This book approaches the construction of complex and transgressive 'pervert' characters in mainstream (not 'art'), adult-oriented (not pornographic) cinema. It deconstructs an episteme on which to base the construction of characters in screenplays, in a way that acknowledges how semiotic elements of characterisation intersect. In addition, it provides an extended re-phrasing of the notion of 'the pervert' as Feiticiero/a: a newly-coined construct that might serve as an underpinning for complex, sexual filmic characters that are both entertaining and challenging to audiences. This re-phrasing speaks to both an existential/phenomenological conception of personhood and to the scholarly tradition of the 'linguistic turn' of continental philosophers such as Foucault and Lacan, who represent language not primarily as describing the world but as constructing it. The result is an original and interdisciplinary volume that is brought to coherence through a queer, post-humanist lens.

This work is devoted to developing as well as expounding the theory of the cultural sciences of the philosopher Alfred Schutz (1899-1959). Drawing on all of Schutz's seven volumes in English, the book shows how his philosophical theory consists of the reflective clarifications of the disciplinary definitions, basic concepts, and distinctive methods of particular cultural sciences as well as their species and genus. The book first expounds Schutz's own theories of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and psychology. It then extends his approach to other disciplines, offering new theories of archaeology, ethnology, and psychotherapy in his spirit in order to stimulate the development of Schutzian theories in these and other disciplines. The second part of the book contains complementary philosophical chapters devoted to culture, groups, ideal types, interdisciplinarity, meaning, relevance, social tension, and verification.

How does Nietzsche, as psychologist, envision the future of religion and atheism? While there has been no lack of "psychological" studies that have sought to illuminate Nietzsche's philosophy of religion by interpreting his biography, this monograph is the first comprehensive study to approach the topic through the philosopher's own psychological thinking. The author shows how Nietzsche's critical writings on religion, and especially on religious decline and future possibilities, are informed by his psychological thinking about moods. The author furthermore argues that the clarification of this aspect of the philosopher's work is essential to interpreting some of the most ambiguous words found in his writings; the words that God is dead. Instead of merely denying the existence of God in a way that leaves a melancholic need for religion or a futile search for replacements intact, Nietzsche arguably envisions the possibility of a radical atheism, which is characterized by a mood of joyful doubt. The examination of this vision should be of great interest to scholars of Nietzsche and of the history of philosophy, but also of relevance to all those who take an interest in the interdisciplinary discourse on secularization.

The author demonstrates the significant role that some of the Edwardian philosophers played in the formation of Russell's work on the problem of the external world done at the tail-end of a controversy which raged between about 1900-1915.

This volume is dedicated to Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough and represents a collaboration of scholars within philosophy and the study of religion. For the first time, specialized investigations of the philological and philosophical aspects Wittgenstein's manuscripts are combined with the outlook of philosophical anthropology and ritual studies. In the first section of the book Wittgenstein's remarks are presented and discussed in light of his Nachlass and relevant lecture-notes by G.E. Moore, reproduced in this book as facsimiles. The second section deals with the cultural and philosophical background of the early remarks, while the third section focuses specifically on the general problem of understanding as being a main issue of these remarks. The fourth section concentrates on the philosophical development characteristic of the later remarks. Finally, the fifth section reviews Wittgenstein's opposition to Frazer, and the ramifications of his remarks, in light of ritual studies. The book is intended for scholars in philosophy and religious studies, as well as for the general reader with an academic interest in philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

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Adorno: A Critical Reader" presents a collection of new essays by many of the world's top critics, who examine Adorno's lasting impact on the arts, politics, history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology.

Few intellectuals captured as much critical attention in the late twentieth century as Theodor W. Adorno. A growing number of his writings, lectures, and addresses have recently become available in English, a development that has inspired a reassessment of his oeuvre and placed Adorno at the center of debates about the role and responsibilities of the intellectual.

Readers interested in the origins of cultural studies and critical theory will find this book an important examination of the broad work of one of the major intellectuals of the twentieth century. Those interested in the arts, politics, history, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology will delight in this important collection of essays that re-evaluate Adorno's work in the context of the many fields that his writings have shaped irreversibly.

In this thoroughly revised edition, James Cox provides an easily accessible introduction to the phenomenology of religion, which he contends continues as a foundational method for the academic study of religion in the twenty-first century. After dealing with the problematic issue of defining religion, he describes the historical background to phenomenology by tracing its roots to developments in philosophy and the social sciences in the early twentieth century. The phenomenological method is then outlined as a step-by-step process, which includes a survey of the important classifications of religious behaviour. The author concludes with a discussion of the place of the phenomenology of religion in the current academic climate and argues that it can be aligned with the growing scholarly interest in the cognitive science of religion.>

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

The core belief underlying this book is that the most useful and effective models to strengthen our intelligence are system ones, developed following the logic of Systems Thinking. Such models can explore complexity, dynamics, and change, and it is the author's view that intelligence depends on the ability to construct models of this nature. The book is designed to allow the reader not only to acquire simple information on Systems Thinking but above all to gradually learn the logic and techniques that make this way of thinking an instrument for the improvement of intelligence. In order to aid the learning and practice of the Systems Thinking discipline, the author has abandoned a rigid formal language for a more discursive style. He writes in the first person, with an ample number of citations and critical analyses, and without ever giving in to the temptation to use formal mathematics.

This book explores the ways deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity (what Jacques Derrida calls the "to-come," [l'a-venir]). In order to achieve this, it focuses on three French expressions, venue, survenue, and voir-venir, each taken from the work of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Catherine Malabou. The idea behind this focus is to elude the issue of the one and only "to-come," as if this was a uniform and coherent entity or structure of experience, and to put forward instead the possibility of a multiplicity of structures, each with a different intonation or pitch. Overall, this book makes an original contribution to the way deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity in the act of writing and translation.

The present volume contains many of the papers presented at a four-day conference held by the Husserl-Archives in Leuven in April 2009 to c- memorate the one hundred and ?ftieth anniversary of Edmund Husserl's birth. The conference was organized to facilitate the critical evaluation of Husserl's philosophical project from various perspectives and in light of the current philosophical and scienti?c climate. Still today, the characteristic tension between Husserl's concrete and detailed descriptions of consciousness, on the one hand, and his radical philosophical claim to ultimate truth and certainty in thinking, feeling, and acting, on the other, calls for a sustained re?ection on the relation between a Husserlian phenomenological philosophy and philosophy in general. What can phenomenological re?ection contribute to the ongoing discussion of certain perennial philosophical questions and which phi- sophical problems are raised by a phenomenological philosophy itself? In addition to addressing the question of the relation between p- nomenology and philosophy in general, phenomenology today cannot avoid addressing the nature of its relation to the methods and results of the natural and human sciences. In fact, for Husserl, phenomenology is not just one among many philosophical methods and entirely unrelated to the sciences. Rather, according to Husserl, phenomenology should be a "?rst philosophy" and should aim to become the standard for all true science.

This monograph analyzes Nicholas Rescher's system of pragmatic idealism. It also looks at his approach to prediction in science. Coverage highlights a prominent contribution to a central topic in the philosophy and methodology of science. The author offers a full characterization of Rescher's system of philosophy. She presents readers with a comprehensive philosophico-methodological analysis of this important work. Her research takes into account different thematic realms: semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical. The book features three, thematic-parts: I) General Coordinates, Semantic Features and Logical Components of Scientific Prediction; II) Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes in Rescher's Methodological Pragmatism; and III) From Reality to Values: Ontological Features, Axiological Elements, and Ethical Aspects of Scientific Prediction. This insightful analysis offers a critical reconstruction of Rescher's philosophy. The system he created is often characterized as pragmatic idealism that is open to some realist elements. He is a prominent representative of contemporary pragmatism who has made a great deal of contributions to the study of this topic. This area is crucial for science and it has been little considered in the philosophy of science.

The discussion of Kant's Practical Philosophy has been marred by viewing it as purely formalist and centered only on the categorical imperative. This important new study sets out a much more vivid account of the nature and range of Kant's concerns demonstrating his commitment to the notion of rational religion and including extensive discussion of his treatment of evil. Culminating with accounts of property, the nature of right and virtue, this work presents Kant as a vital revolutionary thinker.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?" has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself". For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you?" or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you?" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation", such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers", what we also will call "Existenz". "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation". We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder".

Alain Badiou is arguably the most important and original philosopher working in France today. Swimming against the tide of postmodern orthodoxy, Badiou's thought revitalizes philosophy's perennial attempt to provide a systematic theory of truth. This volume, assembled with the collaboration of the author, presents for the first time in English a comprehensive outline of Badiou's ambitious system. Starting from the controversial assertion that ontology is mathematics, this volume sets out the theory of the emergence of truths from the singular relationship between a subject and an event. Also included is a substantial excerpt from Badiou's forthcoming work on the logics of appearance and the concept of world, presented here in advance of its French publication. Ranging from startling re-readings of canonical figures (Spinoza, Kant and Hegel) to decisive engagements with poetry, psychoanalysis and radical politics, Theoretical Writings is an indispensable introduction to one of the great thinkers of our time. The volume includes a preface by Alain Badiou, an extensive editor's introduction, and a glossary of key terms.

Almost everyone can run. Only very few can run a marathon. But what is it for agents to be able to do things? This question, while central to many debates in philosophy, is still awaiting a comprehensive answer. The book provides just that. Drawing on some valuable insights from previous works of abilities and making use of possible world semantics, Jaster develops the "success view", a view on which abilities are a matter of successful behavior. Along the way, she explores the gradable nature of abilities, the contextsensitivity of ability statements, the difference between general and specific abilities, the relationship between abilities and dispositions, and the ability to act otherwise. The book is mandatory reading for anyone working on abilities, and provides valuable insights for anyone dealing with agents' abilities in other fields of philosophy. For this book, Romy Jaster has received both the Wolfgang Stegmuller Prize and the De Gruyter Prize for Analytical Philosophy of Mind or Metaphysics/Ontology.

The influence of anarchists such as Proudhon and Bakunin is apparent in Jean-Paul Sartres' political writings, from his early works of the 1920s to Critique of Dialectical Reason, his largest political piece. Yet, scholarly debate overwhelmingly concludes that his political philosophy is a Marxist one. In this landmark study, William L. Remley sheds new light on the crucial role of anarchism in Sartre's writing, arguing that it fundamentally underpins the body of his political work. Sartre's political philosophy has been infrequently studied and neglected in recent years. Introducing newly translated material from his early oeuvre, as well as providing a fresh perspective on his colossal Critique of Dialectical Reason, this book is a timely re-invigoration of this topic. It is only in understanding Sartre's anarchism that one can appreciate the full meaning not only of the Critique, but of Sartre's entire political philosophy. This book sets forth an entirely new approach to Sartre's political philosophy by arguing that it espouses a far more radical anarchist position than has been previously attributed to it. In doing so, Jean-Paul Sartre's Anarchist Philosophy not only fills an important gap in Sartre scholarship but also initiates a much needed revision of twentieth century thought from an anarchist perspective.

In the early twentieth century an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The historical outcome was momentous: the demise of the movement known as British Idealism, and its eventual replacement by the various forms of analytic philosophy. Since then, a conception of this debate and its rights and wrongs has become entrenched in English-language philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh the events of this formative period in twentieth-century thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

Even though important developments within 20th and 21st century philosophy have widened the scope of epistemology, this has not yet resulted in a systematic meta-epistemological debate about epistemology's aims, methods, and criteria of success. Ideas such as the methodology of reflective equilibrium, the proposal to "naturalize" epistemology, constructivist impulses fuelling the "sociology of scientific knowledge", pragmatist calls for taking into account the practical point of epistemic evaluations, as well as feminist criticism of the abstract and individualist assumptions built into traditional epistemology are widely discussed, but they have not typically resulted in the call for, let alone the construction of, a suitable meta-epistemological framework. This book motivates and elaborates such a new meta-epistemology. It provides a pragmatist, social and functionalist account of epistemic states that offers the conceptual space for revised or even replaced epistemic concepts. This is what it means to "refurbish epistemology": The book assesses conceptual tools in relation to epistemology's functionally defined conceptual space, responsive to both intra-epistemic considerations and political and moral values.

Widely regarded as one of the most profound critics of our time, Rene Girard has pursued a powerful line of inquiry across the fields of the humanities and the social sciences. His theories, which the French press has termed "l'hypothese girardienne," have sparked interdisciplinary, even international, controversy. In The Scapegoat, Girard applies his approach to "texts of persecution," documents that recount phenomena of collective violence from the standpoint of the persecutor-documents such as the medieval poet Guillaume de Machaut's Judgement of the King of Navarre, which blames the Jews for the Black Death and describes their mass murder. Girard compares persecution texts with myths, most notably with the myth of Oedipus, and finds strikingly similar themes and structures. Could myths regularly conceal texts of persecution? Girard's answers lies in a study of the Christian Passion, which represents the same central event, the same collective violence, found in all mythology, but which is read from the point of view of the innocent victim. The Passion text provides the model interpretation that has enabled Western culture to demystify its own violence-a demystification Girard now extends to mythology. Underlying Girard's daring textual hypothesis is a powerful theory of history and culture. Christ's rejection of all guilt breaks the mythic cycle of violence and the sacred. The scapegoat becomes the Lamb of God; "the foolish genesis of blood-stained idols and the false gods of superstition, politics, and ideologies" are revealed.

The Courage of the Truth is the last course that Michel Foucault delivered at the College de France before his death in 1984. In this course, he continues the theme of the previous year's lectures in exploring the notion of "truth-telling" in politics to establish a number of ethically irreducible conditionsbased on courage and conviction.

Engaging recent developments within the bio-cultural study of religion, Shults unveils the evolved cognitive and coalitional mechanisms by which god-conceptions are engendered in minds and nurtured in societies. He discovers and attempts to liberate a radically atheist trajectory that has long been suppressed within the discipline of theology.

When I heard the rumor that the findings about the central nervous system obtained with new technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), were too subtle to correlate with the crude results of many decades of behavioristic psychology, and that some psychologists were now turning to descriptions of subjective phenomena in William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty-and even in Buddhism-I asked myself, "Why not Aron Gurwitsch as well?" After all, my teacher regularly reflected on the types, basic concepts, and methods of psychology, worked with Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in the institute investigating brain-injured veterans at Frankfurt in the 1920s, conspicuously employed Gestalt theory to revise central Husserlian doctrines, and taught Merleau-Ponty a thing or two. That the last book from his Nachlass had recently been published and that I had recently written an essay on his theory of 1 psychology no doubt helped crystallize this project for me. What is "cognitive science"? At one point in assembling this volume I polled the participants, asking whether they preferred "the cognitive sciences" or "cognitive science. " Most who answered preferred the latter expression. There is still some vagueness here for me, but I do suspect that cognitive science is 2 another example of what I call a "multidiscipline. " A multidiscipline includes participants who confront a set of issues that is best approached under more than one disciplinary perspective."