This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science. This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.

Continuums Guides for the Perplexed are clear, concise, and accessible introductions to thinkers, writers, and subjects that students and readers can find especially challengingGCoor, indeed, downright bewildering. Concentrating specifically on what it is that makes the subject difficult to fathom, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of demanding material. Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most influential ethicists of recent times. The importance and relevance of his work has been recognized and celebrated within philosophy, religion, sociology, political theory, and other disciplines. His writing, however, undoubtedly presents the reader with a significant challenge. Often labyrinthine, paradoxical, and opaque, Levinas work seeks to articulate a complex ideology and some hard-to-grasp concepts. Levinas: A Guide for the Perplexed is the ideal text for the student, teacher, or lay reader who wants to develop a full and effective understanding of this major modern philosopher. Focused upon precisely why Levinas is a difficult subject for study, the text guides the reader through the core themes and concepts in his writing, providing a thorough overview of his work. Valuably, the book also emphasizes Levinass importance for contemporary ethical problems and thinking.

Hans-Georg Gadamer is depicted as a paradoxical figure in the literature. When Gadamer's work is approached by itself, outside the history of hermeneutics, he is generally presented as the disciple of Martin Heidegger, whose main theoretical contribution lies in having transposed his ontological hermeneutics into the sphere of the human sciences. Usually the master-student relation ends with a break between the two brought about by the student's desire to become herself a master. In Gadamer and Heidegger's case, scholarship has always excluded the possibility of such a symbolic parricide. However, when Gadamer's work is approached from the history of hermeneutics, he, not Heidegger, is revered as the central figure of hermeneutic theory in the twentieth century, and scholars perceive the works of the latter-together with those of his immediate forerunners Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey-as mere preambles to the great hermeneutic theory proposed by Truth and Method, and the works of those following him as footnotes to it. Gadamer and the Question of Understanding: Between Heidegger and Derrida dismantles this paradox by showing, on the one hand, that Gadamer's translation of Heidegger involved, as he himself says, a series of "essential alterations" to the original which make philosophical hermeneutics a more coherent and better articulated hermeneutic theory, one offering a more faithful description of the phenomenon of understanding than Heidegger's. And, on the other hand, by taking the dossier of the famous encounter between Gadamer and Derrida as its cue, Adrian Costache demonstrates that in light of Derrida's deconstruction, every step Gadamer takes forward from Heidegger as well as from Schleiermacher and Dilthey-however necessary--is problematic in itself. The insights in this book will be valuable to students and scholars interested in modern and contemporary European philosophy, especially those focusing on philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction, as well as those working in social sciences that have incorporated a hermeneutic approach to their investigations, such as pedagogy, sociology, psychotherapy, law, and nursing.

The "Natural Problem of Consciousness" is the problem of understanding why there are presently conscious beings at all. Given a non-reductive naturalist framework taking consciousness as an ontologically subjective biological phenomenon, how can we rationally explain the fact that the actual world has turned out to be one where there are presently living beings that can feel, rather than having developed as a zombie-world in which there would be no conscious experiences of any kind? This book introduces the Natural Problem by relating it to central problems in the philosophy of mind (metaphysical mind-body problem, Hard Problem of consciousness) and emphasizing the distinctive interest of its diachronic dimension. Ranging from philosophy to biology and neuroscience, it offers a thorough analysis aimed at better understanding what could explain why phenomenal consciousness has been preserved throughout evolution by natural selection. This is an original, engaging, and thought provoking philosophical study of a neglected but fundamental question regarding the nature and origin of consciousness.

Reference is a central topic in philosophy of language, and has been the main focus of discussion about how language relates to the world. R. M. Sainsbury sets out a new approach to the concept, which promises to bring to an end some long-standing debates in semantic theory. There is a single category of referring expressions, all of which deserve essentially the same kind of semantic treatment. Included in this category are both singular and plural referring expressions ('Aristotle', 'The Pleiades'), complex and non-complex referring expressions ('The President of the USA in 1970', 'Nixon'), and empty and non-empty referring expressions ('Vulcan', 'Neptune'). Referring expressions are to be described semantically by a reference condition, rather than by being associated with a referent. In arguing for these theses, Sainsbury's book promises to end the fruitless oscillation between Millian and descriptivist views. Millian views insist that every name has a referent, and find it hard to give a good account of names which appear not to have referents, or at least are not known to do so, like ones introduced through error ('Vulcan'), ones where it is disputed whether they have a bearer ('Patanjali') and ones used in fiction. Descriptivist theories require that each name be associated with some body of information. These theories fly in the face of the fact names are useful precisely because there is often no overlap of information among speakers and hearers. The alternative position for which the book argues is firmly non-descriptivist, though it also does not require a referent. A much broader view can be taken of which expressions are referring expressions: not just names and pronouns used demonstratively, but also some complex expressions and some anaphoric uses of pronouns. Sainsbury's approach brings reference into line with truth: no one would think that a semantic theory should associate a sentence with a truth value, but it is commonly held that a semantic theory should associate a sentence with a truth condition, a condition which an arbitrary state of the world would have to satisfy in order to make the sentence true. The right analogy is that a semantic theory should associate a referring expression with a reference condition, a condition which an arbitrary object would have to satisfy in order to be the expression's referent. Lucid and accessible, and written with a minimum of technicality, Sainsbury's book also includes a useful historical survey. It will be of interest to those working in logic, mind, and metaphysics as well as essential reading for philosophers of language.

The essays in this book demonstrate the breadth and vitality of American intellectual history. Their core theme is the diversity of both American intellectual life and of the frameworks that we must use to make sense of that diversity. The Worlds of American Intellectual History has at its heart studies of American thinkers. Yet it follows these thinkers and their ideas as they have crossed national, institutional, and intellectual boundaries. The volume explores ways in which American ideas have circulated in different cultures. It also examines the multiple sites-from social movements, museums, and courtrooms to popular and scholarly books and periodicals-in which people have articulated and deployed ideas within and beyond the borders of the United States. At these cultural frontiers, the authors demonstrate, multiple interactions have occurred - some friendly and mutually enriching, others laden with tension, misunderstandings, and conflict. The same holds for other kinds of borders, such as those within and between scholarly disciplines, or between American history and the histories of other cultures. The richness of contemporary American intellectual history springs from the variety of worlds with which it must engage. Intellectual historians have always relished being able to move back and forth between close readings of particular texts and efforts to make sense of broader cultural dispositions. That range is on display in this volume, which includes essays by scholars as fully at home in the disciplines of philosophy, literature, economics, sociology, political science, education, science, religion, and law as they are in history. It includes essays by prominent historians of European thought, attuned to the transatlantic conversations in which Europeans and Americans have been engaged since the seventeenth century, and American historians whose work has carried them not only to different regions in North America but across the North Atlantic to Europe, across the South Atlantic to Africa, and across the Pacific to South Asia.

Recent technological and scientific developments have demonstrated a condition that has already long been upon us. We have entered a posthuman era, an assertion shared by an increasing number of thinkers such as N. Katherine Hayles, Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Richard Grusin, and Bernard Stiegler. The performing arts have reacted to these developments by increasingly opening up their traditionally 'human' domain to non-human others. Both philosophy and performing arts thus question what it means to be human from a posthumanist point of view and how the agency of non-humans - be they technology, objects, animals, or other forms of being - 'works' on both an ontological and performative level. The contributions in this volume brings together scholars, dramaturgs, and artists, uniting their reflections on the consequences of the posthuman condition for creative practices, spectatorship, and knowledge.

Most commentators judge Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus as either a Medusa into whose face psychoanalysis cannot but stare and suffer the most abominable of deaths or a well-intentioned but thoroughly misguided flash in the pan. Fadi Abou-Rihan shows that, as much as it is an insightful critique of the assimilationist vein in psychoanalysis, Anti-Oedipus remains fully committed to Freud's most singular discovery of an unconscious that is procedural and dynamic. Moreover, Abou-Rihan argues, the anti-oedipal project is a practice where the science of the unconscious is made to obey the laws it attributes to its object. The outcome is nothing short of the "becoming-unconscious" of psychoanalysis, a becoming that signals neither the repression nor the death of the practice but the transformation of its principles and procedures into those of its object. Abou-Rihan tracks this becoming alongside Nietzsche, Winnicott, Feynman, Bardi, and Cixous in order to reconfigure desire beyond the categories of subject, lack, and tragedy. Firmly grounded in continental philosophy and psychoanalytic practice, this book extends the anti-oedipal view on the unconscious in a wholly new direction.

The phrase "Without Authority" is Soren Kierkegaard's way of designating his lack of clerical ordination and to raise the complex and central human issue of authority in human culture. Authors of the essays in IKC-18 demonstrate how Kierkegaard's literary genius, religious passion, and intellectual penetration handle with equal ease and acuity the lily of the field, the bird of the air, the sacrament of holy communion, and the concepts of martyr, witness, genius, prototype, and apostle to create a singular and 'authoritative' contribution to both theology and philosophy of religion.

Jean Baudrillard's work on how contemporary society is dominated by the mass media has become extraordinarily influential. He is notorious for arguing that there is no real world, only simulations which have altered what events mean, and that only violent symbolic exchange can prevent the world becoming a total simulation. An ideal introduction to this most singular cultural critic and philosopher, Jean Baudrillard: live theory offers a comprehensive, critical account of Baudrillard's unsettling, visionary and often prescient work. Baudrillard's relation to a range of theorists as diverse as Nietzsche, Marx, McLuhan, Foucault and Lyotard is explained, and the impact of his thought on contemporary politics, popular culture and art is analyzed. Finally, in the new interview included here, Baudrillard outlines his own position and responds to his critics.

This book examines the moral philosophy of Paul Ramsey--one of the 20th century's most influential ethicists--from a theological perspective illustrating that religion can still play a substantial role in our ongoing moral inquiries. Ramsey wrote prodigiously on ethical issues including politics, medical research, the Vietnam war, and nuclear proliferation. His ethical theory, which concentrates on divine love, or agape, ' as well as justice and order, provides a middle ground between fundamentalism and secularism. Therefore, Ramsey's ethics will appeal to the 21st-century social conscience.

McKenzie grounds his theological exploration in a comprehensive history of the theological and philosophical influences on Ramsey's thought, including Jonathan Edwards' theory of natural morality. He also explores a multidisciplinary selection of Ramsey's writings. In conclusion, McKenzie argues that Ramsey's natural law theory will continue to have significant and increasing relevance for morality in the postmodern world. This is the most thorough study of Paul Ramsey's work as well as a significant contribution to philosophy and theology.

While commentators have sometimes taken up the question of Wittgenstein's view of ethics, none has offered a sustained treatment of what positive contributions Wittgenstein has yet to offer contemporary ethics. In this important new book, Jeremy Wisnewski argues that Wittgenstein, though himself often silent on particular ethical matters, gives us immense resources for understanding the aims appropriate to any philosophical ethics. Using Wittgenstein as a point of departure, Wisnewski re-examines some of the landmarks in the history of moral philosophy in order to cast contemporary ethical philosophy in a new light. Of particular interest is the unique approach to Kant's moral philosophy afforded by seeing him through Wittgensteinian eyes: Wisnewski gives distinct and intriguing analyses of the categorical imperative, arguing that our obsession with a certain brand of ethical theory has led us to misread this most famous contribution to moral philosophy. By seeing the doctrines of historical ethical philosophers anew (particularly those of Kant and Mill), Wisnewski shows a new way of engaging in ethical theory - one that is Wittgensteinian through and through. Rather than assuming that ethical inquiry yields knowledge about what we must do, and what rules we must follow, we should regard ethics (including our historical ethical theories) as clarifying what is involved in the complicated 'form of life' that is ours.

This monograph presents a unitary account of Dewey's philosophy of science and demonstrates the relevance for contemporary debates. The book is written from a theoretical angle and explains Dewey's via on Experience, Language, Inquiry, Construction and Realism. Via taking this route the book addresses key philosophical problems - such as the nature of language, the idea of experience, the notion of logical constructivism, the criticism of representationalism and the nature of scientific practices. John Dewey (1859-1952) is one of the most representative philosophers of the United States. He is well known for his work in education, psychology and social reform and one of the primary figures associated with the philosophy of pragmatism. His Philosophy of Science underwent a period of almost total unpopularity and neglect. In recent times, however, as a consequence of the strong pragmatist renaissance we are now witnessing, Dewey's philosophy of science has attracted new attention. This book presents for the first time a comprehensive overview of Dewey's philosophy of science and will be of interest to scholars working in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy of science and on the relationship between Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism.

Feminist philosophy identifies tensions within mainstream theories of knowledge. To create a more egalitarian epistemology, solutions to these problems have been as diverse as the traditions of philosophy out of which feminists continue to emerge. This book considers two equally formidable approaches theorized by Louise Antony and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. The American philosopher W.V.O. Quine locates knowledge as a branch of empirical science. Shuford shows how both Antony and Nelson use Quine's 'naturalized epistemology' to create empirically robust feminist epistemologies. However, Shuford argues that neither can include physical embodiment as an important epistemic variable. The book argues that John Dewey's theory of inquiry extends beyond Quine's insight that knowledge must be interrogated as an empirical matter. Because Dewey insists that all aspects of experience must be subject to the experimental openness that is the hallmark of scientific reasoning, Shuford concludes that physical embodiment must play an important part in knowledge claims.

This book offers an inside look into the notoriously tumultuous, professional relationship of two great minds: Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend. It collects their complete surviving correspondence (1948-1967) and contains previously unpublished papers by both. An introduction situates the correspondence in its historical context by recounting how they first came to meet and an extensive editorial apparatus provides a wealth of background information along with systematic mini-biographies of persons named. Taken together, the collection presents Popper and Feyerabend's controversial ideas against the background of the postwar academic environment. It exposes key aspects of an evolving student-mentor relationship that eventually ended amidst increasing accusations of plagiarism. Throughout, readers will find in-depth discussions on a wide range of intriguing topics, including an ongoing debate over the foundations of quantum theory and Popper's repeated attempts to design an experiment that would test different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The captivating exchange between Feyerabend and Popper offers a valuable resource that will appeal to scientists, laymen, and a wide range of scholars: especially philosophers, historians of science and philosophy and, more generally, intellectual historians.

The arrow of time and the meaning of quantum mechanics are two of the great mysteries of modern physics. This important new book throws fascinating new light on both issues, and connects them in a wholly original way.

Price shows that for over a century physicists have fallen repeatedly into the same trap when trying to understand the arrow of time: treating the past and future in different ways. To overcome this natural tendency, we need to imagine a point outside time - an Archimedean viewpoint as Price calls it - from which to think about the arrow of time in an unbiased way.

Taking this Archimedean viewpoint Price asks why we assume that the past affects the future but not vice-versa, and argues that causation is much more symmetric in microphysics: to a limited extent - the future does affect the past. Thus Price avoids the usual paradoxes of quantum mechanics, without succumbing to the rival paradoxes of causal loops and time travel.

The wide range of disciplines represented here enables the volume to stand as a contextualizing work in Fanon studies. It contains new original essays on Africana philosophy, the human sciences, dialectical humanism, women of color studies, neocolonial and postcolonial studies, violence, and tragedy.

This, the first in-depth and comprehensive book-length study of the Russian neo-Kantian movement in English language, challenges the assumption of the isolation of neo-Kantianism to Germany. The present investigation demonstrates that neo-Kantianism had an international dimension by showing the emergence of a parallel movement in Imperial Russia spanning its emergence in the late 19th century to its gradual dissolution in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. The author presents a systematic portrait of the development of Russian neo-Kantianism starting with its rise as a philosophy of science. However, it was with the stream of young students returning to Imperial Russia after a period of study at German universities that the movement accelerated. More often than not, these enthusiastic, young philosophers returned home imbued with the neo-Kantianism of their respective but divergent host institutions. As a result, clashes were inevitable concerning the proper approach to philosophical issues as well as the very understanding of Kant's philosophy and his legacy for contemporary thought. In the end, the broad promise of a Western-oriented neo-Kantianism could not withstand the pressures it confronted on all sides.

Translation exposes aspects of language that can easily be ignored, renewing the sense of the proximity and inseparability of language and thought. The ancient quarrel between philosophy and literature was an early expression of a self-understanding of philosophy that has, in some quarters at least, survived the centuries. This book explores the idea of translation as a philosophical theme and as an important feature of philosophy and practical life, especially in relation to the work of Stanley Cavell. The essays in this volume explore philosophical questions about translation, especially in the light of the work of Stanley Cavell. They take the questions raised by translation to be of key importance not only for philosophical thinking but for our lives as a whole. Thoreau's enigmatic remark "The truth is translated" reveals that apparently technical matters of translation extend through human lives to remarkable effect, conditioning the ways in which the world comes to light. The experience of the translator exemplifies the challenge of judgement where governing rules and principles are incommensurable; and it shows something of the ways in which words come to us, opening new possibilities of thought. This book puts Cavell's rich exploration of these matters into conversation with traditions of pragmatism and European thought. Translation, then, far from a merely technical matter, is at work in human being, and it is the means of humanisation. The book brings together philosophers and translators with common interests in Cavell and in the questions of language at the heart of his work.

This is a unique and significant new reference work which reflects the shifting intellectual boundaries of British Thought between 1860 and 1920. Often regarded as an aberrant phase in the history of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy, British Idealism provoked a wide range of attacks and replies from all the major figures of the time, such as Sidgwick, Dewey, Broad and of course Russell. Some of the major figures which were associated with the movements were Bosanquet, F.H. Bradley, Edward Caird, Collingwood, T.H. Green, Hobhouse, McTaggart, Muirhead, Ritchie and and Stirling. Earlier idealists such as the Cambridge Platonists, Coleridge, Carlyle and Ferrier amongst others, are also included as are important later contributors such as Oakeshott. Non-British thinkers who made important contributions to the traditions and discussion such as Blanshard, Croce, Dewey, William James, Peirce, Royce and Santayana also have entries. In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of renewed interest and many of the ideas of that tradition are being reintroduced and discussed in philosophy and politics.

Derrida's claim that 'without deconstruction there can be no responsible political thought' is one of his most provocative, and one that even his most vocal admirers have been reluctant to endorse fully. Deconstruction and Democracy evaluates and substantiates Derrida's assertion, assessing the importance of this eminent contemporary philosopher's work for political thought. From the early 1980s onwards, Derrida has addressed political subjects more and more explicitly; here Alex Thomson argues that the time has come for a fresh understanding of deconstruction -- one that acknowledges its relevance for, and potential contribution to, political thinking. The book provides cogent analysis and exegesis of Derrida's often rather abstruse and impenetrable political writings; explores the implications for political theory and practice of Derrida's work; and brings Derrida's work into dialogue with other major strands of contemporary political thought. Deconstruction and Democracy is the clearest and most detailed engagement available with the politics of deconstruction, and is a major contribution to scholarship on the later work of Jacques Derrida, most notably his Politics of Friendship.