Tapping a rich vein of phenomenological and post-phenomenological approaches to film, this book explores how moving images are 'experienced' and 'encountered' as well as 'read' and 'viewed'. Jenny Chamarette brings theorizations of phenomenology from philosophy, psychology and anthropology, to four close studies of experimental and avant-garde moving image works by internationally recognized and widely studied contemporary French filmmakers, whose cinematic production spans the 1950s to the present day. Acknowledging the shifting ground of the cinematic across multiple media and geographies, from 35mm feature film, to video-tape, to projected installation and digital video, this volume asks how phenomenological approaches to film can help us to rethink the relationship of subjectivity to our future cinematic world.

In the footsteps of Ingardeniana II, this volume marks the 20th anniver- sary of Roman Ingarden's death, partly focusing upon his thought, partly bringing his aesthetics into the present-day framework of research. It might have appeared puzzling to the followers of our Analecta Husserliana why within the original horizon encircled by the research work of our International Society of Phenomenology and Literatur- whose research work is devised in a diametrically opposed direction to that of Roman Ingarden - there is steadfastly running through our discussions a line of Ingardenian reflection. The reason, as I have pointed out in the introduction to Ingardeniana II, expertly edited by Hans Rudnik, is clear: Ingarden's analysis of the intentional structures of works of art offers in its distinct and clear-cut forms an 'objective' correlate - as well as a point of reference - to the vast conundrum of issues concerning the creative endeavor of the writer, poet, artist in their struggle to endow life with its specifically human significance; a conundrum that in our research we are trying to disentangl- elucidating its mysterious ramifications, their sources and dynamic virtualities. As a matter of fact, Ingarden's thought, newly interpreted and originally expanded, occupies a legitimate place in the present collec- tion. We find here, in the first place, an original expansion of Ingarden's aesthetic theory in the monograph of ladwiga Smith followed by the essays of Wadaw Osadnik, Yushiro Takei and Charles Rzepka.

Thomas A. Fay Heidegger and the Formalization of Thought 1 Dagfinn F011esdal The Justification of Logic and Mathematics in Husserl's Phenomenology 25 Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock On Husserl's Distinction between State of Affairs (Sachverhalt) and Situation of Affairs (Sachlage) . . . . 35 David Woodruff Smith On Situations and States of Affairs 49 Charles W. Harvey, Jaakko Hintikka Modalization and Modalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Gilbert T. Null Remarks on Modalization and Modalities 79 J. N. Mohanty Husserl's Formalism 93 Carl J. Posy Mathematics as a Transcendental Science 107 vi Gian-carlo Rota Mathematics and the Task of Phenomenology 133 John Scalon "Tertium Non Datur: " Husserl's Conception of a Definite Multiplicity . . . . . 139 Thomas M. Seebohm Psychologism Revisited 149 Gerald J. Massey Some Reflections on Psychologism 183 Robert S. Tragesser How Mathematical Foundation all but come about: A Report on Studies Toward a Phenomenological Critique of Godel's Views on Mathematical Intuition. . 195 Kenneth L. Manders On Geometric Intentionality 215 Dallas Willard Sentences which are True in Virtue of their Color . . . 225 John J. Drummond Willard and Husserl on Logical Form 243 Index of Names 257 Index of Subjects 259 PREFACE The phenomenology of logic and ideal objects is the topic of Husserl's Logical Investigations. This book determined the early development of the so called phenomenological movement. It is still the main source for many phenomenologists, even if they disagree with Husserl's transcendental turn and developed other phenomenological positions or positions beyond phenomenology he early sense.

The question of relativism is a perennial one, and as fundamental and far reaching as the question of truth itself. Is truth absolute and universal, the same everywhere and for everyone? Or is truth historically, culturally, biologically, or otherwise relative, varying from one epoch or species to another? Although the issues surrounding relativism have attracted especially intense interest of late, they continue to spark heated controversies and to pose problems lacking an obvious resolution. On the side of one prevalent form of relativism, it is argued that we must finally recognize the historical and cultural contingency of our available means of cognition, and therefore abandon as naIve the absolute conception of truth dear to traditional philosophy. According to this line of thinking, even if there were univer sally valid principles, knowledge of them would not be possible for us, and thus an absolute conception of truth must be rejected in light of the demands of critical epistemology. However, when truth is accordingly relativized to some contingent subjective cognitive background, new difficulties arise. One of the most infamous of these is the logical inconsistency of the resulting thesis of relativism itself. Yet an even more serious problem is that the relativization of truth makes truth itself contingent, thereby undermining the motivation for preferring one belief or value to another, or even to its opposite."

To know the work of Jitendra Nath Mohanty even slightly is to commence to appreciate it immensely. Lucidity and sagacity have been its armor; originality and ingenuity have been its strength. And wearing the former and wielding the latter have become so persistent a mark of his work as to suggest that their appeal for Mohanty lies altogether more in the refmed reaches of philosophical craftsmanship than on the coarse ground of intellectual partisanship. The multifaceted character of his work in phenomenology and Indian philosophy has never left us palled by its significance and, as a consequence, has always left us conceding its command on our philosophical discourse. It has fulfilled the most welcomed promise of striking the chords of both imagination and reason by exposing Husserlian phenomenology to the concerns of both the so-called "analytical" and "continental" traditions and by exposing the philosophical tradition of Indian thought to the intricacies of Husserl. Although charting and periodizing the body ofMohanty' s work in phenomeno logy may be the function of a memory inconspicuous for originality and liveli ness, they nonetheless offer a precis conspicuous for the variety of topics that Mohanty has both engaged and enriched. Mohanty's career in phenomenology can be characterized by three phases, each concentrating on different themes, but with the latter two also epitomizing a more incisive and deeper discussion of the issues raised in the first.

This collection of essays draws together work done during a period of more than fifteen years. In the course of these years much has changed, including much about politics. Patterns of political activity have been trans formed. Ways in which we had been accustomed to construe politics have been substantially modified and sometimes replaced. Some apparently in tractable conflicts have been resolved. Other, apparently more manageable, conflicts have shown shocking durability. A number of political doctrines once considered indefinitely serviceable have lost all relevance. And the material and technical resources at our disposal look strikingly different than they did just a few years ago. Practical politics of whatever stripe encounters at every turn ever more grave environmental degradation. But, or so this collection assumes, not everything political has changed. Some political issues, both "theoretical" and "practical," remain persistently trenchant. Questions like the following demand ever renewed consideration. What is the point and worth of belonging to a political community? What entitlements and responsibilities follow upon such membership? Or even more fundamentally, what conditions are required for there to be politics at all? Taken together, the essays collected in this volume propose a way both to understand and to engage in politics which is properly responsive both to perennial political issues and to the peculiar exigencies of our era. Some of them present criticisms of widely held, warmly cherished ways of addressing political matters. Others propose constructive alternatives."

Despite, or perhaps better by virtue of, its very brevity, Appearance and Sense is a difficult text to read and understand, particularly if we make the attempt independently of Husserl's Ideas I. This is certainly at least in part owing to the intent behind Shpet's work. On the one hand it strives to present Husserl' s latest views to a Russian philosophical audience not yet conversant with and, in all likelihood, not even aware of, his transcendental idealist turn. With this aim any reading would perforce be exacting. Yet, on the other hand, Shpet has made scant concession to his public. Indeed, his text is even more compressed, especially in the crucial areas dealing with the sense-bestowing feature of consciousness, than Husserl' s own. For all that, Shpet has not bequeathed to us simply an abbreviated paraphrase nor a selective commentary on Ideas I, although at many points it is just that. Rather, the text on the whole is a critical engagement with Husserl' s thought, where Shpet among other things refonnulates or at least presents Husserl's phenomenology from the perspective of hoping to illuminate a traditional philosophical problem in a radical manner. Since Husserl's text was published only in 1913 and Shpet's appeared sometime during 1914, the latter must have been conceived, thought through, and written in remarkable haste. Indeed, Shpet had already finished a first draft and was busy with a revision of it by the end of 1913.

The discussion on the phenomenology of life will continue to be crucial to the general outlook and direction of phenomenological investigations. The imp- tance of it is not only the fact that it is an innovation in the philosophical circle, but it is also an effort that contributes to the re-reading of the hitherto ex- gerated differences between phenomenology and metaphysics. What is new and signi?cant about life is that even though it is evident in the ?ow of the history of philosophy, no philosopher has seriously addressed it. Not many philosophers have said something in particular about life in serious philoso- ical re?ection. The discussion on life by Henri Bergson attests to this and one 3 can hardly point to other deep re?ections elsewhere about the subject. The advantage here about our area is not only that it has extended the horizon of phenomenological thinking, it has also helped to lead phenomenology from the constitutive analysis to a creative impetus that has brought a new point of view to the ?eld, hence raising questions about the general philosophical t- dition from ancient times. This is a reading which my philosophy attempts to investigate about Tymienieckan thought. The emphasis in philosophy till now has been more on reason in its int- lection and pure rational dimension based on the earliest conception of the human person distinguished by rationality.

In Chapter 1, I explain why temporal syntheses, although distinguished from associative syntheses, count among the most fundamental phenomena of the passive sphere. I draw on Husserl s account of absolute consciousness, which sublates pairs of opposites such as form/content and constituting/constituted, to show that activity and passivity mutually determine one another.

In Chapter 2, I further expand on pre-egoic components of sense-giving acts encompassed by original passivity. I explain the function of primordial association (Urassoziation) in passive genesis with special reference to the problem of syntheses of similarity and contrast. Then, I turn to the difficult issue of the relation between affection and prominence (Abgehobenheit) in the perceptual field.

In Chapter 3, I explore the sphere of secondary passivity a generic name for the modifications undergone by constituted meanings once the process of constitution is accomplished. I give particular consideration to the passive components involved in the phenomena of memory fulfillment and forgetfulness.

Chapter 4 continues the previous chapter by expanding the discussion of secondary passivity from the subjective to the intersubjective level of sedimentation. I focus on Husserl s account of habitus and language as passive factors responsible for cultural crises. I use the example of translation to show, against Husserl, that passivity, understood as alienation, can also provide the palliative for cultural crises.

In Chapter 5, I question the relation between the three meanings of passivity: receptivity, inactuality and alienation. I present the distinction between the lived body and the physical body as a form of self-alienation. Then I discuss the intersubjective significance of the concept of pairing association. Finally, I turn to the problem of Fremderfahrung in the broad sense, that is, the problem of the interaction between home worlds and alien worlds. I defend the harshly criticized idea of analogical transfer by reversing it and by showing that homecultures, one s own body and also one s self manifest themselves in similar modes of accessible inaccessibility.

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Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) is a forceful, perplexing, important book, radical in its own time and profoundly influential ever since. This introductory textbook offers a comprehensive, close reading of the entire work, with a section-by-section analysis that also aims to show how the Genealogy holds together as an integrated whole. The Genealogy is helpfully situated within Nietzsche s wider philosophy, and occasional interludes examine supplementary topics that further enhance the reader's understanding of the text. Two chapters examine how the Genealogy relates to standard questions in moral and political philosophy. Written in a clear, accessible style, this book will appeal to students at every level coming to read the Genealogy for the first time, and a wider range of readers will also benefit from nuanced interpretations of controversial elements in Nietzsche s work.

This volume is the first book-length analysis of the problematic concept of the 'horizon' in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, as well as in phenomenology generally. A recent arrival on the conceptual scene, the horizon still eludes robust definition. The author shows in this authoritative exploration of the topic that Husserl, the originator of phenomenology, placed the notion of the horizon at the centre of philosophical enquiry. He also demonstrates the rightful centrality of the concept of the horizon, all too often viewed as an imprecise metaphor of tangential significance. His systematic analysis deploys both early and late work by Husserl, as well as hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Opening out the question to include that of the origins of the horizon, the book explores the horizon as philosophical theme or notion, as a figure of intentionality, and as a signification of one's consciousness of the world-our 'world-horizon'. It argues that the central philosophical significance of the problematic of the horizon makes itself apparent in realizing how this problematic enriches our philosophical understanding of subjectivity. Systematic, thorough, and revealing, this study of the significance of a core concept in phenomenology will be relevant not only to the phenomenological community, but also to anyone interested in the intersections of phenomenology and other philosophical traditions, such as hermeneutics and pragmatism. "

Flashes of lightning, resounding thunder, gloomy fog, brilliant sunshine...these are the life manifestations of the skies. The concrete visceral experiences that living under those skies stir within us are the ground for individual impulses, emotions, sentiments that in their interaction generate their own ever-changing clouds. While our intellect concentrates on the discovery of our cosmic position, on the architecture of the universe, our imagination is informed by the gloomy vapors, the glimmers of fleeting light, and the glory of the skies. Reconnoitering from the soil of human life and striving towards the infinite, the elan of imagination gets caught up in the clouds of the skies. There in that dimness, sensory receptivity, dispositions, emotions, passionate strivings, yearnings, elevations gather and propagate. From the "Passions of the Skies" spring innermost intuitions that nourish literature and the arts. "

During Edmund Husserl s lifetime, modern logic and mathematics rapidly developed toward their current outlook and Husserl s writings can be fruitfully compared and contrasted with both 19th century figures (Boole, Schroder, Weierstrass) as well as the 20th century characters (Heyting, Zermelo, Godel). Besides the more historical studies, the internal ones on Husserl alone and the external ones attempting to clarify his role in the more general context of the developing mathematics and logic, Husserl s phenomenology offers also a systematically rich but little researched area of investigation. This volume aims to establish the starting point for the development, evaluation and appraisal of the phenomenology of mathematics. It gathers the contributions of the main scholars of this emerging field into one publication for the first time. Combining both historical and systematic studies from various angles, the volume charts answers to the question "What kind of philosophy of mathematics is phenomenology?""

Explores existential and political themes in Orhan Pamuk's work and investigates the apparent contradictions in an arena where Islam and democracy are often seen as opposing and irreconcilable terms. Existential themes delve into literary nuances in Pamuk that discuss love, happiness, suffering, memory and death.

psychiatric treatment approaches there are opportunities for trial and error, exploration and reconsideration, revision of treatment approach, and correc tion of errors. Revisions and corrections are based on observations of pro gress and on response from patients about the impact of treatment efforts. But emergency interventions usually are one time efforts involving a sequence of evaluation, therapeutic intervention, and referral out. Response is limited or absent and there are no opportunities for corrections over time. Therefore, interventions and referrals must be made on the basis of first evaluations, with positive conviction related to current best effort and despite the lack of guidance derived from tracking the patient's progress over time. The staff must tolerate the risk-taking required, and must also be prepared to forego the gratification of seeing the beneficial results of the work done. Even in pro grams structured to allow return visits, and despite the occasional information provided by other agencies after referrals, the majority of patients are lost to follow up. The usefulness of specific interventions is hard to evaluate and the satisfaction of seeing a task completed is rarely available. The emergency program staff must tolerate a considerable amount of stress in the environment. Emergency care centers are collection points for an extraordinary volume of human suffering. The anxieties and strains asso ciated with persistent urgency of need, alarm related to unexpected difficul ties, fearfulness about outcome, closeness of death, and presence of pain pervade the atmosphere."

In this book, Robert Sokolowski argues that being a person means to be involved with truth. He shows that human reason is established by syntactic composition in language, pictures, and actions and that we understand things when they are presented to us through syntax. Sokolowski highlights the role of the spoken word in human reason and examines the bodily and neurological basis for human experience. Drawing on Husserl and Aristotle, as well as Aquinas and Henry James, Sokolowski here employs phenomenology in a highly original way in order to clarify what we are as human agents.

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, first published in 1807, is a work with few equals in systematic integrity, philosophical originality and historical influence. This collection of newly-commissioned essays, contributed by leading Hegel scholars, examines all aspects of the work, from its argumentative strategies to its continuing relevance to philosophical debates. The collection combines close analysis with wide-ranging coverage of the text, and also traces connections with debates extending beyond Hegel scholarship, including issues in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and philosophy of religion. In showing clearly that we have not yet exhausted the Phenomenology's insights, it demonstrates the need for contemporary philosophers to engage with Hegel.

This book introduces Hegel's best-known and most influential work, Phenomenology of Spirit, by interpreting it as a unified argument for a single philosophical claim: that human beings achieve their freedom through retrospective self-understanding. In clear, non-technical prose, Larry Krasnoff sets this claim in the context of the history of modern philosophy and shows how it is developed in the major sections of Hegel's text. The result is an accessible and engaging guide to one of the most complex and important works of nineteenth-century philosophy, which will be of interest to all students and teachers working in this area.

In this book, Robert Sokolowski argues that being a person means to be involved with truth. He shows that human reason is established by syntactic composition in language, pictures, and actions and that we understand things when they are presented to us through syntax. Sokolowski highlights the role of the spoken word in human reason and examines the bodily and neurological basis for human experience. Drawing on Husserl and Aristotle, as well as Aquinas and Henry James, Sokolowski here employs phenomenology in a highly original way in order to clarify what we are as human agents.

An individual has the potentiality to develop himself/herself during each period of his/her life. This potential for development can be affected by many diff- ent factors. These factors are divided into two main areas as internal factors and external factors. The common assumption is that internal factors are more effective than external factors. This is the dilemma about learning which p- cess of lifelong learning is related to self-actualization. In this paper, discussion is limited to concept of lifelong learning and self actualization. LIFELONG LEARNING An individual can take proper support form many components such as family, education system, media and peers. However, they may not provide proper s- port for the individual. Thus, the individual needs more pedagogical support to solve problems of life, develop his/her skills and capabilities. The pedagogical support should be given by educational system. Teaching and learning in some areas such as math, science, drawing, social studies and so on were de ned as pedagogical support in the past. But, this approach is weakening in today. During teaching and learning processes teacher and learner should focus on the learning rather than the teaching. The concept of learning is likely to be argued in many dimensions. The c- cepts of teaching and learning tend to be rede ned based on the latest changes.

Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl focuses on the first ten years of Edmund Husserl's work, from the publication of his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) to that of his Logical Investigations (1900/01), and aims to precisely locate his early work in the fields of logic, philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Unlike most phenomenologists, the author refrains from reading Husserl's early work as a more or less immature sketch of claims consolidated only in his later phenomenology, and unlike the majority of historians of logic she emphasizes the systematic strength and the originality of Husserl's logico-mathematical work.

The book attempts to reconstruct the discussion between Husserl and those philosophers and mathematicians who contributed to new developments in logic, such as Leibniz, Bolzano, the logical algebraists (especially Boole and Schroder), Frege, and Hilbert and his school. It presents both a comprehensive critical examination of some of the major works produced by Husserl and his antagonists in the last decade of the 19th century and a formal reconstruction of many texts from Husserl's Nachlass that have not yet been the object of systematical scrutiny.

This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to analytical philosophers and phenomenologists with a background in standard logic.