to the efforts of millions of teachers, principals, and
staff across America, the majority of schools remain safe havens
for our nation's youth. The unfortunate reality is, however, that
school districts in this country may be touched either directly or
indirectly by a crisis of some kind at any time. Natural disasters
such as floods, earthquakes, fires, and tornadoes can strike a
community with little or no warning. An influenza pandemic, or
other infectious disease, can spread from person-to-person causing
serious illness across the country, or around the globe, in a very
short time. School shootings, threatened or actual, are extremely
rare but are horrific and chilling when they occur. The harrowing
events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax scares have ushered
in a new age of terrorism. Communities across the country are
struggling to understand and avert acts of terror. Children and
youth rely on and find great comfort in the adults who protect
them. Teachers and staff must know how to help their students
through a crisis and return them home safely. Knowing what to do
when faced with a crisis can be the difference between calm and
chaos, between courage and fear, between life and death. There are
thousands of fires in schools every year, yet there is minimal
damage to life and property because staff and students are
prepared. This preparedness needs to be extended to all risks
schools face. Schools and districts need to be ready to handle
crises, large and small, to keep our children and staff out of
harm's way and ready to learn and teach. Taking action now can save
lives, prevent injury, and minimize property damage in the moments
of a crisis. The importance of reviewing and revising school and
district plans cannot be underscored enough, and Practical
Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities
is designed to help you navigate this process. The Guide is
intended to give schools, districts, and communities the critical
concepts and components of good crisis planning, stimulate thinking
about the crisis preparedness process, and provide examples of
promising practices. This document does not provide a cookbook
approach to crisis preparedness. Each community has its own
history, culture, and way of doing business. Schools and districts
are at risk for different types of crises and have their own
definitions of what constitutes a crisis. Crisis plans need to be
customized to communities, districts, and schools to meet the
unique needs of local residents and students. Crisis plans also
need to address state and local school safety laws. Experts
recommend against cutting and pasting plans from other schools and
districts. Other plans can serve as useful models, but what is
effective for a large innercity school district where the
population is concentrated may be ineffective for a rural community
where schools and first responders are far apart.
Hurricane Ivan made landfall on Thursday, September 16, 2004, just
west of Gulf Shores, Alabama. The hurricane brought sustained wind
speeds, torrential rains, coastal storm surge flooding, and large
and battering waves along the western Florida Panhandle and Alabama
coastline. After landfall, Hurricane Ivan gradually weakened over
the next week, moving northeastward over the Southeastern United
States and eventually emerging off the Delmarva Peninsula as an
extratropical low on September 19, 2004. On September 18, 2005, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Mitigation Division
deployed a Mitigation Assessment Team (MAT) to Alabama and Florida
to evaluate building performance during Hurricane Ivan and the
adequacy of current building codes, other construction
requirements, and building practices and materials. This report
presents the MAT's observations, conclusions, and recommendations
as a result of those field investigations. Several maps in Chapter
1 illustrate the path of the storm, the depth of storm surge along
the path, and the wind field estimates. Hurricane Ivan approximated
a design flood event on the barrier islands and exceeded design
flood conditions in sound and back bay areas. This provided a good
opportunity to assess the adequacy of National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) floodplain management requirements as well as
current construction practices in resisting storm surge and wave
damage. FEMA was particularly interested in evaluating damages to
buildings in coastal A Zones where V-Zone construction methods are
not required. The recommendations in this report are based solely
on the observations and conclusions of the MAT, and are intended to
assist the State of Alabama, the State of Florida, local
communities, businesses, and individuals in the reconstruction
process and to help reduce damage and impact from future natural
events similar to Hurricane Ivan. The report and recommendations
also will help FEMA assess the adequacy of its flood hazard mapping
and floodplain management requirements and determine whether
changes are needed or additional guidance required. The general
recommendations are presented in Sections 8.1 and 8.2. They relate
to policies and education/outreach that are needed to ensure that
designers, contractors, and building officials understand the
requirements for disaster-resistant construction in hurricane-prone
regions. Proposed changes to codes and standards are presented in
Section 8.3. Specific recommendations for improving the performance
of the building structural system and envelope, and the protection
of critical and essential facilities (to prevent loss of function)
are provided in Chapter 8. Implementing these specific
recommendations, in combination with the general recommendations of
Section 8.1 and 8.2 and the code and standard recommendations of
Section 8.3, will significantly improve the ability of buildings to
resist damage from hurricanes. Recommendations specific to
structural issues, building envelope issues, critical and essential
facilities, and education and outreach have also been provided. As
the people of Alabama and Florida rebuild their lives, homes, and
businesses, there are a number of ways they can minimize the
effects of future hurricanes.
Following the two damaging California earthquakes in1989 (Loma
Prieta) and 1994 (Northridge), many concrete wall and masonry wall
buildings were repaired using federal disaster assistance funding.
The repairs were based on inconsistent criteria, giving rise to
controversy regarding criteria for the repair of cracked concrete
and masonry wall buildings. To help resolve this controversy, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated a project on
evaluation and repair of earthquake-damaged concrete and masonry
wall buildings in 1996. The ATC-43 project addresses the
investigation and evaluation of earthquake damage and discusses
policy issues related to the repair and upgrade of
earthquake-damaged buildings. The project deals with buildings
whose primary lateral-force-resisting systems consist of concrete
or masonry bearing walls with flexible or rigid diaphragms, or
whose vertical-load-bearing systems consist of concrete or steel
frames with concrete or masonry infill panels. The intended
audience is design engineers, building owners, building regulatory
officials, and government agencies. The project results are
reported in three documents. TheFEMA306report, Evaluation of
Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings, Basic
Procedures Manual, provides guidance on evaluating damage and
analyzing future performance. Included in the document are
component damage classification guides, and test and inspection
guides. FEMA 307, Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and
Masonry Wall Buildings, Technical Resources, contains supplemental
information including results from a theoretical analysis of the
effects of prior damage on single-degree-of-freedom mathematical
models, additional background information on the component guides,
and an example of the application of the basic procedures. FEMA
308, The Repair of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall
Buildings, discusses the policy issues pertaining to the repair of
earthquake-damaged buildings and illustrates how the procedures
developed for the project can be used to provide a technically
sound basis for policy decisions. It also provides guidance for the
repair of damaged components.
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