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Books > Professional & Technical > Energy technology & engineering > Nuclear power & engineering
Nuclear power is not an option for the future but an absolute
necessity. Global threats of climate change and lethal air
pollution, killing millions each year, make it clear that nuclear
and renewable energy must work together, as non-carbon sources of
energy. Fortunately, a new era of growth in this energy source is
underway in developing nations, though not yet in the West. Seeing
the Light is the first book to clarify these realities and discuss
their implications for coming decades. Readers will learn how, why,
and where the new nuclear era is happening, what new technologies
are involved, and what this means for preventing the proliferation
of weapons. This book is the best work available for becoming fully
informed about this key subject, for students, the general public,
and anyone interested in the future of energy production, and,
thus, the future of humanity on planet Earth.
The development of nuclear weapons by the Manhattan Project during
World War II was one of the most dramatic scientific/technological
episodes in human history. This book, prepared by a recognized
expert on the Manhattan Project, offers a concise survey of the
essential physics concepts underlying fission weapons. The text
describes the energetics and timescales of fast-neutron chain
reactions, why only certain isotopes of uranium and plutonium are
suitable for use in fission weapons, how critical mass and bomb
yield can be estimated, how the efficiency of nuclear weapons can
be enhanced, how the fissile forms of uranium and plutonium were
obtained, some of the design details of the 'Little Boy' and 'Fat
Man' bombs, and some of the thermal, shock, and radiation effects
of nuclear weapons. Calculation exercises are provided, and a
Bibliography lists authoritative print and online sources of
information for readers who wish to pursue more detailed study of
this fascinating topic.
The United States of America ratified the Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management (Joint Convention) in April 2003. The Joint
Convention establishes an international peer review process among
Contracting Parties and provides incentives for nations to take
appropriate steps to bring their nuclear activities into compliance
with general safety standards and practices. The U.S. participated
in Review Meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Joint
Convention in November 2003, May, 2006, and May 2009, in Vienna,
Austria. This Fourth Report, an update of the U.S. National Report
prepared under the Joint Convention in September 2011, documents
spent fuel and radioactive waste management safety in the U.S.
under the terms of the Joint Convention. It was prepared by the U.
S. Government for review by the Contracting Parties.
For junior- and senior-level courses in Nuclear Engineering.
Applying nuclear engineering essentials to the modern world
Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, 4th Edition reflects changes
in the industry since the 2001 publication of its predecessor. With
recent data and information, including expanded discussions about
the worldwide nuclear renaissance and the development and
construction of advanced plant designs, the text aims to provide
students with a modern, high-level introduction to nuclear
engineering. The nuclear industry is constantly in flux, and the
4th Edition helps students understand real-world applications of
nuclear technology-in the United States and across the globe.
Built in the 1940s and 1950s, the Y-12 National Security Complex,
located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) primary site for enriched uranium
activities. Because Y-12 facilities are outdated and deteriorating,
NNSA is building a more modern facility--known as the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF). NNSA estimates that the UPF will cost up
to $3.5 billion and save over $200 million annually in operations,
security, and maintenance costs. NNSA also plans to include more
advanced technologies in the UPF to make uranium processing and
component production safer. GAO was asked to (1) assess NNSA's
estimated cost and schedule for constructing the UPF; (2) determine
the extent to which UPF will use new, experimental technologies,
and identify resultant risks, if any; and (3) determine the extent
to which emerging changes in the nuclear weapons stockpile could
affect the UPF project. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed NNSA
technology development and planning documents and met with
officials from NNSA and the Y-12 plant. The UPF project costs have
increased since NNSA's initial estimates in 2004 and construction
may be delayed due to funding shortfalls. NNSA's current estimate
prepared in 2007 indicates that the UPF will cost between $1.4 and
$3.5 billion to construct--more than double NNSA's 2004 estimate of
between $600 million and $1.1 billion. In addition, costs for
project engineering and design, which are less than halfway
completed, have increased by about 42 percent--from $297 to $421
million--due in part to changes in engineering and design pricing
rates. With regard to the project's schedule, NNSA currently
estimates that UPF construction will be completed as early as 2018
and as late as 2022. However, because of a funding shortfall of
nearly $200 million in fiscal year 2011, NNSA officials expect that
the UPF will not be completed before 2020, which could also result
in additional costs. NNSA is developing 10 new technologies for use
in the UPF and is using a systematic approach--Technology Readiness
Levels (TRL)--to gauge the extent to which technologies have been
demonstrated to work as intended. Industry best practices and
Department of Energy (DOE) guidance recommend achieving specific
TRLs at critical project decision points--such as establishing a
cost and schedule performance baseline or beginning
construction--to give optimal assurance that technologies are
sufficiently ready. If critical technologies fail to work as
intended, NNSA may need to revert to existing or alternate
technologies, possibly resulting in changes to design plans and
space requirements that could delay the project and increase costs.
Changes in the composition and size of the nuclear weapons
stockpile could occur as a result of changes in the nation's
nuclear strategy, but NNSA officials and a key study said that the
impact of these changes on the project should be minor. For
example, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in April
2010 by the leaders of the United States and Russia would, if
ratified, reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads from
about 2,200 to 1,550. According to NNSA officials, NNSA and DOD
have cooperated closely and incorporated key nuclear weapons
stockpile changes into UPF's design. Also, an independent study
found that most of the UPF's planned space and equipment is
dedicated to establishing basic uranium processing capabilities
that are not likely to change, while only a minimal amount--about
10 percent--is for meeting current stockpile size requirements. GAO
is making five recommendations for, among other things, improving
the UPF's cost and funding plans, ensuring that new UPF
technologies reach optimal levels of maturity prior to critical
project decisions, and for improving DOE guidance. NNSA generally
agreed with the recommendations.
The principal findings of this study are that Great Britain's
search for an independent nuclear deterrent was waged with a
purposeful dedication that wedded highly effective statecraft and
brilliant, innovative nuclear engineering to produce a strategic
nuclear deterrent that remained under her sovereign control.
Because Britain's efforts in this area were so often achieved in
the face of United States' opposition, Britain's subsequent
utilization of her deterrent capability as an instrument to secure
American support, notwithstanding that opposition, ought to be
considered an example of successful policy management. The product
of this effort has been the Anglo-American "special relationship"
in nuclear weapons. The demonstrable success of British policy
management to nurture and secure the special relationship in
nuclear weapons is confirmed by its endurance in the face of
American indifference, if not overt hostility, to its continuation.
A major contention of this inquiry, therefore, is that the
independent nature of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent has
been the primary prerequisite for the evolution of an
interdependent, hence "special," relationship with the United
States. This relationship will endure, for it must; the physics and
metaphysics of strategic relationships in the thermonuclear age
will secure this constancy. In the meantime, Britain will play a
far greater role internationally than heretofore, just as the
special relationship binds her ever closer to the United States.
And this, after all, has always been a principal objective of
British policy.
This document details the Near-term Task Force Review of insights
from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident.
Turkey, with a robust modern economy and growing energy needs, is
pursuing a switch to nuclear power. But that shift is occurring in
an environment fraught with security challenges: Turkey borders
Iraq, Syria, and Iran-all states with nuclear or WMD ambitions or
capabilities. As a NATO member, Turkey also hosts U.S. nuclear
bombs on its territory, although some question the durability of
this relationship. This dynamic has naturally led to speculation
that Turkish leaders might someday consider moving beyond a
civilian course to develop nuclear weapons. Yet there has been
remarkably little informed analysis and debate on Turkey's nuclear
future, either within the country or in broader international
society. This volume explores the current status and trajectory of
Turkey's nuclear program, adding historical perspective, analytical
rigor, and strategic insight.
On October 1, 2010, the NRC staff began orderly closure of its
Yucca Mountain activities. As part of orderly closure, the NRC
staff prepared this technical evaluation report (TER), a knowledge
management document. This document captures the NRC staff's
technical assessment of information presented in DOE's Safety
Analysis Report (SAR), dated June 3, 2008, as amended, and
supporting information. The TER describes the staff's technical
evaluation of the DOE SAR and, in particular, this document (TER
Preclosure Volume) provides technical insights on the expected
performance of the geologic repository operations area (GROA)
during the period of operations (i.e., prior to permanent closure
or preclosure period). The TER was developed using the regulations
at 10 CFR Part 63 and guidance in the Yucca Mountain Review Plan
(YMRP). The TER does not, however, include conclusions as to
whether or not DOE satisfies the Commission's regulations.
The Fukushima nuclear power plant explosions and the
Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombings are intimately connected events, bound
together across time by a nuclear will to power that holds little
regard for life. In Fukushima: Dispossession or Denuclearization?
contributors document and explore diverse dispossession effects
stemming from this nuclear will to power, including market
distortions, radiation damage to personal property, wrecked
livelihoods, and transgenerational mutations potentially eroding
human health and happiness. Liberal democratic capitalism is itself
disclosed as vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the nuclear
will to power. Contributors contend that denuclearization stands as
the only viable path forward capable of freeing humans from the
catastrophic risks engineered into global nuclear networks. They
conclude that the choice of dispossession or denuclearization
through the pursuit of alternative technologies will determine
human survival across the twenty-first century.
A scientist's recollection of his life as a junior member of the
Manhattan Project, Rider of the Pale Horse recounts McAllister
Hull's involvement in various nuclear-related enterprises during
and after World War II. Fresh from a summer job working with
explosives in the chemistry department of an ordnance plant, Hull
was drafted in 1943, after his freshman year in college. Unlike
other accounts written by scientists and historians of that era,
Hull's narrative offers a realistic picture of the dangerous and
messy job that GIs and civilian powdermen were asked to do. Hull's
description of his postwar work supporting the Bikini Atoll tests
in the Pacific and the early concerns about the effects of a
hydrogen bomb explosion illuminate the Dark Age of nuclear
weaponry. John Hull's illustrations show technicians and scientists
at work and bring the story to life.
This report describes eight events that NRC identified as AOs
during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. One event involved radiation exposure
to an embryo/fetus. The other seven events occurred at NRC-licensed
or regulated medical institutions and are medical events as defined
in Title 10, Pt 35, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part
35).
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