|
Books > Social sciences > Sociology, social studies > Social issues > Social impact of disasters
According to available information, landsliding in the United
States causes an average of 25 to 50 deaths and $1 to $2 billion in
economic losses annually. Although all 50 states are subject to
landslide activity, the Rocky Mountain, Appalachian, and Pacific
Coast regions generally suffer the greatest landslide losses. The
costs of landsliding can be direct or indirect and range from the
expense of cleanup and repair or replacement of structures to lost
tax revenues and reduced productivity and property values.
Landslide losses are growing in the United States despite the
availability of successful techniques for landslide management and
control. The failure to lessen the problem is primarily due to the
ever-increasing pressure of development in areas of geologically
hazardous terrain and the failure of responsible government
entities and private developers to recognize landslide hazards and
to apply appropriate measures for their mitigation, even though
there is overwhelming evidence that landslide hazard mitigation
programs serve both public and private interests by saving many
times the cost of implementation. The high cost of landslide damage
will continue to increase if community development and capital
investments continue without taking advantage of the opportunities
that currently exist to mitigate the effects of landslides. The
widespread occurrence of landsliding, together with the potential
for catastrophic statewide and regional impacts, emphasizes the
need for cooperation among federal, state, and local governments
and the private sector. Although annual landslide losses in the
U.S. are extremely high, significant reductions in future losses
can be achieved through a combination of landslide hazard
mitigation and emergency management. Landslide hazard mitigation
consists of those activities that reduce the likelihood of
occurrence of damaging landslides and minimize the effects of the
landslides that do occur. The goal of emergency management is to
minimize loss of life and property damage through the timely and
efficient commitment of available resources. Despite their common
goals, emergency management and hazard mitigation activities have
historically been carried out independently. The integration of
these two efforts is most often demonstrated in the recovery phase
following a disaster, when decisions about reconstruction and
future land uses in the community are made. The development and
implementation of landslide loss-reduction strategies requires the
cooperation of many public and private institutions, all levels of
government, and private citizens. Coordinated and comprehensive
systems for landslide hazard mitigation do not currently exist in
most states and communities faced with the problem. In most states,
local governments often take the lead by identifying goals and
objectives, controlling land use, providing hazard information and
technical assistance to property owners and developers, and
implementing mitigation projects as resources allow. State and
federal agencies play supporting roles-primarily financial,
technical, and administrative. In some cases, however, legislation
originating at the state or federal level is the sole impetus for
stimulating effective local mitigation activity. In many states
there remains a need to develop long-term organizational systems at
state and local levels to deal with landslide hazard mitigation in
a coordinated and systematic manner. The development of a landslide
hazard mitigation plan can be the initial step in the establishment
of state and local programs that promote long-term landslide loss
reduction. The purpose of this guidebook is to provide a practical,
politically feasible guide for state and local officials involved
in landslide hazard mitigation. The guidebook presents concepts and
a framework for the preparation of state and local landslide hazard
mitigation plans.
Lifelines (e.g., communication, electric power, liquid fuels,
natural gas, transportation, water and sewer systems, etc.) are
presently being sited in "utility or transportation corridors" to
reduce their right-of-way environmental, aesthetic, and cost
impacts on the community and on land use. The individual lifelines
are usually constructed or modified at different time periods,
resulting in their being built to different standards and in
different siting criteria being applied to different segments of an
individual lifeline or to different lifelines that provide similar
functions. Presently, the siting review usually does not consider
the impact of the proximity or collocation of one lifeline upon the
risk to or vulnerability of other lifelines from natural or manmade
hazards or disasters, either because the other lifelines have not
yet been installed or because such a consideration has not been
identified as a factor in the siting evaluation. In August 1988, a
train derailment in northern California also damaged a petroleum
pipeline which was buried along the railroad right-of-way. The
result was a spill of the pipeline fluids in addition to the
derailment (but no significant loss of property and no injuries to
or casualties). When another derailment in San Bernardino occurred
in May l989, which resulted in severe property damage and the loss
of life, the Office of the Fire Marshall also responded to see if
the derailment had impacted a petroleum products pipeline that was
buried along the railroad right-of-way. It was decided that the
pipeline was not damaged, and the fire and safety personnel turned
over the site to the railroad to allow them to clean up the site.
About a week later the pipeline ruptured and the resulting fire
caused considerable property damage and loss of life. The
subsequent investigations concluded that the pipeline may have been
damaged during the derailment, but that the most probable cause of
its damage was the derailment clean up operations. In a similar
sense, communication lines along a highway bridge would be
vulnerable to failure if the bridge were to displace or fail during
a disaster event. In fact, frequently highway bridges and
overpasses are used to route other lifelines, such as
communications and pipelines, over causeways and water bodies. Such
lifelines can be damaged by failure of the superstructure, bridge
foundation movement, or ground deformation along the approaches to
the bridge. Settlement and lateral displacement adjacent to
abutments have been especially troublesome because such movements
tend to impose deformations on the lifelines where they are locally
constrained at the attachment or penetration of the abutment. There
are many such examples of lifeline interdependency that occurred
during the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. In response to these types
of situations, FEMA is focusing attention on the use of such
corridors, and they initiated this study to examine the impacts of
siting multiple lifeline systems in confined and at-risk areas. The
overall FEMA project goals are to develop, for multiple lifeline
systems in confined and at-risk areas, a managerial tool that can
be used to increase the understanding of the lifeline systems'
vulnerabilities and to help identify potential mitigation
approaches that could be used to reduce those vulnerabilities. The
goals also are to identify methods to enhance the transfer of the
resulting information to lifeline system providers, designers,
builders, managers, operators, users, and regulators. To provide a
specific example of how the managerial tool can be used, it was
decided that the methods should be applied to the lifelines in the
Cajon Pass, California, for an assumed earthquake event at the
Pass. The purpose of this report is to provide an inventory of the
major lifeline systems in the Cajon Pass and the earthquake and
geologic analysis tools available to identify and define the level
of seismic risk to those lifelines.
During the past few decades, the number of large public warehouse
stores (often referred to as big-box stores) across the nation has
grown significantly, changing both consumer buying habits and the
public's risk of injury during earthquakes. During an earthquake,
occupant safety in a big-box store depends on both the structural
performance of the building and on the performance of the storage
racks and their contents. Earthquake ground motions can cause
storage racks to collapse or overturn if they are not properly
designed, installed, maintained, and loaded. In addition, goods
stored on the racks may spill or topple off. Both occurrences pose
a life-safety risk to the exposed shopping public. The immediate
stimulus for the project that resulted in this report was a 2003
request from the State of Washington to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) for guidance concerning the life-safety
risk posed by the storage racks in publicly accessible areas of
retail stores, especially the risk of rack collapse of loss of
stored goods during an earthquake. FEMA asked the Building Seismic
Safety Council (BSSC) to develop the requested guidance. To do so,
the BSSC established a Rack Project Task Group composed of
practicing engineers, storage rack designers, researchers,
representatives of the Rack Manufacturers Institute (RMI) and the
Retail Industry Leaders Association, and members of applicable
technical subcommittees responsible for updating the NEHRP
Recommended Provisions. In developing this guidance document, the
Task Group focused primarily on steel single selective pallet
storage racks. It reviewed available information on storage rack
performance during earthquakes and the background on the
development of standards and code requirements for storage racks;
assessed seismic requirements for storage racks and current
practices with respect to rack design, maintenance and operations,
quality assurance, and post-earthquake inspections; and examined
available research and testing data. Based on its study, the Task
Group developed short-term recommendations to improve current
practice and formulated long-term recommendations to serve as the
basis for improved standards documents such as the NEHRP
Recommended Provisions, ASCE 7, and the RMI-developed storage rack
specification. Over the near term, the Task Group recommends that
the 2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions requirements for steel single
selective pallet storage rack design be followed and that
connections be checked in accordance with a procedure to be
developed by RMI. The Task Group also recommends that additional
guidance presented in this report be voluntarily adopted by store
owners and operators. Further, given the fact that maintenance and
use of storage racks is a key element to their acceptable
performance during earthquakes, store owners and operators should
adopt an appropriate quality assurance plan; as a minimum, the best
self-imposed practices of store owners and operators should be
maintained. The Task Group's primary long-term recommendation is
that the RMI specification be brought into conformance with the
2003 NEHRP Recommended Provisions, which is the basis for seismic
requirements found in current seismic design standards and model
building codes. The Task Group also recommends that optional
performance-based and limit state procedures and component cyclic
testing procedures be incorporated into the RMI-developed
specification. Compliance with these procedures will demonstrate
that the storage racks have the capacity to resist maximum
considered earthquake ground motions without collapse. It also is
recommended that regulatory bodies periodically review the quality
assurance programs of stores and implement any regulations needed
to satisfy life-safety concerns that relate to the securing of rack
contents and rack maintenance and use.
The Northridge earthquake of January 17, 1994, caused widespread
building damage throughout some of the most heavily populated
communities of Southern California including the San Fernando
Valley, Santa Monica and West Los Angeles, resulting in estimated
economic losses exceeding $30 billion. Much of the damage sustained
was quite predictable, occurring in types of buildings that
engineers had previously identified as having low seismic
resistance and significant risk of damage in earthquakes. This
included older masonry and concrete buildings, but not steel framed
buildings. Surprisingly, however, a number of modern, welded,
steel, moment-frame buildings also sustained significant damage.
This damage consisted of a brittle fracturing of the steel frames
at the welded joints between the beams (horizontal framing members)
and columns (vertical framing members). A few of the most severely
damaged buildings could readily be observed to be out-of plumb
(leaning to one side). However, many of the damaged buildings
exhibited no outward signs of these fractures, making damage
detection both difficult and costly. Then, exactly one year later,
on January 17, 1995, the city of Kobe, Japan also experienced a
large earthquake, causing similar unanticipated damage to steel
moment-frame buildings. Prior to the 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe
earthquakes, engineers believed that steel moment-frames would
behave in a ductile manner, bending under earthquake loading, but
not breaking. As a result, this became one of the most common types
of construction used for major buildings in areas subject to severe
earthquakes. The discovery of the potential for fracturing in these
frames called to question the adequacy of the building code
provisions dealing with this type of construction and created a
crisis of confidence around the world. Engineers did not have clear
guidance on how to detect damage, repair the damage they found,
assess the safety of existing buildings, upgrade buildings found to
be deficient or design new steel moment-frame structures to perform
adequately in earthquakes. The observed damage also raised
questions as to whether buildings in cities affected by other past
earthquakes had sustained similar undetected damage and were now
weakened and potentially hazardous. In response to the many
concerns raised by these damage discoveries, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) sponsored a program of directed
investigation and development to identify the cause of the damage,
quantify the risk inherent in steel structures and develop
practical and effective engineering criteria for mitigation of this
risk. As the project progressed, interim guidance documents were
published to provide practicing engineers and the construction
industry with important information on the lessons learned, as well
as recommendations for investigation, repair, upgrade, and design
of steel moment frame buildings. Many of these recommendations have
already been incorporated into recent building codes. This project
culminated with the publication of four engineering practice
guideline documents. These four volumes include state-of-the-art
recommendations that should be included in future building codes,
as well as guidelines that may be applied voluntarily to assess and
reduce the earthquake risk in our communities. This policy guide
has been prepared to provide a nontechnical summary of the valuable
information contained in the FEMA/SAC publications, an
understanding of the risk associated with steel moment-frame
buildings, and the practical measures that can be taken to reduce
this risk. It is anticipated that this guide will be of interest to
building owners and tenants, members of the financial and insurance
industries, and to government planners and the building regulation
community.
An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is one of the primary safeguards
against the loss of life and property damage that can result from
the failure of a high-hazard potential dam. Today, there are
approximately 8,300 state-regulated high-hazard potential dams in
the United States. Of these 8.300 dams, approximately 40 percent do
not have an EAP. Since the establishment of the National Dam Safety
Program in 1979, both the state and federal sectors have made
significant progress in increasing the number of state-regulated
high-hazard potential dams with EAP's. The dam safety community
recognizes, however, that much more must be done to reach the goal
established in January 2006 by the National Dam Safety Review
Board: achieve 100 percent compliance for EAP's for high-hazard
potential dams. When the National Dam Safety Review Board met in
October 2005, the losses from Hurricane Katrina had just exposed
significant failures in all aspects of the Nation's emergency
mitigation, planning, and response. The failure of the emergency
management system to respond quickly and effectively to the
disaster brought to the forefront the need for all hazard areas,
including dam safety, to refocus their attention on this critical
requirement. For the dam infrastructure, the need for emergency
action planning is heightened by the aging of dams in the United
States. The 2005 Report Card for America's Infrastructure (American
Society of Civil Engineers, March 2005) states that the number of
unsafe or deficient dams in the United States has risen by more
than 33 percent since 1998, to more than 3,500. To address these
issues, the National Dam Safety Review Board established the Task
Group on Emergency Action Planning and Response. The Task Group,
which began its work in January 2006, recognized that the success
of its effort would require the involvement of all of the sectors
with an interest in its outcome. As a result, the sectors
represented on the Task Group include state and federal dam safety
professionals and engineers, the emergency management community,
the security and protection community, and emergency response
organizations. Appendix D includes the list of Task Group members.
This document provides the Task Group's findings, recommendations,
and strategies for significantly increasing the number of EAP's for
state-regulated high-hazard potential dams.
One of the activities authorized by the Dam Safety and Security Act
of 2002 is research to enhance the Nation's ability to assure that
adequate dam safety programs and practices are in place throughout
the United States. The Act of 2002 states that the Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation with the
National Dam Safety Review Board (Review Board), shall carry out a
program of technical and archival research to develop and support:
improved techniques, historical experience, and equipment for rapid
and effective dam construction, rehabilitation, and inspection;
devices for continued monitoring of the safety of dams; development
and maintenance of information resources systems needed to support
managing the safety of dams; and initiatives to guide the
formulation of effective policy and advance improvements in dam
safety engineering, security, and management. With the funding
authorized by the Congress, the goal of the Review Board and the
Dam Safety Research Work Group (Work Group) is to encourage
research in those areas expected to make significant contributions
to improving the safety and security of dams throughout the United
States. The Work Group (formerly the Research Subcommittee of the
Interagency Committee on Dam Safety) met initially in February
1998. To identify and prioritize research needs, the Subcommittee
sponsored a workshop on Research Needs in Dam Safety in Washington
D.C. in April 1999. Representatives of state and federal agencies,
academia, and private industry attended the workshop. Seventeen
broad area topics related to the research needs of the dam safety
community were identified. To more fully develop the research needs
identified, the Research Subcommittee subsequently sponsored a
series of nine workshops. Each workshop addressed a broad research
topic (listed) identified in the initial workshop. Experts
attending the workshops included international representatives as
well as representatives of state, federal, and private
organizations within the United States. Impacts of Plants and
Animals on Earthen Dams; Risk Assessment for Dams; Spillway Gates;
Seepage through Embankment Dams; Embankment Dam Failure Analysis;
Hydrologic Issues for Dams; Dam Spillways; Seismic Issues for Dams;
Dam Outlet Works. Based on the research workshops, research topics
have been proposed and pursued. Several topics have progressed to
products of use to the dam safety community, such as technical
manuals and guidelines. For future research, it is the goal of the
Work Group to expand dam safety research to other institutions and
professionals performing research in this field. The proceedings
from the research workshops present a comprehensive and detailed
discussion and analysis of the research topics addressed by the
experts participating in the workshops. The participants at all of
the research workshops are to be commended for their diligent and
highly professional efforts on behalf of the National Dam Safety
Program. The National Dam Safety Program research needs workshop on
Embankment Dam Failure Analysis was held on June 26-28, 2001, in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Emergency Management Agency, would like to acknowledge the
contributions of the Agricultural Research Service and the Natural
Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture in organizing the workshop and developing these
workshop proceedings.
In 1999, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) jointly conducted
research and a workshop to shed light on the national problem of
animal intrusion damage to earthen dams and the resulting safety
issues. The FEMA/ASDSO survey and workshop united dam owners,
engineers, state and federal regulators, wildlife managers,
foresters, and academia to form an educated and experienced front
against the growing problem of earthen dam damage and failures due
to animal intrusion. The infor-mation generated by roundtable
discussions and survey answers indicates that while most states
recognize animal intrusion as a problem, only a handful know of
guidance on dams and wildlife management practices available to the
dam professionals and owners. Based on input from the dam
communities, FEMA/ASDSO's mission to develop a guidance manual on
the proper management of nuisance wildlife in the earthen dam
environment became clear. To determine the information needs of the
dam community-and therefore the most appropriate focus of this
manual-FEMA/ASDSO issued a survey in 1999 and used the survey input
from the 48 state dam safety officials representatives and 11
federal agencies representing the Interagency Committee on Dam
Safety (ICODS). Additionally, a second survey was issued in 2003 to
identify the current needs of each state, determine what nuisance
wildlife and damages the states encounter, and understand which
miti-gation methods are being used with success or failure. This
manual provides technical guidance to dam specialists (including
dam owners, operators, inspectors, state dam officials, and
consulting engineers) in areas of focus identified through the two
survey efforts and workshop. The purposes of this manual are to:
Assist dam specialists in understanding the impacts wildlife can
have on earthen dams; Provide dam specialists with basic
information on habitat, range, description, and behavior of common
nuisance wildlife to aid in their proper identification at the dam;
Describe state-of-practice methods to prevent and mitigate adverse
wildlife impacts on earthen dams. Provide state-of-practice design
guidance for repair and preventive design associated with nuisance
wildlife intrusion. It is envisioned that the entire dam specialist
community will use this manual to augment their routine duties in
earthen dam management. This manual is presented as a process
toward dam inspection and management that includes wildlife damage
identification and control. This manual provides technical
information and guidance on: How wildlife damage adversely affects
the safe operation of earthen dams; specifically, hydraulic
alteration, internal and external erosion, and structural integrity
losses (Chapter 2.0); Dam inspections that incorporate a biological
component to sensitize dam specialists to the aspects of their dams
that attract wildlife and to understand where nuisance wildlife are
likely to occur on the dam (Chapter 3.0); Biological data for
specific nuisance wildlife to assist the dam specialist in
identifying which nuisance wildlife inhabits the dam. Biological
data will also assist in controlling nuisance wildlife (e.g.,
listed food sources can be removed to encourage the animal to leave
the area) (Chapter 4.0); Dam design specifications and methods that
can be incorporated into repair of existing dams or new dam designs
to prevent wildlife intrusions (Chapter 5.0); Guidelines to
determine when wildlife management should occur at a dam (beyond
dam repair and prevention actions) and wildlife management methods
that can be implemented when control of specific nuisance wild-life
populations is deemed necessary. Specific methods discussed include
habitat modification, use of toxicants and fumigants, trapping, and
shooting (Chapter 6.0); The fiscal issues related to appropriate
and timely wildlife management at earthen dams (Chapter 7.0).
Disaster preparedness became a renewed priority for our Nation as a
direct response to the devastation of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Following the tragedies of that day, government
at all levels has embedded stronger collaboration with
nongovernmental civic and private sector organizations and the
general public in policies and practices. The Citizen Corps
grassroots model of community preparedness has spread across the
country, and Americans have been asked to become fully aware,
trained, and practiced on how to respond to potential threats and
hazards. To evaluate the Nation's progress on personal
preparedness, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's)
Community Preparedness Division conducts Citizen Corps National
Surveys to measure the public's knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors
relative to preparing for a range of hazards. This report provides
a summary of the findings from the 2009 Citizen Corps National
Survey. The research objectives and survey questions for the
Citizen Corps National Survey were developed based on previous
research, preparedness modeling, and policy and guidance from the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2003, Citizen Corps
conducted a national survey to provide baseline data on individual
preparedness for disasters. In 2007, the Citizen Corps National
Survey was designed to incorporate additional areas of examination
and to refine the questioning, while retaining several specific
questions from the 2003 survey to provide trend data. The 2009
Citizen Corps National Survey includes several more small
refinements. Comparisons between the findings from the 2003, 2007,
and 2009 surveys are noted throughout the report. FEMA's Community
Preparedness Division publishes the Citizen Preparedness Review to
highlight specific areas of research regarding community
preparedness and to summarize research findings from multiple
sources. To assess the research landscape on preparedness, Citizen
Corps has developed and maintains the Citizen Preparedness Surveys
Database of surveys on personal and business preparedness conducted
in the United States since September 11, 2001. As of August 2009,
the database contains 102 surveys on individual preparedness, 29
surveys on business, and 11 surveys on school preparedness.
Analyzing research from this wide variety of sources allows larger
preparedness trends and research gaps to be identified. Citizen
Preparedness Review Issue 3, Patterns in Current Research and
Future Research Opportunities (published summer 2006), made several
recommendations for future research that were taken into
consideration in the development of the Citizen Corps National
Survey implemented in 2007 and 2009. These recommendations
included: More fully explore participants' knowledge of the correct
preparedness measures and appropriate responses for different types
of hazards; Investigate a more comprehensive range of knowledge,
supplies, and skills related to disaster preparedness, such as
knowledge of warning systems, evacuation routes, and training for
specific skills; More fully explore motivational barriers to
preparedness, such as the degree of uncertainty about ability to
perform recommended measures or perceptions that recommended
measures will not make a difference in disaster situations;
Investigate demographic and contextual characteristics as they
relate to preparedness including: prior experience with disasters,
disability/ability factors, and community engagement; Examine
individuals' preparedness in multiple locations in addition to
their homes, such as the school, workplace, and community. An
important finding from the Citizen Preparedness Surveys Database is
that perceived preparedness can be very different from the specific
preparedness measures taken. In nearly all cases, these surveys
substantiate that the proportion of those who have taken
appropriate preparedness measures is much lower than those that
indicate that they are prepared.
Blanco County, Texas has been awarded, under the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Homeland Security Program Grant (HSGP)
authorization to construct a three hundred (300) foot new
communications tower, a total of three hundred twenty (320) feet
with the planned attached antennae. This communications tower will
enhance the interoperable communications among all first responder
disciplines in response to terrorist attacks and during times of
natural or man-made disasters. The HSGP provides grant funding to
public safety agencies for the protection of critical
communications infrastructure from terrorism, natural disasters and
routine operations. HSGP supports the implementation of State
Homeland Security Strategies to address the identified planning,
organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and
other catastrophic events. This Environmental Assessment (EA) has
been prepared according to the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), as applied to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at 44 CFR Part 10. This section
of the federal code requires that FEMA take into account
environmental considerations when authorizing or approving actions,
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act. This phased
project, is a joint venture between Burnet (1,021 Sq. Mi.), Llano
(966 Sq. Mi.) and Blanco (713 Sq. Mi.) Counties will build a P25
Regional VHF Digital Trunking Communications System that allows for
a link back to the Austin Master Site Controller making it an
element of a much larger Capital Area Council of Governments
(CAPCOG) Regional Radio System. The terrain of the three counties
consists of 2,700 Square Miles of rural, rugged hills, valleys, and
lakes over the three county areas. The new system will increase
coverage from nonexistent in numerous locations to approximately
94% AREA Portable Inbound coverage. The Project is being installed
in Phases beginning with FY 2007 Grant Year thru FY 2010 Grant
Year. The link back to the Austin Master Site Controller making it
an element of a much larger CAPCOG Regional Radio System is being
planned for FY 2011 Grant Year. This project will assist Burnet,
Llano and Blanco Counties in completing our P25 Communications
System for our CAPCOG Regional Interoperable project and is fully
compliant with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) January
1, 2013 Narrowband mandate for VHF Frequencies. In support of the
proposed project, the Blanco County Commissioners Court conducted a
public meeting on August 9, 2011 that included discussions
regarding the funding for the Round Mountain Tower site. The
purpose of this EA is to analyze the potential environmental
impacts of the proposed construction of a communications tower
facility. FEMA will use the findings in this EA to determine
whether to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
Experience with recent disaster recovery efforts highlights the
need for additional guidance, structure and support to improve how
we as a Nation address recovery challenges. This experience prompts
us to better understand the obstacles to disaster recovery and the
challenges faced by communities that seek disaster assistance. The
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) is a guide to promote
effective recovery, particularly for those incidents that are
large-scale or catastrophic. The NDRF provides guidance that
enables effective recovery support to disaster-impacted States,
Tribes and local jurisdictions. It provides a flexible structure
that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified and
collaborative manner. It also focuses on how best to restore,
redevelop and revitalize the health, social, economic, natural and
environmental fabric of the community and build a more resilient
Nation. The NDRF defines: Core recovery principles; Roles and
responsibilities of recovery coordinators and other stakeholders; A
coordinating structure that facilitates communication and
collaboration among all stakeholders; Guidance for pre- and
post-disaster recovery planning; The overall process by which
communities can capitalize on opportunities to rebuild stronger,
smarter and safer. These elements improve recovery support and
expedite recovery of disaster-impacted individuals, families,
businesses and communities. While the NDRF speaks to all who are
impacted or otherwise involved in disaster recovery, it
concentrates on support to individuals and communities. The NDRF
introduces four new concepts and terms: Federal Disaster Recovery
Coordinator (FDRC); State or Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators
(SDRC or TDRC); Local Disaster Recovery Managers (LDRM); Recovery
Support Functions (RSFs). The FDRC, SDRC, TDRC and LDRM provide
focal points for incorporating recovery considerations into the
decisionmaking process and monitoring the need for adjustments in
assistance where necessary and feasible throughout the recovery
process. The RSFs are six groupings of core recovery capabilities
that provide a structure to facilitate problem solving, improve
access to resources, and foster coordination among State and
Federal agencies, nongovernmental partners and stakeholders. The
concepts of the FDRCs, SDRCs, TDRCs and RSFs are scalable to the
nature and size of the disaster. The NDRF aligns with the National
Response Framework (NRF). The NRF primarily addresses actions
during disaster response. Like the NRF, the NDRF seeks to establish
an operational structure and to develop a common planning
framework. Fundamentally, the NDRF is a construct to optimally
engage existing Federal resources and authorities, and to
incorporate the full capabilities of all sectors in support of
community recovery. The effective implementation of the NDRF,
whether or not in the context of a Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) declaration,
requires strong coordination across all levels of government, NGOs
and the private sector. It also requires an effective, accessible
public information effort so that all stakeholders understand the
scope and the realities of recovery. The NDRF provides guidance to
assure that recovery activities respect the civil rights and civil
liberties of all populations and do not result in discrimination on
account of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age or
disability. Understanding legal obligations and sharing best
practices when planning and implementing recovery strategies to
avoid excluding groups on these bases is critical. The NDRF is a
guide to promote effective recovery. It is a concept of operations
and not intended to impose new, additional or unfunded net resource
requirements on Federal agencies.
In the last decade, disasters have affected university and college
campuses with disturbing frequency, sometimes causing death and
injury, but always imposing monetary losses and disruption of the
institution's teaching, research, and public service. Damage to
buildings and infrastructure and interruption to the institutional
mission result in significant losses that can be measured by
faculty and student departures, decreases in research funding, and
increases in insurance premiums. These losses could have been
substantially reduced or eliminated through comprehensive
pre-disaster planning and mitigation actions. September 11, 2001
reminded everyone of the importance of taking steps to mitigate the
consequences of disasters. In the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, many higher education institutions reviewed their disaster
plans and began to reconsider issues of safety and security.
Natural and man-made disasters represent a wide array of threats to
the instructional, research, and public service missions of higher
education institutions. This publication provides planning guidance
to these institutions as they prepare to identify their risks,
assess their vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards, and
develop a hazard mitigation plan. Its purposes are to encourage
higher education institutions to take hazard mitigation seriously
and to illustrate a course of action for implementing a mitigation
program to permanently reduce vulnerability to future disasters.
This publication is both a how-to guide and a distillation of the
experiences of six universities and colleges across the country
that have been working over the past several years to become more
disaster-resistant. It complements the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) State and Local Mitigation Planning how-to guides
that provide planning guidance for creating and implementing a
hazard mitigation planning process. These how-to guides are
excellent resources for higher education institutions and are
referenced in this publication whenever appropriate. This guide
provides basic information designed for institutions just getting
started as well as concrete ideas, suggestions, and practical
experiences for institutions that have already begun to take steps
to becoming more disaster-resistant.
The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is a multiagency
center that provides overall Federal support coordination for major
disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic incidents and
emergency management program implementation. Staffed by the
National Response Coordination Staff (NRCS), the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
maintains the NRCC as a functional component of the National
Operations Center (NOC) in support of incident support operations
at the regional-level. Upon activation, the NRCS provides
national-level emergency management by coordinating and integrating
resources, policy guidance, situational awareness, and planning in
order to support the affected region(s).The FEMA National Incident
Support Manual describes how FEMA national staff support FEMA
incident operations and briefly discusses steady-state activities
pertinent to incident operations. This manual defines the
activities of Federal assistance-across the nation and within
FEMA's statutory authority-supporting citizens and first responders
in responding to, recovering from, and mitigating all hazards. It
includes definitions and descriptions of roles and
responsibilities, functions, and organizational structures for
those conducting FEMA incident support duties, thus forming the
basis from which FEMA personnel plan and execute their assigned
missions. This manual also serves as the basis for developing
related guidance (procedures, handbooks, incident guides, training
materials, etc.). This manual will also discuss how NRCS procedures
are relevant to all personnel (FEMA, other Federal agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector) who are
either assigned to or coordinating with the NRCS. The NRCS is
aligned by the functions it performs to meet the FEMA mission. This
has the following advantages: NRCC structure is aligned to its
primary Missions; Planning support, situational awareness,
resources support, and National Response Center and Staff support
are addressed as separate functions; No redundancy of function
exists between incident, the regional-level, and the
national-level; The alignment makes resource support efficient; The
alignment promotes unity of effort.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) mission is "to
support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a
Nation, we work together to build, sustain, and improve our
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate all hazards." As the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) floodplain mapping program has evolved,
Flood Insurance Study (FIS) data and maps have become more detailed
and more accurate through improved computer models and greater use
of Geographic Information Systems (GIS). In addition, the technical
requirements of the FEMA Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning
(Risk MAP) program have resulted in an expansion of the amount of
useful flood data. As the data have improved, the use of the data
has extended beyond floodplain management permits and flood
insurance. For example, the data are being used to increase the
flood resistance in the design of new buildings and retrofits of
existing buildings. Design information, which is available in the
FEMA Building Science Branch library, includes enhanced design,
siting, construction, and retrofit guidance and requirements for
buildings in or adjacent to Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). The
library consists of publications, technical bulletins, training
descriptions, and tools, all of which are available online. The
flood risk data available from the Risk MAP program provides FEMA
with additional resources to inform communities, property owners,
and other interested parties about the vast library of Building
Science resources. The resources can be used together with flood
risk maps and other flood hazard products to reduce the loss of
life, number of injuries, and property damage from flood events.
The purpose of this report is to present the best practices for
incorporating Building Science flood mitigation information into
the Risk MAP program and strategies for informing interested
parties of the Building Science resources.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of
Domestic Incidents, directs the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a National Incident Management
System (NIMS). Initially published in March 2004, and revised in
December 2008, the NIMS provides a consistent national approach for
Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, the private sector,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to work together to prepare
for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate domestic incidents,
regardless of cause, size, or complexity. HSPD-5 directs Federal
agencies to adopt NIMS and encourages adoption of NIMS by all other
stakeholders-State, tribal, and local governments; private sector
organizations; critical infrastructure owners and operators; and
NGOs involved in emergency management. In addition, the adoption
and implementation of NIMS by State, tribal, and local
organizations is a condition for receiving Federal preparedness
assistance through grants, contracts, and other activities, as
stated in HSPD-5. Based upon emergency management and incident
response practices, NIMS represents a core set of doctrine,
concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes
that enables effective, efficient, and collaborative incident
management. The institutionalization of these elements nationwide
through training helps to mitigate risk by achieving greater
preparedness. Incident after-action reports and NIMS both emphasize
that successful implementation relies upon development and
maintenance of a national NIMS training program. Furthermore, NIMS
implementation relies upon comprehensive NIMS training and
standardized personnel qualification. The primary goal of this
guidance is to facilitate training and qualification of emergency
management personnel to all NIMS concepts and principles. The NIMS
Training Program identifies a deliberate method to develop and
maintain a complete NIMS core curriculum and, concurrently, to
provide training guidance to stakeholders for developing their
training plans. To meet this goal, the NIMS Training Program has
the following three objectives: 1. Support NIMS education and
training for all emergency management personnel; 2. Adapt the
functional capabilities defined by NIMS into guidelines, courses,
and a curriculum that help stakeholders to develop personnel
training and credentialing plans that yield the desired
capabilities; 3. Define the minimum personnel qualifications
required for service on complex multijurisdictional incidents
nationwide. The NIMS Training Program lays out a conceptual
framework that maintains a systematic process for the development
of training courses and personnel qualifications. This process
produces trained and qualified emergency management personnel. The
framework facilitates the systematic development of these courses
and qualifications by translating functional capabilities (defined
in NIMS) into positions, core competencies, training, and personnel
qualifications. The NIMS Training Program sets a sequence of goals,
objectives, and action items for the NIC, which administers NIMS
training nationally, and for stakeholders, who run their respective
NIMS training and education programs.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) provides an
opportunity for States, Tribal governments, and local jurisdictions
to significantly reduce their vulnerability to natural hazards. It
also allows them to streamline the receipt and use of Federal
disaster assistance through pre-disaster hazard mitigation
planning. DMA 2000 places new emphasis on State, Tribal, and local
mitigation planning by requiring these entities to develop and
submit mitigation plans as a condition of receiving various types
of pre- and post-disaster assistance (such as the Pre-Disaster
Mitigation PDM] program and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HMGP]) under the Stafford Act. On February 26, 2002, the Department
of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
published an Interim Final Rule (the Rule) to implement the
mitigation planning requirements of DMA 2000. The Rule outlines the
requirements for State, Tribal and local mitigation plans. FEMA has
developed a series of guides, called the Mitigation Planning
"How-To" Guides, to provide State, Tribal, and local governments
with easy-to-understand information needed to initiate and maintain
a hazard mitigation planning process and meet the requirements of
the Rule. The first four How-To Guides are known as the "core four"
guides. They provide the basic instructions for preparing a natural
hazard mitigation plan. They are: Getting Started: Building Support
for Mitigation Planning (FEMA 386-1); Understanding Your Risks:
Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2); Developing
the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and
Implementation Strategies (FEMA 386-3); Bringing the Plan to Life:
Implementing the Hazard Mitigation Plan (FEMA 386-4); This How-To
Guide, Using Benefit-Cost Review in Mitigation Planning (FEMA
386-5), supplements FEMA 386-3 and focuses on guidance for using
Benefit-Cost Review when prioritizing mitigation actions in a
hazard mitigation plan. The purpose of a mitigation plan is to
reduce the community's vulnerability to hazards. After assessing
its risks, a community may consider many mitigation options.
However, due to monetary as well as other limitations, it is often
impossible to implement all mitigation actions. Hence, the Planning
Team needs to select the most cost-effective actions for
implementation first, not only to use resources efficiently, but to
make a realistic start toward mitigating risks. The Rule supports
the principle of cost-effectiveness by requiring hazard mitigation
plans to have an action plan that includes a prioritization process
that demonstrates a special emphasis on maximization of benefits
over costs. The requirement states: The mitigation strategy section
shall include] an action plan describing how the actions identified
in section (c)(3)(ii) will be prioritized, implemented, and
administered by the local jurisdiction. Prioritization shall
include a special emphasis on the extent to which benefits are
maximized according to a cost benefit review of the proposed
projects and their associated costs. 201.6(c)(3)(iii)] The purpose
of this guide is to help local jurisdictions understand how to
apply the concepts of Benefit-Cost Review to the prioritization of
mitigation actions, and thereby meet the requirement of the Rule.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), National Preparedness Directorate (NPD)
and Grant Programs Directorate (GPD), Technical Assistance (TA)
Program seeks to build and sustain capabilities through specific
services and analytical capacities across two primary functional
areas: Preparedness TA activities in support of the four homeland
security mission areas (prevention, protection, response, and
recovery); Homeland security program management This two-pronged
approach ensures that initiatives measurably contribute to the
enhancement of homeland security capabilities through State and
local homeland security programs. The TA program addresses the
areas of greatest State and local need by institutionalizing
knowledge at the State and local level and providing a dynamic menu
of services that is responsive to national priorities. The TA
Program is driven by the following three core tenets: TA must
support the National Preparedness Guidelines (Guidelines), National
Priorities, and associated national strategies and doctrine that
maintain homeland security; TA must be flexible and adaptable to
fully address current national threats and the present day needs of
homeland security personnel; TA must include a layered range of
products ranging from guidance and templates to specialized on-site
support that apply to States, regions, Urban Areas, counties,
tribal entities, and private interests with a role in homeland
security TA service deliveries may take a variety of forms that can
be combined or modified to meet the specific needs of each
requesting State or local jurisdiction. To best accommodate the
wide variety of TA needs and deliverables, NPD and GPD support the
following three levels of TA: Level 1 - Information Resources:
General information to raise awareness or enhance familiarity with
best practices/protocols required within all jurisdictions. Level 2
- Models, Templates, and Samples: Delivery of solution packages and
performance models drawn from Federal, state, and local studies,
best practices, and experience that guides the implementation of
various initiatives. Level 3 - On-site Workshops: Delivery of
rigorous, customized solutions through direct, on-site support,
including workshops, guidance, and facilitation efforts to maximize
direct interaction between TA providers and TA recipients and
ensure the successful implementation of the most complex
initiatives. Preparedness TA services seek to build and sustain
capabilities in support of the four homeland security mission areas
(prevention, protection, response, and recovery) and the suite of
priorities and capabilities outlined in the Guidelines. As
capability gaps are identified within State and local
jurisdictions, Preparedness TA services are designed, developed,
and delivered to address those needs and build capabilities in the
most critical areas. The GPD Program Management TA services provide
direct assistance in the establishment and enhancement of the
overall homeland security administrative framework within State and
local jurisdictions. These TA services help build the
infrastructure at the State and local levels in which preparedness
purchases, training activities, exercises, and additional
assistance can accurately be managed, administered, tracked, and
measured. This component of the overall TA Program includes
services focused on grant reporting, grants management, overall
homeland security program management, and resource management
strategies for special needs jurisdictions.
The National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative supports
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by establishing a
comprehensive, integrated national mutual aid and resource
management system that provides the basis to type, order, and track
all (Federal, State, and local) response assets. For ease of
ordering and tracking, response assets need to be categorized via
resource typing. Resource typing is the categorization and
description of resources that are commonly exchanged in disasters
via mutual aid, by capacity and/or capability. Through resource
typing, disciplines examine resources and identify the capabilities
of a resource's components (i.e., personnel, equipment, and
training). During a disaster, an emergency manager knows what
capability a resource needs to have to respond efficiently and
effectively. Resource typing definitions will help define resource
capabilities for ease of ordering and mobilization during a
disaster. As a result of the resource typing process, a resource's
capability is readily defined and an emergency manager is able to
effectively and efficiently request and receive resources through
mutual aid during times of disaster.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed this
series of mitigation planning "how-to" guides to assist states,
tribes, and communities in enhancing their hazard mitigation
planning capabilities. These guides are designed to provide the
type of information states, tribes, and communities need to
initiate and maintain a planning process that will result in safer
and more disaster-resistant communities. These guides are
applicable to states, tribes, and communities of various sizes and
varying ranges of financial and technical resources. The how-to
guides cover the following topics: Getting started with the
mitigation planning process, including important considerations for
how you can organize your efforts to develop an effective
mitigation plan (FEMA 386-1); Identifying hazards and assessing
losses to your community, tribe, or state (FEMA 386-2); Setting
mitigation priorities and goals for your community, tribe, or state
and writing the plan (FEMA 386-3); Implementing the mitigation
plan, including project funding and maintaining a dynamic plan that
changes to meet new developments (FEMA 386-4); Evaluating and
prioritizing potential mitigation actions through the use of
benefit-cost analysis and other techniques (FEMA 386-5);
Incorporating special considerations into hazard mitigation
planning for historic structures and cultural resources (FEMA
386-6); Incorporating mitigation considerations for manmade hazards
into hazard mitigation planning (FEMA 386-7); Using
multi-jurisdictional approaches to mitigation planning (FEMA
386-8); and Finding and securing technical and financial resources
for mitigation planning (FEMA 386-9). This third guide in the state
and local mitigation planning how-to series is about developing
your community's mitigation strategy and documenting the planning
process. It builds on the resources and organizational framework
discussed in Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation
Planning (FEMA 386-1) and the results of the loss estimation
conducted according to Understanding Your Risks: Identifying
Hazards and Estimating Losses (FEMA 386-2). This guide provides you
and your planning team with the tools necessary to develop
mitigation goals and objectives, identify and prioritize mitigation
actions, formulate an implementation strategy, and assemble the
planning document.
The National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative supports
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) by establishing a
comprehensive, integrated national mutual aid and resource
management system that provides the basis to type, order, and track
all (Federal, State, and local) response assets. For ease of
ordering and tracking, response assets need to be categorized via
resource typing. Resource typing is the categorization and
description of resources that are commonly exchanged in disasters
via mutual aid, by capacity and/or capability. Through resource
typing, disciplines examine resources and identify the capabilities
of a resource's components (i.e., personnel, equipment, training).
During a disaster, an emergency manager knows what capability a
resource needs to have to respond efficiently and effectively.
Resource typing definitions will help define resource capabilities
for ease of ordering and mobilization during a disaster. As a
result of the resource typing process, a resource's capability is
readily defined and an emergency manager is able to effectively and
efficiently request and receive resources through mutual aid during
times of disaster.
|
|