The present anthology seeks to give an overview of the different approaches to establish a relation between phenomenology and psychoanalysis, primarily from the viewpoint of current phenomenological research. Already during the lifetimes of the two disciplines' founders, Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) and Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939), phenomenological and phenomenologically inspired authors were advancing psychoanalytic theses. For both traditions, the Second World War presented a painful and devastating disruption of their development and mutual exchange. During the postwar period, phenomenologists, especially in France, revisited psychoanalytic topics. Thus, in the so-called second generation of phenomenology there developed an intensive reception of the psychoanalytic tradition, one that finds its expression even today in current hermeneutic, postmodern and poststructuralist conceptions. But also in more recent phenomenological research we find projects concentrated systematically on psychoanalysis and its theses. In this context, the status of psychoanalysis as a science of human experience is discussed anew, now approached on the 'first person' basis of a phenomenological understanding of subjective experience. In such approaches, phenomena like incorporation, phantasy, emotion and the unconscious are discussed afresh. These topics, important for modern phenomenology as well as for psychoanalysis, are examined in the context of the constitution of the human person as well as of our intersubjective world. The analyses are also interdisciplinary, making use of connections with modern medicine, psychiatry and psychotherapy. The systematic investigations are enriched by historical analysis and research in the internal development of the disciplines involved. The volume presents recent work of internationally recognized researchers - phenomenologically oriented philosophers, psychoanalysts and psychotherapists - who work in the common field of the two disciplines. The editors hope that this selection will encourage further systematic collaboration between phenomenology and psychoanalysis

Edmund Husserl's importance for the philosophy of our century is immense, but his influence has followed a curious path. Rather than continuous it has been recurrent, ambulatory and somehow irrepressible: no sooner does it wane in one locality than it springs up in another. After playing a major role in Germany during his lifetime, Husserl had been filed away in the history-books of that country when he was discovered by the French during and after World War II. And just as the phenomenological phase of French philosophy was ending in the 1960's, Husserl became important in North America. There his work was first taken seriously by a sizable minority of dissenters from the Anglo-American establish ment, the tradition of conceptual and linguistic analysis. More recently, some philosophers within that tradition have drawn on certain of Husserl's central concepts (intentionality, the noema) in addressing problems in the philosophy of mind and the theory of meaning. This is not to say that Husserl's influence in Europe has alto gether died out. It may be that he is less frequently discussed there directly, but (as I try to argue in the introductory essay of this volume) his influence lives on in subtler forms, in certain basic attitudes, strategies and problems."

This book studies the problem of acquaintance against the background of a more general theory of intentionality. Much of the relevant background is laid out in the book I wrote with Ronald McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (1982). However, since this book is not focussed on HusserI, I shall not assume the reader's familiarity with the prior book or with HusserI's philosophy. (I have sometimes referred to this book-in progress as Acquaintance; I've rounded out the title a bit. ) of The initial inspiration for this work, in the 1970's, was a confluence ideas from the logic of perception and the logic of demonstratives, ideas in which I found phenomenological inspiration. These included Jaakko Hintikka's notion of perceptual individuation, Romane Clark's account of a demonstrative element in perception, David Kaplan's analysis of the meaning (character and content) of demonstratives, and Hector-Neri Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators. I would later add to the list John Perry's appraisal of belief reports involving indexicals (extending Castaneda's ideas) and Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought-experiments (complementing Clark's and Kaplan's ideas of the same vintage). I want to thank Chuck Dement and Ronald McIntyre for their responses to the first draft. For many discussions of issues addressed in the book I thank David Blinder, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfinn F llesdal, Jaakko Hintikka, David Kaplan, Ronald McIntyre, Izchak Miller, Esa Saarinen, John Searle, and Peter Woodruff. I have benefited also from colleagues and students too numerous to name but deserving my thanks nonetheless. Philosophy is a surprisingly communal affair."

This Ingardenia volume is the second in the Analecta Husserliana series that is entirely devoted to the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden. The first was volume IV (1976). Twenty years after Ingarden's death, this volume demonstrates that the Polish phenomenologist's contribution to philosophy and literary scholarship has received world-wide attention. His ideas have proven especially fruitful for the definition of the structure of the literary work of art and the subsequent recognition of its characteristic features. Of all the early phenomenologists who were students of Husserl, it is Ingarden whose work has faithfully pursued the original tenet that language "holds" the essence of the life-world "in readiness" (bereit halten). To investigate this premise with the rigor of a science, as Husserl had envisioned for phenomenology, was Ingarden's life work. That Ingarden did not quite reach his ambitious goal does not diminish his unquestionable achievement. The understanding of the nature of the literary work of art has increased enormously because of his analyses and aesthetics. The Polish phenomenologist investigated above all the work of art as a structure of necessary components which define and determine its nature. That the artistic ingredient was shortchanged under those conditions should not be surprising, particu larly since Ingarden usually kept a purist's philosophical distance from the concrete detail of the material under consideration. He was not concerned with individual works of art but with the principle that was shared by all of them as the defining feature of their being."

The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and positions common to both schools, positions from which we can continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On the other hand successors to both traditions have developed criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict between these two "modem" schools but beyond the kind of philosophy represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move towards a new "postmodern" philosophical style. On the one hand, then and for example, Husserl scholarship has in recent years witnessed the development of an interpretation of Husserl which more closely aligns his phenomenology with the philosophical concerns of the "analytic" tradition. In certain respects, this should come as no surprise and is long overdue. It is true, after all, that the early Husserl occupied himself with many of the same philosophical issues as did Frege and the earliest thinkers of the analytic tradition. Examples include the concept of number, the nature of mathematical analysis, meaning and reference, truth, formalization, and the relationship between logic and mathematics.

and the one in the middle which judges as he enjoys and enjoys as he judges. This latter kind really reproduces the work of art anew. The division of our Symposium into three sections is justified by the fact that phenomenology, from Husserl, Heidegger, Moritz Geiger, Ingarden, in Germany and Poland, Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, E. Levinas in France, Unamuno in Spain, and Tymieniecka, in the United States, have revealed striking coincidences in trying to answer the following questions: What is the philosophical vocation of literature? Does literature have any significance for our lives? Why does the lyric moment, present in all creative endeavors, in myth, dance, plastic art, ritual, poetry, lift the human life to a higher and authentically human level of the existential experience of man? Our investigations answer our fundamental inquiry: What makes a literary work a work of art? What makes a literary work a literary work, if not aesthetic enjoyment? As much as the formation of an aesthetic language culminates in artistic creation, the formation of a philosophical language lives within the orbit of creative imagination.

DaB fUr die Entwicklung der Phanomenologie Husserls nicht zuletzt auch ,wissenschaftstheoretische' Motive ausschlaggebend waren, ist hinreichend bekannt. Umso mehr verwundert es, daB die Husserl-Rezeption sich diese Motive nur selten zueigen gemacht hat. Zwar sind in einer Reihe von Einzel- wissenschaften, wie in der Literaturwissenschaft, der Sozialwissenschaft und besonders auch der Psychologie, phanomenologische Motive wirksam gewor- den. Versuche einer ausdriicklichen wissenschaftskritischen Anwendung der Husserlschen Philosophie auf einzelwissenschaftliehe Theorien jedoch, wie sie z.B. Alfred Schiitz in seinem friihen Werk zur phanomenologischen Grundlegung der "verstehenden Soziologie"l ansatzweise unternommen hat, sind rar. Freilich ging auch Husserl hier nieht eben mit gutem Beispiel voran. Auch er selbst hat seine wissenschaftstheoretische Programmatik nirgends einer ernsthaften Bewahrungsprobe unterzogen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung will diese Frage einer wissenschaftstheore- tischen Anwendbarkeit der transzendentalen Phiinomenologie paradigmatisch im Hinblick auf die Problemstellungen der Geschiehtswissenschaft iiberprii- fen. Was also kann die Phanomenologie fUr die Historik leisten? DaB sieh fiir eine solche Absieht gerade die geschichtstheoretischen Perspektiven in Hus- serls Werk anbieten, hat vor allem zwei Griinde.

lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings. Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of its realization.

While many books have been written about human sexuality, few have seriously explored the philosophical and psychological meaning of erotic love. This reflects a bias and a problem in contemporary culture: the misunderstanding of eros out of a theory of physiological drive-reduction (ignoring the countervailing motivation toward intensification rather than reduction of conscious feeling) has led to an egocentric view of human nature, which in turn motivates a simplistic hedonism in value thinking and an atomistic-individualist conception of society. The ultra-competitive nature of this kind of culture leads to overconcern with masks of invulnerability - i.e., narcissism - which prevents the dropping of superficial defenses necessary for deep and authentic love relationships to mature. But the intense, direct experience of the intrinsic value of another being embodied in authentic love experiences is needed to combat the existential threats to the meaningfulness of life (alienation, powerlessness, relative insignificance in the ultimate scheme, and death). This experience is motivated by the need to be pulled out of oneself into a non-egocentric way of experiencing which cares as much about expressing value feelings, in order to deepen and intensify them, as it does about reducing egocentric drives. The misunderstanding, neglect, and dysfunction of this basic human need thus reflects a serious problem in the psychology of the self and the structure of the community, whose study requires a phenomenological rather than a merely empirical-scientific approach, since the latter approach alone leads almost inevitably to the very reductionism at issue.

Art Line Thought discusses the main issues that beset our time and philosophy by locating these same issues in artworks and describing closely what is shown there. While respecting their differences, art and philosophy are thus made to cross back and forth into one another, delineating in fresh ways our concerns about nature, the human and non-human, the body, femininity, ecology, technology, textism, the end of history, community, postmodernism, relativism and non-Eurocentric ethics. A `philosophy of line' gathers these issues, opposing the current dominance of `word' and linguistic analyses. Art has long been aware that the line communicates meaning at least as well as the word. The volume is divided between contemporary and prehistoric art in order to reveal the presumptions of `Western' culture and how we might move beyond it. Since the book is a critique of Eurocentric thinking and prose, it works at finding new styles of both. Its philosophical meditation is directed equally to those who are intellectually interested in contemporary and prehistoric art, in theories of postmodern culture and criticism, and in anthropology.

Formal ontology combines two ideas, one originating with Husserl, the other with Frege: that of ontology of the formal aspects of all objects, irrespective of their particular nature, and ontology pursued by employing the tools of modern formal disciplines, notably logic and semantics. These two traditions have converged in recent years and this is the first collection to encompass them as a whole in a single volume. It assembles essays from authors around the world already widely known for their work in formal ontology, and illustrates that through the application of formal methods the ancient discipline of ontology may be put on a firm methodological basis. The essays not only illuminate the nature of ontology and its relation to other areas, in language, logic and everyday life, but also demonstrate that common issues from the analytical and phenomenological traditions may be discussed without ideological barriers. Audience: advanced students of and specialists in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive science, computer science, database engineering.

This highly personal account of a lifetime's spiritual and philosophical enquiry charts the author's journey of faith through contemporary culture. Distinguishing between what she posits as the 'universal' and the 'rhapsodic' "logos," Tymieniecka interrogates concepts as varied as creativity and the media, joy and suffering, and truth and ambiguity. She contemplates the possibilities and limits of communication between human beings, and outlines what she calls the 'transnatural destiny' of the human soul.

The book asserts that unlike theory, which unfolds a logical continuity, and unlike dialogue, which is directed sequentially upward toward intellectual conclusions, the mode of reflection of the 'rhapsodic logos' imposes no limits or caps upon its understanding. Instead, the 'logoic' flow interlaces the rhapsodic cadences of our reflections on reality, in all their innumerable fluctuations, and sifts them to mold the intimate mind/soul inwardness that we experience as faith.

The radiative meditations of this 'rhapsodic logos' weave their way through the entanglements of the mystery of incarnation, the constitutive archetypes, the inwardly sacred, the transnatural destiny of the soul, and finally ascend the rhapsodic scales toward culminating faith in the Christo-Logos."

It has been a constant intention of the series of AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY to present to the philosophical reader books which probed the frontiers of contemporary philosophy. That intention remains true of the following volume, which offers an international dialogue regarding the phenomenological program and succeeding movements. Early in this Series we tried, as well, to initiate philosophical discussion across serious boundaries and barriers which have characterized contemporary reflection. That theme also continued in the original essays presented herein. With the publication of this fifth volume in the Series we have crossed something of a minor milestone in our endeavor, and are appreciative of the kind welcome with which we have been received by the readers. We wish to thank sincerely the contributors to this volume for their helpful and willing cooperation. We also wish to thank Ms. Irmgard Scherer for her translation of Professor Apel's paper, as well as Professor Apel himself for reviewing this translation. We are also pleased to thank the Office of the Dean of the College Of Arts And Sciences and especially Dean Betty T. Bennett, for a grant for typing, as well as Ms. Mary H. Wason for her fine typing skills and her kind cooperation.

ihr Wesen, iiber die Eigenart ihres Gebiets ins klare zu kommen, das ist in der Tat eins der Hauptstiicke und Grundstiicke der Erkennt- nistheorie, wie sich ohne weiteres begreift aus der allumspannenden Weite der rein logischen Begriffe und der normativen Anwendung 5 der formallogischen Gesetze. Das formallogische Denken, das analytische im pragnantesten Sinn des W ortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf Grund bloBer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf aIle und jede Gegenstandlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, 10 weil Gegenstande iiberhaupt fUr das Denken Gegenstande nur sind durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutun- gen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen griinden, notwendig fUr aIle bedeutungsmaBig so und so gefaBten bestimmten Gegenstandlichkeiten gelten miissen. 15 Da tritt uns also gleich zu Anfang der Begriff der Bedeutung e- gegen, der nun freilich so allerlei bedeuten kann und der KIarlegung allergroBte Schwierigkeiten bietet. Ihm werden wir und den mit ihm zusammenhangenden Begriffen und Phanomenen umfassende Be- trachtungen zuwenden; solche Betrachtungen sind iibrigens auch, 20 unabhangig von dem Interesse an der klaren Bestimmung des Sinnes formaler Logik, fUr die Logik selbst und die Erkenntniskritik von selbstverstandlicher und aIlergroBter Wichtigkeit. So werden ver- schiedene, obschon nahe zusammenhangende Interessen ihre Befrie- digung finden konnen, und darauf habe ich es urn so mehr abgese- 25 hen, als ich ja weiB, welche Bemiihungen meine jungen Freunde in der Philosophischen Gesellschaft in den beiden letzten Semestern den Bedeutungsproblemen in ihren Diskussionen zugewendet haben.

Building upon the "preliminary conception of Phenomenology" introduced by Heidegger in section II of the Introduction to Sein und zeit, l one may say that a phenomenology of death would mean: "to let death, as that which shows itself, be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. " Does this mean then, that a properly phenomenological d- cription of death may reveal to us what death as a factical event is like "in the very way in which it shows itself from itself"? Although I cannot experience my death in order to describe it, may some kind of phenomenologica'l inference or "extrapolation"2 be the condition for a unique and privileged revelation of what it is like to be dead? There is an important element of phenomenological descr- tion which renders such an extrapolation implausible, and it involves what Husserl originally called the reduction to signi- cance or meaning. It can never be true for the phenomenologist, 1 Heidegger, Martin, Sein und zeit, p. 34. e. t. page 58. 2 Henry W. Johnstone Jr. thinks that while one cannot extrapo late from the experience of sleep to the experience of death, it may be possible to extrapolate from the phenomeno lQgy of sleep to the phenomenology of death. Cf. H. W. John stone Jr., "Toward a Phenomenology of Death," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, 1975, pages 396-7. Cf."

The desire for knowledge is an abiding facet of human experience and cultural development. This work documents curiosity as a sociohistorical force initiating research across the disciplines. Projects generated by theoretical curiosity are presented as historical and material practices emerging as expressions of embodied knowledge and experience. The shifting cultural, philosophical and practical relations between theory and curiosity are situated within classical, medieval, early modern and contemporary communities of practice. The Practice of Theoretical Curiosity advocates for a critical, aesthetic engagement in everyday life. Its purpose is to examine the pedagogical grounds and questions that motivate research programs in the sciences, education, technoculture and post-war social movements. Theoretical curiosity continually resists disciplinary limits. It is a core, embodied process uniting human pursuits of knowledge and power. This inquiry into inquiry itself offers an appreciation of the vital continuity between the senses, perception, and affect and concept development. It is informed by a critical reading of phenomenology as the embodied practice of researchers. This study sponsors a deepening of theory in practice and the practice of theoretical exploration. As a contribution to pedagogical practice, it offers a historical critique of the usually unquestioned philosophical, political and ethical grounds for educational, scientific and social research. The Practice of Theoretical Curiosity profiles significant alliances and persona as agents for the pursuit of novel and often controversial research, adventures and discovery. It claims that the place of technology and the technical is the primary channel for contemporary inquiry. The technosciences of genomics, artificial life and astrobiology are considered as contemporary extensions of a perennial desire to pursue and resist the limits of existing knowledge and representation.

This book shows how phenomenology of the social sciences differs from positivistic approaches, and presents Schutz's theory of relevances--a key feature of his own phenomenology of the social world. It begins with Schutz's appraisal of how Husserl influenced him, and continues with exchanges between Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Felix Kaufmann, Aron Gurwitsch, and Talcott Parsons. This book presents, for the first time, Schutz's incisive criticisms of T.S. Eliot's theory of culture.

This book challenges the standard view of the relationship between Kant's and Sartre's practical philosophies, making a case for regarding Kant as one of Sartre's most significant predecessors. By using an original comparative methodology, the book identifies several fundamental theses of Sartre's practical philosophy despite the common reading of Sartre as a philosopher without a practical philosophy. Furthermore, the book shows that Sartre's practical philosophy proves to be closer to Kant than dominant contemporary Kantian theories are. Starting from the similarities between Kant and Sartre, the book uncovers the project of a critical ethics which is philosophically more compelling than dominant contemporary Kantian theories.

In Being and Time Heidegger gives an account of the distinctive features of human existence, in an attempt to answer the question of the meaning of being. He finds that underlying all of these features is what he calls 'original time'. In this clear and straightforward introduction to the text, Paul Gorner takes the reader through the work, examining its detail and explaining the sometimes difficult language which Heidegger uses. The topics which he covers include being-in-the-world, being-with, thrownness and projection, truth, authenticity, time and being, and historicity. His book makes Being and Time accessible to students in a way that conveys the essence of Heidegger's project and remains true to what is distinctive about his thinking.

A world ever more extensively interlinked is calling out for serving human interests broader and more compelling than those inspiring our technological welfare. The interface between cultures - at the moment especially between the Occident and Islam - presents challenges to mutual understandings and calls for restoring the resources of our human beings forgotten in the struggle of competition and rivalry at the vital spheres of existence. In the evolutionary progress of the living beings the strictly vital concerns, emotions, attributes become sublimed and elevated to the spiritual sphere at which human beings encounter each other and share. Studies presented here bring forth sublimity, generosity, forgiveness, beauty, and are exalting the quest after ciphers and symbols which lead to our sharing the common deepest stream of fraternal reality.

At the heart of this book, a question: what to make of the creeping competences of the EU and of the role the European Court of Justice plays in this respect? Taking the implied powers doctrine as its starting point, the hypothesis is that it shows what is ultimately at stake in the concept of legal competence: the problem of creation in law, or the relationship between constituent and constituted power. By rethinking this relationship, a new conceptual framework to make sense of creeping competences is designed. For this, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used. Tracing back the philosophical roots of creation, legal constitution is understood as constitution in passivity. This leads to a whole new interpretation of the relationship between law and politics, rule following, authority, competences and European integration. From this perspective specific chapters in the case law of the European Court of Justice are reread and the logic behind the competence creep is unmasked. new back cover copy: Europe's constitutional journey has not been a smooth one, and a better division and definition of competence in the European Union is a key issue that needs to be addressed. How can the division of competence be made more transparent? Does there need to be a reorganization of competence? How can it be ensured that the redefined division of competence will not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision, regions? And how can it be ensured that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? Indeed, has the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union already come to a halt? These are the questions this book explores. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice opens with a legal account of competence creep, including the role that the European Court of Justice plays in it and a sketch of the present division of competences and the main principles regulating it. It then discusses the relationship between constituent power and constituted or constitutional power from the viewpoint of the history of constitutional history before offering an alternative theory of their relationship, known as "chiastic theory," which is based on the philosophical investigations of Merleau-Ponty. It details how chiastic theory can be used to make sense of the Court's role in the competence creep in general and the doctrine of implied powers in particular, and it utilizes several case studies concerning competences to sustain this claim. Aimed at researchers and practitioners in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Political Science, the Social Sciences and numerous fields of law, this monograph is a seminal work in the evolving theory and practice of EU law.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is increasingly hailed as one of the key philosophers of the Twentieth century. Phenomenology of Perception is his most famous and influential work and an essential text for anyone seeking to understand phenomenology. In this guidebook Komarine Romdenh-Romluc introduces and assesses Merleau-Ponty's life and the background to his philosophy, the key themes and arguments of Phenomenology of Perception, and the continuing importance of Merleau-Ponty's work to philosophy. Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to Merleau-Ponty for the first time and reading his magnum opus. It is essential reading for students of Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology and related subjects such as art and cultural studies.

This collection offers a critical assessment of transcendentalism, the understanding of consciousness, absolutized as a system of a priori laws of the mind, that was advanced by Kant and Husserl. As these studies show, transcendentalism critically informed 20th Century phenomenological investigation into such issues as temporality, historicity, imagination, objectivity and subjectivity, freedom, ethical judgment, work, praxis. Advances in science have now provoked a questioning of the absolute prerogatives of consciousness. Transcendentalism is challenged by empirical reductionism. And recognition of the role the celestial sphere plays in life on planet earth suggests that a radical shift of philosophy's center of gravity be made away from absolute consciousness and toward the transcendental forces at play in the architectonics of the cosmos.

Armstrong suggests that James's perspective is essentially phenomenological--that his understanding of the process of knowing, the art of fiction, and experience as a whole coincides in important ways with the ideas of the leading phenomenologists. He examines the connections between phenomenology's theory of consciousness and existentialism's analyses of the lived world in relation to James's fascination with consciousness and what is commonly called his
Originally published in 1983.
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