In this work of philosophy, theology, and intellectual history, Duane Armitage offers a clear interpretation of Heidegger's enigmatic theology as uniquely Pauline and Lutheran. He argues that the real impetus, aim, and structure of Heidegger's philosophy of religion as well as his philosophy as a whole, are rooted in Pauline (and Lutheran) ontology. He thus demonstrates that continental philosophy of religion, and, to an extent, Continental Philosophy as a whole, is indebted to St. Paul and Martin Luther. This examination also shows how much of continental thinking itself is traceable to Heidegger's onto-theological critique and hence to Luther and St. Paul. Armitage argues that St. Paul and Luther, or at least Luther's specific reading of St. Paul, remain the un-thought origins of postmodern thinking on religion, and perhaps postmodern thinking in general.

Today's leading theories of meaning, chiefly those of Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson, depend crucially upon Gottlob Frege's distinctions between sense and reference, sense and utterance-force, and sense and tone. But while the notions of reference, sense, and force have dominated the discussion, the subtle workings of tone have received scant attention. Long overdue, this is the first comprehensive study of tone. Careful analysis of the more than two dozen varieties identified by Frege and Dummett reveals serious weaknesses in their explanatory framework. The author sketches a broader conception in terms of speakers correctly making things out to be a certain way, a formulation that avoids the demonstrated shortcomings of Fregean truth-conditional accounts while capturing the representational character of meaning as this applies right across the language-not only to words and sentences, but to discreet linguistic components such as word-order, mood of the verb, and patterns of intonation and stress.

"Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson: Rhizomatic Connections" is the first book length collection of essays exploring the relations between the work of Gilles Deleuze, Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson. With contributions by established international scholars from cultural studies, philosophy and theology, "Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson" examines the articulation between their concepts, methods and modes of doing philosophy and how their thought relates to different disciplines. Organized thematically, each essay examines the section themes in the context of the contrasts, differences and conjunctions--the rhizomatic connections--between their shared concepts. "Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson" will make a significant impact upon and contribution to the scholarship on these philosophers, challenging many of the preconceptions, the "images of thought," through which they are all too often read and interpreted.

In much recent thinking, social and cultural realms are thought of as existing prior to or detached from things, materiality, and landscape. It is often assumed, for example, that things are entirely 'constructed' by social or cultural perceptions and have no existence in and of themselves. Bjornar Olsen takes a different position. Drawing on a range of theories, especially phenomenology and actor-network-theory, Olsen claims that human life is fully mixed up with things and that humanity and human history emerge from such relationships. Things, moreover, possess unique qualities that are inherent in our cohabitation with them qualities that help to facilitate existential security and memory of the past. This important work of archaeological theory challenges us to reconsider our ideas about the nature of things, past and present, demonstrating that objects themselves possess a dynamic presence that we must take into account if we are to understand the world we and they inhabit.

Usually Husserl's analysis of time-constitution is thought of in terms of three phases that are roughly bound up with the central publications, the Lectures, the Bernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts. Today, after the publication of the central texts incorporating the last two phases, the discussion of Husserl's analysis of time-constitution has entered a new phase. This is true for the interpretation of the latter two texts but it also affects out reading of the Lectures. Today, in the aftermath of the recent publication of the C-Manuscipts, it seems more likely that the seemingly separated first two phases are more close to each other than expected. The new and broader context allows for more thorough interpretation of the whole enterprise of time-constitution.

By publishing this collection of contributions of the best international experts in this field, entailing some refreshing approaches of new coming researchers, this collection gives an overview of the most contemporary interpretations of this fundamental phenomenological theme.

It is usually assumed that Wittgenstein's philosophical development is determined either by one dramatic or one subtle change of mind. This book challenges the one-change view. Wittgenstein had many changes of mind and they are so substantial that he can be understood as holding several different philosophies in the late twenties and early thirties. Early in 1929, Wittgenstein envisages a complementary (phenomenological) symbolism in order to carry out the Tractarian task of giving the limits of language and thought. The symbolism failed and he then developed a comprehensive notion of 'grammar' that, he hoped, would fulfill the task. This notion of 'grammar' leads in 1930-1 to the calculus conception of language, which is still defended in the Big Typescript (1932-3). As a complementary tool of the calculus conception, Wittgenstein invents the genetic method, which aims at dissolving philosophical puzzles by the understanding of how they come about. After the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein assimilates an anthropological perspective and puts the genetic method at the center of the stage of his philosophy. The use of the genetic method (associated with an anthropological perspective) develops gradually, taking various forms of application: in the Blue Book, in the versions of the Brown Book (1934-6), and in the Philosophical Investigations.

This volume brings together distinguished Wittgenstein scholars and renowned philosophers of language in order to examine what Wittgenstein has to say about language and to assess its significance for contemporary philosophy.

Kant, in the Critique of pure reason, only dedicates a few pages to the principle of Anticipations of Perception and only a few critical studies are outspokenly dedicated to this issue in recent critical literature. But if one considers the history of post-Kantian philosophy, one can immediately perceive the great importance of the new definition of the relationship between reality and negation, which Kant's principle proposes. Critical philosophy is here radically opposed to the pre-critical metaphysical tradition: "Reality" no longer appears as absolutely positive being, which excludes all negativity from itself, and "negation" is not reduced to being a simple removal, the mere absence of being. Instead, reality and negation behave as an equally positive something in respect to one another such that negation is itself a reality that is actively opposed to another reality. Such a definition of the relation between reality and negation became indispensible for post-Kantian Philosophy and represents a central aspect of Kantian-inspired philosophy in respect to Leibnizian metaphysics. The present work therefore departs from the hypothesis that the essential philosophical importance of the Anticipations of Perception can only be fully measured by exploring its impact in the Post-Kantian debate.

The book shows that Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation of the 1920s is integral to his thinking as an attempt to lead metaphysics back to its own presuppositions, and that his reflection on art in the 1930s necessitates a revision of this interpretation itself. It argues that it is only in tracing this movement of Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation that we can adequately engage with the historical significance of his thinking, and with the fate of metaphysics and aesthetics in the present age.

In this volume, Baz offers a wide-ranging discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-perception, with special focus on Wittgenstein's method. Baz starts out with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and continues with attempts to characterize and defend Wittgenstein's approach to the understanding and dissolution of philosophical difficulties. Baz ends with attempts to articulate-under the inspiration of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology-certain dissatisfactions, both with Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect perception, and with his philosophical approach more generally. On the way, Baz explores connections between Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects and Kant's aesthetics. He examines ways in which the remarks on aspects may be brought to bear on contemporary philosophical work on perception. He discusses some of the implications of Wittgenstein's work on aspect perception for issues in moral philosophy and the philosophy of action.

This lecture, given by Michel Foucault at the College de France, launches an inquiry into the notion of parresia and continues his rereading of ancient philosophy. Through the study of this notion of truth-telling, of speaking out freely, Foucault re-examines Greek citizenship, showing how the courage of the truth forms the forgotten ethical basis of Athenian democracy. The figure of the philosopher king, the condemnation of writing, and Socrates' rejection of political involvement are some of the many topics of ancient philosophy revisited here.

Knowing that we are finite, how can we live to the fullest? Philosopher George Santayana suggested 'spirituality' enables us to enjoy what we have. This book clarifies and extends Santayana's account of spirituality, while suggesting how the detachment of spirituality can relieve human suffering, enrich our lives, and make us better human beings.

After 9/11/2001, gendered narratives of humiliation and revenge proliferated in the U.S. national imaginary. How is it that gender, which we commonly take to be a structure at the heart of individual identity, is also at stake in the life of the nation? What do we learn about gender when we pay attention to how it moves and circulates between the lived experience of the subject and the aspirations of the nation in war? What is the relation between national sovereignty and sovereign masculinity? Through examining practices of torture, extra-judicial assassination, and first person accounts of soldiers on the ground, Bonnie Mann develops a new theory of gender. It is neither a natural essence nor merely a social construct. Gender is first and foremost an operation of justification which binds the lived existence of the individual subject to the aspirations of the regime. Inspired by a reexamination of the work of Simone de Beauvoir, the author exposes how sovereign masculinity hinges on the nation's ability to tap into and mobilize the structure of self-justification at the heart of masculine identity. At the national level, shame is repeatedly converted to power in the War on Terror through hyperbolic displays of agency including massive aerial bombardment and practices of torture. This is why, as Mann demonstrates, the phenomenon of gender itself demands a four-dimensional analysis that moves from the phenomenological level of lived experience, through the collective life of a people expressed in the social imaginary and the operations of language, to the material relations that prevail in our times.

The human body is not simply a physical, anatomical, or physiological object; in an important sense we are our bodies. In this collection, Sartre scholars and others engage with the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre's brilliant but neglected descriptions of our experience of human bodies. The authors bring a wide variety of perspectives to bear on Sartre's thinking about the body, and, alongside in-depth scholarly historical and critical investigations, bring him into dialogue with feminists, sociologists, psychologists and historians, addressing such questions as: Why have philosophers found it so difficult to conceptualize the relationship between consciousness and the body? Do men and women experience their own bodies in fundamentally different ways? What is pain? What is sexual desire? What is it like to live as a racially marked body in a racist society? How do society and culture shape our bodies, and can we re-shape them?

While the relationship between Kant and other major figures in early analytic philosophy, such as Russell, G. E. Moore, and Rudolf Carnap, has been the subject of full length studies, no such work yet exists on the relationship between Kant and Frege. The Origins of Analytic Philosophy Kant and Frege addresses this gap in our understanding of the origins of early analytic philosophy. Its concern is to chart the nature and significance of Frege's break with Kant over the question of whether arithmetic is a synthetic a priori or an analytic a priori science. In rejecting Kant's claim that arithmetic is an a priori synthetic science, Frege returns to a conception of the scope and power of pure reason that shows important similarities to the philosophical outlook of Kant's great predecessor and philosophical opponent Gottfried Leibniz.Delbert Reed shows how, in his attempts to establish the foundations of arithmetic on analytic principles, Frege developed many of the tools, concerns and problems that would dominate the development of analytic philosophy in the 20th century.

This collection of essays by scholars from Europe, Asia, North America, and Latin America offers new perspectives of the phenomenological investigation of experiential life on the basis of Husserl's phenomenology. Not only well-known works of Husserl are interpreted from new angles, but also the latest volumes of the Husserliana are closely examined. In a variety of ways, the contributors explore the emergence of reason in experience that is disclosed in the very regions that are traditionally considered to be "irrational" or "pre-rational." The leading idea of such explorations is Husserl's view that perception, affectivity, and volition are regarded as the three aspects of reason. Without affectivity, which is supposedly irrational, no rationality can be established in the spheres of representation and volition, whereas volitional and representational acts consistently structure the process of affective experience. In such a framework, it is also shown that theoretical and practical reason are inseparably intertwined. Thus, the papers collected here can be regarded as a collaborative phenomenological investigation into the entanglement and mutual dependency of the supposedly "rational" and the "irrational" as well as that of the "practical" and the "theoretical."

This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past of couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered - above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell - and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another. The philosophers brought together in this volume are united by the thought that a proper appreciation of the depth of the skeptical challenge must reveal it to be deeply disquieting, in the sense that skepticism threatens not just some set of theoretical commitments, but also-and fundamentally-our very sense of self, world, and other. Second, that skepticism is the proper starting point for any serious attempt to make sense of what philosophy is, and to gauge the prospects of philosophical progress.

Creative force or creative shaping?

This unprecedented effort to plumb the workings of the ontopoiesis of life by disentangling its primordial forces and shaping devices as they enter into the originary matrixes of life yields fascinating insights.

Prepared by the investigation of the first two matrixes (the womb of life' and sharing-in-life', Analecta Husserliana Volume 74) the present collection of essays focuses upon the third and crowning creative matrix, Imaginatio Creatrix here proves itself to be the source and driving force which brings us to the origins of the human mind - human life.
Studies by: Elof Axel Carlson, A-T. Tymieniecka, N. Milkov, Eldon C. Wait, K. Rokstad, M. Golaszewska, M. Kule, W. Kim Rogers, Piotr Mroz, R. Pinilla Burgos, A. Carrillo Canan, G.R. Ronsivalle, J.E. Smith, A. Pawliszyn, A. Rizzacasa, L. Galzigna and M. Galzigna, Jiro Watanabe, M. Jakubczak, K. Tarnowski, M. Durst, W. Pawliszyn, R.A. Kurenkova, Carmen Cozma, E. Supinska-Polit, I.S. Fiut, Gerald Nyenhuis, Osvaldo Rossi, R.D. Sweeney, and D. Ulicka. "

Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings inspired contemporary philosophical thinking and advanced many issues that had been addressed by traditional philosophy. The questions raised by the Viennese philosopher initiated debates on a reconsideration of philosophical terminology. This is especially true for a term that has generated at least three significant controversies since its creation and will probably generate more disputes in the following years. It is the expression "form(s) of life" which translates into German as "Lebensform(en)" and "Form des Lebens". The present volume contains contributions on forms of life, language games and the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy on other scholears.

This Dictionary offers points of entry into Derrida's complex and extensive works.
This Dictionary offers points of entry into Derrida's complex and extensive works.
From 'aporia' to 'yes', the Dictionary suggests ways into Derrida that show what is at stake in his work.
Demonstrates that Derrida is not just about philosophy, but also about politics and pop music.
Explains why deconstruction matters, and how Derrida can change the way you think.
The A-Z entries are framed by essays on the inherent interdisciplinarity of Derrida's work and on Derrida's relationship to a range of other thinkers.

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

What do we mean when we talk about philosophy today? How does philosophy relate to science, to politics, to literature? What methods does the modern philosopher use, and how does philosophy progress? Does philosophy differ from place to place? What can philosophy do for us? And what can it not do? This book, with contributions from such exciting and influential contemporary philosophers as Simon Blackburn, Michael Friedman, Simon Critchley and Manuel DeLanda, offers us a fascinating picture of the character and methods of philosophy; its possibilities and its limitations. And of course, it is itself a piece of philosophy in action, not merely offering us answers but also prompting us to ask further questions and to philosophise for ourselves.>

An important contribution to the burgeoning field of the ethics of recognition, this book examines the contradictions inherent in the very concept of intimacy. Working with a wide variety of philosophical and literary sources, it warns against measuring our relationships against ideal standards, since there is no consummate form of intimacy. After analyzing ten major ways that we aim to establish intimacy with one another, including gift-giving, touching, and fetishes, the book concludes that each fails on its own terms, since intimacy wants something that is impossible. The very concept of intimacy is a superlative one; it aims not just for closeness, but for a closeness beyond closeness. Nevertheless, far from a pessimistic diagnosis of the human condition, this is a meditation on how to live intimately in a world in which intimacy is impossible. Rather than contenting itself with a deconstructive approach, it proposes to treat intimacy dialectically. For all its contradictions, it shows intimacy is central to how we understand ourselves and our relations to others.

During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. The twelve new essays, by an international group of contributors, range from case studies on individual philosophers (Russell, Carnap, Quine, and Ryle) through discussions of broader themes in the history of analytic philosophy (in logic and philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and psychology) to related methodological reflections (on the relationship between doing analytic philosophy and studying the history of philosophy, on various forms of philosophical history, and on their respective benefits).

"Insight and Analysis" applies Bernard Lonergan's thought to current issues in philosophy and in moral and other areas of theology. The common theme of the book is seen in the thread running through the chapters: a dialogue and critical comparison and contrast between Lonergan's thought and various key interlocutors in philosophy and theology. The title of this book, "Insight and Analysis", suggests its main focus - Lonergan and analytical philosophy - but also references one of Lonergan's most influential works: "Insight: A Study of Human Understanding". The chapters which explore the implications of Lonergan's thought for current work in analytical philosophy include discussions of Dummett, Wittgenstein, Searle, MacIntyre, Mackie, and Hintikka. However, Andrew Beards also brings Lonergan into dialogue with the continental tradition, with an extensive chapter on Badiou. Chapters on fundamental moral theology, Rahner's philosophy, and interrculturality and the writings of (the then) Cardinal Ratzinger indicate the importance of Lonergan as a philosophical theologian. "Insight and Analysis" presents a wide-ranging reassessment of the impact and application of Lonergan's thought.