This powerful book provides a nuanced comparison of Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle as they thought, spoke, and acted through two world wars and the subsequent Cold War. Will Morrisey frames geopolitics as the realm of necessity, and his book will help those who want to learn the art of statesmanship from two of its most accomplished practitioners. Morrisey credits their success in defending political liberty to their ability to frame successful geopolitical strategies. As leaders in and out of power, they defended their countries against the rising superpowers of the twentieth century: the tyrannies of Germany and the Soviet Union, but also, in a different way, the challenge of America's rise to worldwide stature and eventual dominance. Along with these similarities, there were two crucial differences: Churchill stood at the head of a maritime nation while de Gaulle led a land power situated on the dangerous northern European plain; Churchill enjoyed a stable political foundation and concentrated his attention on its defense while de Gaulle needed first to build such a foundation, even as he defended ill-founded regimes. Both leaders understood their supreme task to be the protection of their citizens as civil or political beings who should not be subject to tyranny. Although geopolitics focuses the attention of statesmen on political realities, Churchill and de Gaulle showed how moral principle and prudence can continue to widen the scope of human liberty. Although the world is vastly different today, this nuanced book shows how thinking along with these giants of the twentieth century as they responded to the crises of their own time will make us more thoughtful citizens now and in the future.

The Paradox of EU-India Relations: Missed Opportunities in Politics, Economics, Development Cooperation, and Culture, by Shazia Aziz Wulbers, discusses areas where EU-Indian relations are strained and areas where there is meaningful cooperation, and then situates those areas within the broader context of international relations. Wulbers also considers the United States in her study, as much can be learned from comparing EU-India relations with that of the U.S. and India. She addresses the primary issues confronting the EU and India in both the past and in the present, from politics and economics to each entity's role in global technological advances, finishing with a careful discussion of the role of cultural interactions in EU-India relations. Wulbers also looks to the future when she conducts an analysis of policy convergence and divergence to detect upcoming trends between the EU and India. She uses this analysis to make recommendations for policy makers about the way forward. The Paradox of EU-India Relations: Missed Opportunities in Politics, Economics, Development Cooperation, and Culture, by Shazia Aziz Wulbers, successfully identifies problems and prospects in the relationship between two great entities. It is a comprehensive empirical study which ultimately indicates that the Indian worldview is undeniably different from the European Union worldview, and could therefore be the important cause for problematic divergences in foreign policy trends.

This text is a timely and wide-ranging study providing essential background to the development of global modernity through the European encounter with China. Considering differing notions of peace, empire, trade, religion, and diplomacy as touchstones in the relations between China and Europe on mutuality, the book examines five encounters with France, Portugal, Holland, the pope, and Russia between 1248 and 1720, and reflects on concepts that the West took for granted but which did not successfully cross over into the Chinese world. This cutting edge text provides key insights into the cultural and political conflict which lay at the heart of early Chinese-European relations, as the West's understanding of the truth and appropriateness of its cultural norms was confronted by China's norms and beliefs.

This book introduces a new perspective on risk seeking behaviour, developing a framework based on various cognitive theories, and applying it to the specific case-study of Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria. The author examines why policy makers commit themselves to polices that they do not have the capacity to deliver, and develops an alternative theoretical model to prospect theory in explaining risk taking behaviour based on the concept of overconfidence. The volume suggests that overconfident individuals exhibit risk seeking behaviour that contradicts the risk averse behaviour of individuals in the domain of gain, as predicted by prospect theory. Using a set of testable hypothesis deduced from the model, it presents an empirical investigation of the causes behind Turkish decision makers' unprecedented level of risk taking toward the uprising in Syria and the consequences of this policy.

This book studies the reactions of India, Brazil, and South Africa the three main non-proliferation actors of the Global South to Iran's nuclear program. Their responses are explained and situated in wider foreign policy context.

Although the Falklands War of 1982 had a decisive outcome in respect to the restoration of British control, it failed to resolve the basic cause of the war: the Anglo-Argentine dispute over sovereignty. Relations between the two countries remain unstable, whilst a series of events throughout the past three decades have emphasised the sensitive and important nature of the international problem. First published in 1988, this book stresses the dispute's significance as both a domestic and an international problem, with important consequences for other governments and such international organisations as the United Nations, as well as the two key players. The book shows an equal concern for the obvious and immediate problem of sovereignty, and for the long term future of the South Atlantic and Antarctic region. Discussing issues that remain of major political relevance, this reissue will be of particular value to students of politics, international relations and diplomatic history with an interest in the key developments within and background to the Anglo-Argentine dispute.

Remembering the Cold War examines how, more than two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cold War legacies continue to play crucial roles in defining national identities and shaping international relations around the globe. Given the Cold War's blurred definition - it has neither a widely accepted commencement date nor unanimous conclusion - what is to be remembered? This book illustrates that there is, in fact, a huge body of 'remembrance,' and that it is more pertinent to ask: what should be included and what can be overlooked? Over five sections, this richly illustrated volume considers case studies of Cold War remembering from different parts of the world, and engages with growing theorisation in the field of memory studies, specifically in relation to war. David Lowe and Tony Joel afford careful consideration to agencies that identify with being 'victims' of the Cold War. In addition, the concept of arenas of articulation, which envelops the myriad spaces in which the remembering, commemorating, memorialising, and even revising of Cold War history takes place, is given prominence.

This book analyzes the place and role of sport within public diplomacy, including theoretical conceptualizations of the category of sports diplomacy as a sub-category of public diplomacy and empirical research of selected examples of the use of sport within public diplomacy. The empirical part of the book refers to three approaches to sports diplomacy and concerns the utilization of sport by states in order to shape relations with other states, the role of sport in building the international image of a state and the diplomatic subjectivity of international sports organizations. In reference to the first two approaches, the book uses comparative case study was in order to make observations and generalizations concerning sports diplomacy. Apart from that, the book includes a detailed study of the diplomatic subjectivity of the International Olympic Committee.

In the late 1990s NATO dropped bombs and supported armed insurgencies in Yugoslavia while insisting that its motives were purely humanitarian and that its only goal was peace. However, George Szamuely argues that NATO interventions actually prolonged conflicts, heightened enmity, increased casualties, and fueled demands for more interventions.
Eschewing the one-sided approach adopted by previous works on the Yugoslavian crisis, Szamuely offers a broad overview of the conflict, its role in the rise of NATO's authority, and its influence on Western policy on the Balkans. His timely, judicious, and accessible study sheds new light on the roots of the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

This book examines the interplay between the national and the European levels in EU foreign policymaking, focusing on the Middle East. European engagement in peacemaking in the Middle East dates back to foreign-policy cooperation in the early 1970s. Following the launch of the peace process in 1991, the EU and its Member States further stepped up their involvement in conflict resolution, focusing on one central area of EU engagement - the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This book covers the period from the beginning of the peace process in 1991 until 2008, and focuses on the actions of the big three Member States: Germany, France and the UK. Using the Europeanization concept as framework of analysis, the book examines the problematic dynamics between these Member States' national foreign-policy models and the construction of a common European conflict-resolution policy. It also provides interesting new insights into the EU's international role and potential, addressing the often neglected question of how Europeanization effects help to mitigate some of the classical limitations of European foreign policymaking. The book will be of great interest to students of EU policy, Middle Eastern Politics, peace and conflict resolution, security studies and IR.

This book re-examines the Nixon administration's attitude and approach to the European integration project. The formulation of US policy towards European integration in the Nixon presidential years (1969-1974) was conditioned by the perceived relative decline of the United States, Western European emergence and competition, the feared Communist expansionism, and US national interests. Against that backdrop, the Nixon administration saw the need to re-evaluate its policy on Western Europe and the integration process on this continent. Underpinning this study is the extensive use of newly-released archival materials from the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, the Library of Congress, and the State Department. Furthermore, the work is based on the public papers in the American Presidency Project and the materials on the topic of European integration and unification in the Archive of European Integration. Finally, the study has extensively used newspaper archives as well as the declassified online documents, memoirs and diaries of former US officials. Mining these sources made it possible to shed new light on the complexity and dynamism of the Nixon administration's policy towards European integration.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

Indonesia's foreign policy reflects the turbulence and change which have been, and remain, cental to its political life. First published in 1983, this was the first book to provide a systematic and comprehensive account of the nature and course of Indonesia's foreign policy since independence in 1949. Chapters consider the National Revolution and foundations of future policy, foreign policy in light of domestic needs, and the management of regional order. A product of many visits to Indonesia and interviews with those directly involved in the foreign policy process, Michael Leifer's comprehensive title will of great value to students concerned with the study of foreign policy in Asia, as well as for more general readers with an interest in Indonesia and South-East Asia.

This biography documents K. Kesavapany's journey from the Malayan estates in the late 1930s to his move to Singapore when he was headhunted to join the Singapore Civil Service in the 1970s, and from his entry into Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to his subsequent sojourns abroad, such as in Australia, Turkey, Geneva, Jordan, Indonesia, Russia, United Kingdom and Malaysia. After retiring from his last post with the MFA, he took on the position of Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. This book also elaborates on the next phase of his journey where he holds several prominent portfolios in Singapore's social and academic scene, such as at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Dyslexia Association of Singapore, Singapore Indian Association, Inter-Religious Organization, as well as the Singapore International Foundation.

The May 19-20, 2011 Asan conference provided a venue to reassess foreign policy decision-making in China. Bringing together leading voices in this reassessment, the meeting elicited lively exchanges centered not on refuting rival interpretations but on jointly exploring leads that clarify the processes of China's foreign policy formulation that have yet to be adequately explained. Updating the conference papers to cover the end of 2011, this book reflects the state of analysis on the eve of the important 2012-13 transition to China's fifth-generation leaders.The Asan Institute for Policy Studies is an independent think tank located in Seoul, South Korea, that provides innovative policy solutions and spearheads public discourse on many of the core issues that Korea, East Asia, and the global community face. The goal of the institute is not only to offer policy solutions but also to train experts in public diplomacy and related fields in order to strengthen Korea's capacity to better tackle some of the most pressing problems affecting the country, the region and the world today.

First published in 1992, this book examines Soviet foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in the context of the transformation of the perestroika era in the Soviet Union. The discussion begins in 1985 and ends in 1989 with the Soviet partial withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay. Buszynski considers Gorbachev's effort to disengage from the Cambodian problem, the weakening of the Soviet alliance with Vietnam and the real effort to overcome old hostilities with growth areas in ASEAN such as Thailand and Singapore. This is a fascinating and relevant title, of particular value to students with an interest in Russia and the history of international relations in Southeast Asia.

This book presents and interprets archival records of the meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and George W. Bush between 1989 and 1991, including transcripts of conversations between top leaders on the rapid and monumental events of the final days of the Cold War. Particularly effective interlocutors were the foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker, especially interesting when they interacted directly with Bush or Gorbachev. The documents were obtained from the Gorbachev Foundation and the Russian State Archives and from the United States government through requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Taking place at a time of revolutionary change in Eastern Europe, stimulated in part by Gorbachev and by Eastern Europeans (the Solidarity movement, dissidents, reform communists), the Malta Summit of 1989 and subsequent meetings helped defuse any potential for superpower conflict. Each of the five summits is covered in a separate chapter, introduced by an essay that places the transcripts in historical context. The anthology offers a fascinating glimpse into the relationship that defined the last, waning years of the Cold War-a unique record of these historic, highest-level conversations that effectively brought it to a close. The quality and scope of the dialogue between these world leaders was unprecedented and is likely never to be repeated.

This book addresses the relationship between the Russian Federation and Cuba from 1992 to the present, the period since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Mervyn J. Bain analyzes the reasons why the relationship between Havana and Moscow continues to thrive even after the end of the Cold War and the death of international socialism. He argues that there are five main areas to be studied in order to understand why the Russians and Cubans have maintained close cultural and political ties well into the twenty-first century. Bain first explores the effects the disintegration of the Soviet Union had on the relationship between Moscow and Havana in the years since 1992. He goes on to describe how the two countries have adapted (or failed to adapt) to the New World Order and the ways in which their foreign policy have changed the shape of their dialogue with each other. The third and fourth sections detail both the impact of globalization and the increased cultural, economic, and military exchange between Russians and Cubans. Bain concludes by showing readers the importance of placing the Russian-Cuban relationship in an international context, especially highlighting the influence of the United States over it. This book will be of interest to those interested in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, Cuban foreign policy, and international relations.

The Physiology of Industry is a remarkable work which set out to challenge contemporary theory surrounding the economics of labour, supply and demand. First published in 1889, Hobson's first book outlines some of the key areas of his theory of underconsumption. The precise contribution of Mummery, who died in a mountaineering accident in 1895, is unclear, although Hobson did state that it was heated debates with the businessman that gave him faith in these theories. The chapters analyse the nature of production, the relationship between wealth and consumption, the influence of the supply of gold on the economy and the law of supply and demand. This is an interesting work which marked a shift in economic thought, and will be of value to researchers and student of industrial theory and modern economic history.

Heinrich Von Treitschke was a prolific German historian and political writer during the nineteenth century. In Germany, France, Russia and Islam, first published in 1915, he considers European diplomatic relations from the patriotic perspective of imperial Germany, in particular examining Germany's relationship to Turkey and France. This is a fascinating classic work, which will be of great value to academics and students interested in nineteenth-century European politics and history.

This book is an in-depth reflection and analysis on why and how unsettling empathy is a crucial component in reconciliatory processes. Located at the intersection of memory studies, reconciliation studies, and trauma studies, the book is at its core transdisciplinary, presenting a fresh perspective on how to conceive of concepts and practices when working with groups in conflict. The book Unsettling Empathy has come into being during a period of increasing cultural pessimism, where we witness the spread of populism and the rise of illiberal democracies that hark back to nationalist and ethnocentric narratives of the past. Because of this changed landscape, this book makes an important contribution to seeking fresh pathways toward an ethical practice of living together in light of past agonies and current conflicts. Within the specific context of working with groups in conflict, this book urges for an (ethical) posture of unsettling empathy. Empathy, which plays a vital role in these processes, is a complex and complicated phenomenon that is not without its critics who occasionally alert us to its dark side. The term empathy needs a qualifier to distinguish it from related phenomena such as pity, compassion, sympathy, benign paternalism, idealized identification, or voyeuristic appropriation. The word "unsettling" is just this crucial ingredient without which I would hesitate to bring empathy into our conversation.

This edited collection examines the political, economic and security legacies of former US President Barack Obama in Asia and the Pacific, following two terms in office between 2009 and 2017. In a region that has only become more vivid in the American political imagination since Obama left office, this volume interrogates the endurance of Obama's legacies in what is increasingly reimagined in Washington as the Indo-Pacific. Advancing our understanding of Obama's style, influence and impact throughout the region, this volume explores dimensions of US relations and interactions with key Indo-Pacific states including China, India, Japan, North Korea and Australia; multilateral institutions and organisations such the East Asia Summit and ASEAN; and salient issue areas such as regional security, politics and diplomacy, and the economy. How far has the Trump administration progressed in challenging or disrupting Obama's Pivot to Asia? What differences can we discern in the declared or effective US strategy towards Asia and to what extent has it radically shifted or displaced Obama-era legacies? Including contributions from high-profile scholars and policy practitioners such as Michael Mastanduno, Bruce Cumings, Maryanne Kelton, Robert Sutter and Sumit Ganguly, contributors examine these questions at the halfway point of the 2017-21 Presidency of Donald Trump, as his administration opens a new and potentially divergent chapter of American internationalism. -- .

In January 1981, just days before Jimmy Carter left the White House, many of the president's officials were well satisfied with the administration's campaign to promote human rights. But as commentators, scholars, and the incoming president began to critique Carter's bipolar policy, it became clear that Carter had not only failed to persuade the American public that he had a clear grasp on the international role of the US, but he failed to build a lasting domestic consensus on foreign policy. The Carter administration aimed to renew its ideological challenge to the USSR through human rights and to persuade the Soviets to ease internal repression in order to strengthen Congressional support for detente and arms control. Contrary to what he envisioned, the more vigorously the White House pursued a pro-human rights agenda, the more the Soviets lost interest in detente; the more the administration relegated human rights to quiet diplomacy, the more critics within the United States accused the President of abandoning his commitment to human rights. In the end, the White House lost the opportunity to stabilise bipolar relations and the domestic support Carter had managed to garner in 1976. Critics of detente, helped by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defeated him. Based on recently declassified archival documents, A precarious equilibrium offers a fresh interpretation of President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy and its contradictory impact on US-Soviet affairs. -- .

Unbeknownst to just about all observers of international affairs, America's decision in 1991 to provide air defense to oppressed Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf War had ended ushered in an entirely new era in American foreign policy. Until that moment, the United States used military power to defend against threats (real and perceived) that its leaders thought would either weaken America's position in the world order or-in the worst case-threaten the homeland. For the first time ever, the United States militarily was now actively involved in states that represented no threat, and with missions that were largely humanitarian and socio-political. After establishing the Kurdish no-fly zone, the US in quick succession intervened in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Even after 9/11, it decided that it had a duty to not just invade Iraq, but reconstruct Iraqi society along Western lines. In Mission Failure, the eminent international relations scholar Michael Mandelbaum provides a sweeping interpretive history of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to show why this new approach was doomed to failure. America had always adhered to a mission-based foreign policy, but in the post-Cold War era it swung away from security concerns to a near-exclusive emphasis on implanting Western institutions wherever it could. Many good things happened in this era, including a broad expansion of democracy and strong growth in the global economy. But the U.S. never had either the capacity or the will to change societies that were dramatically different from our own. Over two decades later, we can see the wreckage: a broken Iraq a teetering Afghanistan, a China that laughs at our demands that they adopt a human rights regime, and a still-impoverished Haiti. Mandelbaum does not deny that American foreign policy has always had a strong ideological component. Instead, he argues that emphasizing that particular feature generally leads to mission failure. We are able to defend ourselves well and effectively project power, but we have very little capacity to change other societies. If nothing else, that is what the last quarter century has taught us.