Heinrich Von Treitschke was a prolific German historian and political writer during the nineteenth century. In Germany, France, Russia and Islam, first published in 1915, he considers European diplomatic relations from the patriotic perspective of imperial Germany, in particular examining Germany's relationship to Turkey and France. This is a fascinating classic work, which will be of great value to academics and students interested in nineteenth-century European politics and history.

This book is an in-depth reflection and analysis on why and how unsettling empathy is a crucial component in reconciliatory processes. Located at the intersection of memory studies, reconciliation studies, and trauma studies, the book is at its core transdisciplinary, presenting a fresh perspective on how to conceive of concepts and practices when working with groups in conflict. The book Unsettling Empathy has come into being during a period of increasing cultural pessimism, where we witness the spread of populism and the rise of illiberal democracies that hark back to nationalist and ethnocentric narratives of the past. Because of this changed landscape, this book makes an important contribution to seeking fresh pathways toward an ethical practice of living together in light of past agonies and current conflicts. Within the specific context of working with groups in conflict, this book urges for an (ethical) posture of unsettling empathy. Empathy, which plays a vital role in these processes, is a complex and complicated phenomenon that is not without its critics who occasionally alert us to its dark side. The term empathy needs a qualifier to distinguish it from related phenomena such as pity, compassion, sympathy, benign paternalism, idealized identification, or voyeuristic appropriation. The word "unsettling" is just this crucial ingredient without which I would hesitate to bring empathy into our conversation.

This edited collection examines the political, economic and security legacies of former US President Barack Obama in Asia and the Pacific, following two terms in office between 2009 and 2017. In a region that has only become more vivid in the American political imagination since Obama left office, this volume interrogates the endurance of Obama's legacies in what is increasingly reimagined in Washington as the Indo-Pacific. Advancing our understanding of Obama's style, influence and impact throughout the region, this volume explores dimensions of US relations and interactions with key Indo-Pacific states including China, India, Japan, North Korea and Australia; multilateral institutions and organisations such the East Asia Summit and ASEAN; and salient issue areas such as regional security, politics and diplomacy, and the economy. How far has the Trump administration progressed in challenging or disrupting Obama's Pivot to Asia? What differences can we discern in the declared or effective US strategy towards Asia and to what extent has it radically shifted or displaced Obama-era legacies? Including contributions from high-profile scholars and policy practitioners such as Michael Mastanduno, Bruce Cumings, Maryanne Kelton, Robert Sutter and Sumit Ganguly, contributors examine these questions at the halfway point of the 2017-21 Presidency of Donald Trump, as his administration opens a new and potentially divergent chapter of American internationalism. -- .

In January 1981, just days before Jimmy Carter left the White House, many of the president's officials were well satisfied with the administration's campaign to promote human rights. But as commentators, scholars, and the incoming president began to critique Carter's bipolar policy, it became clear that Carter had not only failed to persuade the American public that he had a clear grasp on the international role of the US, but he failed to build a lasting domestic consensus on foreign policy. The Carter administration aimed to renew its ideological challenge to the USSR through human rights and to persuade the Soviets to ease internal repression in order to strengthen Congressional support for detente and arms control. Contrary to what he envisioned, the more vigorously the White House pursued a pro-human rights agenda, the more the Soviets lost interest in detente; the more the administration relegated human rights to quiet diplomacy, the more critics within the United States accused the President of abandoning his commitment to human rights. In the end, the White House lost the opportunity to stabilise bipolar relations and the domestic support Carter had managed to garner in 1976. Critics of detente, helped by the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, defeated him. Based on recently declassified archival documents, A precarious equilibrium offers a fresh interpretation of President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy and its contradictory impact on US-Soviet affairs. -- .

Unbeknownst to just about all observers of international affairs, America's decision in 1991 to provide air defense to oppressed Kurds in Iraq after the Gulf War had ended ushered in an entirely new era in American foreign policy. Until that moment, the United States used military power to defend against threats (real and perceived) that its leaders thought would either weaken America's position in the world order or-in the worst case-threaten the homeland. For the first time ever, the United States militarily was now actively involved in states that represented no threat, and with missions that were largely humanitarian and socio-political. After establishing the Kurdish no-fly zone, the US in quick succession intervened in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. Even after 9/11, it decided that it had a duty to not just invade Iraq, but reconstruct Iraqi society along Western lines. In Mission Failure, the eminent international relations scholar Michael Mandelbaum provides a sweeping interpretive history of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era to show why this new approach was doomed to failure. America had always adhered to a mission-based foreign policy, but in the post-Cold War era it swung away from security concerns to a near-exclusive emphasis on implanting Western institutions wherever it could. Many good things happened in this era, including a broad expansion of democracy and strong growth in the global economy. But the U.S. never had either the capacity or the will to change societies that were dramatically different from our own. Over two decades later, we can see the wreckage: a broken Iraq a teetering Afghanistan, a China that laughs at our demands that they adopt a human rights regime, and a still-impoverished Haiti. Mandelbaum does not deny that American foreign policy has always had a strong ideological component. Instead, he argues that emphasizing that particular feature generally leads to mission failure. We are able to defend ourselves well and effectively project power, but we have very little capacity to change other societies. If nothing else, that is what the last quarter century has taught us.

In the aftermath of World War I there was furious agitation throughout Islam against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Coupled with the powerful effect of the principle of self-determination, British indifference to Muslim sentiments gave rise to militant nationalism in Islam--which became de facto anti-Western. This detailed and convincing account describes British indecisiveness, policy contradictions, and how militant nationalism was aggravated by the Greek invasion of Smyrna and its ambition to create a Hellenic Empire in Anatolia with Britain's connivance. Immediately after World War I there was a fair chance of mutual coexistence and good relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This possibility was nipped in the bud by the military administration (1918-1920) responsible for the anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem in April 1920. High Commissioner Herbert Samuel supported the Arab extremists in his misguided policy, and complicated the situation further. The appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husseini to the exalted post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and subsequently to the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council of the Palestinians, proved fatal to Arab-Jewish relations and to the possibility of peace. As Friedman shows, the British administration of Palestine bears a considerable share of responsibility for the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Against this diplomatic background Arab-Jewish hostilities thrived, with consequences that endure today.

The idea of peace is always enchanting, for it encompasses the tranquility and serenity for which every human yearns. The nation of Israel has never known peace, but it dreams of peace. In practice Israel navigates between the poles of war and peace, with endless middle-of the-road situations like cease-fire, truce, armistice, and other temporary cessations of hostilities.

The Oslo Idea traces the roots of the current campaign to delegitimize Israel. The campaign is not linked to Israeli resistance, to the absence of an acceptable settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, or to Israel's reluctance to abandon territory. It results from a change of tactics by the Palestinian leadership. Israeli argues that these tactics have been used to exhaust, reduce, and replace Israel rather than produce a compromise. Half the Palestinian people and other uncompromising Arabs and Muslims have stated that goal openly and act to achieve it.

Raphael Israeli deconstructs the immense illusion of the Oslo peace accords, which initiated the so-called "peace process." He shows how Oslo lured a naive Israeli leadership into a trap. He shows how outside factors, bent on finding and supporting an evasive peace, have helped perpetuate the fiasco Oslo represents. He shows how Oslo's supporters have advanced the "peace process" by coaxing and threatening Israel behind the scenes, and binding Israel alone with the Oslo commitments and their derivatives. More importantly, the author outlines and analyzes the basic and seemingly unbridgeable points of contention that remain: security, refugees, settlements, water, borders, and the status of Jerusalem itself.

Through a range of case studies spanning the post-Cold War period in Iraq, Moldova and Serbia, this innovative book breaks new ground in its study of asymmetric conflicts where warring sides exhibit vast power differentials. It uses multiple theories to examine the different pathways that encourage minor powers to engage in both offensive and defensive wars that they are likely to lose, analysing domestic crisis as a key catalyst and considering ways to mitigate conditions that drive conflict. The author provides an important framework that can be applied to contemporary conflicts elsewhere.

This book presents a comprehensive framework, six pathways of connection, which explains the impact of public diplomacy on achieving foreign policy goals. The comparative study of three important public diplomacy practitioners with distinctive challenges and approaches shows the necessity to move beyond soft power to appreciate the role of public diplomacy in global politics. Through theoretical discussions and case studies, six pathways of connection is presented as a framework to design new public diplomacy projects and measure their impact on foreign policy.

This book examines in depth science diplomacy, a particular field of international relations, in which the interests of science and those of foreign policy intersect. Building on a wealth of examples drawn from history and contemporary international relations, it analyzes and discusses the links between the world of scientists and that of diplomats. Written by a professor of economics and former Embassy counselor for science and technology, the book sets out to answer the following questions: Can science issues affect diplomatic relations between countries? Is international scientific cooperation a factor for peace? Are researchers good ambassadors for their countries? Is scientific influence a particular form of cultural influence on the world stage? Do diplomats really listen to what experts say when negotiating on the future of the planet? Is the independence of the scientist threatened by science diplomacy? What is a scientific attache for?

This second volume in the 'Many Peaces' series analyses the emergence of elicitive conflict transformation, demonstrating how the principles of peace and conflict work are interrelated with humanistic psychological insights and methods.This volume discusses the recent changes of working conditions in the fields of diplomacy, military, development cooperation and political economy, exploring how this 'trans-rational' turn impacts practical peace and conflict work and experiential peace education. Based on the principles of humanistic psychology and Yoga philosophy, and as a wider concept of John Paul Lederach's well-known conflict pyramid, this book introduces a wide range of breath-oriented, voice-oriented and movement-oriented methods and their application in practical fieldwork.Dietrich's study presents a new model of themes, levels and layers in conflict analysis, which adds to the conventional understanding of human relations and conflicts.Other books in the 'Many Peaces' series include Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture by Wolfgang Dietrich.

The ethics of hospitality ? the welcome of the foreigner ? is implied in all moral debate in international relations ranging from questions of asylum to those of humanitarian intervention. Why then has there been so little reflection on hospitality in the study of international relations to date?

Seeking to correct this striking omission, and making an important and original contribution to debates about ethics in international relations in the process, Baker outlines a theory of cosmopolitanism as hospitality which goes beyond existing cosmopolitanisms. He argues that we must understand cosmopolitanism not as the pursuit of a world in which there are no more foreigners but as the welcome of the foreigner. However, though hospitality calls for a welcome, there is always a decision on the welcome to be made. Cosmopolitanism as hospitality is therefore always as much a politics as it is an ethics.

Addressing issues of central concern for those who seek to understand our obligations to strangers, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, security studies, ethics, and political and international theory.

More than ever, humanitarian aid workers and diplomats are engaging with vulnerable populations in areas once considered too dangerous to touch. Drawing on decades of on-the-ground experience in conflict environments around the world, Van Arsdale and Smith offer this important and revealing guide to the ethics, theory, and practice of work outside so-called Green Zones of safety. On behalf of governments or NGOs, on missions ranging from complex humanitarian emergencies to post-war reconstruction, social scientists in interdisciplinary teams are operating in settings where the line between civilian and military projects is increasingly blurred. This book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the realities of these new humanitarianisms and for the fields of international relations, anthropology, development studies, and peace studies.

In any multilateral setting, some state representatives weigh much more heavily than others. Practitioners often refer to this form of diplomatic hierarchy as the 'international pecking order'. This book is a study of international hierarchy in practice, as it emerges out of the multilateral diplomatic process. Building on the social theories of Erving Goffman and Pierre Bourdieu, it argues that diplomacy produces inequality. Delving into the politics and inner dynamics of NATO and the UN as case studies, Vincent Pouliot shows that pecking orders are eminently complex social forms: contingent yet durable; constraining but also full of agency; operating at different levels, depending on issues; and defined in significant part locally, in and through the practice of multilateral diplomacy.

United States Protocol is a must-have reference for communicating with government and business officials, international organizations, and high-level military personnel, both in the United States and abroad. Everything you need is presented in a comprehensive, detailed, and well-organized book that makes it easy to navigate official protocol. Former President Bill Clinton says in his foreword that it is "an authoritative user's manual for international relations, it promises to become an indispensable reference not only for those in Washington, but for all Americans in contact with people in other nations." Ambassador Mary Mel French uses her personal experience as a former Chief of Protocol to give us the most up-to-date and user-friendly guide to diplomatic protocol at the international, national, and state level. She includes meticulous instructions, in-depth diagrams and tables, a comprehensive table of contents, and a plethora of examples that make United States Protocol the perfect guide to any official event."

Death Tango traces the Middle East dynamic back to the events of March 27-29, 2002. March 27, Passover Eve, witnessed the most bloody and traumatic Arab terrorist attack in Israel's history, the Park Hotel bombing in Netanya. On March 28, an Arab League summit in Beirut adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, the most far-reaching Arab attempt to set parameters for ending the Israel-Arab conflict. The next day, Israel invaded and reoccupied the West Bank in Operation Defensive Shield. Alpher illustrates the interaction between these three critical events and depicts the key personalities-politicians, generals, and a star journalist-involved on all sides. It moves from a suicide bombing to the deliberations of Arab leaders; from the Israel Prime Minister's Office-where Ariel Sharon fulminated against Yasser Arafat-to Washington, where the United States fumbled and misunderstood the dynamics at work; and on to the Jenin refugee camp, where Israeli soldiers won a bloody military battle but Israel lost the media battle of public opinion. Based on extensive interviews and his deep personal knowledge, Alpher analyzes the three days in late March 2002 as a catalyst of extensive change in the Middle East, concluding that Arabs and Israelis are dancing a kind of "death tango."

The period from the outset of World War I to the end of World War II was among the most significant in the history of the United States. Twice it was drawn into "foreign entanglements"-wars it initially thought were no concern of its own and of which it tried to steer clear-only to realize that it could not stand aside. With each one, it geared up in record time, entered the fray massively, and was crucial to the outcome. Each war tested the American people and their leaders, and in each case the country came out of the conflagration stronger than before-and even more important-yet stronger relative to other countries than it had ever been. This was the period when the United States became a world leader. The Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy from World War I through World War II relates the events of this crucial period in U.S. history through a chronology, an introductory essay, and over 600 cross-referenced dictionary entries on key persons, places, events, institutions, and organizations.

Between 1900 and 1960, many writers in France and Britain either had parallel careers in diplomatic corps or frequented diplomatic circles: Paul Claudel, Albert Cohen, Lawrence Durrell, Graham Greene, John le Carre, Andre Malraux, Nancy Mitford, Marcel Proust, and others. What attracts writers to diplomacy, and what attracts diplomats to publishing their experiences in memoirs or novels? Like novelists, diplomats are in the habit of describing situations with an eye for atmosphere, personalities, and looming crises. Yet novels about diplomats, far from putting a solemn face on everything, often devolve into comedy if not outright farce. Anachronistic yet charming, diplomats take the long view of history and social transformation, which puts them out of step with their times - at least in fiction. In this collection of essays, eleven contributors reflect on diplomacy in French and British novels, with particular focus on temporality, style, comedy, characterization, and the professional liabilities attached to representing a state abroad. With archival examples as evidence, the essays in this volume indicate that modern fiction, especially fiction about diplomacy, is a response to the increasing speed of communication, the decline of imperial power, and the ceding of old ways of negotiating to new.

The Instant New York Times Bestseller "I could not put this extraordinary book down. Three Days at the Brink is a masterpiece: elegantly written, brilliantly conceived, and impeccably researched. This book not only sparkles but is destined to be a classic!" -Jay Winik, bestselling author From the #1 bestselling author and award-winning anchor of Special Report with Bret Baier, comes the gripping lost history of the Tehran Conference, where FDR, Churchill, and Stalin plotted D-Day and the Second World War's endgame. With the fate of World War II in doubt and rumors of a Nazi assassination plot swirling, Franklin Roosevelt risked everything at a clandestine meeting that would change the course of history. November 1943: The Nazis and their Axis allies controlled nearly the entire European continent. Japan dominated the Pacific. Allied successes at Sicily and Guadalcanal had gained them modest ground but at an extraordinary cost. On the Eastern Front, the Soviet Red Army had been bled white. The path of history walked a knife's edge. That same month a daring gambit was hatched that would alter everything. The "Big Three"-Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin-secretly met for the first time to chart a strategy for defeating Adolf Hitler. Over three days in Tehran, Iran, this trio-strange bedfellows united by their mutual responsibility as heads of the Allied powers-made essential decisions that would direct the final years of the war and its aftermath. Meanwhile, looming over the covert meeting was the possible threat of a Nazi assassination plot, code-named Operation Long Jump. Before they left Tehran, the three leaders agreed to open a second front in the West, spearheaded by Operation Overload and the D-Day invasion of France at Normandy the following June. They also discussed what might come after the war, including dividing Germany and establishing the United Nations-plans that laid the groundwork for the postwar world order and the Cold War. Bestselling author and Fox News Channel anchor Bret Baier's new epic history, Three Days at the Brink, centers on these crucial days in Tehran, the medieval Persian city on the edge of the desert. Baier makes clear the importance of Roosevelt, who stood apart as the sole leader of a democracy, recognizing him as the lead strategist for the globe's future-the one man who could ultimately allow or deny the others their place in history. With new details discovered in rarely seen transcripts, oral histories, and declassified State Department and presidential documents from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Baier illuminates the complex character of Roosevelt, revealing a man who grew into his role and accepted the greatest challenge any American president since Lincoln had faced.

The Cold War revealed, for the first time in human history, the logic of human togetherness, which indicated that it was not only necessary for nation-states to live together but also possible for them to do so. The necessity was because of the inescapably shared vulnerability of "mutually assured destruction," not only in terms of security but more so in economic well-being and political stability. The possibility was due to the unipolar world structure sustained by the global governance web of interdependent partnership which worked powerfully "between" the power agents to ensure the best of all possible world. This latent governance system was both hierarchical and dynamic because its power was "connective" in the sense that power was rooted in one another and the ability to be interdependent by empowering other power agents and sharing vulnerability at the same time was the way of becoming the "nucleus" on the global web of interdependent partners and hence gaining power in transforming one another connectively and governing the world collectively. George Kennan's patience in building up hard and soft powers "within" individual power agents of the web and Wilson/Roosevelt's institutionalization of collective power "above" each power agents contributed to the construction of the system. The Soviet big-brotherly governing type was proven a failure.

Between 1920 and 1950, British and US internationalists called for aviation and atomic energy to be taken out of the hands of nation-states, and instead used by international organizations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. An international air force was to enforce collective security and internationalized civil aviation was to bind the world together through trade and communication. The bomber and the atomic bomb, now associated with death and devastation, were to be instruments of world peace. Drawing on rich archival research and focusing on public and private discourse relating to the control of aviation and atomic energy, Waqar H. Zaidi highlights neglected technological and militaristic strands in twentieth-century liberal internationalism, and transforms our understanding of the place of science and technology in twentieth-century international relations.

France has long been engaged in a very active cultural and scientific diplomacy. It aims both at ensuring and valorising the international presence of France in the domains of language, culture, communication, or higher education and research. This diplomacy is backed by a network of cooperation services in embassies and cultural institutions, as well as by numerous operators and specialised agencies in various sectors. This book asks whether cultural diplomacy, invented by France in the 18th century, is in danger. It asks whether the present system, aimed at helping artists and creators, professionals of teaching and culture, researchers and intellectuals, can be improved. And it argues that a diplomacy of influence needs coherent foreign policy connecting sectors and promoting partnerships.

This book examines early modern politics, diplomacy and finance by looking at the transfer of money and other resources between sovereigns in return for military or political service, often known as the payment of 'subsidies'. Focusing on payments made by the French crown, the contributors explore how subsidies provided opportunities for princes, statesmen, generals and merchant-bankers to pursue their political goals. By highlighting the ways in which the payment and acceptance of subsidies shaped concepts of honour and reputation, the book shows how material interests and questions of identity coalesced. The construction of states and the political debates within polities are seen to have been influenced by the movement of money and resources across borders. Consequently, the interaction between financial and mercantile hubs and networks was vital to state formation in early modern Europe. An electronic version of this book is available under a creative commons licence: manchesteropenhive.com/view/9789198469844/9789198469844.xml -- .