The Habits of Racism examines some of the complex questions raised by the phenomenon and experience of racism. Helen Ngo draws on the resources of Merleau-Ponty to show how the conceptual reworking of habit as bodily orientation helps to identify the subtle but more fundamental workings of racism--to catch its insidious, gestural expressions, as well as its habitual modes of racialized perception. Racism, as Ngo argues, is equally expressed through bodily habits, which, once reformulated, raises important ethical questions regarding the responsibility for one's racist habits. Ngo then/also considers what the lived experience of racism and racialization teaches us about the nature of embodied and socially-situated being, arguing that racialized embodiment problematizes and extends existing accounts of embodied experience, and calls into question dominant philosophical paradigms of the "self" as coherent, fluid, and synchronous. Drawing on thinkers such as Fanon, she argues that the racialized body is "in front of itself" and "uncanny" (in the Heideggerian senses of "strange" and "not-at-home"), while exploring the phenomenological and existential implications of this disorientation and displacement. Finally, she returns to the visual register to take up the question of objectification in the racist gaze, critically examining the subject-object ontology presupposed by Sartre's account of "the gaze" (le regard). Recalling that all embodied being is always already relational and co-constituting, Ngo draws on Merleau-Ponty's concept of the intertwining to argue that a phenomenology of racialized embodiment reveals to us the ontological violence of racism-not a merely violation of one's subjectivity as commonly claimed, but also a violation of one's intersubjectivity. The original arguments in The Habits of Racism will be of particular value to students and scholars interested in critical philosophy of race, phenomenology, and social and political philosophy, and may also be of interest to those working in feminist philosophy, queer studies, and disability studies.

Philosophical genealogy is a distinct method of historical and philosophical inquiry that was developed by the nineteenth-century philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, and subsequently adopted and extended by the twentieth-century philosopher, Michel Foucault. In brief, genealogies critically examine the historical origin of philosophical concepts, ideas and practices. They challenge the value of traditional methods of philosophical inquiry along with the results that these inquiries produce. Philosophical Genealogy Volume I: An Epistemological Reconstruction of the Genealogical Method explored the three axes of the genealogical method: power, truth and the ethical. In addition, various ontological and epistemic problems pertaining to each of these axes were examined. In Philosophical Genealogy Volume II: An Epistemological Reconstruction of the Genealogical Method, these problems are now resolved. Volume II establishes what requisite ontological underpinnings are required in order to provide a successful, epistemic reconstruction of the genealogical method. Problems regarding the nature of the body, the relation between power and resistance as well as the justification of Nietzschean perspectivism, are now all clearly answered. It is shown that genealogy is a profound, fecund and, most importantly, coherent method of philosophical and historical investigation which may produce many new discoveries in the fields of ethics and moral inquiry provided it is correctly employed.

Every human being knows that we are walking through life following trails, whether we are aware of them or not. Medieval poets, from the anonymous composer of Beowulf to Marie de France, Hartmann von Aue, Gottfried von Strassburg, and Guillaume de Lorris to Petrarch and Heinrich Kaufringer, predicated their works on the notion of the trail and elaborated on its epistemological function. We can grasp here an essential concept that determines much of medieval and early modern European literature and philosophy, addressing the direction which all protagonists pursue, as powerfully illustrated also by the anonymous poets of Herzog Ernst and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Dante's Divina Commedia, in fact, proves to be one of the most explicit poetic manifestations of the fundamental idea of the trail, but we find strong parallels also in powerful contemporary works such as Guillaume de Deguileville's Pelerinage de la vie humaine and in many mystical tracts.

The course of German philosophy in the twentieth century is one of the most exciting and controversial in the history of human thought. In this outstanding and engaging introduction, a companion volume to his German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Weber to Heidegger, Julian Young examines and assesses the way in which some of the major German thinkers of the period reacted, often in starkly contrasting ways, to the challenges posed by the nature of modernity, the failure of liberalism and the concept of decline. Divided into two parts exploring major intellectual figures of the left and right respectively, Young introduces and assesses the thought of the following figures: Georg Lukacs: the critique of capitalism: alienation, reification, and false consciousness Ernst Bloch: the Marxist utopia Walter Benjamin: the confluence of phenomenology and left-wing thought: the Arcades Project, aura, and the technological reproduction of the artwork Oswald Spengler: the pessimistic right and the concept of Western decline Max Scheler: Catholic conservatism and the 'objective hierarchy of values' Carl Schmitt: the failure of liberalism, dictatorship, 'friends' versus 'enemies' Leo Strauss: the rejection of moral relativism and the return to classical philosophy. Highly relevant when the viability of liberal democracy is again called into question, German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Lukacs to Strauss is essential reading for students of German philosophy, phenomenology and critical theory, and will also be of interest to students in related fields such as literature, religious studies, and political theory.

Phenomenalism, Phenomenology and the Question of Time: A Comparative Study of the Theories of Mach, Husserl, and Boltzmann analyzes two interconnected themes: the split between phenomenalism and phenomenology, and the question of time in relation to physical processes and irreversibility in physics. The first theme is the overlooked connections between the modern phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (and his mentor Franz Brentano) and phenomenalism as associated with Ernst Mach. The book's historical-conceptual perspective draws attention to the ways in which Husserl's twentieth century advance of phenomenological method was conceived in relation to Mach's late nineteenth century and early twentieth century work both in science and philosophy. At first glance, Mach's phenomenalism appears to be in stark contrast to Husserl's phenomenology, but on closer inspection, it influenced and informed its inception. By analyzing Husserl's revolutionary method of phenomenology in connection to Mach's earlier conceptions, the book elucidates the rise of modern physics, especially through the work of Ludwig Boltzmann, as an important context to both Mach's philosophical work and Husserl's early overtures into phenomenology and his later critique of the "crisis" of European sciences. The discursive affinities and differences between phenomenalism and phenomenology are examined in terms of a more contemporary debate over naturalizing phenomenology, either as a method continuous with science or reduced to it. This immanent tension is examined and evaluated specifically through the second thematic axis of the book, which deals with the question of time and irreversibility. Time in physics conforms to an explanatory scheme that relegates the issues of directionality and symmetry of time to concepts that are radically different from any phenomenological attempts to explain temporality in terms of intuition and consciousness. It is precisely through the notion of irreversibility that both perspectives, scientific and phenomenological, explicate time's arrow not as a mere manifestation of sensory asymmetry, as Mach would have it, but rather, through indirect descriptions of time and temporal objects. The issue of time's arrow, irreversibility, and Boltzmann's physical hypotheses regarding the nature of time are introduced and comparatively assessed with Husserl's work on phenomenology and the role of temporality to consciousness.

Among the first and foremost of American continental philosophers, Alphonso Lingis refines his own thought through a topic usually deemed unworthy of philosophical examination-passion. Lingis criticizes traditional scientific accounts of the emotions as dividing or disrupting our lives and argues for passion as a unifying force, a concept which invites philosophical exploration. The book's structure is twofold. First, it offers an examination of Lingis's most recent developments through the topic of passion with essays from some of the most established commentators on the work of Lingis. Second, it offers a substantial retrospective on Lingis's thought in relation to some of the major figures in continental philosophy, namely Levinas, Kant, Heidegger, Butler, Foucault, and Nietzsche, all interweaving the theme of passion. Written to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of Lingis's birth, these essays show how Lingis's thought has not only endured over so many productive decades but also remains vital and even continues to grow.

Classic Writings for a Phenomenology of Practice features examples of newly translated classic phenomenological texts that have been largely forgotten or misunderstood. The writings are unique in that they speak to the practice of doing phenomenological research for the purpose of gaining insights and better understandings regarding aspects of professional practice and ordinary life phenomena and events. Phenomenology does not have to be impenetrable philosophy, dealing with tedious technical issues. Instead, phenomenology may offer relevance, value, and enduring allure to readers and researchers who are engaged with the quotidian life experiences and events of students, patients, clients, friends, and other individuals. This phenomenological approach aims to stay as close as possible to the ordinary events of everyday life: seeing the first smile of a child, feeling compulsive, being humorous, having a conversation, experiencing childhood secrecy, encountering new things-topics that span a manifold of life experiences. In this collection of classic phenomenological writings, each author is thoughtfully introduced, and each text is followed by a conversational descant: a reflection on the phenomenological reflection. The presentation of these classic writings and their reflections aims to show us what it means to do phenomenology directly on the phenomena that we live-thus asking us to be attentive to the fascinating varieties and subtleties of primal lived experiences and consciousness in all its remarkable complexities. This book is relevant for scholars and students who are interested in human science research and the origins and practices of the phenomenological method.

Essays on Aesthetic Genesis is a collection of essays written on Jeff Mitscherling's work in realist phenomenology, Aesthetic Genesis: The Origin of Consciousness in the Intentional Being of Nature. The authors explicate, expand, contextualize and apply the concepts of intentional being, the "New Copernican Hypothesis" (a reversal of the fundamental tenet of phenomenology that all consciousness is intentional-intentionality, rather, gives rise to consciousness), the idea of intentional structures in nature, and the foundational concepts of Aesthetic Genesis as they appear in the work of Aristotle, Ingarden and Gadamer amongst others. This book takes as its focus Mitscherling's comprehensive phenomenological analysis of embodiment, aesthetic experience, the interpretation of texts, moral behavior, and cognition, and exemplifies subsequent work in the field of realist phenomenology being conducted by an international collection of active scholars influenced by Aesthetic Genesis.

Heidegger's influence in the twentieth century probably outstrips that of any other philosopher, at least in the so-called Continental tradition. The 'revolution' Heidegger brought about with his compelling readings of the broader philosophical tradition transformed German philosophy and spread quickly to most of Europe, the United States and Japan. This volume examines Heidegger's influence in a region where his reception has had a remarkable and largely hidden history: Eastern Europe and Russia. The book begins by addressing two important literary influences on Heidegger: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. It goes on to examine Heidegger's philosophical influence, and features three crucial figures in the reception of Heidegger's thought in Eastern Europe and Russia: Vladimir Bibikhin, Krzysztof Michalski, and Jan Patocka. Finally the volume deals with an often vexed issue in current treatments of Heidegger: the importance of Heidegger's philosophy for politics. The book includes essays by an international team of contributors, including leading representatives of Heideggerian thought in Russia today. Heidegger's thought plays a key role in debates over Russian identity and the geopolitical role Russia has to play in the world. The volume surveys the complicated landscape of post-Soviet philosophy, and how the rise of widely differing appropriations of Heidegger exploit familiar fault lines in the Russian reception of Western thinkers that date back to the first stirrings of a distinctively Russian philosophical tradition.

Philosophers often use the term "naturalism' in order to describe their work. It is commonplace to see a metaphysical, epistemological and/or ethical position self-described and described by others as one that is "naturalized." But what, if anything, does the term naturalized add--or subtract---to the position being articulated? I demonstrate in The Problem of Naturalism: Analytic and Continental Perspectives, that the term naturalism connotes such a broad meaning that it is difficult to demarcate naturalism from philosophy itself. Still, many philosophers have tried to provide non-trivial and non-vacuous definitions of the term. My book, by and large, argues that such attempts are unsuccessful. Instead, I argue that naturalism is an attitude and neither a methodology nor a substantive position. I then articulate the guidelines the naturalist needs to follow, as well as the virtues he or she needs to practice, in order for the term naturalism to do any meaningful work. Much of the book explains and then critiques the various attempts to define naturalism in the Anglo-American secondary literature. Some of the criticisms I raise seem to emanate from the internal logic of the naturalistic position being expressed. However, others have emerged from gleaning the work of such Continental thinkers as: Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Foucault. I use these thinkers in order to expose the unjustified implicit and sometimes explicit assumptions that many naturalistic philosophers presume to hold when they attempt to render a clear, distinct and robust naturalist position.

The Psychoanalysis of the Absurd offers an interdisciplinary study of Existentialism and Phenomenology and their importance to the clinical work of Contemporary Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. The concept of Absurdity, developed by Camus, has never been applied to the therapeutic situation or directly contrasted with its antithesis; the search for personal meaning. The book begins with narrative accounts of the historical development of Psychoanalysis, Existentialism and Phenomenology in 20th century Europe. The focus here is on fin de siecle Vienna and Paris between the Wars as the principal incubators of the two disciplines. Accompanied by composite case illustrations, Leffert then explores his own development of the Psychoanalysis of the Absurd, drawing on the work of Camus, Heidegger and Sartre. Absurdity is first discussed in relation to the Bio-Psycho-Social Self and Dasein is posited as a bridge concept, with personal meaning as the antithesis to Absurdity, before being discussed in relation to the world and how it impinges on self. A final chapter attempts to tie together particular issues raised by the book: Subjective well-being, Meaning, thrownness, Absurdity, Death and Death Anxiety and how we have become technologically enhanced human beings. Existential psychotherapy and psychoanalysis have, until now, largely gone their own way: the goal of this book is to fold them back into Contemporary Psychoanalysis. Establishing that the concept of Absurdity is of singular clinical importance to both diagnosis and therapeutic action, this book will be of great interest to clinicians, philosophers, and interdisciplinary scientists.

Um die Sache der Phanomenologie handelt es sich in den folgenden Meditationen. Sie sind aus der Uberzeugung des Verfassers erwach- sen, dass die phanomenologische Philosophie imJahre 1990nochetwas zu sagen hat, etwas Bedeutsames. Sie ist keineswegs die sagenhafte "Philosophia perennis". Es ist auch nicht so, dass sie die Losung der Probleme aller Philosophen und philosophischen Stromungen zu bie- ten hatte. Abersiespieltnochstetseine unersetzliche Rolleimintellek- tuellen Gesprach unseres Jahrhunderts. Sie verdient es nicht, zu dem alten Eisen geworfen zu werden, das lediglich als Material fur histori- sche Betrachtungen Interesse erregt. Ist im produktiven Denken derer, die der phanomenologischen Be- wegung zugerechnet werden, eine gewisse Erschlaffung eingetreten? "Die Phanomenologen werden sich etwas einfallen lassen mussen", sagte unlangst ein Bekannter. Dieser Rat, diese Mahnung sind jedoch ein wenig einseitig. Das bessere Neue soll ja jeweils aus dem guten Alten erwachsen. Eine Besinnung auf das bereits Geleistete sollte daher allem "Einfallen-lassen" vorhergehen. Die phanomenologische Bewegunghat im Laufe ihrerEntwicklung mancherlei wertvolleDenk- anstosse hervorgebracht, die bisher nicht in ihrer philosophischen Be- deutsamkeit erkannt wurden. An diese Denkmotive ware zunachst anzuknupfen. Dies gilt vor allem in Bezug auf den Initiator der phanomenologi- schen Philosophie Edmund Husserl. Wahrend einige seiner Schriften bekannt, ja uberbekannt sind, bleiben manche seiner intimen Uberle- gungen unbeachtet. Sie fugen sich nicht in das, was man mit einem gewissen Recht die "offizielle Doktrin" nennen konnte. Der Verfasser wird bemuht sein, aufwichtiges Gedankengut Husserls aufmerksam zu machen und es zu verwerten.

When future historians chronicle the twentieth century, they will see phenomenology as one of the preeminent social and ethical philosophies of its age. The phenomenological movement not only produced systematic reflection on common moral concerns such as distinguishing right from wrong and explaining the status of values; it also called on philosophy to renew European societies facing crisis, an aim that inspired thinkers in interwar Europe as well as later communist bloc dissidents.
Despite this legacy, phenomenology continues to be largely discounted as esoteric and solipsistic, the last gasp of a Cartesian dream to base knowledge on the isolated rational mind. Intellectual histories tend to cite Husserl's epistemological influence on philosophies like existentialism and deconstruction without considering his social or ethical imprint. And while a few recent scholars have begun to note phenomenology's wider ethical resonance, especially in French social thought, its image as stubbornly academic continues to hold sway. "The Far Reaches" challenges that image by tracing the first history of phenomenological ethics and social thought in Central Europe, from its founders Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl through its reception in East Central Europe by dissident thinkers such as Jan Patocka, Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), and Vaclav Havel.

The Psychoanalysis of the Absurd offers an interdisciplinary study of Existentialism and Phenomenology and their importance to the clinical work of Contemporary Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. The concept of Absurdity, developed by Camus, has never been applied to the therapeutic situation or directly contrasted with its antithesis; the search for personal meaning. The book begins with narrative accounts of the historical development of Psychoanalysis, Existentialism and Phenomenology in 20th century Europe. The focus here is on fin de siecle Vienna and Paris between the Wars as the principal incubators of the two disciplines. Accompanied by composite case illustrations, Leffert then explores his own development of the Psychoanalysis of the Absurd, drawing on the work of Camus, Heidegger and Sartre. Absurdity is first discussed in relation to the Bio-Psycho-Social Self and Dasein is posited as a bridge concept, with personal meaning as the antithesis to Absurdity, before being discussed in relation to the world and how it impinges on self. A final chapter attempts to tie together particular issues raised by the book: Subjective well-being, Meaning, thrownness, Absurdity, Death and Death Anxiety and how we have become technologically enhanced human beings. Existential psychotherapy and psychoanalysis have, until now, largely gone their own way: the goal of this book is to fold them back into Contemporary Psychoanalysis. Establishing that the concept of Absurdity is of singular clinical importance to both diagnosis and therapeutic action, this book will be of great interest to clinicians, philosophers, and interdisciplinary scientists.

Since the initial publication of "Experimental Phenomenology" in 1977, Don Ihde s groundbreaking career has developed from his contributions to the philosophy of technology and technoscience to his own postphenomenology. This new and expanded edition of "Experimental Phenomenology" resituates the text in the succeeding currents of Ihde s work with a new preface and two new sections, one devoted to pragmatism and phenomenology and the other to technologies and material culture. Now, in the case of tools, instruments, and media, Ihde s active and experimental style of phenomenology is taken into cyberspace, science and media technologies, computer games, display screens, and more."

This volume of new essays explores the relationship between the thought of Wittgenstein and the key figures of phenomenology: Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. It is the first book to provide an overview of how Wittgenstein's philosophy in its different phases, including his own so-called phenomenological phase, relates to the variety of phenomenological approaches developed in continental Europe. In so doing, the volume seeks to throw light on both sides of the comparison, and to clarify more broadly the relations between analytic and phenomenological philosophy. However, rather than treating the interpretation of either phenomenological philosophy or Wittgenstein as an already settled issue, several chapters in the volume examine and question received views regarding them, and develop alternatives to such views. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology will be of interest to scholars working in philosophical methodology and metaphilosophy, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and logic, and ethics.

The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of two distinct philosophical schools in Europe: analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The history of 20th-century philosophy is often written as an account of the development of one or both of these schools, as well as their overt or covert mutual hostility. What is often left out of this history, however, is the relationship between the two European schools and a third significant philosophical event: the birth and development of pragmatism, the indigenous philosophical movement of the United States. Through a careful analysis of seminal figures and central texts, this book explores the mutual intellectual influences, convergences, and differences between these three revolutionary philosophical traditions. The essays in this volume aim to show the central role that pragmatism played in the development of philosophical thought at the turn of the twentieth century, widen our understanding of a seminal point in the history of philosophy, and shed light on the ways in which these three schools of thought continue to shape the theoretical agenda of contemporary philosophy.

When future historians chronicle the twentieth century, they will see phenomenology as one of the preeminent social and ethical philosophies of its age. The phenomenological movement not only produced systematic reflection on common moral concerns such as distinguishing right from wrong and explaining the status of values; it also called on philosophy to renew European societies facing crisis, an aim that inspired thinkers in interwar Europe as well as later communist bloc dissidents.
Despite this legacy, phenomenology continues to be largely discounted as esoteric and solipsistic, the last gasp of a Cartesian dream to base knowledge on the isolated rational mind. Intellectual histories tend to cite Husserl's epistemological influence on philosophies like existentialism and deconstruction without considering his social or ethical imprint. And while a few recent scholars have begun to note phenomenology's wider ethical resonance, especially in French social thought, its image as stubbornly academic continues to hold sway. "The Far Reaches" challenges that image by tracing the first history of phenomenological ethics and social thought in Central Europe, from its founders Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl through its reception in East Central Europe by dissident thinkers such as Jan Patocka, Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), and Vaclav Havel.

What is the nature of time? This new study engages with the philosophy of Henri Bergson on time and proposes a new way of thinking about the effects of future events on the past. According to Bergson, time is an integral feature of real things, just as much as their material or size. When a flower grows, it takes a period of real time for it to flourish, which cannot be quickened or slowed down, nor can it be eliminated from the process of growth. Bergson named this real time 'duration' and argued that everything and everyone exist as duration, and that internal processes flow into one another, with no clear boundaries that separate one phase of duration from another. According to Bergson's philosophy, the past does not disappear but smoothly flows into the present, forming an indivisible dynamic unity. But what if the causal flow of temporal reality is not unidirectional? What if not only past events influence future ones, but future ones in their turn have retrospective effect on past occurrences? The author of this book analyses these key questions, asserts that the changeability of the past follows from Bergson's theory of time and proposes a theory of embodied time that involves the retrospective enrichment of reality.

Changing Art into Research: Soliloquy Methodology presents a research methodology that enables inquiry into one's personal experiences in an endeavour to reveal essential commonalities of human experience. Arts-informed research methods are becoming increasingly popular with scholars in Arts, Education and the Social Sciences, but there is often confusion about how to turn arts practice into rigorous inquiry. This book examines the theoretical perspectives needed to inform these research approaches, which are often missing in methods teaching and research. Soliloquy is a new methodology that interprets and applies Husserl's philosophical concept of Transcendental Phenomenology. It marries together the synthesizing powers of the unconscious mind with the analytical capacities of conscious cognition and articulation. It further explores the possibility that both cognitive and intuitive ways of knowing are valid and appropriate for academic inquiry, provided these methods are aligned through a philosophically consistent, theoretical framework. This book will be of great interest to academics and postgraduate students engaged in arts-based qualitative research and those doing an arts-based practice dissertation.

Legendary director, actor, author, and provocateur Werner Herzog has incalculably influenced contemporary cinema for decades. Until now there has been no sustained effort to gather and present a variety of diverse philosophical approaches to his films and to the thinking behind their creation. The Philosophy of Werner Herzog, edited by M. Blake Wilson and Christopher Turner, collects fourteen essays by professional philosophers and film theorists from around the globe, who explore the famed German auteur's notions of "ecstatic truth" as opposed to "accountants' truth," his conception of nature and its penchant for "overwhelming and collective murder," his controversial film production techniques, his debts to his philosophical and aesthetic forebears, and finally, his pointed objections to his would-be critics--including, among others, the contributors to this book themselves. By probing how Herzog's thinking behind the camera is revealed in the action he captures in front of it, The Philosophy of Werner Herzog shines new light upon the images and dialog we see and hear on the screen by enriching our appreciation of a prolific--yet enigmatic--film artist.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is widely regarded as the founding figure of the philosophical movement of "phenomenology." Husserl's philosophical program was both embraced and rejected by many, but in either case, his ideas set the stage for and exercised an enormous influence on the development of much of the philosophy that followed. In particular, his thought provides the backdrop and impetus for movements such as existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction. Also, because of his career-long concerns with logic and mathematics, there are many points of contact between Husserl's phenomenology and so-called "analytical philosophy," further cementing study of Husserl's thought across the philosophical spectrum. The A to Z of Husserl's Philosophy provides the means to approach the texts of Husserl, as well as those of his major commentators. This is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on key terms and neologisms, as well as brief discussions of Husserl's major works and of some of his most important predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.

"Spinoza Contra Phenomenology" fundamentally recasts the history of postwar French thought, which is typically presumed by detractors and celebrants alike to have been driven by a critique of reason indebted above all to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Although the reception of German phenomenology gave rise to many of the most innovative developments in French philosophy, from existentialism to deconstruction, not everyone in France was pleased with this German import. The book recounts how a series of French philosophers used Spinoza's rationalism to erect a bulwark against the nominally irrationalist tendencies of Husserl's and Heidegger's thought in France. From its beginnings in the interwar years in philosophy of science and the history of philosophy, this Spinozist rationalism would prove foundational for Louis Althusser's rethinking of Marxism and Gilles Deleuze's ambitious metaphysics. There has been a renewed enthusiasm for Spinozism in various quarters of late by those who would see it as a kind of neo-vitalism or philosophy of life and affect. Peden bucks the trend by tracking a decisive and neglected aspect of Spinoza's philosophy--his rationalism--in a body of thought too often presumed to have rejected reason. In the process, he demonstrates that the critical resources of Spinoza's rationalism have yet to be exhausted today.

Despite hundreds of millions of visitors each year, zoos have remained outside of the realm of philosophical analysis. This lack of theoretical examination is interesting considering the paradoxical position within which a zoo is situated, being a space of animal confinement as well as a site that provides valuable tools for species conservation, public education, and entertainment. Why Do We Go to the Zoo? argues that the zoo is a legitimate space of academic inquiry. The modes of communication taking place at the zoo that keep drawing us back time and time again beg for a careful investigation. In this book, the meaning of the zoo as communicative space is explored. This book relies on the phenomenological method from Edmund Husserl and a rhetorical approach to examine the interaction between people and animals in the zoo space. Phenomenology, the philosophy of examining the engaged everyday lived experience, is a natural method to use in the project. Despite its rich history and tradition it is interesting that there are very few books explaining "how to do" phenomenology. Why Do We Go to the Zoo? provides a detailed account of how to actually conduct a phenomenological analysis. The author spent thousands of hours in zoos watching people and animals interact as well as talking with people both formally and informally. This book asks readers to bracket their preconceptions of what goes on in the zoo and, instead, to explore the meaning of powerful zoo experiences while reminding us of the troubled history of zoos.

In his late work Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Immanuel Kant struggles to answer a straightforward, yet surprisingly difficult, question: how is radical conversion-a complete reorientation of a person's most deeply held values-possible? In this book, Ryan S. Kemp and Christopher Iacovetti examine how this question gets taken up by Kant's philosophical heirs: Schelling, Fichte, Hegel and Kierkegaard. More than simply developing a novel account of each thinker's position, Kemp and Iacovetti trace how each philosopher formulates his theory in response to tensions in preceding views, culminating in Kierkegaard's claim that radical conversion lies outside a person's control. Kemp and Iacovetti close by examining some of the moral-psychological implications of Kierkegaard's account, particularly the question of how someone might responsibly relate to values that have, by their own admission, been acquired in contingent and accidental fashion.